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Abstract 
 
The promotion of democracy has become a key objective of the European Union (EU) in sub-Saharan Africa. 
One of the ways in which this objective is pursued is by reacting to violations of democratic principles using 
negative measures: naming and shaming strategies or economic/diplomatic sanctions. Yet the application of 
negative measures has been criticised as being characterised by „double standards‟, meaning that similar 
violations of democratic principles have led to a different response from the EU. This dissertation searches for 
explanations for these double standards. In-depth comparative studies on the motivations for double standards in 
the application of negative measures in sub-Saharan Africa in the post-2000 period have been lacking. While 
double standards have mostly been attributed to the prevalence of self-interested objectives of the EU, this 
dissertation considers two additional factors: (1) a potential conflict in the EU‟s normative objectives 
(democracy, development and stability) and (2) expectations about the effectiveness of negative measures.  
 
These three explanatory factors (norms, self-interest and effectiveness) are investigated for ten case studies in 
sub-Saharan Africa: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Guinea, Côte d‟Ivoire and 
Zimbabwe. It is shown that there have been double standards in the EU‟s reaction to violations of democratic 
principles in these countries: similar violations of democratic principles have led to different reactions from the 
EU (positive measures, low-cost negative measures and sanctions). The motivations for these double standards 
are then investigated by studying the potential impact of norms, self-interest and effectiveness.  
 
On the one hand, previous studies emphasising self-interest are confirmed. Historical interests related to the 
desire of member states to maintain their sphere of influence have in some cases led to double standards (Chad, 
Côte d‟Ivoire, Zimbabwe). Moreover, the growing concern for self-interested security objectives such as the war 
on terror has led to increased tolerance for governments that are seen as crucial allies in fighting these security 
concerns (Ethiopia, Nigeria, Chad), while sanctions were more easily adopted where this was not the case 
(Zimbabwe, Guinea, Côte d‟Ivoire). On the other hand, the study also found evidence that runs counter to the 
importance of self-interest: (1) commercial interests were found to have little explanatory value, (2) some 
countries that can also be considered allies in the security sphere were not shielded from negative measures 
(Kenya), and (3) the EU also avoided negatives measures in countries that were not allies in the pursuit of 
security objectives (Eritrea, Rwanda). Furthermore, the EU‟s other normative objectives (stability, development) 
were found to be equally important. Negative measures were more easily adopted in countries where 
development performance had been weak (Zimbabwe, Guinea, Côte d‟Ivoire, Niger) or where internal stability 
was under threat (Kenya, Côte d‟Ivoire, Niger). In contrast, negative measures were avoided in the case of 
„development success stories‟ (Rwanda, Ethiopia). Lastly, the study revealed that expectations about 
effectiveness were equally taken into account by the EU. Sanctions were more often adopted in case of a 
coordinated action with the main other actors, and when the domestic position of the government was already 
weakened. Furthermore, sanctions were avoided where the EU was found to have no leverage (Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Rwanda, Ethiopia).  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Introducing the research topic and question 
 
„Why was the Commission so welcoming of President Issaias of Eritrea when 
President Mugabe, who is also involved in a repressive regime like that of 
President Issaias, is banned from the EU? Does the Commission feel that 
consequently it is practising double standards?‟ (European Parliament 2007a). 
 
This question posed by Member of European Parliament (MEP) Sajjad Karim at the occasion of the 
invitation of Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki to the European Commission clearly illustrates the 
research puzzle on which this dissertation is based. The MEP is right to point out that Eritrea, a one-
party state with the worst press freedom record in the world, is not more democratic than Zimbabwe. 
Yet Mugabe is subject to a travel ban, while Afewerki is not. If double standards refer to „a set of 
principles that applies differently and usually more rigorously to one group of people or circumstances 
than to another‟, as defined in Merriam-Webster‟s dictionary, then the MEP‟s claim that double 
standards are applied to the leaders of Eritrea and Zimbabwe is correct.  
 
Democratic principles have become a key aspect of European Union (EU) relations with sub-Saharan 
Africa and a condition for receiving aid. The EU now has the instruments to publicly condemn 
violations of democratic principles, address these issues with the government in regular dialogue, 
support democratic actors and institutions, or impose negative measures including travel bans, 
weapons embargoes or the suspension of development assistance. However, the EU has often faced 
accusations of double standards in the application of these instruments. To start with, the mere focus 
of political conditionality on economically weak and politically unimportant sub-Saharan African 
countries already points to such double standards (Fierro 2003: 309). According to Bartels: „It is 
telling [...] that the EU has consistently failed to make public mention of human rights clauses in 
agreements with the Mediterranean or Central Asian countries, many of which have far from perfect 
human rights records‟ (Bartels 2005: 39). Similarly, Brummer argues that, although sanctions were 
mostly imposed against countries with severe violations of democratic principles, „several other 
countries that appear equally problematic [did] not face sanctions‟ (Brummer 2009: 197).  
 
The true challenge is then to find out what causes these double standards. The above-mentioned 
studies already indicate that poor, economically weak, strategically unimportant countries, often in 
sub-Saharan Africa, are more often subject to negative measures than important commercial or 
strategic partners. This argument seems supported by Human Rights Watch researcher Carina 
24 
 
Tertsakian, who criticised Nigeria‟s hosting of the Commonwealth summit in 2003, while Mugabe 
was not invited:  
 
„So what‟s the difference between Nigeria and Zimbabwe? The former produces 
large amounts of oil and, with more than 50 million Muslims, counts as a 
valuable ally in the “war against terrorism”‟ (Tertsakian 2003) 
 
However, the example of Eritrea, an extremely poor country, with an isolated government that is under 
United Nations (UN) sanctions for supporting the Al-Shabaab, shows that this explanation is probably 
too simplistic. As I will argue, profound, up-to-date comparative research on this question has been 
lacking. The question of double standards therefore poses a puzzle, which this dissertation will 
address.  
 
1.1.1. Research question  
The main research question is thus the following:  
Which factors can explain double standards in the EU’s reactions to violations of democratic 
principles in sub-Saharan Africa?  
 
The research question immediately requires further specification and definition. First of all, which 
„reactions‟ to violations of democratic principles are we talking about? The most commonly used 
distinction in instruments of democracy promotion is that between positive measures (often referred to 
as carrots), and negative measures (often referred to as sticks). Positive measures include „normative 
suasion‟ to persuade or convince countries to undertake democratic reform (Warkotsch 2008a; 
Warkotsch 2009) and capacity-building strategies, where the EU „assists‟ democracy by providing 
financial aid to either civil society organisations or to state-driven democratic reform (Burnell 2000: 9; 
Santiso 2001: 159). Negative measures may range from simple „naming and shaming‟ strategies 
including public declarations, demarches, common positions and Council conclusions (Smith 2001: 
191; Warkotsch 2009: 254) to negative conditionality where certain benefits (aid, trade, diplomatic 
visits) are suspended as a punishment for violations of democratic principles (Fierro 2003: 100-101; 
Smith 1998: 256). Negative measures also include diplomatic sanctions and arms embargoes (Kreutz 
2005: 6). In this dissertation, the term „negative measures‟ includes all the aforementioned 
instruments. Negative measures that go beyond naming and shaming strategies, including 
development aid suspensions, arms embargoes, diplomatic sanctions or any form of economic 
sanctions, will be referred to as „sanctions‟.  
 
Secondly, I should establish what I mean by „democratic principles‟. It is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to make a critical analysis of the model of democracy pursued by the EU in its relations 
25 
 
with sub-Saharan Africa.
1
 Since I am mainly interested in the reasons for double standards rather than 
in the effectiveness of EU democracy promotion, I will examine the EU‟s reaction to violations of two 
key principles of liberal democracy: electoral democracy and civil-political rights. There is a 
consensus that liberal democracy is the democratic model that the EU pursues in third countries 
(Kotzian et al. 2011: 995; Wetzel and Orbie 2011; Burnell 2011: 58). Diamond provides a workable 
definition of liberal democracy. According to this definition, liberal democracy first and foremost 
presupposes electoral democracy: „a civilian, constitutional system in which the legislative and chief 
executive offices are filled through regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage‟ 
(Diamond 1999: 10). Liberal democracy further requires the absence of reserved domains of power for 
the military or other actors not accountable to the electorate, horizontal accountability of officeholders 
to one another and extensive provisions for pluralism and individual and group freedoms, secured 
through the rule of law (Ibid.: 10-11). In its own official documents on EU relations with the group of 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, the EU mentions the following democratic principles: 
legitimacy (free and fair elections), legality (the existence of clear-cut rules as guaranteed by an 
appropriate constitutional, legislative and regulatory system) and effective application (horizontal 
accountability, respect for the rule of law by state institutions) (European Commission 1998: 5-9). 
This definition largely concurs with Diamond‟s definition of liberal democracy.  
 
Although the above-mentioned definitions suggest that other aspects of liberal democracy are equally 
pursued by the EU, it can be assumed that the EU‟s negative measures will be used mainly as a 
reaction to violations of (1) electoral democracy and (2) civil-political rights. First of all, these two 
features are the key elements of liberal democracy, with the adjective „liberal‟ referring to the respect 
for civil-political rights, while electoral democracy is mainly embedded in the noun „democracy‟ 
(Donnelly 1999). Moreover, it has been argued that political conditionality is mainly applied to induce 
governments of developing countries to hold elections (Van Cranenburgh 2000: 21; Tomasevski 1997: 
163-165; Diamond 1999: 56). Furthermore, donors typically focus on „first generation‟ human rights 
(civil-political rights such as the freedom of press, freedom of association, etc.) rather than second 
generation rights (economic, social and cultural) rights (Neumayer 2003a: 652). This is no different 
for the EU. It has been noticed that negative conditionality has mostly been applied as a response to 
sudden deteriorations of the electoral process, including flawed elections or a coup d’état (Laakso et 
al. 2007a: 16; Portela 2010: 142-143). 
 
Lastly, I should make clear that the dissertation is limited to sub-Saharan African countries. However, 
throughout the dissertation I sometimes refer to „Africa‟, or „EU-African‟ relations. Although this is 
not entirely correct when mentioning those aspects of EU-Africa relations that are only applicable to 
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 For this discussion, see, for example, Lumumba-Kasongo (2005). 
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sub-Saharan Africa (as part of the African, Caribbean and Pacific or ACP group), the reason for this is 
purely to improve fluidity in the text.  
 
1.1.2. EU democracy promotion in sub-Saharan Africa  
In order to better understand the research question, a short background to EU democracy promotion in 
sub-Saharan Africa is necessary. It is important to mention the context in which democracy emerged 
as an aspect of EU relations with sub-Saharan Africa, and how this context has changed over the years. 
At the same time, the overview will introduce the main instruments at the EU‟s disposal to react to 
violations of democratic principles.  
 
The question of how to react to violations of democratic principles in partner countries was already 
raised in the 1970s, in the context of the severe human rights violations by the Idi Amin regime in 
Uganda. The European Economic Community (EEC) partially suspended aid to Uganda, and aid 
programmes were limited to those that directly benefited the population. However, at that time, there 
was considerable reluctance from the ACP countries to accept references to democratic principles in 
the association agreements with the EU. The inclusion of civil-political rights was particularly 
sensitive as it was argued that the Lomé Agreement was an economic agreement. Moreover, there was 
a fear that the inclusion of human rights could lead to unilateral action and selective and 
discriminating measures by the Community. As a result, the Lomé III Agreement (1985-1990) did not 
mention democratic principles, but was limited to economic and social rights, anti-discrimination and 
human dignity (Arts 2000: 168-181).  
 
Nonetheless, by the time of the signature of the Lomé-IV Agreement (1989), references to democratic 
principles had become more acceptable, while the pressure for such references had mounted. Human 
rights had become part and parcel of international, European and even African law. In this respect, the 
African Charter on Human and People‟s Rights (1986) should be mentioned. On the European side, 
the activism of the European Parliament (EP) on human rights issues is notable, which led to the 
adoption of a Council statement on human rights (1986), as well as an Annual Report on human rights. 
At the same time, ACP countries found themselves in a much weaker position compared to the 1970s. 
The economic crisis and related debt crisis had made them more dependent on foreign aid and loans, 
while the Soviet Union had become reluctant to support African countries (Fierro 2003: 67). It is in 
this context that the human rights clause in Lomé IV (1990-1995) was adopted. This clause, to be 
found in Article 5 of the Agreement, clearly stated that „development policy and cooperation shall be 
closely linked to respect for and enjoyment of fundamental human rights‟. In contrast to the previous 
Lomé agreements, there was now a clear reference to all human rights (civil, political, economic, 
social, cultural), although there was no specific reference to democratic principles. Nonetheless, the 
article did not specify what should be done in case human rights were violated. It only mentioned that 
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financial resources could be allocated to the promotion of human rights (Crawford 2000: 95). On some 
occasions, however, the Community suspended aid on a purely unilateral basis, namely in Gambia, 
Equatorial Guinea, Kenya and Malawi (Smith 1998: 264-267).  
 
The end of the Cold War further speeded up the adoption of political conditionality in the EEC‟s 
agreements with ACP countries. First of all, ACP countries, after losing their economic negotiating 
power, now also lost their strategic importance. During the Cold War, many sub-Saharan African 
countries were seen as clients Western countries should keep close, regardless of the democratic 
character of their governments (Dunning 2004: 410-411; Stokke 1996: 20; Kraxberger 2005: 51-52). 
Secondly, the end of the Cold War also entailed a reorientation towards the Central and East European 
Countries, which received increased economic aid with a view to incorporate them into the 
Community. In this enlargement process, political conditionality was applied, since new members had 
to comply with political criteria, including the rule of law, respect for human rights, a multi-party 
system and free and fair elections (De Ridder et al. 2008: 244-247). Thirdly, the collapse of 
communism as an alternative model to liberal democracy also rendered Western countries more 
powerful vis-à-vis African states, as it was believed that there was no alternative to the Western model 
(Abrahamsen 2000: 3 and 34). Fourthly, the political competencies of the EEC widened with the 
Maastricht Treaty, which introduced a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). One of the 
objectives of the CFSP was „to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms‟ (Smith 1998: 261-263). CFSP instruments have been 
frequently used to promote democratic principles, including diplomatic declarations, demarches, 
political dialogue, diplomatic sanctions and arms embargoes (Smith 2008: 115-116).  
 
In this context, the Council issued a Resolution on human rights, democracy and development (1991), 
in which member states expressed their preference for a positive approach, based on an open and 
constructive dialogue with partner countries and financial assistance in support of democratisation. 
However, it was added that, „in the event of grave and persistent human rights violations or the serious 
interruption of the democratic processes, the Community and its Member States will consider 
appropriate responses in the light of the circumstances‟. These appropriate responses could range from 
confidential demarches to the suspension of cooperation. In the subsequent Lomé-IV-bis Convention 
(1995), conditionality was introduced „in its purest form‟ (Hilpold 2002: 63). Contrary to the human 
rights clause in Article 5 of Lomé-IV, the new clause was a true „conditionality clause‟, as it 
introduced human rights, democracy and the rule of law as „essential elements‟ of the agreement and 
foresaw a procedure in case of violation of these essential elements. This procedure, which was 
outlined in Article 366(a) of the agreement, stated that consultations could be called in case one of the 
Parties had violated one or several of the essential elements. Appropriate measures could be taken if 
no solution was found during consultations. As to these measures, it was emphasised that „suspension 
should be a measure of last resort‟. While conditionality was thus established, there was equally an 
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evolution in the positive measures at the EU‟s disposal. As a reaction to an EP request, the European 
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) was introduced in 1994 as a budget line to 
finance democracy promotion activities (Santiso 2002: 11).  
 
The Cotonou Agreement (2000-2020) further strengthened the political dimension of the Partnership 
between the European Community (EC) and the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
(henceforth ACP-EC Partnership). Article 8 introduced a political dialogue with the objective to 
„exchange information, to foster mutual understanding, and to facilitate the establishment of priorities 
and shared agendas‟. Democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance were 
explicitly mentioned as topics of the dialogue. At the same time, Cotonou broadened the application of 
conditionality to include „good governance‟. The EU had meant to incorporate good governance as an 
essential element of the Cotonou Agreement, but this was opposed by the ACP group (Holland 2002: 
202-203). A compromise was to introduce good governance as a „fundamental element‟, meaning that 
„only serious cases of corruption, including acts of bribery [...] constitute a violation of that element‟ 
(Article 9).  
 
Nonetheless, after the signature of the Cotonou Agreement, the EU became less prone to use negative 
conditionality. A consensus emerged in the late 1990s that conditionality does not work without the 
commitment of partner countries. This was also the case for the EU‟s conditionality clause, which 
often failed because of a lack of commitment from recipient countries (Hazelzet 2005; Mbangu 2005). 
Indeed, Laakso and others noted a „sanctions fatigue‟ after the invocation of Article 96 against 
Zimbabwe in 2002 (Laakso et al. 2007a: 53). This sanctions fatigue concurred with a number of 
studies that argued that aid could only have a positive effect on economic growth when interacting 
with good economic policies, leading donors to adopt „aid selectivity‟ by focusing on the better 
performers (Addison and McGillivray 2004: 349; World Bank 1998). Apart from learning effects, the 
change in Commissioners also played a role. Whereas Commissioner Nielson was still somewhat 
„enthusiastic‟ about political conditionality, Commissioner Michel was strongly in favour of positive 
measures (anonymous interviews, February-March 2008).  
 
Apart from these new ideas on conditionality, the EU‟s leverage in sub-Saharan Africa has also 
diminished, as it is increasingly pushed away by other actors. Firstly, there is the growing presence of 
the United States (US), which has focused on African oil to diminish dependence from the Middle 
East and has stepped up military cooperation in the war on terror (Volman 2003). Secondly, newly 
emerging countries, including the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and Arab countries, 
developed an interest in the primary commodities needed for their growing economies. These actors 
publicly oppose interference in the internal affairs of their economic partners (Wissenbach 2009). 
Furthermore, there are signs that the heydays of democracy are increasingly belonging to the past. 
Indeed, the economic success of non-democratic countries (China, Russia) casts doubt on the link 
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between democracy and development. On some occasions, these actors have engaged in „autocracy 
promotion‟, meaning the deliberate or unintended diffusion of undemocratic norms (Burnell 2011: 
254). The financial-economic crisis that has affected European and American economies since 2008 
will undoubtedly further add to the diminishing influence of „the West‟.  
 
In this context, from 2005 onwards, political conditionality has become less important in EU discourse 
and policy practice. The 2005 revision of the Cotonou Agreement reinforced political dialogue as a 
preventive mechanism to discuss violations of democratic principles. Hence, before applying the 
Article 96 mechanism, a reinforced and formalised Article 8 dialogue should be held to „exhaust all 
options prior to consultations under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement‟. Moreover, whereas the 
original provisions foresaw a maximum duration of 30 days, the maximum terms for consultations 
were extended to 60 days (Mackie 2008: 147-148). In 2006, the European Commission announced a 
new incentive mechanism to promote democratic governance
2
 in ACP countries. The EU‟s approach 
was different from the aid selectivity applied by most donors, as the EU rewarded countries committed 
to democratic governance, rather than focusing aid allocation on the better performers. With the 
Governance Incentive Tranche, €1.2 billion of the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) was thus 
set aside to top up the country envelope with 10-35 percent extra aid, depending on the quality of the 
Governance Action Plan drawn up by the country and the participation in African initiatives on 
democratic governance (Carbone 2010; Molenaers and Nijs 2009; Molenaers and Nijs 2011).  
 
This is not to say that negative measures have become irrelevant, nor that political conditionality is 
completely abandoned. The most recent revision of the Cotonou Agreement (2010) has not changed 
the provisions regarding political conditionality, although in practice the application of Article 96 has 
mostly been limited to cases of coups d’état. However, other forms of negative conditionality have 
emerged, namely the suspension of general budget support. The provision of budget support in non-
democratic countries has sparked a debate in the EU. The EP has been particularly critical about 
disbursing budget support on politically sensitive moments, such as in the context of the post-electoral 
crisis in Kenya (2007). As a result, there have been several unilateral decisions to suspend budget 
support for political reasons, namely in Ethiopia (2005), Honduras (2009), Nicaragua (2008) and 
Niger (2009) (Hayman 2011a).
3
 This discussion has further been nurtured by the changing 
international context. Indeed, the Arab spring has increased awareness of the sensitivity of budget 
support in an authoritarian context. At the same time, austerity measures due to the financial-economic 
                                                     
2 „Democratic governance‟ was used to refer to a wide range of policies deemed positive for a country‟s 
economic and political development. This included democratic principles but also public finance management, 
sound economic policies, etc. (see Chapter 3).  
3 These are the only examples I could find of EU budget support being suspended on the basis of purely political 
criteria. In sub-Saharan Africa, there have been similar incidents in Zambia and Mozambique, where the EU 
used budget support as a leverage to raise political issues (Molenaers et al. 2010). In Uganda, political dialogue 
was started after the harassment of political opponents in the run-up to the 2005 elections, but eventually aid was 
not suspended.  
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crisis have made European donors more wary of the destination of aid funds. In this context, the 
European Commission and Council of the EU have recently agreed to make general budget support 
conditional on democracy and good governance by concluding „Good Governance and Development 
Contracts‟ with countries receiving general budget support (European Commission 2011a; Council of 
the EU 2012a). These examples show that the question „to suspend or not to suspend‟ is still on the 
table, even in the current context.  
 
1.1.3. Liberal democracy in sub-Saharan Africa 
Promoting liberal democracy in sub-Saharan Africa is certainly a challenge. On the one hand, since the 
second half of the 1990s, multi-party systems have become the norm on the subcontinent. By 1998, 
only seven sub-Saharan African countries had not yet experienced multi-party elections (van de Walle 
2001: 13). On the other hand, most sub-Saharan African democracies are „hybrid regimes‟, combining 
elements of liberal democracy and authoritarianism (Diamond 2002: 23-24). While elections are held 
in most sub-Saharan African countries, these are often organised in a way clearly favouring the ruling 
party and accompanied by restrictions on the freedom of opposition, association and press freedom. 
Most sub-Saharan African regimes fall within what Diamond described as „competitive electoral 
authoritarian‟ regimes (van de Walle 2002: 68-69). This means that elections are organised and some 
competition between parties is allowed, while the liberties, respect for human rights and independent 
democratic institutions to allow for genuinely competitive elections are lacking (Diamond 2002: 29-
33). This can be related to political conditionality: there is just enough democratisation to keep the aid 
tap running, but not enough to risk losing power (Levitsky and Way 2005: 30; Brown 2005: 184). As a 
result, there are few cases where elections lead to an ousting of the incumbent (van de Walle 2001: 
16). Posner and Young (2007: 131) calculated that incumbents lost only 14 out of 100 elections in sub-
Saharan Africa.  
 
As military coups have become unacceptable with the third wave of democratisation, new ways of 
holding on to power have emerged, involving constitutional procedures rather than suspending the 
constitution. Especially in countries where the ruling party has more than two thirds of the seats in 
parliament, the constitution has often been changed to allow the President to run for a third term 
(Posner and Young 2007: 127 and 134). Constitutional amendments may also prevent opponents from 
taking part in presidential elections on the basis of nationality requirements, such as in Côte d‟Ivoire 
and Zambia (Mulikita 2003: 108). In other cases, such as Gabon and Togo, African Presidents – after 
turning themselves into Presidents for life – ensured the transfer of power to their sons after their death 
(Mengara 2010: 57).   
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1.1.4. Delimitation of the research  
This dissertation focuses on EU policies, while taking into account member states‟ policies and 
positions when there is reason to believe that these may influence EU policies, for example the former 
colonial power, key trade, development, diplomatic or military partners. The positions of the member 
states should be mentioned because most negative measures are the responsibility of the Council of the 
EU. Although most of the events described in this dissertation have taken place before the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, which abolished the pillar structure, I prefer not to distinguish between 
European Community policies and European Union policies to avoid complication. While many of the 
policies described here are part of development cooperation and thus in principle an EC responsibility 
in the pre-Lisbon era, in this dissertation I will nevertheless refer to these as „EU‟ policies.  
 
The dissertation will take into account the position of other international actors where relevant, as the 
EU could take this into consideration in its decision on how to react to violations of democratic 
principles (see Chapter 5). However, the reasons for the positions of other international actors do not 
form the object of this study. The specific focus on the EU has a number of advantages and 
disadvantages. A first advantage is that it allowed a thorough review of the academic literature on EU 
development and Africa policies as well as primary documents, news articles and interviews with EU 
officials in Brussels. This provided further insight into the potential reasons for double standards in 
EU reactions to violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa. Secondly, by focusing on 
the EU, I was able to investigate a relatively large number of case studies on a systematic basis and 
into substantial detail. Thirdly, there are reasons to believe that the EU is different from other donors. 
To begin with, colonial history cannot be ignored in EU-African relations. Because of colonial history, 
Africa is often seen as the backyard of Europe, while the US‟s sphere of influence rather lies in Latin 
America. As noted by Taylor: „In terms of sheer power projection, despite all the brouhaha about 
China‟s sudden rise in Africa, the EU (or individual constituent members) remains the key influence in 
virtually all countries in Africa‟ (Taylor 2011: 195). The EU remains the largest trade partner of most 
African countries and the most important donor (EU and member states combined) (Taylor 2010: 98; 
Mangala 2010a: 168). Even when only multilateral EU aid is taken into account, the EU was the 
second largest donor in 2010, after the US.
4
 In contrast to the US and the member states, the EU has 
development cooperation offices (and now diplomatic delegations) in all sub-Saharan African 
countries, rather than focusing on specific partner countries. In addition, EU-Africa relations can be 
expected to be more „developmental‟ when compared to the US. In the field of development aid, the 
EU tries to appear as a „leading and benevolent identity‟ towards developing countries, by showing 
great willingness and engagement to reach internationally agreed development targets (Orbie 2003; 
Orbie and Versluys 2008). In contrast, US development policies are less in line with new trends in 
international development cooperation such as the respect for country ownership (Whitfield and Fraser 
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 See: EU donor atlas 2010: http://fs2-2010.bbj.it/EUDA_05_NEW.aspx (last accessed 22 May 2012).  
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2009: 2). When focusing on „hard‟ policy areas, including security and energy, the EU often focuses 
on the link with development, by strengthening human security, multilateralism, or the development 
impact of energy (Martin 2007; Youngs 2009c). In contrast, the US is more keen on enhancing its 
direct security interests (e.g. the war on terror), as well as its energy supplies (Hentz 2004; Van de 
Walle 2009; Taylor 2010: 24-34). This image of the EU as a benevolent foreign policy actor is also 
reflected in the debate on the role of the EU in world politics, which depicts the EU as a different 
policy actor, variously termed „normative‟ (Manners 2002), „ethical‟ (Aggestam 2008), „responsible‟ 
(Mayer and Vogt 2006) and many more.  
 
The main disadvantage of focusing on the EU is that generalisation to other actors is difficult. Hence, 
the dissertation is in the first place a contribution to the literature on EU foreign affairs, democracy 
promotion and development policies rather than to the more general literature on democracy 
promotion and political conditionality. However, several conclusions are also relevant for other 
donors. For example, all donors of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) have signed the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, hence it can be assumed that this has 
an effect on their approach to negative measures in aid receiving countries, albeit to different degrees. 
Further remarks on generalisation to other donors are made in the general conclusions.  
 
The dissertation focuses on the period from 2000 until mid-2011. This timeframe mainly applies to the 
EU‟s reaction to violations of democratic principles and less to the explanations or the democratic 
record of the cases. Indeed, when information was found preceding or following the period under 
review that was relevant to answer the hypotheses, this will also be mentioned. Regarding the 
democratic record of the cases, the period preceding the 2000s is often mentioned to give an idea of 
when multi-party democracy was introduced or how long the ruling party had been in power.  
 
There are several reasons for this specific timeframe. As will be discussed below, studies on political 
conditionality have mostly focused on the first applications of conditionality in the second half of the 
1990s and – in some cases – first half of the 2000s. However, as I have argued, in more recent years, 
conditionality has moved to the background. Moreover, the explanations for double standards in the 
reactions to violations of democratic principles may also be different in this period, when compared to 
the 1990s. First, after 9/11 security issues moved to the forefront of EU foreign policy, which is 
reflected in the adoption of the first European Security Strategy in 2003. Second, since the mid-1990s 
the EU has developed its instruments and capacity for conflict prevention and peacekeeping, which 
has become a key aspect of EU-Africa policies. Third, since the 2000s, the EU has increasingly 
focused on its immediate neighbourhood, where economic and security concerns are most dominant. 
Fourth, it can be assumed that the expansion of the EU‟s diplomatic and economic relations with third 
countries makes the need to maintain close relations with its former colonies less important. Fifth, the 
EU‟s influence on the African continent is declining due to the growing scramble for African 
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resources and the emergence of new economic and political powers, as well as the increased US 
interest in Africa. Sixth, the international development agenda has significantly changed with the 
adoption of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness in 2005. Last, since the 2000s there has been a 
substantial evolution in regional integration in Africa. Especially the African Union (AU) and the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are playing an increasingly political role, 
including on democratisation.  
 
1.2. Status quaestionis 
After introducing the research topic and question, the academic literature relevant for the research 
question will be reviewed here. I start by outlining the main theoretical debate informing my research, 
namely that of norms versus self-interest in EU foreign policy. In reviewing the empirical literature 
that addresses the research question, I will argue that self-interested explanations are dominant, while 
expectations about effectiveness are also sometimes mentioned. The third part then argues that these 
conclusions cannot be simply applied to EU democracy promotion in sub-Saharan Africa. The existing 
literature mentioning potential explanations for double standards in EU reactions to violations of 
democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa is then considered, and the main shortcomings are 
highlighted.  
 
1.2.1. The debate on EU foreign policy  
The EU is often depicted as a „special‟ foreign policy actor. This distinctiveness has been described in 
various role conceptions. The most well-known and highly debated is that of „Normative Power 
Europe‟. With the idea of Normative Power Europe, Manners argues that the EU‟s international 
identity or role relies mainly on its ideational impact, or its „ability to shape conceptions of “normal” 
in international relations‟ (Manners 2002: 239). The EU‟s normative basis consists of three core norms 
(peace; liberty; democracy, the rule of law and human rights) and four minor norms (social solidarity, 
anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance). These norms are diffused in a 
normative manner, namely through contagion (unintentional diffusion of ideas), informational 
diffusion (strategic and declaratory communications), procedural diffusion (institutionalisation of a 
relationship), transference (exchange of goods, trade, aid, technical assistance), overt diffusion 
(physical presence of the EU in third states and international organisations) and the cultural filter 
(impact of international norms and political learning in third states and organisations). As an example, 
Manners illustrates the EU‟s position on the abolition of the death penalty, where the EU held on to its 
strong adherence to human rights, despite the absence of obvious material gain from its interventions 
and in the face of strong international opposition. Notwithstanding the growing concern for national 
security after 9/11, Manners argues that this does not necessarily put in question the EU‟s normative 
power, as long as the EU takes a fundamentally different approach to the war on terror by addressing 
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human security and focusing on the root causes of conflict (Manners 2006: 414-415). In this sense, the 
EU would, rather than defend the nation-state, focus on peace, democracy and human rights. Manners‟ 
ideas led to an enormous flow of reactions. One important contribution was the proposal to shift focus 
from what the EU „is‟ to what it „does‟. Hence, the notion of „Ethical Power Europe‟ refers to the self-
image of the EU as an ethical power „doing good‟ in the world (Aggestam 2008: 2). Taking up this 
suggestion, in a more recent contribution Manners focuses on the „normative ethics‟ of the EU. On the 
basis of the above-mentioned core and minor norms, he formulated nine substantive normative 
principles of the EU.
5
  
 
Some authors have been virulently opposed to the conception of Normative Power Europe. The most 
well-known reaction came from Hyde-Price (2006; 2008), who argues that neorealism is a better 
theoretical approach to explain EU policies. He takes as an example the European Security and 
Defence Policy (EDSP), which is and will remain in the hands of Europe‟s great powers. Youngs 
(2004a) makes the case that normative dynamics and strategic interests cannot be easily separated. 
Indeed, the EU often uses human rights policies to pursue its self-interest, for example by using human 
rights conditionality when human rights abuses lead to serious instability. Lerch and Schwellnus 
(2006) point to the fact that the parallel existence of supranational external relations with an 
intergovernmental foreign and security policy and national foreign policies make EU policies 
incoherent. Moreover, the EU may also resort to „rhetorical action‟: the instrumental use of arguments 
to persuade others of its selfish claims.  
 
The debate about the EU in foreign policy reflects a more general debate in international relations 
theory on the motivations of the foreign policy behaviour of states and international organisations. 
These motivations are mostly divided in two main categories: norms and self-interest. The importance 
of self-interest is defended by proponents of rationalist approaches to international relations, which 
assume that states pursue their self-interest according to a logic of consequences. Foreign policy 
behaviour can thus be explained by (1) the expectations actors have of the consequences of their 
actions and (2) their self-interest (preferences) and resources (March and Olsen 1998: 950). The most 
widely recognised example of such an approach is realism, which believes that politics function along 
a conception of human nature that is basically self-centred, self-regarding and self-interested (Jackson 
and Sørensen 2010: 69). States thus perceive their self-interest, which is conceived in terms of power. 
States cannot be led by moral concerns as political leaders are responsible for the security and welfare 
of their citizens. As a result, states will subordinate moral concerns to power politics (Morgenthau 
1985: 5-14). Applied to EU foreign policy, such an approach would predict that EU decisions are 
always the outcome of the national interests of the member states: „The EU is not a sovereign actor in 
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 i.e. Sustainable peace, social freedom, consensual democracy, associative human rights, supranational rule of 
law, inclusive equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance.  
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its own right, but acts as a vehicle for the collective interests of its member states‟ (Hyde-Price 2006: 
220). Hence, larger member states will use the EU to maximise their interests, for example by making 
the EU balance against the dominant global power. Moral concerns are only second-order concerns 
that are subordinated to national security. As long as these do not conflict with their core national 
interests, member states will use the EU as an institutional repository for their moral concerns (Ibid.: 
222-223). In the case of the EU‟s Africa policy, former colonial powers may use the EU to defend 
their sphere of influence, especially when threatened by other international actors (Gegout 2009).   
 
In contrast, states may also act according to the logic of appropriateness. This means that state 
behaviour is based on identities rather than self-interest, and on rules rather than individual rational 
expectations. Appropriateness may be cognitive, referring to a particular conception of the self, or 
based on ethical considerations, referring to behaviour that is considered as virtuous (March and Olsen 
1998: 951). This approach fits within social constructivist understandings of international relations. 
Rather than focusing on material forces, social constructivism believes the international system is 
constituted by ideas, which may range from ideologies or shared belief systems to normative beliefs 
about right and wrong, beliefs about cause-effect or policy prescriptions on problem-solving (Jackson 
and Sørensen 2010: 165). Social constructivists do not deny the importance of interests, yet they 
challenge the fact that these interests have a material rather than social basis. Hence, while realists see 
interests as constituted by the distribution and composition of material capabilities, geography and 
natural resources, social-constructivists believe that interests are primarily based on ideas. In this view, 
power and interest have the effects they do „in virtue of the ideas that make them up‟ (Wendt 1999: 
135). Finnemore (1996) argues that states are socialised to accept new norms, values and perceptions 
of interest by international organisations. She takes the example of the consensus that has arisen 
around the notion of poverty reduction. There was little political benefit for states to suddenly focus on 
poverty reduction, but the World Bank managed to make the idea widely accepted (Finnemore 1996: 
89-127). Applied to EU-Africa relations, this would mean that the EU perceives poverty reduction as a 
norm it should pursue because it is socialised to do so by the World Bank. 
  
1.2.2. Self-interest and effectiveness 
The literature on political conditionality seems to agree with rationalist approaches to foreign policy. 
The general assumption is that democracy is not on top of donor priorities, and donors will therefore 
abstain from adopting negative measures when their economic or security interests are at stake. 
Analysing the implementation of political conditionality by the EU, the US, Sweden and the UK, 
Crawford found that these donors imposed weaker or no negative measures against commercially 
important countries such as China, Nigeria, Indonesia and Sri Lanka and/or against geo-strategic 
partners such as Turkey, Indonesia, Algeria and Egypt (Crawford 2001: 211-227). Tomasevski 
attributed the fact that France – unlike other donors – did not suspend aid after flawed elections in 
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Cameroon (1992) to French fears that an Anglophone head of government would be elected 
(Tomasevski 2000: 186). A study on human rights promotion by the like-minded donors concludes 
that even these donors – which are often assumed to have a higher profile on human rights issues – 
will only sustain an assertive human rights policy when costs are believed to be low in terms of other 
foreign policy objectives. For example, the Netherlands was much more fierce in its approach to 
Suriname than towards Indonesia. Comparing Dutch and Canadian human rights policies in the 
Philippines, the Netherlands was more assertive because there were less commercial interests at stake. 
In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, Canada and Norway adopted a coherent and moderately assertive 
human rights policy because the costs to other vital national interests were low (Gillies 1996).   
 
When looking at the targets of EU sanctions, a similar picture emerges. Analysing autonomous CFSP 
sanctions,
6
 Brummer comes to the conclusion that „the EU‟s sanctions policy by and large corresponds 
with neo-realist predictions. When security and welfare interests are at stake, the EU refrains from 
adopting sanctions. Conversely, sanctions are only imposed when they entail little cost for the Member 
States‟ (Brummer 2009: 193). Portela (2005) argues that autonomous EU sanctions in sub-Saharan 
Africa and South-East Asia are mostly informed by considerations of human rights and democracy, 
while in the neighbourhood, these sanctions are more directly related to security objectives. Again, the 
main reason advanced for this regional bias is the EU‟s concern for stability of its immediate eastern 
neighbourhood.  
 
Research on EU democratisation policies in Central Asia found that the EU has hardly pushed through 
its declared objective of democratisation out of fear to damage special relations with Russia, to lose 
allies in the war on terror and to endanger energy supplies. Moreover, there is the risk that 
democratisation may lead to instability, which could possibly create a breeding ground for Islamic 
fundamentalism (Warkotsch 2006; Crawford 2008; Hoffmann 2010). Equally, the EU‟s reluctance to 
use negative measures against Russia has been attributed to the concern of some member states for 
energy supplies (Fischer 2007). Similar arguments are made by those who study EU democracy 
promotion in the Mediterranean region. According to these studies, the EU has been more interested in 
stabilising than in democratising Southern Mediterranean countries, as ousting the regimes in place 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s would put energy supplies at risk, cause massive migration to 
the EU and endanger cooperation in the war on terror (Jünemann 2004: 7; Gillespie and Whitehead 
2002: 196; Balfour 2005: 126; Youngs 2009a: 911-912). In some cases, „authoritarian stability‟ has 
been preferred over a difficult democratisation process that might prepare the ground for Islamist 
movements. Moreover, when moderately Islamist political parties were excluded from the political 
process, such as in Morocco, this has been tacitly accepted by the EU (Echagüe and Youngs 2007: 
                                                     
6
 Autonomous sanctions are sanctions that are not a mere implementation at EU level from sanctions taken by 
the UN Security Council.  
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326-329; Youngs 2009a: 911-912, Kausch 2008: 13). The EU has also been concerned with illegal 
migration, especially in these countries bordering the EU. Destabilisation of neighbouring countries 
might cause massive migration flows into the EU. Moreover, the EU needs the cooperation of certain 
non-democratic governments to prevent illegal migration, such as Morocco (Youngs 2009a: 911). This 
approach is believed to have contributed to the stalemate in which Arab populations have lived for 
years, leading to the Arab revolutions in early 2011 (Scarpetta and Swidlicki 2011). Furthermore, 
research on EU democracy promotion in South East Asia finds that the fear of risking commercial 
relations with important trade partners causes double standards. Algieri attributed the EU‟s reluctance 
to take strong sanctions towards China to the member states‟ „perspectives of securing shares on the 
Chinese market‟ (Algieri 2007: 178). He compares the Chinese case to that of Myanmar, where the 
EU has imposed negative measures, but which is not an important commercial partner.  
 
To be fair, attempts have also been made to go beyond the norms versus self-interest dichotomy and 
take other factors into account. Indeed, some studies point to the mere consideration of effectiveness in 
EU decision-making on which instrument to use for democracy promotion. Smith believes that, along 
with commercial or political interests, doubts about the effectiveness of negative measures cause 
inconsistencies in the EU‟s application of these negative measures. She points to the north-south 
division in the position of member states on negative measures: while northern member states are 
often convinced of the effectiveness of negative measures, southern member states mostly doubt the 
effectiveness of coercive methods (Smith 2008: 138). Knodt and Junemann suggest that the EU‟s 
response to violations of democratic principles may depend on whether there is cooperation from the 
state apparatus or civil society (Knodt and Junemann 2007). This proposition has been confirmed by 
Fischer, and by Echagüe and Youngs. Fischer argues that the EU‟s unwillingness to use negative 
measures against Russia also derives from its inability to do so. Russia has become more and more 
reluctant to accept political conditionality, which can be explained by economic growth, the EU‟s 
increased dependence on Russian gas and a growing hostility towards the EU due to mounting 
competition in the post-Soviet space (Fischer 2007: 263). A similar situation has been observed in the 
case of Saudi-Arabia, where the EU hardly has any leverage in terms of trade or aid incentives, nor 
any access points such as civil society partners or other interlocutors (Echagüe and Youngs 2007: 322-
326). Panebianco notes that the EU prefers positive measures in China because coercion would have 
little effect as China expresses different interests and defines values and principles differently 
(Panebianco 2005: 142-146). Warkotsch investigates two related propositions on the influence of 
considerations of effectiveness on decision-making on negative measures: (1) the degree of economic 
dependence of the target state and (2) the domestic conditions for democratic change. In his research 
on negative measures as a reaction to democratic wrongdoing in the post-Soviet space, he finds that 
the EU applies beyond-rhetoric negative measures less often in economically independent countries, 
although he adds that it is difficult to judge whether this finding can be attributed to considerations of 
effectiveness, member states‟ interests or the fear of destabilising an already weak state. As to the 
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selection of „easy cases‟, namely countries which exhibit conditions for democratic change, he reaches 
inconclusive results. On the one hand, he finds that the EU does not respond more often to violations 
of democratic principles in countries with a relatively competitive political system. On the other, the 
EU is more likely to respond to violations of democratic principles when these are accompanied by 
opposition mobilisation (Warkotsch 2008a).  
 
1.2.3. Sub-Saharan Africa: Between humanitarianism and self-interest? 
Nonetheless, the above-mentioned studies were predominantly focused on regions where almost all 
countries are important to the EU‟s commercial and/or security interests. Indeed, instability in the 
neighbourhood countries has direct consequences for the EU in terms of migration, criminal groups 
operating in Europe, etc. The European Security Strategy clearly states that „Neighbours who are 
engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or 
exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe‟ (European Union 2003: 6). 
Moreover, in the Middle East and North Africa, the events of 9/11 have had a huge impact on the 
perception of the EU regarding potential security threats in this predominantly Arab region (Jünemann 
2004: 4). Moreover, three out of five North African countries are important oil and gas suppliers: 
Egypt, Libya and Algeria (Martinez 2008). Similarly, Central Asia‟s proximity to Afghanistan has 
caused a renewed security interest in the region. In addition, three of the five Central Asian republics 
have important gas reserves, which are crucial as an alternative to the more volatile supplies coming 
from Russia: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (International Crisis Group 2006a: 3). 
Furthermore, studies have often tended to focus on those „extreme‟ cases where EU commercial 
interests are clearly dominant, such as China and Russia. These authoritarian superpowers-in-the-
making are then compared to isolated „rough‟ states including Myanmar and Belarus to conclude that 
the double standards applied by the EU are due to its prioritisation of commercial interests (e.g. 
Algieri 2007; Brummer 2009).   
 
In contrast, the EU‟s commercial and security interests in sub-Saharan Africa are more diverse. Africa 
has been described as being in between marginalisation and globalisation (Engel and Olsen 2005: 1). 
This „marginal‟ status is to a certain degree reflected in the EU‟s relations with sub-Saharan Africa. 
Sub-Saharan Africa‟s share in the EU‟s import of energy resources is very small and remains under 5 
percent, even if the EU has increasingly prioritised energy relations with the continent. Only Nigeria 
belongs to the top gas suppliers of the EU (at place 4) (Youngs 2009b: 6). Regarding security interests, 
because of its geographical location, crises in sub-Saharan Africa do not have such direct 
consequences for the EU. It is no surprise that sub-Saharan Africa is hardly mentioned in the EU‟s 
Security Strategy or in the EU‟s Counter-Terrorism Strategy (European Union 2003; European Union 
2005: 7).  
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For this reason, sub-Saharan Africa is often perceived in developmental and humanitarian terms 
(Cargill 2010: 19-24; Porteous 2007: 65 and 121; Engel and Olsen 2005: 9). This is strengthened by 
the perception in the public and media of Africa as a „hopeless continent‟ (Williams 2004: 45), full of 
„failed states‟ (Abrahamsen 2005). On the one hand, it cannot be denied that sub-Saharan Africa is 
home to severe poverty and conflict. It is the poorest region in the world in terms of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita (Bigsten and Durevall 2008). Despite sustained GDP growth in a number of 
sub-Saharan African countries, per capita incomes have not increased between 1960 and 2004 due to 
the declining life expectancy (Callaghy 2009: 61-62). Of the 48 Least Developed Countries as 
designated by the UN, 33 were located in sub-Saharan Africa.
7
 Moreover, according to the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, at the end of the 1990s, sub-Saharan Africa was the most 
conflict-ridden region in the world (Collier and Hoeffler 2002: 13). A third of all violent conflicts 
between 1990 and 2003 occurred in Africa (Fukuda-Parr 2010: 17). At the start of the century, 20 out 
of 45 countries were in conflict, causing an estimated 4,000 deaths per week (Abrahamsen and 
Williams 2001: 251). Of an estimated 20 to 25 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the 
world, over 10 million are African (Deng 2009: 348). Hence, it may be argued that sub-Saharan Africa 
presents an opportunity for the EU to appear as a humanitarian, developmental or ethical power.  
 
On the other hand, despite the many continuing problems, an idea of „African renaissance‟ has 
emerged with the renewed interest of old and new powers, as well as the high economic growth in a 
number of sub-Saharan African countries. The growing problem of energy security has brought sub-
Saharan Africa back on the foreign policy agenda of the US. At the same time, the declining 
importance of the West and the rise of new powers has also been reflected in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Mangala 2010b: 6-7; Pirozzi 2010: 90-91). The Economist, which only a decade ago referred to sub-
Saharan Africa as the „hopeless‟ subcontinent, now refers to a dozen African economies with high 
growth rates as „Lion kings‟ – an analogy to the Asian tigers. The Economist points to the fact that 
sub-Saharan Africa‟s real GDP growth rate has been 5.7 percent on average over the past decade, 
compared to only 2.4 percent over the previous two decades. Forecasts are that sub-Saharan Africa‟s 
economy will grow at an average rate of 7 percent over the next 20 years, slightly faster than that of 
China (The Economist 2011, January and December). Similarly, Radelet (2010) challenges the 
predominant view of sub-Saharan Africa as an entire subcontinent mired in failure, conflict and 
stagnation. His book Emerging Africa refers to the enormous progress made in seventeen emerging 
sub-Saharan African countries.
8
 Five key evolutions have characterised these countries in recent years: 
democratisation, more sensible economic policies, the end of the debt crisis, the spread of new 
technologies and the emergence of a new generation of policymakers, activists and business leaders. In 
                                                     
7
 See the website of the UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, landlocked 
developing countries and small island developing states, http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25/ (last consulted on 18 
May 2012) 
8
 Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Rwanda, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia.  
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his book Rising Africa, Mahajan (2009) points to the enormous business opportunities in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
 
This African renaissance has also been translated in increased economic and political integration. The 
most important event in this regard was the creation of the AU as a continental institution to replace 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2001 (Kwasi Tieku 2004). Unlike its predecessor, the AU 
has developed into a political organisation that increasingly plays a role in peace and security in 
Africa. Moreover, in 2001 the AU set up the New Economic Partnership on African Development 
(NEPAD) as an economic development programme with the four primary objectives of (1) eradicating 
poverty, (2) promoting sustainable growth and development, (3) integrating Africa in the world 
economy, and (4) accelerate the empowerment of women (De Waal 2002). The AU and NEPAD have 
been strongly encouraged by donors, which see in these attempts to increased integration an 
encouraging sign that African leaders are willing to take matters in their own hands. Importantly, both 
the AU and NEPAD also focus strongly on democratic governance. One of the initiatives of NEPAD 
was the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) by which countries voluntarily allow peer review 
in four thematic areas: democracy and good political governance, economic governance and 
management, corporate governance and socio-economic development (Hope 2005). 
 
Moreover, sub-Saharan Africa‟s strategic importance in global politics has increased since the 2000s. 
The terrorist attacks of September 2001 have made the international community aware that conflicts in 
Africa can also be felt within the borders of the EU. So-called failed states, many of which are located 
in sub-Saharan Africa, are perceived as a threat to global security as these might become a safe haven 
for terrorists, drugs or human trafficking and other illegal activities (Mangala 2010b: 9). Indeed, since 
2003 the US and EU member states have become increasingly active in counter-terrorism activities in 
sub-Saharan Africa, more particularly in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel which are seen as breeding 
grounds for terrorism. To this should be added the continuing interest of former colonial powers, 
which wish to maintain their sphere of influence in sub-Saharan Africa. It has been argued that this 
continues to play a role in French Africa policies, which is also reflected in EU Africa policies (Taylor 
2010: 51; Gegout 2009).  
 
It is in this context that the increased EU attention for Africa in the 21
st
 century should be regarded. 
This started in Cairo with the first EU-Africa summit in 2000 and culminated in the 2007 Joint Africa-
EU Strategic Partnership, adopted at the second EU-Africa summit in Lisbon. The aim to have an all-
encompassing political dialogue with the AU and to enhance cooperation in the field of security, 
democracy and human rights, the environment, trade, etc. shows the determinacy of the EU to 
strengthen its cooperation with Africa, and to reaffirm itself vis-à-vis other actors with an interest in 
sub-Saharan Africa (Mangala 2010a: 172-174).  
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1.2.4. Double standards in EU democracy promotion in sub-Saharan Africa  
The question should then be raised whether the proposition that self-interest overrides democracy 
promotion, observed in strategically important regions and crucial trade partners, is also valid in sub-
Saharan Africa. It has been suggested that negative measures are most often implemented in sub-
Saharan Africa because of the poor, marginal status of African countries (Smith 2001: 195; Crawford 
2001: 210-227; Abrahamsen 2000: 4). Yet only very few studies have investigated the reasons for 
double standards in the EU‟s reaction to violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Most of these confirm rationalist approaches by arguing that double standards can be explained by the 
prevalence of the self-interest of EU member states. In his research on EU democracy promotion in 
Africa in the 1990s, Olsen finds that the EU was much softer in its approach to Niger than to Kenya. 
In Niger, France insisted on the resumption of cooperation after the 1996 coup to secure its supplies of 
uranium (Olsen 1998). Hence, Olsen states:  
 
„[...] if a single strong member country of the EU wants to take care of what it 
considers its national interests, it can do so in defiance of common decisions in 
the Council of Ministers. And it can do so, in spite of the fact that the Union 
treaty stresses that promotion of democracy is one of the important aims of the 
development policy of the EU. Niger does not represent a “security” concern, 
neither for the EU nor for any of the member countries apart from France, 
because France is so heavily dependent on the import of uranium‟ (Olsen 1998: 
360-361).  
 
Similarly, in a study on EU democracy promotion in Nigeria, Khakee states that „Democracy 
promotion is not a top priority in EU-Nigeria relations. Oil is widely regarded as paramount, followed 
by trade relations‟ (Khakee 2007: 4). This is confirmed by Youngs, who stresses that the Article 96 
procedure was never instigated towards any of Africa‟s big energy producers (Youngs 2009c: 138). 
Brüne argues that the rather soft approach taken by the EU towards Ethiopia can be explained by the 
EU‟s security concerns. The EU does not want to risk a destabilisation of Ethiopia, which is seen as an 
important partner in the war on terror (Brüne 2007).  
 
However, these conclusions are contradicted by Hazelzet‟s research on EU development aid 
suspensions in ACP countries and three non-ACP countries
9
 in the period 1989-2000. Hazelzet found 
that the severity of human rights violations was more important than the commercial or strategic 
importance of a country in determining the harshness of EU sanctions. Contrary to what was expected, 
former colonies were sanctioned more severely than non-former colonies, although French ex-colonies 
were sanctioned slightly less severely than former British colonies (Hazelzet 2005, 2010).  
                                                     
9
 Burma, Romania and Tajikistan.  
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While these studies are an important step in the direction of more empirical research on EU democracy 
promotion in sub-Saharan Africa, there remains a large gap in the literature. Olsen uses comparative 
case study analysis, but focuses on the 1990s. Hazelzet‟s research is also confined to the period 1989-
2000 and, because of its quantitative methodology, does not provide many details on the specific 
explanations for double standards. Research by Brüne and Khakee is more recent and includes case 
study material, but conclusions are only based on one case study. As I have argued earlier, more up to 
date analyses are therefore needed given the changed context of the post-2000 period when compared 
to the 1990s.  
 
1.2.5. EU-Africa relations: Norms or self-interest?  
The literature on EU-Africa relations and EU development policies raises arguments in favour of both 
norms and self-interest. On the one hand, a number of studies suggest that norms are an important 
driver of EU policies. In the EU‟s aid allocation, Grilli and Riess found that multilateral EU aid was 
less influenced by trade interests and more based on recipient needs than the bilateral assistance of 
member states (Grilli and Riess 1992). Currently, EU development assistance under the EDF is based 
on a quantitative aid allocation model that is entirely based on recipient needs and past performance. 
Dearden investigated this aid allocation model for the 9
th
 EDF (2000-2007) and found a correlation of 
83 percent with actual aid commitments. EU development assistance in the ACP group is thus strongly 
related with development indicators such as the Human Development Index (HDI), in contrast to non-
ACP aid allocation which is more influenced by political considerations (Dearden 2009).  
 
In a recent edited volume on EU development policy, Gänzle and others raise the question whether the 
EU is an „enlightened superpower in the making‟ (Gänzle et al. 2012). Indeed, many authors see 
development policies and Africa policies as a field where the EU tries to affirm its normative power, 
often by emphasising its distinctiveness vis-à-vis other actors. Birchfield argues that, since the gap 
between rich and poor has widened, development policy provides an excellent opportunity for the EU 
to show its normative power (Birchfield 2011). Smith and Steffenson refer to the EU as a 
„development superpower‟, given its wide-ranging and highly institutionalised relationship with the 
ACP group and the volume of aid funds, which gives it a comparative advantage over the US (Smith 
and Steffenson 2005: 353). Orbie and Versluys state that development policy provides a way for the 
EU to reinforce its internal and external legitimacy by showing itself as a „force for the good‟ to the 
domestic and international public (Orbie and Versluys 2008: 86). In relation to its developing partners, 
the EU tries to appear as a „leading and benevolent‟ donor by promising generous aid funds (Orbie 
2003). According to Bretherton and Vogler, the EU‟s policies vis-à-vis the ACP group are a way of 
promoting its role as a relatively benign „patron/mentor‟, given the focus on partnership and 
cooperation and the low percentage of aid tied to commercial interests (Bretherton and Vogler 2006).  
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A number of recent initiatives and reforms in EU development and Africa policies can also be seen 
from this perspective. According to Carbone, the Governance Initiative was an attempt of the 
European Commission to distinguish itself from the World Bank and the US by propagating an 
incentive-based approach (Carbone 2010). As regards the 2007 EU-Africa summit, Carbone 
underlines the European Commission‟s attempts to launch new initiatives such as the EU-Africa 
Infrastructure Partnership, as well as its endeavour to put the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
in a central position. Carbone interprets these efforts as an attempt by the European Commission, and 
Directorate-General (DG) Development in particular, to strengthen the EU‟s common identity in 
international development (Carbone 2011: 210-211). The Commission‟s efforts to improve aid 
coordination and aid effectiveness should also be seen in this light (Carbone 2010). Similarly, Furness 
believes that the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) could be a way for 
the EU to enhance coherence, coordination, professionalism and legitimacy in EU development policy 
and, in this way, establish itself as a „development power Europe‟ (Furness 2010). A further 
manifestation of the EU‟s normative power in its Africa policies can be found in the cases of the 
ratification of the status of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Kyoto Protocol, where the 
EU managed to build an image of itself as an altruistic actor by empowering African countries 
(Scheipers and Sicurelli 2008).  
 
Similar claims have been made with regard to the EU‟s „hard‟ foreign policy priorities in sub-Saharan 
Africa: security and energy. The EU‟s EUFOR-Congo mission (2006) can be seen as an example of 
the above-mentioned human security approach. Martin argues that the EU‟s focus on human rights and 
a bottom-up approach in this mission points to the attempt to pursue human security (Martin 2007: 72-
73). Similarly, Sicurelli sees in the EU‟s conflict management in Darfur an example of how the EU 
tried to take a distinctive, normative approach, namely by focusing on regional integration, positive 
conditionality and international law. She claims that the enormous public attention for the Darfur crisis 
provided an opportunity for the EU to build its identity as an international actor: „peacebuilding 
assistance in Darfur has allowed the EU to craft its image as an ethical player, especially in 
comparison to China, the US and other external actors in Africa‟ (Sicurelli 2010: 71). Moreover, 
although energy has become more important in the EU‟s Africa policies, as could be observed in the 
adoption of an Africa-EU Energy Strategy in 2007, this strategy mostly focused on the developmental 
aspects of energy for Africa (Hadfield and Youngs 2008: 4; Youngs 2009c: 131).  
 
This is not to say that the norms that the EU promotes through its Africa policies are necessarily 
welcomed by or even adequate for its counterparts in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, the EU‟s policies 
are based on its own constitutive norms, including regional integration, free market economy, etc. 
These norms have often been pushed through despite the resistance of African governments, as can be 
observed in the promotion of market mechanisms and security instruments in the case of 
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environmental protection, and trade liberalisation in the case of the Economic Partnership Agreements 
(Sicurelli 2010).  
 
At the same time, there are studies that see EU development cooperation and Africa policies as largely 
determined by the self-interest of the EU and its member states. Despite the EU‟s rhetorical 
commitment to democracy and human rights, research has found that its actual aid allocation has been 
more concerned with its self-interest than with these normative objectives. Studying the underlying 
motivations for EU aid allocation in 1980-1995, Zanger found that strategic and economic factors 
were more important than democracy and human rights (Zanger 2000). Similar conclusions were 
drawn in a study on the EU‟s aid allocation in the 1990s, which concluded that political similarity (e.g. 
similarities in voting behaviour in the UN) was positively correlated with EU aid allocation, while 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law did not have a significant effect (Neumayer 2003a). The 
creation in 2010 of the EEAS, which has obtained considerable competences in the field of 
development, could also be seen as a move in the direction of a development policy that is dominated 
by the EU‟s security interests (Del Biondo et al. 2012).  
 
Moreover, several studies on the EU‟s security policies in sub-Saharan Africa confirm the view that 
the ESDP has mainly been used to do something good for Europe, rather than to do something good 
for Africa (Bailes 2008). It has been argued that EU humanitarian interventions such as those in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (2003, 2006) or Chad/Central African Republic (2007) are 
driven by the self-interested objective of the largest member states, and particularly the UK and 
France, to re-engage with their former colonies (Olsen 2009). Similarly, Gegout (2009) argues that the 
EU‟s interventions in the DRC were an instrument of France to preserve its zone of influence and 
defend the national prestige. Moreover, the EU‟s recent shift to a more securitised development policy 
is seen as driven by the concern for EU security, rather than that of African countries. Indeed, the 
inclusion into the Cotonou Agreement of issues with doubtful relevance for development, including 
cooperation in the war on terror and in the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, can be 
seen as a prioritisation of the EU‟s security interests (Hadfield 2007: 63; Vogt 2006: 168-169).  
 
Furthermore, the EU‟s trade policies in Africa are seen as serving EU self-interest rather than the 
needs of African countries. Indeed, whereas under the Lomé regime the EU extended unprecedented 
trade preferences to the ACP states, the Cotonou Agreement provided that these would be gradually 
reduced and replaced by reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements. Farrell described this shift as 
motivated by a „trenchant pursuit of what are really neo-liberal goals and the extension of economic 
liberalisation in the interests of the EU‟ (Farrell 2008: 279). Similar opinions have been voiced about 
the Joint Africa-EU Strategic Partnership (2007), which was seen as restoring the EU‟s position in the 
context of a growing rat race for African resources (Campbell 2008: 91; Schoeman 2011: 45).  
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1.3. Hypotheses 
1.3.1. Analytical framework: Norms, self-interest and effectiveness 
In the review of the literature, it became clear that the reasons for double standards in the EU‟s 
reactions to violations of democratic principles are mostly ascribed to the predominance of the EU‟s 
self-interest, in line with rationalist approaches to international relations. However, it was argued that 
there are both arguments for a normative and for a self-interested EU-Africa policy. I will thus focus 
on this dichotomy between norms and self-interest. I will take a wide approach to norms, whereby 
norms refer to those objectives that are predominantly other-focused and meant to meet humanitarian 
needs, including good governance, economic development and regional and internal stability. On the 
other hand, self-interest refers to the EU‟s objectives that are predominantly self-interested and EU-
focused, including the historical interests of member states in preserving their sphere of influence, 
commercial interests or security interests.  
 
As was mentioned earlier, norms and self-interest cannot easily be separated (Youngs 2004a). First of 
all, norm promotion can be seen as concealing the EU‟s real self-interested intentions. From this 
perspective, norms are „interest in disguise‟ (Vincent 1986: 120). In this view, the concern for stability 
in third countries is mainly self-interested, given the possible consequences of destabilisation of 
African countries for the EU in terms of migration flows or transnational criminal activities. However, 
as I have argued, the consequences of instability in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa for the EU 
should not be overestimated. Moreover, it should be mentioned that the conception of internal and 
regional stability as a „norm‟ came inductively, after observing that countries such as Rwanda were 
praised for their internal stability, although the EU had few security interests there. Furthermore, 
democracy promotion may equally be seen as a strategy to serve the EU‟s self-interest. Democracy 
may be exported as a means to promote peace in line with the democratic peace theory, or as a means 
to further the interests of transnational capital (Holden 2009: 18). In the analysis of the case studies, 
the distinction between norms and self-interest will be made to the extent possible. In case the EU 
would have a special, self-interested reason to prefer internal stability in a country (e.g. in the Niger 
Delta in Nigeria because of commercial interests or in Ethiopia because of security interests), this will 
be addressed separately in the subchapter on security interests.  
 
A second critique that is often made is that the promotion of norms is a way of self-preservation for 
norm promoters. From this perspective, if the European Commission favours providing aid to 
development success stories, this may equally be led by its „self-interest‟ in spending development 
funds (its main task) and becoming an effective donor. Furthermore, the European Commission‟s 
attempts to develop a conflict prevention strategy could be interpreted as a way for the Commission to 
safeguard its bureaucratic influence in EU-Africa policies, in a context where security objectives (and 
hence the Council) were becoming more and more important (Sicurelli 2010: 66; Gibert 2011a: 180). 
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While this is certainly a relevant claim, it is not in conflict with the idea of norm promotion. Indeed, 
while poverty reduction and conflict prevention may be regarded as in the bureaucratic self-interest of 
the European Commission, the same can be said about all normative, ethical or moral objectives.  
 
A third argument is that ethical or normative foreign policy is essentially self-interested, because it 
serves to „have a sense of self-identity, purpose and self-belief‟ (Chandler 2003: 300). This is of 
course partly true, but does not run counter to the idea of Normative Power Europe. It has been argued 
that states may follow norms because they want others to think well of them or because they want to 
think well of themselves (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 8). Normative Power Europe is about exercising 
power through norms rather than military or economic power, about gaining status on the international 
scene via normative objectives.  
 
It should be emphasised that normative behaviour is not necessarily „good‟, nor is self-interested 
behaviour necessarily bad. Indeed, the pursuit of norms may have detrimental effects for sub-Saharan 
African countries. For example, the MDGs have frequently been criticised for being too focused on 
numerical targets (Clemens et al. 2007; Easterly 2008). Equally, it has been argued that good 
governance is based on the Western ideal state model for an optimal functioning of the market 
economy that is not necessarily beneficial for sub-Saharan African countries (Kiely 1998; Hildyard 
and Wilkins 1998). In the same spirit, the emphasis of donors on state failure is believed to be 
informed by a static, a-historical definition of the state based on European customs, practices, 
organisation and structures (Hill 2005). Although these studies raise important questions, the focus of 
this research is not on the feasibility and appropriateness of the norms the EU promotes in sub-Saharan 
Africa, but on norms as a driver of EU foreign policy. Again, similar critiques can be made about the 
promotion of liberal democracy as a norm (Lumumba-Kasongo 2005). Furthermore, self-interest may 
also be „good‟ for a country. For example, a former coloniser may continue development assistance in 
former colonies, in order not to lose influence and because of historical links. Although this decision is 
to a large degree self-interested, especially when the needs in former colonies are lower than in other 
countries, it also has substantial benefits for the country.  
 
Apart from the norms-versus-interests dichotomy, I will look at a third factor: expectations about the 
effectiveness of negative measures. As noted supra, the importance of this factor was raised in a 
number of studies. A concern for the effectiveness of negative measures suggests that the EU behaves 
as a rational actor, according to the logic of consequences. This presupposes that the EU does not 
merely use negative measures to „do something‟ according to the logic of appropriateness, but in the 
hope that this strategy will actually provoke a change in the target country. It assumes that the EU will 
not use costly negative measures when it is expected that the benefits of this approach will be low. On 
the one hand, this motivation is not unrelated to the EU‟s self-interest: the adoption of negative 
measures is avoided because of the risk to hurt diplomatic and commercial relations. On the other, the 
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EU‟s preference for positive measures is also motivated by altruistic motives. Indeed, aid 
conditionality has been criticised for hurting the poor, despite the aim to change the behaviour of the 
government (Uvin 1993: 69). Perhaps the most well-known and criticised example is the UN sanctions 
regime against Iraq in 1996-1998, which caused the death of more than one million Iraqis (Goss 
2002). To a certain extent, this is mitigated by the fact that the EU mostly focuses on targeted 
sanctions or on a reorientation of development assistance from the government to social programmes 
implemented by civil society. Even so, the suspension of certain development programmes 
implemented by the government may have negative consequences for the population. Moreover, even 
if they do not, the government may use the sanctions as a scapegoat for the poor performance of the 
economy, as has happened in the case of Zimbabwe (Laakso et al. 2007a: 75). In this way, negative 
measures may hurt the image of the EU, rather than that of the target regime.  
 
Furthermore, while conditionality is seen as an instrument of normative power (Manners 2002: 245), 
the EU‟s foreign policy image and identity are equally built on its preference for „soft power‟, positive 
conditionality and political dialogue (Michalski 2005; Carbone 2010; Youngs 2001; Vogt 2006). 
Indeed, Vogt has argued that „dialogue seems to have become a value in itself‟ (Vogt 2006: 166). 
Moreover, Youngs sees in the elaborate consultations in the Article 96 procedure and the emphasis on 
political dialogue a clear belief of the EU in socialisation strategies, based on partnership and mutual 
dialogue (Youngs 2001: 42-43). The emphasis on engagement and dialogue is also mentioned by 
Manners as an example of how the EU can „be reasonable‟ in world politics (Manners 2008: 58). One 
can see a clear difference here with the US emphasis on coercion and confrontation. The European 
Commission is often seen as the driver of this approach. For example, in contrast to the US approach 
to China, the Commission has propagated constructive engagement with China, rather than pushing 
through its interests and values (Carbone 2011: 212-214). Applied to the EU‟s instruments for 
democracy promotion in sub-Saharan Africa, the emphasis on positive measures can be seen in the 
conception of aid suspension as „a measure of last resort‟ (Article 9) and on political dialogue as a 
preferable platform to discuss democratic principles (Annex VII, Article 1).  
 
Similar to the difference between norms and self-interest, the difference between self-interest and 
expectations about effectiveness may appear dubious. Indeed, low expected effectiveness could also 
be used by the EU as a scapegoat for situations where negative measures might endanger its self-
interest. Hence, when the EU suggests that aid suspensions in oil producing countries would have little 
effect, this may be an excuse for the EU to protect its own commercial interests. However, this factor 
was mainly added inductively as it became clear that considerations about effectiveness played a clear 
role in itself, including in the case of Eritrea and Niger.  
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1.3.2. Conflicting norms 
The EU‟s Africa and development policies have been described as „holistic‟ as they have moved from 
a purely economic approach to one incorporating issues of stability, democratisation and good 
governance. In this way, the EU promotes the nine substantive normative principles that constitute its 
normative basis, according to Manners: sustainable peace, consensual democracy, associative human 
rights, the supranational rule of law, sustainable development, social freedom, inclusive equality, 
social solidarity, and good governance (Manners 2008). However, it has equally been recognised that 
trade-offs may be needed when different norms collide in a concrete context. For example, in a tense 
security situation, donors often prefer stability to democracy. There are equally examples where 
donors downsize their democracy promotion agenda in countries with a relatively good development 
performance. From this perspective, the question arises whether double standards in the EU‟s reaction 
to violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa could be explained as a trade-off between 
(1) democracy and development and (2) democracy and stability.  
  
1.3.2.1. Development 
The EU is one of the staunchest promoters of good governance, poverty reduction, the MDGs and aid 
effectiveness. Poverty reduction is the primary objective of EU development policies. The EU has 
often defended these goals to the detriment of democracy. For example, unlike most other donors, the 
EU‟s budget support is provided on an apolitical basis. Similar trade-offs have been made by the UK, 
which equally has ambitions to become a development superpower.  
 
From the African side, it is clear that democracy promotion and development policies may conflict in 
concrete cases. Indeed, amongst the best performers regarding the MDGs, democratic as well as non-
democratic countries can be found. For example, the index of GDP per employed person has increased 
in countries that are perceived as „free‟ by Freedom House (Mali, Namibia, Ghana, Botswana, Cape 
Verde, Mauritius, Lesotho), but equally in countries that were considered „partly free‟ (Mozambique, 
Ethiopia, Uganda) or „not free‟ (Mauritania, Chad, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea). Amongst the countries 
with a considerable improvement in the ratio of underweight under-five year olds, there were „free‟ 
(Mali), „partly free‟ (Nigeria, Mozambique, Malawi, Niger, Tanzania, Senegal) and „not free‟ 
countries (Rwanda, Angola) (ECA et al. 2009).  
 
In this light, the following hypothesis will be tested:   
H.1. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against countries that are perceived as 
development success stories, and more likely to impose negative measures against countries that are 
not perceived as development success stories.  
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1.3.2.2. Stability 
Stability has become an important objective of the EU‟s Africa policies. Since the 1990s, the EU has 
been working on national and regional conflict prevention and resolution. EU development funds have 
increasingly been used to enhance stability (e.g. programmes on Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration). The EU has engaged in addressing state fragility and has mediated in intra- and 
interstate conflicts. Moreover, the EU has built the capacity of the AU and ECOWAS for regional 
peacekeeping and supports regional powers, including Nigeria and South Africa, in their mediation 
role in African conflicts.  
 
However, democracy and stability do not necessarily go hand in hand. While authoritarian regimes are 
often successful in silencing dissent, elections may prove a cause for political violence. The EU may 
thus be reluctant to impose negative measures on countries that are internally stable. Moreover, non-
democratic governments may also play an important role in regional peace-building, for example by 
engaging in regional peacekeeping or mediating in regional conflicts.  
 
Hence, the following two hypotheses are added:  
H.2. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived as 
contributing to internal stability, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments 
that are not perceived as contributing to internal stability.  
 
H.3. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived as 
contributing to regional stability, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments 
that are not perceived as contributing to regional stability. 
 
1.3.3. Self-interest   
As was suggested in the status quaestionis, sub-Saharan Africa has become more important for the 
EU‟s commercial and security interests, while historical interests may also continue to play a role.  
 
1.3.3.1. Historical interests 
As noted by Young: „Colonial heritage is the necessary point of departure for analysis of African 
international relations‟ (Young 2009: 19). This has also been the case for EU-African relations. 
Indeed, the provisions in the Treaty of Rome, the Yaoundé Agreement and the Lomé Agreements have 
been described as attempts by former colonial powers to put in place an Eurafrique in order to 
maintain their influence in sub-Saharan Africa via extensive aid and trade benefits and aid allocation 
based on political judgment rather than needs. While these practices are increasingly belonging to the 
past, there are still instances where former colonial powers try to influence the EU‟s development and 
Africa policies vis-à-vis former colonies.  
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These critiques are most relevant for France. Indeed, French Africa policy has been based on 
maintaining influence in former colonies via politicised development aid, institutional relationships 
and a patron-client network between French and African leaders, regardless of their commitment to 
democracy. Although French Africa policies have drifted away from these neo-colonial practices, it is 
believed that France still sees francophone sub-Saharan Africa as its backyard. For the other former 
colonial powers, these motivations seem less relevant. The UK‟s Africa policies have been noted to be 
primarily driven by security and commercial interests and by humanitarian objectives, rather than by 
the desire to maintain a sphere of influence. Belgium‟s policies in the DRC have been compared to 
French neo-colonial Africa policies, but diplomatic relations between the DRC and Belgium have 
equally been difficult because of criticism about the lack of progress on democracy and good 
governance. Italy has been described as a minor player in the Horn of Africa, despite its colonial 
history in Somalia and Eritrea.  
 
The following hypothesis will be tested in the cases:  
H.4. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that protect the sphere of 
influence of member states, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments that do 
not protect the sphere of influence of member states. 
  
1.3.3.2. Commercial interests 
Although, as stated above, the EU‟s commercial interests in sub-Saharan Africa are minor when 
compared to other regions, the increasing scarcity of certain primary resources that are found in sub-
Saharan Africa could make commercial interests more important in the 2000s. This has been 
recognised by former development commissioner Louis Michel: „The increasing globalisation of the 
economy and headlong dash to economic expansion is making the leading economic powers, both 
traditional and emerging, even more determined to gain access to the immense resources of the 
African continent‟ (Michel 2008b: 9-10). This is first of all the case for energy resources, including 
oil, gas and uranium (nuclear energy). Moreover, the EU has also become aware of an increased 
shortage of certain non-energy raw materials, including cobalt, platinum, titanium, chromium, etc. 
(Ibid.: 9-10).  
 
Hence, the following hypothesis will be tested:  
H.5. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures in countries where EU commercial interests 
are important and where governments serve EU commercial interests, and more likely to impose 
negative measures against countries where the EU only has minor commercial interests or where the 
government does not serve EU commercial interests. 
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1.3.3.3. Security interests  
As noted above, the EU‟s concerns for security in sub-Saharan Africa have traditionally been 
perceived as a „humanitarian issue‟ given the limited direct consequences for European security, 
compared to the EU‟s neighbourhood. Since the 9/11 attacks, however, there has been an increased 
awareness that insecurity in Africa can also affect EU security. This has been translated in provisions 
on the war on terror, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and migration in the 
Cotonou Agreement. Moreover, EU development funds have been used to support the fight against 
organised crime, illegal migration, human trafficking, etc. The EU‟s massive efforts in the fight 
against piracy in the Gulf of Aden, including the military operation Atalanta, are a further 
manifestation of the fact that the EU‟s self-interested security concerns have become more important 
in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
The importance of the war on terror has raised concerns that a situation has emerged where violations 
of democratic principles are tolerated as long as states agree to cooperate in the war on terror. Given 
the increased role of self-interested security concerns in EU-Africa policies, a similar pattern could be 
expected in EU reactions to violations of democratic principles in Africa.  
 
Hence, the hypothesis to be investigated is the following:  
H.6. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived as 
important allies in the fight against security problems affecting the EU, and more likely to impose 
negative measures against governments that are not perceived as important allies in the fight against 
security problems affecting the EU. 
 
1.3.4. Expectations about effectiveness 
There seems to be an implicit assumption in the literature that the concentration of negative measures 
on sub-Saharan Africa is due to the fact that these are mostly poor, aid dependent countries, where the 
EU has some leverage. Nonetheless, even in aid dependent countries, the EU‟s leverage should not be 
overestimated. As I have argued supra, the EU‟s influence is declining with the increased interest of 
new and old powers in sub-Saharan Africa, which are often willing to provide assistance without any 
political strings attached. At the same time, there is a consensus in the literature that negative measures 
are more likely to be successful in case of a coordinated action by the main international actors, rather 
than a unilateral effort. In this sense, it is notable that African regional organisations have become 
more important in democracy promotion. Related to this, in some countries the EU has more leverage 
than in others. Economic leverage is more likely in aid dependent countries where the EU is a major 
donor and where the EU provides budget support. Moreover, political leverage should also be taken 
into account. Apart from international pressure, the target government may also be under domestic 
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pressure. From this perspective, EU negative measures are more likely to be imposed against 
governments that are domestically weakened.  
Hence, the following hypotheses will be tested:  
H.7. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures when there are no or few other international 
actors prepared to impose negative measures, while it is more likely to impose negative measures in 
case of a coordinated action by international actors. 
 
H.8. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures in countries where it lacks leverage, while it is 
more likely to impose negative measures when it has substantial leverage. 
 
H.9. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures when the domestic position of the government 
is strong, while it is more likely to impose negative measures when the domestic position of the 
government is weak.  
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1.4. Methodology 
To test these nine hypotheses, I have conducted a qualitative analysis of ten country cases. In the 
following I will separately address four elements of my approach: (1) the qualitative character of the 
analysis and the combination of deduction and induction, (2) the number of cases, (3) comparability of 
the cases and (4) the choice of data.  
 
1.4.1. Qualitative case study analysis 
Rather than a quantitative analysis, a qualitative analysis was chosen, because I believe that a certain 
number of the above-mentioned hypotheses cannot be sufficiently investigated on the basis of 
quantitative indicators. Case studies enable the improvement of construct validity or the ability to 
measure the concept one tries to investigate (Bennett 2004: 34-35). For example, historical interests 
cannot be captured by the available quantitative indicators. Other studies investigating the motivations 
for aid allocations or sanctions simply included the number of years during which the recipient 
country was a former colony (Neumayer 2002; Neumayer 2003b; Alesina and Dollar 2000; 
Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2006) or specified which country was the former coloniser (Hazelzet 2000; 
Hazelzet 2005). One study is more specific and looks at „friendly‟ former colonies, although it is not 
clear how it is decided whether a country is „friendly‟ or not (Bowles 1989). However, I believe that 
historical interests should be investigated into more depth to understand their exact impact on the EU‟s 
reaction to violations of democratic principles. This can only be done on a qualitative basis by looking 
at the relations between former colonies and colonisers. Another example is the state of liberal 
democracy in the country cases. Quantitative studies on the motivations for aid allocation or sanctions 
mostly rely on databases such as Freedom House or Polity IV (Laakso et al. 2007a; Hazelzet 2000; 
Hazelzet 2005; Neumayer 2003b; Wolf and Spoden 2000). As a result, these studies are based on the 
available quantitative indicators, which only capture one aspect of democratisation (e.g. political rights 
and civil liberties in the case of Freedom House). However, the EU‟s decision to take negative 
measures as a response to violations of democratic principles is rather complex and cannot be 
understood by solely looking at quantitative indicators. Negative measures are used to react to certain 
events, such as the closure of an independent newspaper, the imprisonment of human rights activists 
or a flawed electoral process (Laakso et al. 2007a; Portela 2010). Therefore, I will make a qualitative 
assessment of the situation of liberal democracy in the cases, based on reports by Freedom House, 
Polity IV, the Bertelsmann Foundation, US State Department, NGOs such as International Crisis 
Group, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, combined with the available academic 
literature. To this qualitative analysis, an assessment of quantitative indicators will be added. While 
such an analysis may still not perfectly reflect the situation on the ground, I believe it will be sufficient 
to assess how the situation of liberal democracy is perceived by the EU. This is because the EU itself 
uses this kind of information and is under pressure from human rights organisations making or using 
these analyses. Another disadvantage of quantitative data is that they can give a distorted picture of 
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reality. For example, the most commonly used indicator to measure economic growth is the GDP. 
However, in the case of Chad, looking only at GDP growth would lead to the conclusion that Chad is 
an economic success story, given that it had spectacular growth rates of over 30 percent in 2004. 
Qualitative analysis can put this in perspective. The high GDP growth was related to the beginning of 
oil extraction in 2003, but this extra income hardly benefited the population, as there was severe 
corruption, an increase in the defence budget, etc.  
 
A second advantage of a qualitative case study analysis is the possibility to generate new hypotheses. 
In the course of empirical research, new hypotheses may arise from the case studies, on the basis of 
which the research model can be refined (Bennett 2004: 19; Kacowicz 2004). In quantitative research, 
on the other hand, the researcher does not know the cases well enough to see factors that are not 
„tested‟ in the research design. For this reason, quantitative research is often supplemented by a case 
study analysis of „outliers‟. In my research, I used a combination of induction and deduction. Although 
the investigation of the cases departed from potential explanatory variables, the possibility was left 
open to include new variables. In interviews as well as in the primary and secondary literature that was 
consulted, new factors regularly popped up. Hence, whereas my research originally started from the 
expectation that self-interest would be the main explanatory factor, in the course of the case study 
analysis I became aware that „norms‟ were equally relevant. It was only by looking at specific cases 
(namely Ethiopia and Rwanda), that I started focusing on conflicting norms. Regarding the hypotheses 
on effectiveness, I had already considered including this factor from the beginning and had gathered 
some data for a number of case studies. However, it was only after investigating all the cases and 
taking all factors together, that I was truly convinced of the need to include this factor.  
 
Apart from generating new hypotheses, comparing a certain variable across different cases also 
allowed to refine the hypotheses (Burnham et al. 2004: 82). For example, regarding commercial 
interests, I found that the policies of recipient governments sometimes endangered the EU‟s 
commercial interests (e.g. through resource nationalism, selling contracts to non-European firms). As a 
result, I took up this factor, refined the hypothesis and then tried to see whether this was also 
applicable to other cases. In the same way, the data selection and operationalisation of the explanatory 
variables was fine-tuned along with the progression of the research, using the experience from 
previous cases and applying this to others. For example, regarding a country‟s role for regional 
stability, I noticed that several sources (interviews and reports) noted the presence of refugees from 
neighbouring countries. I then tried to systematically investigate this factor in other cases.  
 
Of course the main disadvantage of this combination of induction and deduction is the complexity of 
the research and the limited theoretical contribution that was made. However, I believe it was the best 
way to address my research question, which was empirical rather than theoretical in nature. The 
combination of induction and deduction has enabled me to investigate in a relatively objective way. 
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Until the very last stage of my research, I had not drawn any final conclusions, and tried to 
continuously challenge my own propositions. Moreover, although the research was originally not 
theoretically driven, the hypotheses were based on a thorough empirical literature review of all 
possibly relevant studies.
10
 Furthermore, in the last stage of my research, I linked my findings to the 
theoretical debate on the EU‟s foreign policy. By doing this, I was encouraged to structure my 
hypotheses according to the norms, self-interest and effectiveness trichotomy.  
 
Thirdly, case studies allow to identify causal mechanisms within a case. While statistical methods rely 
on associations and correlation, case studies allow to look at the whole chain of evidence from the 
hypothesised cause to the observed effect. When applied very rigorously and carefully, causality can 
be investigated by process-tracing methods (Bennett 2004: 23-24). Process-tracing tries to follow the 
chain of decisions by policy-makers linking the independent and dependent variable (Checkel 2008: 
125). Given the relatively large number of cases, such a rigorous process-tracing was not possible in 
this research. Moreover, as most of the decision-making happens behind closed doors, most of the 
„steps‟ in EU decision-making were impossible to assess. However, by interviewing officials involved 
in decision-making, I tried to approach the chain of events as detailed as possible. This was not 
possible for earlier periods, as the officials responsible at the time were not easily accessible, but was 
attempted to the extent possible for the more recent time period.  
 
Lastly, case study methods allow to capture complex interaction patterns (Bennett 2004: 38-39). It has 
been argued that case studies are the „middle ground‟ between positivists and constructivists and that 
many authors using case study research adopt a „soft positivist‟ stance. Case studies often 
„compromise stern methodological premises with the limitations and constraints of the complex reality 
we want to understand and explain‟ (Kacowicz 2004: 108-120). This is also the approach of the 
present dissertation. I departed from the assumption that there are many potential combinations of 
explanations, none of which are necessary nor sufficient to predict the outcome. The reality is simply 
too complex to capture in a small number of independent variables which will with x percent certainty 
predict the dependent variable. We can only try to make general and tentative assumptions on which 
factors might be important. This does not mean that exaplanations are not possible, but that one should 
be cautious and avoid seeing the variables as deterministic.  
 
1.4.2. A relatively large number of cases 
To mitigate the prevalent critique that case study research does not allow for generalisation, I chose to 
focus on ten country cases, which is a relatively large number. Moreover, given that, in the case of 
Côte d‟Ivoire, there appeared to be a large difference between the EU‟s reaction to the 2010 elections, 
                                                     
10
 E.g. studies on democracy promotion, international development policies, the position of sub-Saharan Africa 
in international relations, EU-Africa policies, the Africa policies of the main EU member states, etc.  
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when compared to the situation in 2000, this country case was divided in two cases, bringing the total 
amount of cases to eleven. The number of cases is large enough to represent the group of sub-Saharan 
African countries where violations of democratic principles have taken place since 2000. In 2010, 39 
sub-Saharan African countries were considered either „not free‟ or „partially free‟ by Freedom House 
(Freedom House 2010). My selection of ten countries thus includes one fourth of the sub-Saharan 
African countries in these two groups combined. If a more restrictive selection is followed by looking 
at those countries considered „authoritarian‟ by the Economist Intelligence Unit‟s Democracy index, 
there are 25 authoritarian countries in sub-Saharan Africa (out of 44 assessed countries). I included 
nine or more than one third of this group, excluding Kenya which is regarded as a hybrid regime in 
this index (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2010).  
 
A number of disadvantages of the research model should also be mentioned. One problem that was 
difficult to avoid was the possibility that different cases influence each other (Bennett 2004: 43-44). 
Earlier, I noted that the failure of negative measures in Zimbabwe affected the EU‟s readiness to resort 
to negative conditionality under Article 96. Therefore, in analysing whether the EU has applied double 
standards, I will try to take this into account and look at whether the EU might have applied other 
negative measures, such as the suspension of budget support (Ethiopia 2005, Niger 2009) or the 
adoption of targeted measures (Guinea 2009, Côte d‟Ivoire 2010). Another disadvantage of case 
studies is that it is difficult to assess the causal weight of variables (Bennett 2004: 44). Hence, it will 
be difficult to generalise which variable has been most dominant in explaining the outcome. 
Nevertheless, as outlined above, this study does not claim to be able to identify „the‟ most important 
variable, but acknowledges the complexity of potential explanations. Thirdly, case study research 
mostly suffers from the potential indeterminacy of results because a trade-off is made between 
parsimony and richness in the selection of variables and cases to be studied (Kacowicz 2004: 108). 
This problem is referred to as the „too many variables, not enough cases‟ problem. As a general rule, a 
research design should include one more case than its amount of hypotheses. For this reason, I kept the 
number of cases rather high, and the number of hypotheses was limited to those thought to be most 
determinant and interesting to investigate (Burnham et al. 2008: 84). Indeed, my research design 
respects the general rule given that there are more cases (11) than hypotheses (9). Furthermore, the 
hypotheses are structured in three main clusters: norms, self-interest and effectiveness.  
 
1.4.3. Comparability  
In the selection of the cases, I have tried to ensure that cases are comparable (Gerring 2004: 348). 
Comparability is first of all enhanced by the limitation of the cases to sub-Saharan African countries. 
Relations between the EU and sub-Saharan Africa all take place within the framework of the Cotonou 
Agreement and the related provisions on political dialogue and conditionality. It has been argued that 
these provisions are much more developed when compared to those in the EU‟s agreements with other 
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regions (Santos Moore 2006: 143-150; Bartels 2005: 84-88). Moreover, the suspension of budget 
support is most likely to happen in this group given the focus of EU budget support on the ACP 
group.
11
 The EU thus has the same „toolbox‟ of instruments at its disposal in all the case studies. 
Moreover, EU relations with the ACP group were – for the main part of the period investigated here – 
the responsibility of the European Commission‟s DG Development. The latter was regarded as much 
more poverty focused, compared to the more political orientation of DG Relex, which was responsible 
for development cooperation and external relations in most other regions (Carbone 2007: 48). Of 
course there is also a downside to this limitation to sub-Saharan Africa: I will not be able to investigate 
cross-regional variation of EU motivations and the possible influence of different institutional 
responsibilities and related cultures.  
 
Comparability is further enhanced by selecting countries that experienced comparable violations of 
democratic principles. Indeed, in order to identify „double standards‟, I should choose countries that 
experienced comparable violations of democratic principles, but where the reaction of the EU has been 
different. All the cases selected here have experienced one of the following violations of democratic 
principles in the period between 2000 and mid-2011: mass arrests of opposition members, violence 
against peaceful demonstrations, a flawed electoral process or a „constitutional coup‟ (where the 
president changes the constitution to stay in power). Moreover, while there have been similar 
violations of democratic principles in the eleven cases, in some cases the EU has adopted or threatened 
to adopt sanctions (Zimbabwe, Guinea, Côte d‟Ivoire 2010, Niger, Kenya), while in others it has been 
more reluctant to adopt sanctions (Côte d‟Ivoire 2000, Eritrea, Ethiopia) and in a third group, only 
low-cost negative measures were taken (Chad, Rwanda, Nigeria).   
 
Furthermore, in the selection of the cases it was attempted to have maximum variance regarding the 
explanatory variables, adopting in this way a „diverse cases‟ research design (Seawright and Gerring 
2005: 15-16). By ensuring variance between the variables, I tried to avoid a „selection bias‟ by only 
selecting cases that show a strong relevance of one explanation (Bennett 2004: 39). As suggested 
earlier, it was impossible to assess this completely before the actual research, so at the stage of 
selection these variables were assessed tentatively on the basis of preliminary research.   
 
Regarding norms, countries vary on internal and regional stability and on development performance. 
There are countries that are internally relatively stable (Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Guinea, Eritrea, Rwanda) 
and countries facing instability (Côte d‟Ivoire, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Kenya). On regional peace, the 
countries include regional powerhouses (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya), countries that are seen as 
endangering regional stability (Eritrea), and countries that have hardly played a foreign policy role in 
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 Under the 10th EDF, the European Commission aimed to increase budget support (general and sectoral) to 
44% of programmable funds (Michel 2008c: 23).  
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their neighbourhood (Niger, Guinea). Regarding development performance, there are countries that 
experienced high growth, but relatively low human development (Nigeria, Kenya), countries with high 
growth and increasing human development (Rwanda, Ethiopia) and countries with low (Guinea, Côte 
d‟Ivoire, Eritrea, Chad) or negative (Zimbabwe) growth rates. 
 
As regards self-interest, the cases vary on historical, commercial and security interests. Historical 
interests differ throughout the cases, which include countries without a colonial history (Ethiopia), 
countries that are former French colonies (Chad, Niger, Guinea, Côte d‟Ivoire), former UK colonies 
(Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe), as well as one former Italian colony (Eritrea) and one former Belgian 
colony (Rwanda). Amongst the former colonies there are countries with which the former colonial 
power has maintained strong relations (Chad, Niger) and countries with which relations have become 
troubled (Kenya, Zimbabwe, Côte d‟Ivoire, Rwanda). Guinea is also particular in the sense that it 
explicitly chose to break away from the French sphere of influence after decolonisation. Commercial 
interests also vary. There are significant commercial partners of the EU in Africa (Kenya, Nigeria, 
Côte d‟Ivoire), less important commercial partners (Guinea, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia) and negligible 
commercial partners (Eritrea, Chad, Rwanda, Niger). Furthermore, the countries include important 
(Nigeria, Niger) and less important (Côte d‟Ivoire, Chad) suppliers of oil, gas and uranium to the EU. 
Regarding security interests, there are countries where the government is a partner in the war on terror 
(Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Chad, Niger), piracy (Kenya, Nigeria), illegal immigration or organised 
crime (Nigeria), but there are equally governments that have been less capable or willing to cooperate 
on security issues that might affect the EU (Côte d‟Ivoire, Eritrea) or countries where these issues 
were less relevant (Guinea, Zimbabwe, Rwanda).  
 
Lastly, the cases also represent significant variance regarding expectations about effectiveness. The 
cases include aid dependent countries (Rwanda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Niger), oil producers (Nigeria, 
Chad, Côte d‟Ivoire), and non-oil producers that are little aid dependent (Zimbabwe, Kenya, Guinea). 
Moreover, in some countries the EU is one of the few donors (Niger, Chad), while in others, there are 
many other donors (Rwanda, Ethiopia). There are countries where the domestic position of the 
government remained relatively strong (Rwanda, Ethiopia, Eritrea) and countries where it had 
significantly weakened (Chad, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Côte d‟Ivoire, Guinea, Nigeria, Niger).  
 
1.4.4. Data 
The variables were primarily investigated on the basis of desk research, using a wide variety of 
sources, including official documents from the EU and other donors, reports and data from NGOs and 
academic literature where available. Given the large amount of information used and the diversity of 
the sources, the specific data selection will be further explained in the Chapters when discussing the 
operationalisation of the hypotheses. In the use of secondary data, there is inevitably a bias towards 
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cases on which there has been previous research, which can explain why some of the sections contain 
more information on one country than on others. For example, there has been much more academic 
research on Rwanda, Kenya and Nigeria when compared to Niger or Guinea.  
 
Apart from desk research, I conducted in-depth expert interviews. Most of these interviews were held 
at a rather late stage in the research (January-May 2012), with the aim to present the tentative 
conclusions of my research to the interviewees. The interviews were non-structured, as the questions 
were meant to fill the gaps that were left after examining all available sources. The questions thus 
differed from case to case and from interview to interview. Most of the interviews were conducted 
with EU officials responsible for the countries. In most of the cases, this was either the desk officer at 
the EEAS or the geo-coordinator in the European Commission‟s DG Development responsible at the 
time of the interview. This means that in most cases, the interviewee had only been involved in EU 
decision-making for one or two years. In some cases, including Côte d‟Ivoire, Niger and Chad, it was 
possible to speak with officials that were responsible in earlier periods. Moreover, interviews 
conducted for previous research with desk officers for Eritrea, Chad, Côte d‟Ivoire and Zimbabwe 
(March 2007 and February-March 2009) were also used. In order to obtain information about the 
reality on the ground, I spoke with Belgian ambassadors and diplomats currently or formerly 
responsible for the seven countries where there was or had been a Belgian embassy. This excluded 
Chad, Niger and Guinea, where diplomats based in neighbouring countries indicated to be poorly 
informed. The main reason for contacting Belgian diplomats was of course accessibility: as a Belgian 
researcher it was easier to get in touch with Belgian diplomats. Moreover, I was able to interview most 
of them (except one) face-to-face in Brussels in January 2012. Apart from policy-makers, I 
interviewed experts on Niger (Jeremy Keenan), Rwanda (Filip Reyntjens) and Côte d‟Ivoire (Karel 
Arnaut). In addition to interviews focused on one country, some more general interviews were held 
with representatives in the Africa Working Group (France, UK), ACP Working Group (Belgium), the 
EDF committee (France), two officials within the Belgian Technical Cooperation and five officials 
within the European Commission‟s DG Development working on more horizontal issues related to 
governance, democracy promotion and conditionality. Counting all these interviews together, I used 
46 interviews for this dissertation. In addition, during field research in Ethiopia in January 2011, I 
spoke with an additional 35 representatives of international and European aid agencies and embassies 
(EU and member states), as well as Ethiopian representatives of the government, nongovernmental 
organisations and political parties. The purpose of this field research was not limited to my Ph.D. 
research, and included work on democracy assistance, but during the interviews the motivations for 
EU reactions to violations of democratic principles were also repeatedly discussed. There was a 
significant difference in the length of these interviews. While the standard length was approximately 
one hour, there were also very short interviews (15 min.), as well as interviews that took several hours. 
To ensure full anonymity of the interviewees and taking into account the sensitivity of the subject, I 
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will not refer to their names nor positions, but only mention the month and year in which the interview 
took place.  
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2. Double standards  
Although, as stated in the Introductory Chapter, the assumption that there are double standards in the 
EU‟s reaction to violations of democratic principles is widely shared, this claim is often easily made, 
without going deeper into why exactly one can speak of double standards. This Chapter therefore has 
two aims: (1) to introduce the cases by discussing the situation of liberal democracy and the EU‟s 
reaction and (2) to make the argument that there are double standards in the EU‟s reaction to violations 
of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa. The Chapter will proceed as follows. First, the case 
studies are introduced, focusing on two aspects: (1) the situation of liberal democracy, focusing in 
particular on the period since 2000 and (2) the instruments the EU has used to promote democracy 
since 2000 (negative or positive). The second section then shows that there have been double 
standards in the EU‟s reaction to violations of democratic principles. To substantiate this argument, I 
will first compare the EU‟s reaction in the ten countries, and then the level of liberal democracy. The 
Chapter will end with a table listing (1) those countries where the EU was most reluctant to impose 
negative measures and (2) those countries where the EU was least reluctant to impose negative 
measures, taking into account the gravity of violations of democratic principles.  
 
2.1. An overview of ten country cases 
As was explained in the Introductory Chapter, I will concentrate on the EU‟s reaction to violations of 
the two key elements of liberal democracy: (1) electoral democracy and (2) civil-political rights. As 
regards electoral democracy, this includes whether elections are seen as free, fair and inclusive. 
Amongst violations of electoral democracy I also count so-called constitutional coups, where the 
government amends the constitution to run for a third term. Cases of military coups d’état were 
omitted since there have not been any double standards in these cases: the EU invokes the Article 96 
procedure without any exception in case of a military coup (Laakso et al. 2007a: 18). However, in 
some of the countries, namely Guinea, Niger and Côte d‟Ivoire, a military coup preceded or followed 
the EU‟s adoption of negative measures. I will concentrate on those civil-political rights that are 
mostly assumed as inherent in liberal democracy, including freedom of opposition, freedom of 
association, press freedom, freedom of expression, etc. (Neumayer 2003b: 20). As stated in the 
Introductory Chapter, violations of these civil-political rights are most likely to lead to a reaction of 
the EU.  
 
On liberal democracy the following secondary sources were consulted. First, Freedom House 
publishes a yearly Freedom in the World report, which is available online from 2002 to 2012. In most 
cases the 2011 report was used as the 2012 report was not yet available at the time of writing. The 
reports discuss electoral democracy and civil-political rights. Apart from Freedom in the World, the 
Freedom of the Press reports were also consulted. Second, the Bertelsmann Foundation publishes 
reports on the status and evolution of democracy and the market economy. These reports, which were 
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available for 2002, 2005, 2007 and 2009, were consulted for information on civil-political rights and 
on electoral democracy. Third, the Polity IV project of the Center for Systemic Peace codes the 
authoritarian characteristics of states. Country reports are also issued; the latest available at the time of 
writing dated from 2008. These reports give a description of executive recruitment, the existence of 
constraints on the executive and the possibility of political participation. Fourth, reports by Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch were consulted. Amnesty International provides reports on 
violations of civil-political rights: imprisoned journalists, opposition members or human rights 
activists, violence against peaceful demonstrators or the adoption of legislation curtailing civil-
political rights. Although reports on all the cases were available, it should be added that some 
countries (e.g. Zimbabwe, Côte d‟Ivoire) received more attention than others (e.g. Niger, Chad). 
Human Rights Watch issues very detailed reports on a limited number of countries, including Ethiopia 
and Eritrea. However, for a number of countries, including Niger, such reports were not available. 
Fifth, reports from the International Crisis Group were used where available, namely for Chad, 
Nigeria, Kenya, Eritrea, Côte d‟Ivoire, Guinea and Zimbabwe. Sixth, I consulted press releases from 
the Committee to Protect Journalists, which reports on the imprisonment of journalists. Seventh, for 
those cases where the former sources only provided limited information (e.g. Niger), I analysed 
background notes by the US State Department,
12
 leaked US embassy cables and news articles from 
Agence France Presse, using the LexisNexis database. Eight, on elections, I used official election 
observer reports or, when these could not be found, official statements from observer teams. Where 
available I used the report by the EU-Election Observation Mission (EU-EOM), as this was often the 
largest observer team and because it can be expected the EU will particularly focus on these reports. 
Lastly, where available I examined academic articles. On the latter it should be added that there is 
plenty of academic research on certain countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Côte d‟Ivoire, 
Eritrea, Zimbabwe), while on others there was hardly any academic literature available (Niger, Chad, 
Guinea). 
 
To assess the EU‟s instruments to democracy promotion, I mainly relied on primary data. The online 
database of the Council of the EU was the first to be consulted and the most important source of 
information. This database contains Council Conclusions, Commission Communications, Presidency 
declarations and working documents on Council meetings. Second, to find the final Council Decisions 
and Common Positions, the Eur-lex database was searched.
13
 Third, since the Council online database 
was not complete on Presidency declarations, I searched for Presidency declarations in the Bulletin of 
the European Union (online version).
14
 Fourth, in some cases I used the Prelex database to find 
European Commission documents.
15
 Fifth, the EU‟s press database was searched for press releases.16 
                                                     
12
 Available on the following website: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/  
The 2011 version was used given that this was the most recent version at the time of writing.  
13
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/  
14
 http://ec.europa.eu/archives/bulletin/en/welcome.htm 
15
 http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm?CL=nl 
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Sixth, the answers to parliamentary questions and debates in the EP were analysed, using the online 
database.
17
 Seventh, I analysed two generations (2002-2007; 2008-2013) of Country Strategy Papers 
(CSPs), National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) and Joint Annual Reports (JARs) on EU development 
cooperation. These three reports are the main source on development projects financed by the EDF. 
Furthermore, the CSPs and JARs also provide information on political dialogue and, where applicable, 
earlier aid suspensions. For more information on democracy promotion projects, I used the OECD‟s 
Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which provides a short description of projects reported to the 
OECD as Official Development Assistance (ODA). For EIDHR projects, information was gathered 
from the website of DG DEVCO-Europeaid, which contains compendia of projects for 2000-2006 and 
2007-2009, as well as a list of projects financed in 2009.
18
 For some countries, further information was 
provided by evaluation studies prepared for the European Commission. Lastly, these official 
documents were supplemented with the available information in the press (BBC News, Agence France 
Presse, Agence Europe) and academic literature.  
 
2.1.1. Eritrea 
2.1.1.1. Liberal democracy in Eritrea 
Eritrea adopted a constitution introducing a multi-party system in 1997. However, this constitution 
was never implemented. Polls were scheduled for 1998, but have been postponed ever since. In May 
2008, the Eritrean president stated that Eritrea would not be ready for elections in the next three to four 
decades (US Embassy Eritrea 2008a). Eritrea is led by the People‟s Front for Democracy and Justice 
(PFDJ) which – under the name Eritrea People‟s Liberation Front (EPLF) - led the struggle for 
independence from Ethiopia. Former secretary general of the EPLF Isaias Afewerki has been president 
since independence (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009a: 3). There is no legal opposition in Eritrea, the 
PFDJ is the only admitted party. There is some opposition abroad, but these groups are in disarray and 
their leaders are not taken seriously in Asmara (Reid 2009: 211). Even within the ruling party, there is 
no room for dissident voices. In May 2001, a group of 15 senior members of the ruling party wrote an 
open letter to the president in which they criticised the government for acting in an „illegal and 
unconstitutional manner‟ and called upon party members and the general public to express their 
opinion. In September 2001, eleven of them were arrested and charged with treason. They have 
remained in jail ever since. Moreover, their arrest was followed by a ban on all privately owned 
newspapers and the arrest of journalists critical of the government (Amnesty International 2001a; 
Kibreab 2009: 34-38). Other waves of arrests of those expressing criticism on the government have 
followed, including civil servants, diplomats, military commanders, health professionals and 
businesspeople (Amnesty International 2004a). An independent civil society is not present in Eritrea 
                                                                                                                                                                      
16
 http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do  
17
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application/search.do  
18
 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/index_en.htm  
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because of the absolute lack of freedom of assembly and association. In 2005, the government enacted 
stricter regulations for the registration of nongovernmental organisations working in Eritrea (Freedom 
House 2011; Bertelsmann Foundation 2009a: 6).  
 
2.1.1.2. EU democracy promotion  
After the crackdown on dissidents in September 2001, the Council Presidency undertook a demarche, 
during which specific issues such as the arrest of journalists were discussed (European Parliament 
2004a). When Eritrea reacted by expulsing the Italian ambassador, all EU member state ambassadors 
temporarily withdrew from the country (The Guardian 2001, October). Although there were no formal 
sanctions and the Article 96 procedure was not started, new commitments remained frozen until a new 
CSP was signed in November 2002 (European Commission 2002a; European Community and Eritrea 
2003a). Meanwhile, efforts were made to restart political dialogue. In April 2002, the situation of 
political prisoners was discussed (European Parliament 2002). In early 2003, political dialogue was 
formally restarted when Commissioner Nielson visited Eritrea (Pretorius et al. 2006: 61). However, 
whereas the EU hoped to address the essential elements of the Cotonou Agreement, Eritrea‟s main 
interest was to discuss foreign affairs, namely the border conflict with Ethiopia (Council of the EU 
2003a; European Community and Eritrea 2009: 21). A letter to the Eritrean President was sent by the 
Council Presidency in September 2003, September 2004 and October 2005, expressing concern about 
the detention of journalists and requesting to allow a mission of EU ambassadors to visit the 
journalists and other political detainees. The question was raised by the ambassadors in political 
dialogue, but President Afewerki refused to discuss the issue and never answered to the letters 
(European Parliament 2005a; European Parliament 2005b). In 2004-2006, dialogue was put on hold 
(European Parliament 2006). In 2006, the EU put the imprisonment of the eleven dissidents back on 
the agenda and issued a public declaration asking the Eritrean government to disclose information on 
the prisoners and to bring them to court (Council of the EU 2006a). Since then, a declaration is issued 
each year in September to recall these demands. During President Isaias Afewerki‟s visit to Brussels in 
May 2007, Development Commissioner Michel urged for improvements regarding the situation of 
democracy (European Parliament 2007d). At the UN General Assembly in October 2007, the EU 
called on the Eritrean government to comply with its international human rights obligations and to 
convene a human rights dialogue with the EU (European Parliament 2007b). In July 2008, political 
dialogue was restarted (European Parliament 2009a). In March 2009, the EU ambassadors in Eritrea 
handed a list to the government of Eritrea containing the names of political prisoners that the EU 
would like to see released and have more information about (European Parliament 2009b). During a 
meeting in May 2010, the question was again raised and in September 2010, a political dialogue 
session was exclusively devoted to human rights issues (European Parliament 2010a). In April 2009 
and despite pressure from human rights organisations and the EP, the Commission signed a new CSP 
with Eritrea for the period 2009-2013. There has not been any budget support in Eritrea and the EU‟s 
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assistance to Eritrea is very small, due to Eritrea‟s limited absorption capacity (European Commission 
2009a). Nevertheless, between 2000 and 2008, about €170 million was allocated to Eritrea (European 
Parliament 2009c). 
 
Apart from its focus on political dialogue, the EU hopes to encourage democratisation in Eritrea 
through capacity-building. As such, the CSP 2002-2007 identifies governance as a „focal area‟, and 
envisages projects to promote the electoral process and the set-up of democratic institutions (European 
Community and Eritrea 2003b). In addition, Eritrea was a focal country for the EIDHR (European 
Parliament 2005c). However, government restrictions have made it difficult to support civil society in 
Eritrea, and the government‟s unwillingness to establish democratic institutions or to hold elections 
has rendered EU support in this sector irrelevant. Moreover, there are no political human rights 
organisations in Eritrea (Pretorius et al. 2006: 59). As a result, democracy assistance has been limited 
to a project with the National Confederation of Eritrean Workers, projects on women‟s and children‟s 
rights and a project focused on local courts (European Parliament 2010b; Pretorius et al. 2006: 60; 
European Commission s.d.b.).  
 
2.1.2. Ethiopia 
2.1.2.1. Liberal democracy in Ethiopia 
In 1992, the Ethiopian People‟s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) overthrew the communist 
junta by Mengistu. Meles Zenawi was appointed prime minister of the transition regime and a new 
constitution was adopted introducing a multi-party system. In 1995 and in 2000, parliamentary 
elections were held, but these were dominated by the ruling party. During 2001-2004, protests by 
students, human rights activists and opposition members were often met with severe police repression. 
For example, in April 2001, several thousands of students and more than hundred opposition members 
were arrested after protesting against the lack of academic freedom and police brutality (Amnesty 
International 2001d). Against this background, the May 2005 parliamentary elections were held in a 
much more open sphere when compared to previous elections: the new electoral law enhanced 
competition and parties were given equal access to the broadcasting media (Abbink 2006: 173-181). 
However, the counting process was marred by irregular practices and a lack of transparency, while 
there was no adequate complaints and appeals mechanism, leading the EU-EOM to conclude that the 
elections fell short of international principles (EU-EOM Ethiopia 2005: 1). The official release of the 
results was postponed several times, feeding suspicions of fraud amongst opposition supporters. 
Moreover, the government issued a one-month blanket ban on demonstrations right after the elections. 
In early June 2005, the ban was first defied by a number of university students, who were immediately 
arrested. This led to protests supported by the opposition, which were severely cracked down by 
security forces, leading to about 36 deaths. Final results announced in September indicated that the 
EPRDF had won the elections with 327 of a total of 547 seats. However, the opposition had grown 
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from 12 to 161 seats (Harbeson 2005: 148-154). The opposition challenged the results, but 
demonstrations were prohibited and many opposition members were arrested for planning protests. In 
October 2005, the largest opposition coalition Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) refused to 
take up its seats and blocked parliament. In a new round of manifestations against the election results 
in early November 2005, the police fired live ammunition on protestors, leading to the death of 193 
civilians and nine politicians (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009: 194-197). This was followed by a country-
wide clampdown on opposition supporters, in which an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 people were 
arrested (Abbink 2006: 192). In July 2007, 30 political detainees were charged but pardoned after 
signing a letter admitting they were guilty (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009: 197).  
 
After the 2005 elections, civil-political rights were curtailed by a series of laws that clearly envisaged 
the opposition, the independent media and civil society. The new party formation law stipulated that 
political parties could not accept funding from abroad. The 2008 Mass Media and Freedom of 
Information Proclamation increased punishment for defamation, allowed prosecutors to halt the 
publication of pieces deemed a threat to public order and placed restrictions on foreign media 
ownership. In 2009, the Charities and Societies Proclamation prohibited civil society organisations 
that receive more than 10 percent of their funding from abroad to work on issues of human rights, 
democratisation, good governance, conflict prevention, etc. (Ibid.: 200-202).  The 2009 anti-terrorism 
legislation defines terrorism so broadly as to allow prosecution of, for example, journalists who 
publish articles referring to opposition movements (Human Rights Watch 2010a). Furthermore, the 
ruling party extended its power base. Microcredit programmes were used as an incentive to attract new 
members, while government employees were threatened they could lose their jobs and prerogatives if 
they did not become party members. Party members were then asked to convince at least four friends 
and family to join the EPRDF. In the meantime, the potential impact of the opposition was weakened 
by new legislation in parliament and the government-controlled electoral board made registration of 
opposition members for the 2008 local and 2010 parliamentary elections extremely difficult. Together 
with the weakening of the opposition, which had become hopelessly divided, this strategy succeeded 
in re-establishing the EPRDF as the sole party in power: it gained all but a few seats in the 2008 local 
and 2010 parliamentary elections (Tronvoll 2010; Aalen and Tronvoll 2008). EU observers to the 
2010 parliamentary elections again concluded that the elections failed to meet international standards, 
given the narrowing of the political space preceding the elections and the lack of level playing field 
between the parties (EU-EOM Ethiopia 2010).  
 
2.1.2.2. EU democracy promotion  
Until the 2005 parliamentary elections, the EU had taken a rather low profile on democracy. Concern 
about the imprisonment of students and opposition activists in 2001 was only expressed behind closed 
doors in a demarche by the EU Presidency (European Parliament 2001). EU involvement in Ethiopia‟s 
69 
 
democratisation process however increased in the context of the 2005 parliamentary elections. A large 
– 200 member – observer team was sent and voter education by civil society was supported. Despite 
the critical assessment by the EU-EOM, the EU did not immediately condemn the elections, focusing 
instead on mediation between the ruling party and the opposition (Abbink 2006: 189; Council of the 
EU 2005a). Yet when the dispute over the results took a violent turn, the EU – jointly with the US - 
called on all parties to end the violence (Council of the EU 2005b). Following the mass arrests in early 
November 2005, the EU called for an end to the violence, the return to dialogue and the release of 
detainees (Agence France Presse 6 November 2005). In December 2005, the EU froze its funds 
earmarked for general budget support, as well as €155 million in sectoral budget support for the road 
sector (European Community and Ethiopia 2007: 33). The decision was taken unilaterally by the 
European Commission in conjunction with other donors providing budget support, without taking 
recourse to Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement. However, the suspension of aid was only of short 
duration. In late 2006, sectoral budget support for the road sector was resumed, and in early 2007, the 
EU joined the Protection of Basic Services programme, by which budget support is transferred to the 
lower tiers of government and targeted specifically at basic services including health and education 
(European Community and Ethiopia 2007: 33). Commissioner for Development Michel raised the 
issue of political prisoners during a visit in February 2006 when he visited the political detainees, and 
again in December 2006 during a joint visit with the President of the Commission. Moreover, an EU 
observer was sent to the trials of the political opponents arrested in November-December 2005 
(European Parliament 2007c). Yet after the release of most political detainees in July 2007, public 
criticism about Ethiopia‟s democratic record stalled, despite the increasing authoritarianism of the 
EPRDF regime. A public declaration was issued after the proclamation of the civil society law in 
January 2009, but it was cautious and focused mainly on the potential consequences of the legislation 
for development cooperation (Council of the EU 2009a). In December 2009, a public declaration was 
issued protesting against the closure of a private newspaper and the intimidation of journalists 
(Council of the EU 2009b). Moreover, the public reaction to the 2010 parliamentary elections was 
surprisingly weak. Despite the EU-EOM‟s concerns about the electoral process, High Representative 
Catherine Ashton called the elections „an important moment in the democratic process in the country‟ 
(Council of the EU 2010a). When the Ethiopian government denied Chief Observer Thijs Berman to 
present his final report in the capital Addis Ababa, Catherine Ashton made a slightly more critical 
declaration in which she invited the government „to draw on the report and consider carefully its 
recommendations‟ (Council of the EU 2010b). While the large democratic governance envelope (€49 
million) of the CSP for 2008-2013 suggests a high priority on these issues in EU cooperation, most 
programmes (in the justice sector, supporting democratic institutions) are government-led and hence 
have little impact on democratisation, while support to civil society has recently become focused on 
less conflictive issues due to the new civil society legislation (anonymous interviews, January 2011). 
Rather than using coercive strategies, EU representatives raise concerns about violations of democratic 
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principles in the political dialogue held twice a year with prime minister Meles Zenawi (interviews, 
January 2011). 
 
2.1.3. Kenya 
2.1.3.1. Liberal democracy in Kenya 
From independence in 1963 until 1992, Kenya was a one-party state. Under domestic and international 
pressure, President Daniel arap Moi introduced a multi-party system in 1992, but elections in 1992 and 
1997 were marred by intimidation and violence against the opposition, media control and doubtful 
election procedures (Freedom House 2011). Nonetheless, in 2002, Moi announced his retirement. 
Main opposition parties National Alliances of Kenya (NAK) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
formed the National Rainbow Coalition (NRC), whose candidate Kibaki won the elections. However, 
the NRC was soon divided between Kibaki‟s NAK and the LDP, which was led by Raila Odinga. The 
Memorandum of Understanding signed before the elections stipulated that Kibaki would be President 
and Odinga prime minister once a new constitution was agreed and that minister posts would be 
divided between both parties. Once in power, however, Kibaki denied the promised cabinet posts to 
the LDP. Moreover, the negotiation of the new constitution provoked a fierce debate between both 
parties. The draft constitution proposed after two years of negotiation was unacceptable for Odinga‟s 
LDP, since the position of the prime minister was weakened and the role of the President strengthened, 
while a single-chamber instead of a two-chamber parliament was foreseen. Odinga‟s camp managed to 
convince most voters and the draft constitution was rejected in the 2005 referendum (Whitaker and 
Giersch 2009: 5-7).  
 
Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in December 2007, in which Kibaki faced his 
former ally Odinga, who led the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). While voting and 
campaigning were considered relatively free and fair, problems emerged in the counting process. This 
led the EU-EOM to conclude that the elections fell short of international and regional standards (EU-
EOM Kenya 2008) and raised suspicions of fraud amongst the opposition. The first results, with 70 
percent of the votes counted, pointed to Odinga as the winner. Furthermore, there were delays in the 
communication of results in areas believed to be strongholds of Kibaki. The opposition also mistrusted 
the electoral commission, to which Kibaki had unilaterally appointed members just before the 
elections (Abuya 2009: 133-134; Mueller 2008: 198; International Crisis Group 2008a: 6). As a result, 
the final results, which declared Kibaki as the winner with a very narrow margin (4,578,034 against 
4,352,860), were disputed by the opposition, especially since Odinga‟s party lay far ahead in the 
parliamentary elections, with 99 seats to 43 (Abuya 2009: 135-136). Odinga‟s supporters were 
disappointed and angry about the results, and many turned to violence against whom were believed to 
be Kibaki supporters. Under mediation by Kofi Annan, a power-sharing agreement was reached in 
February 2008 with Kibaki as a President and Odinga as prime minister. The agreement foresaw the 
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creation of two commissions that would look into the conduct of elections (the Kriegler Commission) 
and into the post-electoral violence (the Waki Commission) (Brown 2009: 8). The Kriegler report 
(2008) found that, given the lack of independence of the electoral board and electoral malpractices, the 
electoral process was so flawed that it was impossible to conclude which political party had won the 
elections. The Waki report (2008) concluded that both the opposition and the ruling party were 
responsible for the violence (Southall 2009: 445-446). In August 2010, a new constitution was 
approved by referendum, which imposed new checks on the authority of the president. Moreover, the 
ICC has recently initiated an investigation into crime against humanity against those believed 
responsible for the postelection violence (Freedom House 2011). National elections, originally 
scheduled for 2012, have been postponed until 2013.  
 
2.1.3.2. EU democracy promotion  
Given the successful transfer of power from Moi to Kibaki in 2002, the EU focused on positive 
measures during Kibaki‟s first years as a president, including capacity-building for constitutional, 
electoral and judicial reform as well as support to non-state actors (European Community and Kenya 
2007: 15). However, the EU reacted harshly to the flawed elections in December 2007. Following the 
EU-EOM‟s negative report, the EU called on Kenya‟s leaders to address the concerns raised by the 
observers (Council of the EU 2008a). Aid was not immediately suspended, but the EU made clear that 
„business as usual‟ was not an option until a solution was found for the impasse (Council of the EU 
2008b). The invocation of Article 96 was seriously considered and the EU repeatedly threatened with 
aid suspension should the government fail to negotiate with the opposition. The disbursement of 
budget support was delayed until the announcement of the election results, however, due to a technical 
impossibility to delay the payment until after the end of the year, it was finally disbursed in the midst 
of the post-electoral violence (Michel 2008a). Commissioner for Development Michel travelled to 
Kenya several times in January and February 2008 to support the mediation process by Kofi Annan 
(Agence France Presse 19 January 2008; 7 February 2008). As a deal was struck in February 2008 and 
a coalition government was formed in April 2008, the EU did not proceed to the opening of Article 96 
consultations. Nonetheless, the EU strongly insisted on the implementation of the reforms 
recommended by the Kriegler and Waki commissions. After the release of the Waki report in October 
2008, there were rumours that the EU considered to link the provision of budget support to the 
implementation of the recommendations of the report (US Embassy Kenya 2008a; Kippin 2009: 12). 
Council Conclusions in July 2009 called for a prompt implementation of the reforms agreed under the 
power-sharing agreement, including electoral reform, police and judicial reform and measures to 
combat impunity (Council of the EU 2009c). In October 2009, the EU showed concern about the 
failure of the government of Kenya to establish a tribunal on the post-election violence, and called on 
the government to respect the jurisdiction of the ICC (Council of the EU 2009d). In December 2009, 
an EU Troika mission was sent to Kenya to push for reform (US Embassy Kenya 2009a). When the 
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ICC listed six individuals to appear for the Court, Ashton urged the individuals to cooperate fully with 
the ICC (Council of the EU 2011d).    
  
2.1.4. Chad 
2.1.4.1. Liberal democracy in Chad 
Chad is led by President Idriss Déby and his Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (MPS), which took 
power after a military coup in 1990. Although multi-party elections were introduced in 1993, 
subsequent elections were seriously flawed (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009f: 7; International Crisis 
Group 2006c: 3; Freedom House 2011). In the 2001 presidential elections, members from the electoral 
commission resigned citing irregularities during the polls and the lack of transparency in the 
management of the elections (Agence France Presse 23 May 2001). After challenging the results, six 
opposition candidates and some thirty opposition activists were detained. Gatherings of more than 20 
people were prohibited and a peaceful demonstration against the election results was violently 
dispersed by the police (Amnesty International 2001b; Freedom House 2011). After the 2001 
elections, opposition parties established the Coordination pour la Défense de la Constitution (CPDC) 
which would boycott all further polls, since participating would legitimise a seriously flawed electoral 
process. Apart from those opposition parties that chose to boycott the elections, most of the opposition 
either turned to armed struggle or was co-opted by the president (International Crisis Group 2008b: 9-
10). In the subsequent legislative elections held in 2002, most opposition parties and members 
boycotted the elections, in which Déby‟s party took 112 of the 155 seats.  
 
Despite earlier promises that he would step down after a second mandate, President Déby pushed 
through a constitutional amendment in June 2005 to allow him to run for a third term in a referendum 
that was boycotted by the opposition. The presidential elections in May 2006 – held amidst great 
turmoil as the government had survived a coup d’état a few months earlier - were won by President 
Déby, which was not surprising given the opposition boycott (International Crisis Group 2006c: 2 and 
11). In November 2006, a six-month state of emergency was declared, including a ban on media 
coverage of sensitive issues (Freedom House 2011). After months of dialogue between the opposition 
and the presidential majority, a political agreement was reached in August 2007. The agreement 
foresaw the creation of a new electoral board with strict parity between the opposition and the 
majority, a revision of the electoral code and adoption of a new electoral list (International Crisis 
Group 2008b: 10-11). In February 2008, a coalition of rebels launched an attack on N‟Djamena and 
almost ousted Déby. As a reaction, Déby declared a state of emergency, arrested three opposition 
members and restricted the freedom of the press. One opposition member, Ibni Oumar Saleh, 
disappeared and was never found (Amnesty International 2008a; Freedom House 2011). Nonetheless, 
the implementation of the political agreement went ahead. In June 2008, a new prime minister was 
appointed, who named a new cabinet (US embassy Chad 2008a). In July 2009, the CPDC and the 
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ruling party created an independent electoral commission (International Crisis Group 2010b: 16-17). 
However, legislative elections were repeatedly postponed. They were finally held in February 2011 
and were won by the presidential majority with 125 of 175 seats. The elections, observed by an EU 
Election Observation Mission, took place in a relatively open sphere, but the ruling party had a 
considerable advantage over the opposition as it used state resources in the campaign (EU-EOM 
Tchad 2011: 4-6). Presidential elections were held on 25 April 2011. The three main opposition 
candidates boycotted the elections after their demands for electoral reform had not been met (Freedom 
House 2012).  
 
2.1.4.2. EU democracy promotion  
Although the EU has become more strongly involved in the Chadian democratisation process since the 
mid-2000s, it has remained reluctant to use negative measures. After the 2001 presidential elections, a 
public declaration was issued in which the EU regretted the irregularities and deplored the restriction 
of liberties during the electoral period, the use of force against public demonstrators and the brutal 
questioning of opposition candidates (Council of the EU 2001a). The opening of Article 96 
consultations was however not considered (Byrne 2001). The EU did not publicly react to the 2002 
legislative elections nor to the 2005 constitutional referendum. After the 2006 presidential elections, 
Commissioner Michel stated he deplored the lack of peaceful dialogue between government and 
opposition and the opposition boycott (Michel 2006). From then onwards, the EU took a more 
proactive stance and mediated a political dialogue between the government and the non-armed 
opposition, which led to the August 2007 political agreement. The EU also took part in the follow-up 
and support committee (International Crisis Group 2008b: 11-12). Commissioner Michel travelled 
several times to Chad in January-February 2008 to encourage the implementation of the agreement 
(European Commission 2008a). Together with France, the European Commission was involved in the 
creation of a commission of investigation into the disappearance of opposition member Saleh 
(Assemblée Nationale de la France 2008). Moreover, to support the implementation of the political 
agreement, the creation of an independent electoral commission and an electoral census were 
supported and an observer mission was sent to the 2011 legislative elections (but not to the 
presidential elections) (European Community and Chad 2007a; European Commission 2008a; EU-
EOM Tchad 2011).  
 
2.1.5. Niger 
2.1.5.1. Liberal democracy in Niger 
Niger turned to multi-party rule with the election victory of Mahamane Ousmane in 1993. In 1996, 
however, General Mainassara overthrew Ousmane in a military coup. Mainassara was elected in 
elections that were marred by intimidation and were boycotted by the opposition, but in 1999 he was 
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ousted in a military coup. A new constitution was adopted and elections in November 1999 deemed 
free and fair by international observers were won by Mahamadou Tandja. Under the latter‟s 
Presidency, respect for civil-political rights improved, although after an army mutiny in 2002, a 
human rights activist and journalists were imprisoned. Municipal and presidential elections in July-
December 2004 were won by President Tandja and his party and were considered by observers as „free 
from massive fraud‟. However, after demonstrations against the rising cost of living in 2005-2006, 
several journalists were arrested (Freedom House 2011; Agence France Presse 5 August 2006). In 
2007, the government resigned after a motion of no confidence over an embezzlement scandal 
involving prime minister Amadou (Center for Systemic Peace 2008a). After the demission of his 
prime minister, Tandja concentrated power in his own hands (US embassy Niger 2007a). In May 
2009, Tandja asked the National Assembly to approve a referendum proposal to change the 
constitution to postpone the presidential elections until 2012 and to eliminate term limits on the 
president. The prime minister would become irrelevant under the new constitution (US State 
Department 2011a). When lawmakers and the constitutional court opposed the plan, Tandja dissolved 
the parliament and the courts and declared the state of emergency. The referendum was held in August 
2009 and the proposal passed with almost 92 percent of the vote, amidst opposition claims of fraud 
(Freedom House 2011). Journalists and opposition members who were critical of the referendum were 
arrested, some demonstrations were prohibited and many of those protesting against the referendum 
were arrested. The subsequent legislative elections in October 2009 were won by the presidential 
majority and boycotted by the opposition (US State Department 2011a). In February 2010, Tandja was 
ousted in a military coup led by Salou Djibo. Elections were held in January 2011, excluding Tandja 
who was held in custody. The elections were considered generally free and fair by the EU-EOM and 
resulted in the appointment of Mahamadou Issouffou (EU-EOM Niger 2011). 
  
2.1.5.2. EU democracy promotion  
After President Tandja‟s election in 1999, the EU fully resumed development assistance, which had 
been suspended since the coup in 1996. There was no official reaction to the violations of the freedom 
of press and association in 2002, 2005 and 2006. The EU focused instead on capacity-building, 
including projects to support civil society, elections and human rights awareness (European 
Commission and Niger 2008; EIDHR 2006). There was no formal political dialogue under Article 8, 
but concerns about violations of democratic principles were raised in the regular policy dialogue 
between the donors and the Nigerien authorities. Nonetheless, the programming dialogue on the CSP 
for 2008-2013 gave new impetus to political dialogue, and it was agreed in 2007-2008 to make 
dialogue more frequent and structured (European Community and Niger 2008: 53). However, given 
the lack of interest from the Nigerien government, the first meeting only took place in March 2009 
(anonymous interview, February 2012). After President Tandja‟s announcement of his plans to stay in 
power, the main strategy of the EU changed from dialogue to negative measures. Tandja‟s decision to 
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dissolve the constitutional court and to declare a state of emergency was firmly condemned by the EU 
(Council of the EU 2009e). The European Commission sent a letter to the president, in which it called 
for strengthened political dialogue and raised the possibility of Article 96 consultations (European 
Commission 2009b). In the meanwhile, a request for disbursement of budget support was denied 
because of „governance‟ problems (Agence France Presse 12 July 2009). On 24 July, an Article 8 
dialogue took place, but the EU found that the willingness of the government to return to the legal 
constitutional framework was lacking (European Commission 2009b). On the eve of the referendum, 
the EU reiterated that the continuous violation of the essential elements would have serious 
consequences for EU development cooperation (Council of the EU 2009f). In October 2009, the 
European Commission sent a proposal to the Council on the opening of consultations under Article 96 
of the Cotonou Agreement (European Commission 2009b). Consultations were held in December 
2009, during which the Nigerien authorities made commitments regarding press freedom, municipal 
elections and dialogue with the opposition (Council of the EU 2009g). To keep dialogue ongoing, the 
EU delegation attended Tandja‟s New Year‟s address in January and did not issue a declaration 
following the end of Tandja‟s second term in December 2009 (US Embassy Niger 2010). After the 
military coup, the EU refocused on the transition to civilian rule. During a second round of Article 96 
consultations, the EU gave its approval to the transition plan presented by the Nigerien authorities and 
presented a roadmap to move gradually to the resumption of full cooperation. Meanwhile, EU aid was 
restricted to humanitarian assistance and measures to support the transition to democracy (Council of 
the EU 2010c). The January 2011 elections were welcomed by the EU and full cooperation was 
resumed after President Issoufou‟s inauguration in April 2011 (Council of the EU 2011a; Council of 
the EU 2011b).  
 
2.1.6. Nigeria 
2.1.6.1. Liberal democracy in Nigeria 
After five years of military dictatorship, General Abacha died in 1998, after which General Abubakar 
prepared the ground for the return to civilian rule. In 1999, presidential elections were held and won 
by Olusegun Obasanjo, although there were allegations of ballot stuffing and voter falsification (Shola 
Omotola 2006: 158). Despite improvements to address impunity and press freedom, in the run-up to 
the 2003 elections, state police and intelligence services attacked journalists, human rights activists, 
supporters of the opposition and peaceful demonstrators (Human Rights Watch 2003a). Moreover, 
presidential and parliamentary elections were characterised by serious shortcomings as regards 
election administration, electoral laws and voter registration. The EU-EOM concluded that the 
legislative elections were marked by serious shortcomings and delays in the electoral preparations, and 
that the presidential and gubernatorial elections did not meet minimum standards in a number of states 
(EU-EOM Nigeria 2003: 2). The results, with 62 percent of the votes won by Obasanjo, were 
contested by Muhammadu Buhari of the All Nigeria People‟s Party, but the Supreme Court ruled in 
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2005 that the documented fraud did not affect the outcome (Freedom House 2011). The 2004 local 
elections, after having been postponed for two years, were noted to be „simply stage-managed by the 
ruling party‟ (Bertelsmann Foundation 2005a: 4). The 2007 presidential elections were so severely 
flawed that observers from the National Democratic Institute and Chief Observer Max Van den Berg 
from the EU-EOM concluded that the elections were the worst they had ever observed (International 
Crisis Group 2007a: 6; Enabulele and Ewere 2010: 185). Several important opposition candidates 
were excluded as they appeared on a list of officials allegedly involved in corruption (International 
Crisis Group 2007a: 2). The independence of the electoral board was seriously doubted (Suberu 2007: 
98). Furthermore, observers witnessed ballot stuffing, under-age voting, intimidation of voters and a 
flawed voter registration. The ruling party did little to avoid political violence and used it as a pretext 
to arrest opposition figures (International Crisis Group 2007a: 4-5; Human Rights Watch 2007: 11-
21). The elections were won by President Yar‟Adua from the ruling People‟s Democratic Party (PDP), 
who was appointed by Obasanjo as his successor. At his inauguration Yar‟Adua acknowledged the 
elections had been flawed, and immediately promised comprehensive electoral reform. In August 
2007, an electoral reform panel was set up, composed of 23 members representing diverse interests. 
However, doubts about electoral reform soon emerged after the release of the panel‟s report in 
December 2008 (Shola Omotola 2010: 6-7). In 2010, however, after a long period of illness, Yar‟Adua 
was succeeded by Goodluck Jonathan. Jonathan was re-elected in April 2011 in what were believed to 
be the fairest elections in Nigeria, but also the bloodiest, since political violence instigated by the main 
opposition candidate resulted in more than 800 deaths (EU-EOM Nigeria 2011; Human Rights Watch 
2011a).   
 
2.1.6.2. EU democracy promotion  
After Nigeria‟s return to civilian rule in 1999, the EU lifted the sanctions it had imposed in the early 
1990s. In 2001, a Common Position was adopted, outlining the main areas of cooperation between the 
EU and Nigeria. Democracy-building measures were announced and a close political dialogue was 
envisaged (Council of the EU 2001b). Following the 2003 presidential and gubernatorial elections, 
which had been supported with EDF funds, the Council Presidency referred to the elections as „an 
important step for the democratic process in Nigeria‟, but noted the „serious irregularities and 
instances of fraud‟ observed by the EU-EOM and called on the Nigerian authorities to settle disputes 
peacefully and prosecute those responsible for political violence (Council of the EU 2003b). Council 
Conclusions adopted in November 2003 reiterated the predominantly positive approach and 
congratulated the Nigerian authorities with their efforts to consolidate democracy, while underlining 
the EU‟s willingness to support these processes (Council of the EU 2003c). Political dialogue was 
relaunched in 2004 in the format of a Ministerial Troika, but it hardly focused on democratisation 
(Council of the EU 2004a). Besides political dialogue, the EU also invested in capacity-building for 
democracy. During 2003-2009, numerous macro- en microprojects were financed by the EIDHR to 
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support civil society in projects regarding freedom of the press, strengthening civil society, promoting 
human rights, participation in the democratic process, etc. Moreover, an enormous amount was 
invested in the 2007 elections. A €40 million programme was signed covering the pre- en post-election 
phase, and the EU delegation took the lead in establishing a joint donor basket fund, which focused on 
building technical capacity of the electoral board, as well as on the role of civil society in the elections 
(Adetula et al. 2010: 6). Unlike in 2003, the EU was fairly critical about the 2007 presidential 
elections, stating its disappointment about the lack of progress in relation to the 2003 elections, the 
violence, organisational difficulties and irregularities. Nonetheless, the possibility of sanctions was not 
raised, and the EU underlined its continued commitment to dialogue and engagement (Council of the 
EU 2007a). High-level political dialogue was relaunched in May 2008 with the new leaders. However, 
democracy was only a minor topic in the dialogue, and there was little criticism on Nigeria‟s flawed 
electoral process. Instead, the EU took note of the readiness of the Nigerian authorities to address 
electoral flaws and it was agreed that the EU would finance this process (Council of the EU 2008c). At 
a Ministerial Troika in May 2009, it was agreed to step up political dialogue and cooperation under a 
new strategy „Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward‟, an initiative under the Joint Africa-EU Strategic 
Partnership. Dialogue would be held once a year at Ministerial Troika level, twice a year at Senior 
Officials level and at least once each Council Presidency at ambassadors level. The EU‟s willingness 
to support the electoral reform process was re-emphasised (Council of the EU 2009h). Moreover, it 
was agreed to make „Governance and human rights‟ a priority theme for the EU-Nigeria political 
dialogue and the EU intended to step up financial support in the governance sector to 50-60 percent of 
the funds available under the 10
th
 EDF (European Parliament 2009d). The EU sent an observer team to 
observe the presidential elections in 2011, and Commissioner Barroso immediately congratulated 
President Goodluck Jonathan on his re-election (European Commission 2011b).   
 
2.1.7. Rwanda 
2.1.7.1. Liberal democracy in Rwanda 
After the 1990-1993 civil war in Rwanda, the Arusha agreements were signed, which established 
transitional institutions and foresaw multi-party elections in 1999. The transitional government, 
eventually extended until 2003, was dominated by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), the former 
Tutsi rebel movement in Rwanda. Although individuals from other political parties had been included 
in the government, they were weakened (Sidiropoulos 2002: 81), leading to the resignation of five 
Hutu Ministers in 1995, including prime minister Faustin Twagiramungu. In 2000, several other 
prominent politicians, including the speaker of the parliament and President Bizimungu, were forced 
to resign (Longman 2011: 32-33). Elections held since 2001 show an immense popularity of President 
Kagame and the RPF, but this should be seen in the context of restricted civil-political rights. 
Divergent opinions are dismissed as „genocidal ideology‟, which is prohibited by the constitution. 
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Independent newspapers
19
 and human rights organisations
20
 have faced intimidation, arrests and 
harassment of their members (International Crisis Group 2002a; Reyntjens 2006: 1104-1107; 
Longman 2011: 28-29). A parliamentary report in 2004 recommended banning five NGOs on the basis 
of genocidal ideology (Silva-Leander 2008: 1614; Longman 2011: 29-30). Moreover, political parties 
closely identified with the genocide, as well as parties based on ethnicity or religion, are prohibited 
(Longman 2011: 33-34). As such, the Party for Democracy and Regeneration was banned in 2001 and 
its leader, former President Bizimungu, was arrested and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment 
(Reyntjens 2006: 1104-1107; Beswick 2010a: 235). In the context of the 2003 elections, the 
opposition party with the largest support base, the Hutu-based Democratic Republican Movement, was 
declared illegal (Longman 2011: 33; Silva-Leander 2008: 1613). In 2009, a controversial press law 
was signed that allowed the government to regulate journalists and review the content of publications 
(Longman 2011: 36).  
 
Local elections held in 2001 were criticised by human rights organisations for the lack of pluralism 
allowed (Ibid.: 38-39). The 2003 constitution was adopted in a referendum in April 2003, but 
campaigning had been exclusively in support of the text (Reyntjens 2006: 1108). The EU-EOM found 
numerous instances of fraud and irregularities in the 2003 presidential and parliamentary elections. 
Moreover, there was an uneven competition, with Kagame and the ruling party dominated the 
campaign (EU-EOM Rwanda 2003: 4). Faustin Twagiramungu, who ran as an independent candidate, 
faced considerable harassment and intimidation from the RPF and its supporters (Beswick 2010a: 
236). In the 2008 parliamentary elections, several irregularities were noted, the campaign was marred 
by intimidation and there was hardly any debate between contestants (EU-EOM Rwanda 2008: 3-5). 
In the run-up to the 2010 presidential elections, Human Right Watch observed increased threats, 
intimidation, arrests and violence against opposition candidates or independent journalists (Human 
Rights Watch 2010b). The vice-president of the Green Party, Rwisereka, was murdered amidst serious 
suspicions that the government was behind the murder. In the aftermath of the elections, opposition 
leaders Victoire Ingabire (FDU-Inkingi) and Bernard Ntaganda (PS-Imberakuri) were arrested 
(Human Rights Watch 2011b; Human Rights Watch 2010c). Regarding the 2010 presidential 
elections, the Commonwealth observer mission noted a „lack of critical opposition voices‟ 
(Commonwealth Secretariat 2010: 30). 
 
2.1.7.2. EU democracy promotion 
Despite the many violations of democratic principles noted above, the EU has mainly focused on 
positive measures in Rwanda. This is shown in a 2001 Common Position, in which the EU expressed 
support for the democratisation process in Rwanda and encouraged the government to „guarantee 
                                                     
19
 E.g. Umuseso, Umuvugizi, Umurabyo and Umuco 
20
 E.g. Liprodhor, Association rwandaise pour la défense des droits de la personne et des libertés publiques and 
Association rwandaise pour la défense des droits de l‟homme 
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effective protection of the civil and political rights‟ (Council of the EU 2001c). The disbursement of 
electoral support for the 2003 elections was delayed because of the allegations of fraud, but was 
eventually paid at the end of the year (Hayman 2006: 115). In a public declaration, the EU called the 
elections „a fundamental step in the country‟s national reconciliation process‟, although the EU-
EOM‟s observations concerning intimidation and arrests of the opposition were also noted (Council of 
the EU 2003d; Council of the EU 2003e). Similarly, Council Conclusions adopted in December 2003 
congratulated Rwanda with the completion of its electoral process, while calling on Kagame to ensure 
respect for constitutional rights (Council of the EU 2003f). In 2004, the Council Presidency issued two 
public declarations about violations of democratic principles in Rwanda. The first concerned the 
sentencing of Pasteur Bizimungu and stated that the trial had not been fair nor impartial (Council of 
the EU 2004b). The second followed the parliamentary report on genocidal ideology and raised 
concern about the interpretation of the term „genocidal ideology‟, calling on the government of 
Rwanda to respect the freedom of speech, association and expression (Council of the EU 2004c). 
Political dialogue under Article 8 started in 2004 (European Parliament 2008). Despite the critical EU-
EOM assessment of the 2008 parliamentary elections, Commissioner Michel called the elections 
„important steps towards the consolidation of democracy in Rwanda‟ (European Commission 2008b). 
The EU did not send an observer team to the 2010 presidential elections (EU business 2010, August). 
However, in July 2010, Catherine Ashton issued a declaration in which she firmly condemned the 
murder of the president of the Green Party and of three other public figures in July 2010 and urged the 
government of Rwanda to investigate these murders (Council of the EU 2010d). In August 2010, 
Ashton noted to be „concerned about the serious incidents which marred the pre-electoral period‟ and 
recommended further opening of the political space. However, the suspension of development 
assistance has not been seriously considered. On the contrary, Rwanda is receiving more and more aid 
from the EU, which is to a great extent provided by sectoral and general budget support. For example, 
in 2008, the Rwandan government was rewarded for its progress on the MDGs with an MDG Contract 
involving €175 million in general budget support (European Commission 2008g).  
 
2.1.8. Guinea 
2.1.8.1. Liberal democracy in Guinea 
Multi-party democracy was introduced in 1991 under President Lansana Conté who seized power in 
1984, but elections organised in 1993 and 1998 were plagued by voter intimidation and government 
repression. The main opposition candidate, Alpha Condé, was arrested in 1998 and was only released 
four years later (International Crisis Group 2003a: 4). In November 2001, Conté organised a national 
referendum in which a constitutional amendment was adopted allowing him to remain in office for a 
third term. The referendum was boycotted by the opposition and was believed to be seriously flawed, 
which made the opposition decide to boycott further elections (Center for Systemic Peace 2008b). In 
the legislative elections that followed in June 2002, votes were not even counted, but simply divided 
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amongst the ruling party and those opposition parties that did not boycott the elections (Bertelsmann 
Foundation 2007a). Presidential elections in December 2003 were characterised by fraud and vote 
rigging and resulted in a landslide victory by President Conté (Center for Systemic Peace 2008b). In 
2004, several opposition leaders were arrested for alleged coup plots (International Crisis Group 2005: 
5). Starting from the end of 2004, however, the government appointed a new prime minister, Cellou 
Dallein Diallo after the post of prime minister had been vacant for eight months. In 2005, a 
programme of electoral reform was started. Electoral lists were revised, privately owned radio and 
television stations were allowed and a new electoral commission was created representing opposition, 
ruling party, civil society and government bureaucracy. Municipal elections held in 2005 were seen as 
an improvement from previous elections, with equal campaigning time for the ruling party and the 
opposition (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007a; International Crisis Group 2006b: 2). However, these 
positive steps were halted in 2006, when Conté dismissed the prime minister. Moreover, peaceful 
demonstrations against the high cost of living in 2006-2007 were suppressed with brutal police force. 
In June 2006, at least 13 people were killed and many more injured after security forces fired on 
unarmed protestors (Human Rights Watch 2006). In 2007, security forces killed more than 130 people 
when opening fire on protestors (Freedom House 2011). In order to stem the protests, Conté appointed 
Lansana Kouyaté as prime minister, who was chosen from a list put forward by trade unions and civil 
society organisations. However, Conté hardly took his new prime minister into account, and in 2008, 
the prime minister was replaced by a close ally (International Crisis Group 2008c). Legislative 
elections were repeatedly planned and postponed over 2007-2008. In December 2008, Conté died in 
office, and a military junta led by Dadis Camara took power. Initial hopes that the junta was 
committed to democratic transition were dashed when Camara announced he would stand for 
elections, despite earlier promises that no member of the junta would participate. Moreover, in 
September 2009, about 160 protestors were killed and many women were raped by security forces in 
an opposition rally against the flawed transition process (International Crisis Group 2009a). In January 
2010, the military junta announced that the military would no longer stand as a candidate in 
presidential elections. Presidential elections were held in June and October 2010 and were won by 
Alpha Condé with 52 percent of the vote in the second round. The elections led to political violence, 
often along ethnic lines, but were deemed legitimate by most observers, including the EU-EOM 
(Freedom House 2011; Arieff 2011: 8-10; EU-EOM Guinea 2011).   
 
2.1.8.2. EU democracy promotion  
Since the early 2000s, the EU has actively pressured President Conté‟s regime for democratic reform. 
After the 2001 referendum, the EU called for „observance of constitutional rules, preservation of 
checks and balances, liberalisation of the media and the establishment of a framework for a fair and 
transparent electoral process‟ (Council of the EU 2001d). A demarche was undertaken to push for the 
referendum to be held in democratic conditions. In December 2001, Special Representative for the 
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Mano River Region Hans Dahlgren urged for a postponement of the legislative elections and an 
invitation of international observers. After an EU mission concluded in April 2002 that the minimum 
conditions for legislative elections were not respected, EU electoral assistance was suspended. In 
January 2003, the EU again decided not to support presidential elections after a discussion between 
Commissioner Nielson and Special Representative Dahlgren and the Guinean authorities (Laakso et 
al. 2007a: 83; International Crisis Group 2003a: 9). When the new CSP for Guinea was discussed in 
the EDF committee in June 2003, it was blocked because of the lack of democratic reform (Laakso et 
al. 2007a: 84). In August 2003, the European Commission proposed to open consultations under 
Article 96 and in May 2004, the proposal was endorsed by the Council. While consultations first 
yielded few results (International Crisis Group 2005: 13), finally an action plan was agreed in which 
the Guinean authorities proposed to liberalise airwaves and to organise local elections in 2005 and 
parliamentary elections in June 2007. After a follow-up mission, the EU concluded that there was 
willingness on the part of the Guinean authorities to implement the plan. Nonetheless, the EU 
suspended all aid, except for programmes to improve the living conditions of the most disadvantaged 
people and to support civil society or the democratisation process (Council of the EU 2005c). After the 
set-up of an electoral commission and the liberalisation of media outlets in 2006, the EU partially 
lifted these measures (International Crisis Group 2007b: 13). After the appointment of a prime 
minister of consensus in May 2007, the EU started political dialogue with the newly appointed prime 
minister on the progress made in the framework of the Article 96 consultations (Council of the EU 
2007b). At the same time, the EU firmly condemned the death of several protestors in a clash with 
security forces in June 2006 (Council of the EU 2006b) and during the protests in January-February 
2007. Moreover, aid was not fully resumed because there had not been enough progress on legislative 
elections and Conté was reluctant to cede powers to the prime minister (European Commission 
2008c). 
 
Consultations under Article 96 were reopened after the December 2008 coup d’état, and appropriate 
measures taken in 2005 were extended (Council of the EU 2009i). After the attacks on demonstrators 
in September 2009, the Council imposed a weapons embargo, targeted sanctions against those 
responsible for the violence and halted the application of the fisheries agreement (Council of the EU 
2009j; Council of the EU 2010e; Council of the EU 2009k). Although the 2010 presidential elections 
were positively assessed by the EU-EOM and strongly welcomed by Commissioner Piebalgs and High 
Representative Catherine Ashton (European Commission 2010), it was decided that a new CSP could 
only be signed after legislative elections (European Commission 2011c).  
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2.1.9. Côte d’Ivoire 
2.1.9.1. Liberal democracy in Côte d’Ivoire 
Côte d‟Ivoire turned to multiparty democracy in 1990 and subsequent elections were easily won by 
long-time ruling president Houphouët-Boigny. When Houphouët-Boigny died in office in 1993, he 
was replaced by Konan Bédié. Bédié introduced the requirement of Ivoirité for presidential candidates, 
meaning that both parents need to be born in Ivory Coast. This provision was meant to exclude 
Ouattara, the popular former prime minister who was half Burkina, from running for the 1995 
elections. Ouattara‟s exclusion made him popular amongst the northerners, many of whom had 
difficulties to prove their origins. In 1999, Bédié was ousted in a coup led by General Robert Guei. 
Although Guei promised to hold inclusive multiparty elections, he renewed the Ivoirité requirement 
and Ouattara was again prevented from participating in the October 2000 presidential elections. These 
were won by Laurent Gbagbo with 60 percent of the votes. Guei tried to hold on to power by 
disbanding the electoral commission and claiming victory, but popular protests forced him to cede the 
presidency to Gbagbo (Chirot 2006: 68-71). However, northerners, who had seen their candidate 
Ouattara excluded, called for new elections. This led to severe political violence, in which it is 
believed Gbagbo‟s government was equally responsible (Human Rights Watch 2000). Moreover, the 
citizenship question remained unresolved under Gbagbo‟s presidency. In December 2000, 
parliamentary elections were held, again excluding Ouattara. In January 2001, citizenship rules were 
even further restricted (Center for Systemic Peace 2008c). Nonetheless, local elections were held in 
March 2001 including Ouattara‟s party Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR), which won most of 
the seats. In August 2002, Gbagbo formed a government of unity with members of the RDR (US State 
Department 2011b).  
 
These positive steps were halted in September 2002, when the Mouvement Patriotique de Côte 
d’Ivoire (MPCI), rebellious military personnel exiled in Burkina Faso, attacked government ministries 
in Abidjan, Bouake and Korhogo. After it was suppressed in Abidjan, the rebellion withdrew to the 
north and the centre of the country. In the west, two other rebel movements, the Mouvement Populaire 
Ivorien du Grand Ouest (MPIGO) and the Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MPJ) fought for 
western cities. The war led to a complete division of the country, with the MPCI in the north, MPIGO 
and MPJ in the west and the government in the south (Blé Kessé 2005: 116-118). In December 2002, 
the three rebel groups formed the Forces Nouvelles. The insurgency was used by Gbagbo to eliminate 
his political opponents. Without any evidence of their involvement, he accused Ouattara and Guei. 
The latter was killed by gendarmes, but Ouattara found refuge in the German embassy (International 
Crisis Group 2003b: 11). Subsequent peacebrokering deals tried to resolve the underlying political 
problems. The January 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement included the revision of the conditions for 
the eligibility of the presidency and aimed to improve conditions for Ivorians with foreign origin. A 
prime minister with executive powers would be appointed, and a government of national unity would 
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rule until general elections in 2005 (Ibid.: 31-32). However, the government fell short in implementing 
the agreement. Seydou Diarra was appointed as prime minister but Gbagbo sidelined him in important 
decisions. Violence against foreigners mounted under Gbagbo‟s presidency and in March 2004, 
government forces opened fire on an opposition march, killing about 120 civilians (Klaas 2008: 118). 
Furthermore, the freedom of press came under attack as the Young Patriots, youth militia loyal to 
President Gbagbo, started attacking opposition newspapers (Amnesty International 2006). Presidential 
elections, which were originally planned for 2005, were continuously postponed. In October 2006, 
Gbagbo‟s presidency was extended and a new prime minister was appointed, Banny, who would 
assume full responsibility over the peace process. After a few months, however, Banny was sidelined 
by Gbagbo (International Crisis Group 2007e: 2).  
 
A direct dialogue between President Gbagbo and the Forces Nouvelles, mediated by President of 
Burkina Faso Blaise Compoaré, led to the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement in March 2007. The 
Agreement reinforced Gbagbo with his constitutional powers, while Guillaume Soro of the Forces 
Nouvelles was appointed as prime minister. This interim government would implement a programme 
of identification of the population and organise open and transparent elections (International Crisis 
Group 2007e: 2-3;US State Department 2011b). In 2009, a new voter list was approved by the UN. 
Presidential elections were held in November 2010 and despite the violence and tensions between the 
main candidates, international observers concluded they were generally free and fair (Zounmenou 
2011: 50). However, after the second round, President Gbagbo refused to recognise the result 
announced by the electoral commission that Ouattara had won by 54 percent of the vote. The 
Constitutional Council declared Ouattara as the winner, but Gbagbo held on to the presidency, leading 
to violent conflict with Ouattara and his supporters (International Crisis Group 2011a: 1-9). Security 
forces controlled by Gbagbo as well as militia loyal to him severely cracked down on Ouattara 
supporters (Human Rights Watch 2011c). Gbagbo was arrested in April 2011 by forces loyal to 
Ouattara, supported by French troops.  
 
2.1.9.2. EU democracy promotion  
After the 1999 military coup, the EU opened consultations under Article 366(a) of the Lomé 
Agreement, and aid disbursements were proceeded only gradually (European Commission 2000). 
Although the new constitution adopted in 2000 renewed the provisions on national criteria for 
presidential candidates, the EU welcomed the constitution. Moreover, when General Guei announced 
his candidacy, there was no official reaction from the EU. Nonetheless, when the Supreme Court ruled 
in October 2000 that Ouattara did not meet the nationality rules and could thus not run for elections, 
the EU suspended electoral assistance (Council of the EU 2000a; Agence France Presse 18 October 
2000; 19 October 2000). When Laurent Gbagbo assumed the presidency, he was supported by the EU, 
ignoring claims by Ouattara‟s supporters that the elections should be held again. Commissioner for 
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Development Nielson declared that new elections were desirable, but would not be a condition for EU 
development cooperation (Agence France Presse 26 October 2000; 27 October 2000; 9 November 
2000). However, the EU pushed for the inclusion of Ouattara‟s party in the December 2000 legislative 
elections (Council of the EU 2000b). The failure to do this was regarded as „detrimental to the return 
of democracy in Côte d‟Ivoire‟ (Council of the EU 2000c) and the EU suspended electoral assistance 
to the elections (Assemblée Nationale de la France 2000b). On 22 January 2001, the Council opened 
consultations under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement to discuss the lack of inclusiveness of the 
October and December 2000 elections, as well as the violence committed against civilians during the 
transition period. The EU was encouraged by the commitments made by the Ivorian authorities and by 
some encouraging signs including the inclusive and transparent local elections held in March 2001, the 
start of a national dialogue and the set-up of a national reconciliation committee (Council of the EU 
2001e). For this reason, the EU did not suspend ongoing programmes but approved new programmes 
on a gradual basis (Council of the EU 2001e). In February 2002, full cooperation was resumed, 
although Gbagbo still needed to deliver on some of the promises made, including the investigation of 
violence (Council of the EU 2002a). Moreover, inclusive legislative elections and presidential 
elections were not yet held.  
 
From then onwards, the EU gave Gbagbo the benefit of the doubt, which was clear in September 2002, 
when the EU condemned the attacks „against a legitimate government‟ (Council of the EU 2002b). 
The EU supported the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, the implementation of which was followed up by 
the Commission‟s head of delegation (European Parliament 2004b). However, optimism was scattered 
after the attacks on an opposition march in March 2004 which was interpreted by the EU as calling 
into question the reconciliation process (Council of the EU 2004d). Hence, in August 2004 the 
Commission requested the Council to open consultations under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement 
(European Commission 2004), but this was refused by the Council. Instead, the EU supported the 
weapons embargo and asset freezes of the UN (Youngs 2006: 349), as well as mediation efforts by the 
AU and ECOWAS (Council of the EU 2006c; Council of the EU 2007c). After the appointment in 
2006 of prime minister Banny, the EU started to discuss the resumption of development assistance 
with the newly appointed prime minister (Côte d‟Ivoire et Communauté européenne 2008: 27). The 
Ouagadougou agreement allowed the signature of a new CSP and NIP in 2007, and the EU agreed to 
support the implementation of the agreement with a view to the 2010 presidential elections. As such, 
the EU financed the identification process and provided electoral assistance.
21
 In addition, an EU-
EOM was sent to the 2010 elections. Immediately after the December 2010 elections, the EU 
recognised Ouattara as the winner and called on all parties to ensure a peaceful transition. Targeted 
sanctions were imposed on President Gbagbo and 124 of his staff, as well as on 13 economic entities 
that remained in the hands of Gbagbo, such as the Port of Abidjan and San Pedro (Council of the EU 
                                                     
21
 See website EU delegation in Côte d‟Ivoire,  
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/cote_ivoire/projects/list_of_projects/projects_fr.htm (last accessed 1 July 2012) 
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2010f; European Parliament 2011a). Moreover, several declarations were issued by High 
Representative Ashton denouncing Gbagbo‟s resort to violence and unwillingness to leave power. In 
April 2011, due to the gravity of the situation, the EU strengthened the sanctions on Gbagbo‟s aides, 
while lifting the sanctions on economic entities (Council of the EU 2011c; European Parliament 
2011b).  
 
2.1.10. Zimbabwe 
2.1.10.1. Liberal democracy in Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe has been ruled by Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic 
Front (ZANU-PF) since 1980, when Mugabe came to power after a guerrilla against the white 
minority regime. After years of political unrest in the 1990s, a new constitution was drafted in 1999 
and put to a referendum. The constitution was turned down after a successful campaign by the newly 
formed opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The 2000 parliamentary 
elections, which was marred by intimidation, resulted in a narrow victory for ZANU-PF, which won 
62 seats, compared to 57 for the MDC. According to international observers, the elections would have 
been won by the MDC had the elections been free and fair (Laakso 2002: 437-457). Conscious of the 
growing success of the opposition, Mugabe‟s government turned increasingly violent towards the 
opposition, civil society and journalists. MDC members were harassed, assaulted, arrested and even 
killed (International Crisis Group 2002c; Amnesty International 2001c). Moreover, new legislation 
enabled the government to silence dissident voices. The 2002 Public Order and Security Act allowed 
the government to interpret criticism on the government or peaceful demonstrations as a threat to 
public security. The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (2002) gave the government 
increased powers to intervene in the media, required all journalists to register with a government-
dominated media commission and banned foreign journalists (Amnesty International 2003). In the 
2002 presidential elections, several domestic observers and international observers were refused by the 
electoral board. According to a Commonwealth observer report, the elections were marred by 
politically motivated violence and intimidation (Baker 2002: 1145). A few days after the elections, 
more than 1,400 people were arrested nationwide, most of them poll agents or observers from civil 
society (Amnesty International 2002a). The local elections in September 2002 were marred by 
political violence and about 700 MDC candidates were prevented from participating (Amnesty 
International 2002b). In 2004, a bill was adopted that banned international human rights groups and 
prevented civil society organisations that received foreign funding from working on human rights 
(Amnesty International 2004b). In the run-up to the 2005 parliamentary elections, some progress was 
made with the nomination of an electoral commission and the enactment of a new electoral law. 
However, the elections, which were boycotted by a large part of the MDC, were marred by 
intimidation of the opposition. Moreover, the electoral process remained strongly in favour of the 
ruling party (Human Rights Watch 2005). Intimidation of the opposition continued in 2006-2007. For 
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example, in March 2007, 50 MDC activists were arrested after attending a prayer meeting, defying a 
three-month blanket ban imposed by the authorities (Amnesty International 2007).  
 
In the run-up to the March 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections, Mugabe introduced a 
number of constitutional amendments to increase his chances of victory, including the harmonisation 
of presidential and parliamentary elections and an increase in seats in ZANU-PF strongholds 
(International Crisis Group 2007c: 4). Parliamentary elections in March 2008 were surrounded by 
violence against the opposition, while the campaigning period was dominated by ZANU-PF, and the 
electoral commission, judiciary and security forces were clearly supporting the ruling party (Badza 
2008). Nevertheless, the MDC won with 99 seats to 97 seats for Mugabe. The results of the 
presidential elections were contested. After initial signs that Tsvangirai had won, the electoral 
commission found that Tsvangirai secured only 47.9 percent and a run-off vote was needed. Facing 
increased political violence, Tsvangirai withdrew from the poll. In an attempt to settle the political 
crisis, in September 2008, the Global Political Agreement (GPA) was reached between the MDC and 
ZANU-PF, which allowed Mugabe to stay president but created the post of prime minister for 
Tsvangirai and divided minister posts between the two parties. However, Mugabe assured that the 
most important ministries were held by ZANU-PF. Especially Mugabe‟s continuing dominance over 
the security forces is problematic, as it has allowed the perseverance of arrests and violence against the 
MDC, human rights activists and trade unions (Werner and Chitiyo 2011: 42).  
 
2.1.10.2. EU democracy promotion 
The EU has from 2000 onwards strongly reacted to the deteriorating political situation in Zimbabwe. 
In April 2000, the EU threatened to cut €120 million if the 2000 parliamentary elections were to be 
postponed (Laakso 2002: 450-451). The violent campaigning during the 2000 parliamentary elections 
was severely condemned by the Council (Council of the EU 2000d; Council of the EU 2000e). After 
the 2000 elections, the EU made several public declarations condemning the lack of press freedom and 
the violence against the opposition (Council of the EU 2000f; Council of the EU 2000g; Council of the 
EU 2001f). In February 2001, an attempt was made to start political dialogue under Article 8 of the 
Cotonou Agreement, but this did not get any further than some quarrels about the agenda. In June 
2001, the EU stated that urgent progress was needed on the end of political violence, international 
observation to the 2002 presidential elections, press freedom and the independence of the judiciary 
(Council of the EU 2001g). In October 2001, the EU opened consultations under Article 96. During 
the consultations, there was serious disagreement between the EU and the Zimbabwean delegation on 
whether foreign journalists and EU observers should be allowed to monitor the 2002 presidential 
elections (Council of the EU 2002c). Furthermore, the EU was discouraged by the political violence 
preceding the elections and the adoption of laws restricting civil-political rights (Council of the EU 
2002d). After the first meeting ended in a stalemate, the EU requested a letter by Foreign Minister 
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Mudenge outlining the steps to be taken towards meeting EU concerns. The latter proved 
unsatisfactory for the EU (US embassy Zimbabwe 2002a). When the Zimbabwean authorities revoked 
the visa of the head of the EU-EOM Pierre Schori, this prompted the EU to adopt appropriate 
measures against Zimbabwe (Laakso et al. 2007a: 74). All projects, except those in direct support of 
the population, were suspended and redirected to democracy assistance and projects in the social 
sectors (Council of the EU 2002e). Moreover, targeted sanctions were taken against those responsible 
for political violence, including the freezing of their assets and a visa ban. Furthermore, an arms 
embargo was imposed (Council of the EU 2002f). A few months later, the Council suspended all 
bilateral Ministerial contact with Zimbabwe (Council of the EU 2002g).  
 
Throughout 2002-2008, the Council made numerous declarations condemning violations of the 
freedom of association, speech, press and opposition. Since most development aid went through civil 
society organisations, democracy assistance took place almost entirely within the framework of the 
EIDHR. Many micro- and macro-projects were approved between 2002 and 2010, in the fields of civic 
education, freedom of the press, human rights awareness, strengthening civil society, etc. The list of 
persons subject to targeted sanctions was extended several times as a reaction to continuous violations 
of democratic principles. In the context of the 2008 parliamentary elections, several declarations and 
Council conclusions were issued to condemn the conduct of the elections, and the list of people 
targeted by sanctions was extended by 37 people and four companies (Council of the EU 2008d; 
Council of the EU 2008e). Although the GPA was welcomed and led to a first high-level visit in 
September 2009, it was made clear that sanctions could only be lifted before real progress was made in 
the implementation of the GPA (Hansen 2011: 261). Meanwhile, the EU approved positive measures 
to encourage the implementation of the agreement. Financial support was provided to the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for programmes to strengthen the electoral commission 
and to support the constitution making process.
22
 In June 2009, a Ministerial troika led by prime 
minister Tsvangirai took place in Brussels, during which it was decided to restart political dialogue 
under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement with the objective to progressively normalise EU-
Zimbabwean relations according to the implementation of the GPA. In 2010, appropriate measures 
were modified to allow support to the implementation of the GPA and for macro-economic 
stabilisation (European Commission 2012). In February 2012, the negative measures were again eased 
by removing 51 people from the visa ban and asset freeze list and prolonging appropriate measures 
under Article 96 for only six months, during which a CSP is prepared (Council of the EU 2012b; 
Council of the EU 2012c).  
 
  
                                                     
22
 Europeaid, online database:  
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/funding/beneficiaries/index.cfm?lang=fr&mode=SM&push=refine&type=gr
ant 
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2.2. Double standards in EU reactions to violations of democratic 
principles?  
After the overview of the situation of liberal democracy and the EU‟s instruments for democracy 
promotion in the ten country cases, I will now address the question whether there have been double 
standards in the EU‟s reaction. As noted in the Introductory Chapter, double standards refer to „a set of 
principles that applies differently and usually more rigorously to one group of people or circumstances 
than to another‟. Hence, if similar violations of democratic principles are met by a different response 
from the EU, this points to double standards in the EU‟s reaction. To find out whether this is the case 
for the ten country cases, I will start by comparing the response of the EU (ranging from positive to 
negative). In the following section, I will compare the gravity of violations of democratic principles.  
 
2.2.1. Comparing the EU’s reaction 
As discussed previously, the EU‟s reaction to violations of democratic principles varies between 
positive and negative measures. A distinction should also be made according to the costs of these 
instruments for sender and target, as it is often assumed that international actors are especially 
reluctant to use costly negative measures in case important interests are at stake. Costs can refer to 
social costs, in terms of a loss of legitimacy in the case of sanctions, or economic costs, when 
sanctions entail the reduction of aid, trade, or other benefits. For the sender, costs depend on the 
expected reaction of the target country and the decision-making costs (Warkotsch 2008b: 228-229). 
Political dialogue and capacity-building are positive measures that are little costly to sender and target. 
Given that most of what is said during political dialogue remains behind closed doors, social costs are 
limited. Moreover, political dialogue does not have economic implications. However, political costs 
are larger for political dialogue than for capacity-building because it is likely that the EU will express 
concerns via this instrument. Capacity-building does not inflict any material loss on the target country, 
nor is there any naming and shaming involved, since democracy assistance is mostly unknown to the 
general public and does not imply that a regime is regarded as illegitimate (Kotzian et al. 2011: 1003). 
On the contrary, capacity-building is often voluntary and agreed with the recipient (Youngs 2009a: 
898). However, capacity-building is potentially politically intrusive when certain sectors are supported 
that may endanger the regime, including elections, the free press or human rights organisations. It is 
no coincidence that most EU democracy assistance in more sensitive areas is funded by the EIDHR, 
which is implemented without consent of the government (Kotzian et al. 2011: 1003; Börzel and Risse 
2009: 46).  
 
Negative measures may range from pure naming and shaming strategies to sanctions. Public 
declarations or Council Conclusions in which the EU‟s discontent about a certain situation is 
expressed, are less costly than sanctions, given that there is no direct economic cost for sender nor 
target. For this reason, Kotzian et al. (2011: 999) assess declarations as „non-intrusive‟ and „weak‟ 
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negative measures. In terms of decision-making costs, although public declarations are a CFSP 
responsibility and thus subject to unanimity rule, discussion on their content is mostly smoother when 
compared to sanctions, given that the implications are smaller (Warkotsch 2008b: 229). Since 
declarations are issued on a daily basis, discussions are held via the COREU
23
 network on the basis of 
an initiative by the High Representative of the Foreign and Security Policy (formerly the Council 
Presidency), a member state or the Commission. Public declarations are often issued by the Council 
Presidency without prior coordination, on the basis of earlier agreed language, in case immediate 
action is required. Even so, public declarations entail social costs in terms of naming and shaming. For 
the sender, concern about democratic principles endangers the main function of diplomacy: 
communication among states and maintaining good relations (Vincent 1986: 132). For this reason, the 
need to find a common position often results in a weakening of the wording („is worried‟, „is 
concerned‟) or a lowest common denominator (Vončina 2011: 172 and 180).  
 
Sanctions (aid suspension, trade embargoes, CFSP sanctions) are without doubt the strongest and most 
costly instrument. As sanctions are punitive measures (Kotzian et al. 2011: 1005), they bear the 
greatest risk for the imposing country in terms of a potential loss of trade relations or market share, 
countermeasures by the target country or a reassessment of the latter‟s relations with the sanctioning 
country (Warkotsch 2008b: 228-229). Moreover, decision-making costs are high. Sanctions taken in 
the framework of the CFSP should be adopted on the basis of unanimity (De Vries and Hazelzet 2005: 
98). For the suspension of development cooperation under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, 
however, specific decision-making rules apply. The Council decides on the opening of Article 96 
consultations on the basis of a proposal by the European Commission or a member state (Council of 
the EU 2000h). However, up until today, Article 96 consultations have never been formally proposed 
by a member state (anonymous interview, February 2012). A partial suspension of cooperation can be 
decided by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), while full suspension of cooperation is decided on the 
basis of unanimity (Portela 2010: 29). Since in most cases, development assistance is only partially 
suspended, QMV applies in most cases. Nonetheless, even in these cases, the member states will 
search for consensus in the Council (Laakso et al. 2007a: 27). Decision-making costs are a bit lower 
for the suspension of budget support, given that this can be done unilaterally, while Article 96 is a 
cumbersome procedure, which requires a Council approval, several months of consultations, etc. A 
third way of suspending aid is when the adoption of a new CSP is postponed. Decision-making costs 
are lower here, as it does not involve the cumbersome Article 96 procedure. Moreover, in this case 
adopting a new CSP amongst controversy about violations of democratic principles entails decision-
making costs, as the member states may give a negative opinion via their representatives in the EDF 
committee, which the Commission is obliged to take into account (Council of the EU 2007f). 
                                                     
23
 The COREU network is a mailing network used for exchanging information between Member States‟ Foreign 
Ministries and the Commission and consultation on political analyses relating to multilateral questions or third 
country situations.  
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However, in the long run postponing a CSP is not sustainable without invoking the Article 96 
procedure, as was the case in Guinea (see supra).  
 
Sanctions are also costly to the target country, since they imply both an economic and a social cost 
(Warkotsch 2008b: 229). The economic cost should not be exaggerated. In the case of aid restrictions, 
the EU mostly redirects assistance from government to civil society in order to prevent causing 
hardship for the population (Portela 2010: 131). However, some CFSP sanctions may have the effect 
of an indirect trade embargo. This was the case in Côte d‟Ivoire, where the Port of Abidjan and San 
Pedro were put on the list of companies which saw their assets frozen, and in Zimbabwe, where 
several state companies were on the list. For most CFSP sanctions, however, the social cost is more 
important than the economic cost. Indeed, arms embargoes, the freezing of personal assets or travel 
bans do not have significant economic consequences. For the sender, the impossibility of exporting 
arms may have economic consequences, but these do not compensate for the fact that providing arms 
to an undemocratic regime would be strongly criticised by the public. For the target, the consequences 
are also predominantly social, although there are limited economic consequences, namely in case bank 
accounts are blocked. In fact, assets freezes and travel bans are often referred to as „smart‟ or 
„targeted‟ sanctions, which seek to punish those responsible for violations of democratic principles, 
while minimising the consequences for the population (Kreutz 2005: 6). Moreover, for CFSP 
sanctions, there are many loopholes in the implementation (Eriksson 2005: 120). The social cost of 
being regarded as a pariah of the international community is however substantial (Portela 2010: 98). 
Indeed, there is a lot of media attention for these sanctions. For example, in 2007 Gordon Brown 
provoked a media storm when he decided not to attend the EU-Africa summit in Lisbon because 
Robert Mugabe would be present (BBC News 2007, September). 
 
Mentioning decision-making costs, it should be noted that the EP does not have a say in the adoption 
of negative measures. Regarding the decision to open consultations under Article 96, it is merely 
provided that the EP will be immediately and fully informed on the opening of consultations and on 
the adoption of appropriate measures (Council of the EU 2006d). Moreover, the EP does not have a 
right of approval or scrutiny over the European Development Fund, which falls outside the budget of 
the EU (Maxwell and Herbert 2012). Similarly, on the adoption of Common Positions, which are at 
the basis of CFSP sanctions, the EP is merely consulted and informed, while the Lisbon treaty 
provides that „[The High Representative] shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are 
duly taken into consideration‟ (Treaty on European Union, Article 36). The EP can however exercise 
pressure on Commission and Council by adopting resolutions and asking parliamentary questions. 
Nonetheless, there were cases where the EP has been decisive in the adoption of negative measures. 
After the EP rejected the draft agreement for an EU-Guinea fisheries partnership in the light of the 
violence in September 2009, the Council and Commission decided to cancel the fisheries agreement, 
although the EP‟s opinion was only advisory (Europolitics 2009, October).  
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The list in Table 1 thus summarises the EU‟s instruments for democracy promotion in the period 
2000-mid-2011. In the case of Kenya, there was no suspension of aid, but the threat thereof should be 
noted. As regards the suspension of budget support, in some cases the EU was not providing budget 
support and, as a result, it was impossible to suspend budget support.  
 
Table 1: EU reactions to violations of democratic principles, 2000 until mid-2011 
 Capacity-
building 
Political 
dialogue 
Declarations, 
Conclusions 
Budget 
support 
Art. 96 CFSP  
Eritrea + + + N/A - - 
Ethiopia + + + + - - 
Kenya + + + Threat Threat - 
Chad + + + - - - 
Niger + + + + + - 
Nigeria + + + N/A - - 
Rwanda + + + - - - 
Guinea + - + N/A + + 
Côte 
d‟Ivoire 
+ - + N/A + + 
Zimbabwe + + + N/A + + 
N/A: not applicable  
 
The main distinction is between the countries where the EU imposed sanctions (budget support, Art. 
96, CFSP sanctions) and countries where only low-cost negative measures, such as public 
declarations, were adopted. In Rwanda, Chad and Nigeria, the EU has predominantly focused on 
positive measures and lost-cost negative measures. In Chad, the EU only used declarations to react to 
the flawed electoral process, and did not publicly react to a number of key events, including the 2005 
referendum. Similarly, in Rwanda, the EU on some occasions publicly reacted to violations of 
democratic principles (e.g. after the 2003 and 2008 elections and in 2004), but sanctions were never 
seriously considered. Similarly, in Nigeria the EU has voiced concerns about the electoral process, but 
the option of sanctions never seemed on the table.  
 
In comparison, the EU has reacted with more costly negative measures in countries like Eritrea and 
Ethiopia, albeit reluctantly. In Eritrea, the imprisonment of dissident party members in 2001 provoked 
immediate reaction by the EU. Although there were no sanctions under Article 96 or the CFSP, the EU 
undertook a demarche, publicly condemned the situation, ambassadors were temporarily withdrawn 
and a new development strategy was put on hold. However, after the Country Strategy Paper was 
signed in November 2002, the EU refocused on positive measures combining political dialogue with 
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capacity-building. A new CSP was thus signed in 2009. In Ethiopia, the EU remained silent during 
violations of civil-political rights in 2000-2002. After the 2005 elections, the EU seemed reluctant to 
criticise the elections, despite clear concerns from its observer mission. Budget support was suspended 
as a reaction to the political violence in December 2005, but aid was resumed in the following year 
without any guarantee from the Ethiopian government that political prisoners would be released. 
Moreover, the EU has reacted very cautiously to the closure of political space in recent years and 
welcomed the 2010 parliamentary elections, despite concerns by its observer mission.  
 
In comparison, in Kenya, Niger, Guinea, Côte d‟Ivoire and Zimbabwe, the EU has been less reluctant 
to impose negative measures. Naming and shaming strategies have been used more forcefully in these 
countries, and the EU has adopted or threatened with sanctions. In Kenya, after the December 2007 
elections the EU immediately made clear that development assistance would not continue if no 
solution was found for the crisis. Moreover, the EU has closely followed up on the implementation of 
the power-sharing agreement. In the other cases, sanctions were adopted, either under Article 96 of the 
Cotonou Agreement (Niger, Guinea 2003, Côte d‟Ivoire 2001, Zimbabwe) or under the CFSP (Guinea 
2009, Côte d‟Ivoire 2010, Zimbabwe). In the case of Côte d‟Ivoire, there was a serious shift in the 
EU‟s preparedness to adopt costly negative measures. Whereas the 2001 Article 96 consultations only 
led to a limited and short suspension of aid, in 2010 a wide range of sanctions was taken, including 
economic sanctions.  
 
In Niger, Guinea and Zimbabwe, all projects were suspended, except those in direct support of the 
population. Moreover, in these countries, conditionality was applied more strictly compared to Côte 
d‟Ivoire (2001). Full aid could only be resumed if free and fair general elections were held. Hence, in 
the case of Guinea and Zimbabwe, sanctions were maintained for a long duration, as elections were 
postponed or were not regarded as free and fair. Moreover, in Guinea (2009) and Zimbabwe, the EU 
deployed the full arsenal of sanctions: many critical public declarations, suspension of development 
cooperation, an arms embargo and targeted sanctions against those responsible for political violence.  
 
2.2.2. Comparing liberal democracy 
In the previous paragraphs, it was concluded that negative measures were applied unevenly. However, 
this does not necessarily imply that there are double standards. Indeed, an uneven application of 
negative measures may also be related to a difference in gravity of violations of democratic principles. 
As I have indicated in the Introductory Chapter, one can only speak of double standards when a 
similar situation leads to the application of different sets of principles. Hence, the next step in my 
analysis is to compare the gravity of violations of democratic principles, and assess whether there is an 
overlap with the EU‟s negative measures. To assess the gravity of violations of democratic principles, 
a qualitative and quantitative comparison of liberal democracy is made.  
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2.2.2.1. Qualitative comparison of liberal democracy 
2.2.2.1.1. Electoral democracy  
In the overview of the cases, it was clear that elections were often characterised by flawed procedures, 
a lack of level playing field, a partial electoral board, ballot stuffing, etc. The „free and fairness‟ of 
elections is not easy to assess, and even the validity of observations from international observers has 
been questioned (see, for example, Geisler 1993: 617-620; Carothers 1997: 20-26; Baker 2002: 1153-
1155; Van Cranenburgh 2000: 30). Moreover, there have been various cases where the EU has been 
reluctant to criticise elections, despite serious concerns raised by the EU-EOM. The latter are 
politically independent and as a consequence, there is no legal obligation for the EU to follow up on 
the reports. However, EU-EOMs raise the expectation amongst voters and other stakeholders (e.g. 
human rights groups) that the EU fully stands behind these missions and that political consequences 
are drawn when a negative report is issued (Meyer-Resende 2006: 1-9). Nonetheless, as could be 
observed in the description of the cases, there are „double standards‟ in the EU‟s follow-up of critical 
observer reports. Therefore, an overview of parliamentary elections, presidential elections and 
constitutional referenda is given in Annex 1, indicating which type of elections is concerned, whether 
EU or non-EU observers monitored the elections and what their main conclusion was. Local elections 
are not included, since these are not often scrutinised by international observers. The last column 
quotes the main elements of the official EU reaction, if available. On elections, several sources were 
used, including the African Elections Database, news articles retrieved via the LexisNexis Database, 
official reports and declarations by election observer missions, academic articles, US State Department 
Yearly Human Rights Reports and the DIEM database
24. On the EU‟s reaction I used EU official 
documents, most of which were also mentioned in the case study overview. 
 
From this overview, it can be concluded that there were double standards in the EU‟s reaction to 
violations of electoral democracy. First of all, in some cases, the EU followed its observer mission and 
criticised the elections or adopted sanctions, whereas in others it did not. This is shown by the cases of 
Nigeria, Rwanda and Ethiopia, where the EU-EOM wrote a damaging report about the elections, yet 
the EU was reluctant to impose negative measures. In none of these cases, sanctions were adopted. 
The suspension of budget support in Ethiopia in 2005 was a reaction to the assault by security forces 
on peaceful demonstrators in the aftermath of the elections. On the conduct of the elections, the 2005 
public declaration only cautiously referred to the concerns of the EU-EOM. Moreover, despite 
concerns by the EU-EOM about the 2010 parliamentary elections, the High Representative referred to 
the elections as „an important moment‟ in Ethiopia‟s democratic process. A similar example is that of 
Rwanda, where the EU stated it was „obliged to point out‟ the concerns raised by its observer mission 
                                                     
24
 This is a recent project on data collection to study international election monitoring, led by Professor Judith 
Kelley. See http://sites.duke.edu/kelley/  
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after the damaging report about the 2003 elections. Although the EU was less reluctant to criticise the 
elections in Nigeria (especially those of 2007), sanctions never seemed an option.  
To a certain degree, the situation in Rwanda can be compared to that in Côte d‟Ivoire. In Rwanda, 
several opposition candidates were prevented from participating in the elections, such as the main 
opposition party Democratic Republic Movement which was banned on charges of „divisionism‟. As 
in Côte d‟Ivoire, the exclusion of certain candidates/parties was clearly motivated by the fear that 
these parties would become powerful. However, in Côte d‟Ivoire, the EU opened consultations under 
Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, while in Rwanda there hardly was any criticism.   
 
Furthermore, there were three cases where a „constitutional coup‟ was committed by the government: 
Chad, Niger and Guinea. In all three countries, the president changed the constitution to secure a third 
term in presidential elections. However, in Chad this event went more or less unnoticed, there was not 
even an official reaction by the EU. In Guinea, on the other hand, the EU strongly disapproved the 
president‟s decision to prolong his mandate. This also played a role in the decision in 2003 to open 
consultations under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, as was mentioned in the Commission 
Communication on the opening of consultations (European Commission 2003a: 2-3). Moreover, in 
Niger, the EU immediately reacted to President Tandja‟s decision to change the constitution, 
threatening with aid sanctions and eventually opening Article 96 consultations. A further similarity in 
these three countries is the opposition boycott in the elections. Indeed, in Guinea (2002) and in Chad 
(2002, 2006), the opposition boycotted the elections out of protest with electoral malconduct. 
Similarly, in Niger (2009), the opposition boycotted the August 2009 referendum and the October 
2009 elections. Yet in Guinea and Niger, the EU reacted with sanctions, whereas in Chad, it did not.  
 
2.2.2.2. Civil-political rights  
Moreover, I compared the ten country cases on the situation of civil-political rights in the period from 
2000 until mid-2011: freedom of association, freedom of the press and freedom of opposition. The 
organisations that report most frequently on these violations of civil-political rights are Amnesty 
International and the Committee to Protect Journalists. I analysed reports by these NGOs and 
compiled a list of violations of civil-political rights (Annex 2). It should be recognised that a certain 
bias is possible. For example, the UK-based organisation Amnesty International reports more often on 
Anglophone countries and countries of particular interest to the UK such as Zimbabwe. At the same 
time, I did not find a lot of evidence for other violations of civil-political rights in other sources, 
namely those mentioned in the overview of cases. The Committee to Protect Journalists reports on 
every single case where journalists are arrested or intimidated, therefore I only focused on the more 
severe cases, involving several journalists or editors.  
 
95 
 
On the basis of this overview, it can be concluded that there were double standards in the EU‟s 
reactions to violations of civil-political rights. On the one hand, taking the case of Zimbabwe it is not 
surprising that such extensive sanctions were adopted, given the continuous and high-scale violation of 
civil-political rights in the country. Similarly, in Guinea, the attention for violations of civil-political 
rights may also be related to the scope of these violations. For example, in 2007 and 2009, more than a 
hundred people were killed by security forces. On the other hand, while this can certainly explain the 
sanctions taken in 2009, the EU has from the early 2000s scrutinised Guinea‟s civil-political rights 
record and consultations were opened in 2003, much before these mass-scale events. Moreover, in 
Ethiopia, security forces equally committed severe violations of civil-political rights, including during 
student protests in the early 2000s, and especially after the 2005 elections, when more than 200 people 
were killed. However, in this case the EU was much more reluctant to impose sanctions. In Côte 
d‟Ivoire, more than 160 people were killed when security forces opened fire on an opposition march in 
March 2004, yet the Council did not agree to start Article 96 consultations.  
 
Furthermore, in a number of countries where the EU adopted or threatened with sanctions, including 
Niger and Kenya, violations of civil-political rights were much less flagrant. Although violations of 
civil-political rights increased in the context of the 2009 referendum in Niger, before this date Niger‟s 
record of civil-political rights had been better than in most other countries. Similarly, the respect for 
civil-political rights improved under President Kibaki, yet the EU did not refrain from threatening with 
sanctions after the December 2007 elections.  
 
To be fair, it should be added that violations of civil-political rights were not as frequent in Chad and 
Eritrea. However, this does not make these countries more democratic, on the contrary. In both 
countries, there are no demonstrations because of the weakness (or absence, in the case of Eritrea) of 
civil society and the opposition.   
 
2.2.2.2. Assessment of liberal democracy on the basis of quantitative indicators 
From the previous paragraphs and tables, it was clear that there is no perfect overlap between 
violations of liberal democratic principles and the EU‟s reaction. Similar violations of electoral 
democracy and civil-political rights have led to different reactions from the EU: in some cases, 
sanctions were adopted, while in others the EU did not react or only adopted low-cost negative 
measures. To strengthen the argument that there have been double standards in the EU‟s reaction to 
violations of democratic principles, I will now compare the cases on quantitative indicators on 
democratic principles.  
 
The first indicator is Freedom House‟s political rights score. This score is based on a checklist of 
questions grouped into three categories. First, questions are asked on the electoral process: are the 
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executive and parliament chosen via free and fair elections, are electoral laws fair, is there an 
inpendent electoral commission? A second set of questions focuses on political pluralism and 
participation: the freedom to form political parties, the competitiveness of elections, the freedom of 
vote, and the political rights of and electoral opportunities for minority groups. A third set of questions 
addresses the functioning of the government, focusing on whether the government has the effective 
power to govern, is accountable to the public and free from corruption.
25
 Countries are scored between 
1 (best score) and 7 (worst score).   
 
To allow comparison, the table orders the countries according to whether the EU has adopted 
sanctions (the countries in the bottom rows) or not (the countries in the top rows). If there would not 
be any double standards, the countries in the top rows would have lower scorings, as their political 
rights score would be better.  
 
Table 2: Freedom House Political Rights score 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Chad 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 
Rwanda 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Nigeria 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 
Eritrea 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Ethiopia 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 
Kenya 6 6 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 
Niger 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 
Côte d'ivoire 6 5 6 6 6 6 6 7 6 6 6 
Guinea 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 5 
Zimbabwe 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 
Source: Freedom House Freedom in the World
26
 
 
This is however not the case: although the countries in the bottom rows (Côte d‟Ivoire, Guinea, 
Zimbabwe) indeed have high political rights scores, these are not higher than the countries in the top 
rows (Chad, Rwanda). Moreover, the worst scoring countries did not necessarily face sanctions (e.g. 
(Eritrea, Chad, Rwanda), while some of those that did (Kenya, Niger) had a much better score. 
However, it should be added that Nigeria and Ethiopia, where the EU was reluctant to impose negative 
measures, scored better on political rights.  
 
Moreover, the case for double standards becomes even stronger when taking into account the time 
dimension. Although the situation of political rights has deteriorated in countries like Ethiopia (2010), 
Nigeria (2008) and Chad (2007), the EU remained reluctant to impose negative measures. Moreover, 
                                                     
25
 See Freedom House website: http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=364&year=2010 
26
 Note that the year refers to the year on which the report was based, not the year in which the report was issued.  
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there was not always an overlap between the EU‟s adoption of negative measures and a deterioration 
of the political rights score. In Zimbabwe, the EU imposed sanctions in 2002, although the situation of 
political rights had remained equal. Similarly, the Article 96 procedure was invoked against Guinea in 
2003-2004, but the political rights score did not change in this period. In Côte d‟Ivoire, the EU 
resumed aid in 2002, although the situation of political rights worsened, and did not adopt any 
negative measures when political rights deteriorated in 2007. Nonetheless, in Niger and Kenya, the 
EU‟s reaction did follow the evolution in political rights. Niger‟s political rights score deteriorated in 
2009, exactly when the EU imposed sanctions. In Kenya, the political rights score worsened in 2007 
and the EU‟s position changed accordingly. Moreover, the EU‟s reluctance to impose negative 
measures in Rwanda in the early 2000s could also be related to the relative improvement of the 
political rights score in 2003.  
 
The Freedom House civil liberties score is based on three categories of questions. One component is 
„freedom of expression and belief‟, which includes freedom of the media, religion, private expression 
and academic freedom. Secondly, „associational and organisational rights‟ encompasses freedom of 
assembly, freedom for nongovernmental organisations and the presence of trade unions and 
professional organisations. Thirdly, „the rule of law‟ focuses on the independence of the judiciary, 
respect for the law by the authorities, protection from political terror and the protection of equal 
treatment. Finally, „personal autonomy and individual rights‟ are rights to chose a residence, 
occupation, education, marriage partners and include the right to own property.  
 
Table 3: Freedom House Civil Liberties score 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Chad 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 
Rwanda 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Nigeria 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Eritrea 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 
Ethiopia 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 
Kenya 5 5 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 
Niger 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 
Côte d'Ivoire 5 4 6 5 6 6 6 5 5 5 6 
Guinea 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 
Zimbabwe 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Source: Freedom House Freedom in the World  
 
Again, the worst performers on the civil liberties score were not necessarily those where sanctions 
were taken. The scores of Chad, Rwanda and Eritrea were comparable to those of Zimbabwe and 
Guinea, yet the EU imposed sanctions against Zimbabwe and Guinea, but not against Chad, Rwanda 
and Eritrea. A similar observation can be made in Ethiopia, where the EU seemed reluctant to impose 
negative measures, although its civil liberties scoring was on the same level as Guinea. On the other 
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hand, the EU imposed sanctions in Niger and Kenya, despite the relatively good record of these 
countries on civil liberties.  
 
Moreover, taking into account the time dimension, there are additional reasons to assume double 
standards. On the one hand, in Zimbabwe (2001), Kenya (2008), Côte d‟Ivoire (2010), Guinea (2009) 
and Eritrea (2001), the EU started focusing on negative measures when the situation of civil liberties 
was worsening. On the other, the EU did not impose any sanctions when the situation of civil liberties 
deteriorated in Eritrea (2009), Ethiopia (2010), Nigeria (2001) or Côte d‟Ivoire (2004).  
 
Polity IV codes the authority characteristics of states. I used the Institutionalised Democracy indicator, 
since this is a composite index and thus provides a more general picture of the democratic character of 
the cases. Four indexes are combined in Institutionalised Democracy. Firstly, „Competitiveness of 
Executive Recruitment‟ measures whether citizens have equal opportunities to be elected for the 
government. This indicator can have three values: (1) selection (hereditary succession or designation), 
(2) dual/transitional (dual executives, one is chosen by hereditary succession, one by competitive 
election) and (3) election (competitive elections). Secondly, the „Openness of Executive Recruitment‟ 
is assessed. The recruitment of the chief executive can range from closed (hereditary succession) to 
open (elite designation, competitive election or transitional arrangements). Thirdly, „Executive 
Constraints‟ measures the extent of institutionalised constraints on the decision-making powers of the 
executive. Executive constraints are rated on a seven-point scale, ranging from (1) unlimited authority 
to (7) executive authority or subordination. Lastly, „Competitiveness of Participation‟ codes the extent 
to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued. Competitiveness is coded on 
a five-point scale, ranging from (1) repressed to (5) competitive. The Institutionalised Democracy 
indicator weighs these four variables into a ten-point composite index. The higher the score, the more 
democratic a country (Marshall et al. 2010: 14-27). It should be noted that minor fluctuations in a 
country‟s authority characteristics are not reflected in the data, which can explain that the score has 
been quite constant over the years.  
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Table 4. Polity IV Institutionalised Democracy  
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Chad 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Rwanda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nigeria 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Eritrea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ethiopia 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Kenya 2 2 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 8 
Niger 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 0 4 
Côte d'Ivoire 5 5 
         
Guinea 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Zimbabwe 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 
Source: Polity IV
27
 
 
On the basis of this indicator, it can be concluded that countries with lower scores on Institutionalised 
Democracy did not necessarily face the most costly negative measures. Rwanda and Eritrea are the 
worst scoring countries, but have not been subject to sanctions. Moreover, although Chad had similar 
scores to Guinea and Zimbabwe, Chad did not face sanctions, unlike Guinea and Zimbabwe. On the 
other hand, Nigeria and Ethiopia scored much better than the other countries on Institutionalised 
Democracy, which can explain why the EU was reluctant to adopt negative measures. When taking up 
the time dimension, the case of Niger is notable. Niger had quite a high score on Institutionalised 
Democracy, but after the constitutional coup in 2009, its score suddenly fell from 7 to 0. Hence, the 
EU‟s imposition of sanctions in the case of Niger can be explained by this sudden drop. This effect 
could also be noted in the case of Kenya, albeit to a less spectacular degree. After the December 2007 
elections, Kenya‟s Institutionalised Democracy score decreased by one point.  
 
An indicator that is often used by donors is the „Voice and Accountability‟ score by the World Bank. 
As a composite indicator, it relies on a wide array of indicators on electoral democracy and civil-
political rights, including Freedom House, the African electoral index, the Reporters without Borders‟ 
index on press freedom, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Economist Intelligence Unit index, 
the Gallup World poll, etc. The percentile rank in which the country‟s scores can be situated is given. 
The higher the ranking, the more democratic, as this means the country‟s Voice and Accountability 
score is amongst the highest in the world. For example, if Chad‟s percentile rank was 9.5 percent in 
2009, this means Chad‟s score was amongst the 9.5 percent lowest.  
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 Côte d‟Ivoire‟s Institutionalised democracy score was not available after 2001.  
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Table 5. World Bank Voice and Accountability indicator
28
  
 
2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Chad 20.7 20.7 18.8 15.4 10.1 8.7 8.7 8.7 9.5 
Rwanda 7.2 6.7 13.5 11.1 11.5 12.0 12.5 11.1 10.9 
Nigeria 28.8 28.8 26.9 26.0 24.5 30.8 30.8 29.8 24.2 
Eritrea 10.1 2.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.4 1.0 0.9 
Ethiopia 18.8 14.4 16.3 16.8 14.4 15.9 14.4 11.5 12.3 
Kenya 24.5 27.9 39.4 43.8 41.8 44.2 43.8 42.8 37.4 
Niger 45.7 41.8 40.9 43.3 42.3 35.1 36.1 33.7 28.9 
Côte d’Ivoire 12.0 13.5 13.0 9.1 7.7 9.6 11.5 12.0 14.2 
Guinea 14.9 11.5 10.1 14.4 13.5 12.5 11.1 9.6 9.0 
Zimbabwe 15.4 9.1 10.6 6.7 6.3 8.2 7.7 7.7 6.6 
Source: Wordwide Governance Indicators  
 
According to the Voice and Accountability indicator, Niger, Kenya and Nigeria were most democratic 
in 2000-2009, while Eritrea, Chad and Zimbabwe were least democratic in this period. Ethiopia, 
Rwanda, Côte d‟Ivoire and Guinea have similar scores, ranking somewhere in between the worst and 
best performers. However, these scores do not concur with the EU‟s application of negative measures. 
Indeed, although Eritrea was counted amongst the 1 percent countries with the worst Voice and 
Accountability score in 2008, the EU has been reluctant to impose sanctions against Eritrea. In 
contrast, one of the best scoring countries (Niger) was subject to sanctions. Moreover, although 
Guinea, Chad, Ethiopia, Côte d‟Ivoire and Rwanda had similar scores, the EU has been reluctant to 
impose negative measures in Chad, Ethiopia and Rwanda, but not in Guinea and Côte d‟Ivoire.  
 
Taking into account the time dimension, the argument for double standards becomes stronger. While 
Chad‟s score deteriorated over the years, the EU did not react with negative measures. On the other 
hand, the EU threatened with negative measures against the Kenyan governemnt (2007), although the 
Voice and Accountability indicator improved. On the other hand, Niger‟s severe deterioration in Voice 
and Accountability can explain the EU‟s focus on negative measures in 2009. The other countries did 
not show considerable changes.  
 
The Reporters without Borders‟ Press Freedom Index is based on a questionnaire with 43 criteria 
assessing press freedom. The questionnaire includes every possible violation directly affecting 
journalists (murders, imprisonment, physical attacks) and news media (censorship, searches, 
harassment, confiscation of publications), as well the degree of impunity enjoyed by those responsible. 
Moreover, the indicator also takes into account the level of self-censorship and the freedom of the 
media to investigate and be critical. Furthermore, the indicator looks at the legal framework in which 
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 2001 score not available.  
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the media operate and the level of independence of the media. A potential downside of the indicator is 
that it includes violations of press freedom by non-state actors. The higher the score, the lowest its 
record of press freedom (Reporters without Borders 2010).  
 
Table 6. Press Freedom Index Reporters Without Borders 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Chad 28.75 24.00 33.25 30.00 35.50 36.50 41.25 44.50 33.17 
Rwanda 37.50 34.25 37.25 38.00 41.00 58.88 50.00 64.67 81.00 
Nigeria 15.50 31.50 37.75 38.75 32.23 49.83 37.75 46.00 51.50 
Eritrea 83.67 91.50 93.25 99.75 97.50 114.75 97.50 115.50 105.00 
Ethiopia 37.50 37.50 37.00 42.00 75.00 63.00 47.75 49.00 49.38 
Kenya 24.75 18.50 22.25 30.00 30.25 23.75 21.25 25.00 19.00 
Niger 18.50 15.75 18.33 13.00 24.50 25.50 37.00 48.50 28.50 
Côte d’Ivoire 19.00 42.17 60.38 52.25 25.00 27.00 26.50 29.00 36.00 
Guinea 26.00 33.17 24.50 26.00 27.50 33.50 21.50 28.50 33.50 
Zimbabwe 48.25 45.50 67.50 64.25 50.00 62.00 54.00 46.50 39.50 
Source: Website Reporters Without Borders, en.rsf.org  
 
Some of the countries where the EU was reluctant to impose sanctions, including Eritrea and Rwanda, 
appeared to be the worst performers on the Press Freedom Index. Moreover, although Ethiopia and 
Zimbabwe have comparable scores on the index, the EU was reluctant to impose sanctions against 
Ethiopia. Guinea, Niger, Côte d‟Ivoire and Kenya, four countries where the EU was not reluctant to 
impose negative measures, had similar press freedom scores to Chad and Nigeria, where the EU did 
not adopt sanctions.  
 
Moreover, whereas press freedom worsened over the years in countries like Eritrea, Rwanda and 
Nigeria, the EU did not react to this evolution. In Ethiopia (2006), the EU resumed aid while press 
freedom was deteriorating. However, in Niger (2009), decreasing press freedom was met with 
sanctions.  
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2.3. Conclusion 
This Chapter provided an extensive analysis of double standards in the EU‟s reaction to violations of 
democratic principles. First, an overview of the cases was given, focusing both on the situation of 
liberal democracy from 2000 until mid-2011 and the EU‟s instruments for democracy promotion. The 
second part of the Chapter then addressed the question of double standards by investigating whether 
similar violations of democratic principles led to an even reaction from the EU. This question was 
answered on the basis of a comparison of (1) the instruments used by the EU to react to violations of 
democratic principles and (2) the gravity of violations of democratic principles. It was clear that 
similar violations of democratic principles (electoral democracy and civil-political rights) led to 
different reactions by the EU.  
 
I will conclude this Chapter by presenting a table listing those countries where the EU has been most 
reluctant to use negative measures and those countries where the EU has been least reluctant, taking 
into account the gravity of violations of democratic principles. This table will be used in the 
subsequent Chapters, as the hypotheses will differ in these two groups of cases.  
 
    Table 7. Chapter summary: Double standards 
 
 
In Chad and Rwanda, the EU can be considered most reluctant to impose negative measures. Firstly, 
there were clear violations of electoral democracy in both countries. In Chad, elections were boycotted 
by the opposition and in 2005, President Déby committed a constitutional coup to prolong his rule. 
Secondly, there have been frequent violations of civil-political rights, including the arrest of the main 
opposition candidates after the coup attempt in February 2008. This was reflected in Chad‟s scores on 
the quantitative indicators on civil-political rights and electoral democracy, which were comparable to 
EU most reluctant to impose negative measures 
Chad, Rwanda 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Côte d‟Ivoire (2000-2005) 
Nigeria 
EU least reluctant to impose negative measures 
Niger 
Zimbabwe  
Guinea 
Côte d‟Ivoire 2010 
Kenya 
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those of Guinea and Zimbabwe. However, the EU has focused on positive measures and low-cost 
negative measures, including dialogue, limited naming and shaming strategies and capacity-building.  
 
Rwanda cannot be regarded as an electoral democracy: international observers have assessed all 
parliamentary and presidential elections held since 2003 as seriously flawed. Moreover, civil-political 
rights are restricted in Rwanda: genocidal laws have been used to restrict the activities of independent 
human rights organisations, journalists and the opposition. In many indicators on democratisation, 
Rwanda was amongst the worst scoring countries, comparable to Guinea and Zimbabwe. However, the 
EU has mainly relied on positive measures or low-cost negative measures to promote democracy in 
Rwanda.   
 
Eritrea is probably the least democratic of the ten country cases. There have not been any presidential 
or parliamentary elections since independence, nor is there a legal opposition, independent press or 
civil society. Indeed, in all the quantitative scores assessed in this Chapter, Eritrea ranked at the 
bottom. Nonetheless, the EU has been reluctant to impose negative measures, especially after 2002. In 
2001, a short diplomatic conflict arose after the EU undertook a demarche to protest against the 
imprisonment of dissidents and the prohibition of the independent press. However, while the signature 
of a new CSP was halted, it was signed only a year later, despite the fact that political prisoners had 
not been released. Moreover, in April 2009, a new CSP was signed, although the situation of electoral 
democracy and civil-political rights had not improved.  
 
While Ethiopia was not the worst scoring country in quantitative indicators, its record on electoral 
democracy and civil-political rights has been equally as problematic as, for example, that of Guinea or 
Zimbabwe. Civil-political rights were most severely violated in the context of the 2005 parliamentary 
elections, when more than 200 people were killed and several thousands arrested for participating in 
peaceful demonstrations. Although the EU suspended direct and sectoral budget support as a reaction 
to this crackdown on manifestations, aid was resumed only a year later. Moreover, there has been a 
general reluctance to express public criticism about Ethiopia‟s democratic record. For example, 
despite the damaging report of the EU-EOM in 2005 and 2010, the EU downsized the findings of the 
report.  
 
In Côte d‟Ivoire, it is necessary to distinguish the EU‟s reaction to the December 2000 elections to that 
to the December 2010 elections. While the EU was somewhat reluctant to impose sanctions after the 
2000 elections, in 2010 the EU adopted a comprehensive package of costly sanctions. Indeed, after 
Article 96 consultations in 2000-2001, aid was not suspended but gradually resumed. Moreover, after 
only one year the EU fully resumed cooperation, because the municipal elections and national 
reconciliation in 2001 were interpreted as positive signals. However, the situation of foreign citizens 
and their exclusion from the electoral process had not been resolved. Moreover, when 120 civilians 
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were killed during peaceful protests in March 2004, the EU did not impose sanctions. In comparison, 
aid suspension in Niger, Guinea and Zimbabwe was of longer duration and was made conditional on 
free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections. However, after the 2010 elections in Côte 
d‟Ivoire, the EU deployed a wide range of sanctions, including sanctions with serious economic 
implications. To clearly show this in the analysis made below, Côte d‟Ivoire will henceforth be split 
up in two cases, namely 2000-2005 and 2010-2011.  
 
In Nigeria, the main problem was electoral democracy, while the situation of civil-political rights was 
better than in most other countries. Although the 2003 and 2007 elections were severely flawed, there 
were no countries with similar violations of democratic principles that were subject to sanctions. 
Indeed, in most other cases, it was the combination of a flawed electoral process with severe violations 
of civil-political rights that led to sanctions. As a result, in the case of Nigeria, the argument for double 
standards is weaker than in the other cases.  
  
Nonetheless, there were equally cases where the EU was less reluctant to adopt negative measures. 
This was especially the case in Niger, which has been subject to sanctions, although the situation of 
electoral democracy and civil-political rights was not worse than in other countries. Indeed, it was 
only with the 2009 referendum that the situation of electoral democracy and civil-political rights 
deteriorated. Moreover, such a „constitutional coup‟ had equally been committed by President Déby in 
Chad, who was not subject to sanctions.  
 
Guinea was subject to sanctions from 2003 onwards. The suspension of EU development assistance in 
2003 responded to Guinea‟s flawed electoral process and violations of civil-political rights. Elections 
had been boycotted in 2002 and 2003, and the 2001 referendum eliminated presidential term limits. 
Moreover, there was a crackdown on demonstrations in 2006, 2007 and 2009. However, the decision 
to open Article 96 consultations in 2003 remains surprising, as the most flagrant violations of 
democratic principles took place after this date. Hence, the decision to open consultations under 
Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement was primarily based on the electoral process, most notably the 
2001 referendum that eliminated presidential term limits and the opposition boycott of the 2002 and 
2003 elections. In this sense, the situation was comparable to that in Chad, where elections were 
equally boycotted and President Déby ran for a third term after changing the constitution. At the same 
time, the perdurance of the sanctions can be explained by the fact that the situation was not improving. 
The 2009 sanctions responded to the violent crackdown on demonstrations in September 2009, but 
there had equally been such crackdowns in Ethiopia (2005) and Côte d‟Ivoire (2004), which did not 
lead to such costly sanctions.  
 
In Zimbabwe, the EU adopted a comprehensive sanctions package, including not only aid suspension 
but also an arms embargo, travel ban and assets freeze. Moreover, these sanctions have been extended 
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over the years, and the EU has been reluctant to lift them, although some progress was made with the 
2008 Global Political Agreement. Although violations of civil-political rights were most frequent in 
the Zimbabwean case, the fact that sanctions were already adopted in early 2002 remains surprising.  
 
The case of Kenya after the December 2007 elections has been recognised as one where „greater 
support for human rights and democracy-building‟ was possible (Kippin 2009: 12; Brown 2009). 
Indeed, the EU put significant pressure on government and opposition to accept the power-sharing 
agreement and made clear that „business as usual‟ would not be possible unless a solution was found 
for the crisis. The reason why Article 96 was not instigated is that African mediation quite soon led to 
a power-sharing agreement. Moreover, the EU followed up on the implementation of the agreement 
and urged the government to implement the reforms.  
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3. Conflicting norms 
 
„The Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the ACP States, of the 
other part, hereinafter referred to as the “Parties” hereby conclude this Agreement in 
order to promote and expedite the economic, cultural and social development of the 
ACP States, with a view to contributing a stable and democratic political 
environment‟ (Cotonou Partnership Agreement, Article 1, emphasis added).   
 
3.1. Introduction 
According to Manners (2008), the EU aims to promote nine normative principles in world politics: (1) 
sustainable peace, (2) social freedom, (3) consensual democracy, (4) associative human rights, (5) 
supranational rule of law, (6) inclusive equality, (7) social solidarity, (8) sustainable development and 
(9) good governance. It is clear that these nine normative principles cover a broad spectrum of 
objectives. Indeed, it has been argued that the EU conducts „structural foreign policy‟ by which it tries 
to „influence or shape sustainable political, legal, socio-economic, security and mental structures‟ 
(Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 25-26). The EU thus aims to thoroughly change third countries, 
in a similar way as it has „transformed‟ candidate members in the accession process (Grabbe 2006; 
Börzel 2010). Gibert clearly sees this approach in the EU‟s Africa policies, although she adds that the 
lack of true diplomatic capacities hampers the EU‟s wide ambitions (Gibert 2011b). Hadfield claims 
that the introduction of political conditionality and security provisions in the Cotonou Agreement has 
merged two roles of the EU, namely that of a donor and of an actor on the international scene. The 
holistic approach to poverty reduction has led to what she calls „foreign development policy‟ (Hadfield 
2007: 44 and 52). Holden argues that the EU exercises „structural power‟ over developing countries 
via a highy transformative aid agenda including the reform of state, laws and institutions (Holden 
2009: 183).  
 
As stressed by Manners, the EU‟s development policy „became the primary means outside of Europe 
to promote the normative principles of good governance, sustainable development, social solidarity, 
rule of law, human rights, freedom and democracy‟ (Manners 2008: 415). These normative principles 
can be structured around the triple objective of democracy, development and stability. As emphasised 
in a 1996 Commission Communication: „the EU policy aims concerning Africa might be summarized 
as helping to foster peace and stability, development, democracy and the respect for human rights‟ 
(European Commission 1996: 2). Applied to the nine substantive normative principles identified by 
Manners, „democracy‟ entails consensual democracy, associative human rights, social freedom, and 
the supranational rule of law. These are the essential elements of the Cotonou Agreement, which are a 
condition for development assistance and an area of support (as part of „institutional development and 
capacity building‟). „Development‟ encompasses sustainable development, inclusive equality, social 
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solidarity and good governance. As stated in the first article of the Cotonou Agreement: „The 
partnership shall be centred on the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating poverty consistent 
with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries in the 
world economy‟ (emphasis added). Sustainable development is thus one of the main objectives of EU 
development cooperation. Moreover, with the focus on poverty reduction, the EU also promotes social 
solidarity in development cooperation. Inclusive equality refers to combating social exclusion and is 
inherent in some of the MDGs, including those on child and maternal health and universal primary 
education. Since the 2005 revision, the Cotonou Agreement states that the MDGs must underpin EU 
development cooperation. Moreover, the promotion of the fight against poverty-related diseases and 
the protection of sexual and reproductive health and rights of women was added as a focus of EU 
cooperation (art. 25). The EU Consensus for Development mentions the pursuit of the MDGs as one of 
the primary objectives, along with poverty reduction and sustainable development. Good governance 
is also an important aspect of the EU‟s development agenda, as can be noted in the emphasis in the 
Cotonou Agreement on the fight against corruption and the inclusion of good governance as a 
„fundamental element‟ of the Agreement. The substantive principle „sustainable peace‟ forms the third 
main objective of stability, and is achieved through conflict prevention and peacekeeping missions. 
Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement is dedicated to peace-building, conflict prevention and 
resolution.  
 
The idea is that these objectives are mutually enhancing, and therefore should be tackled jointly. 
Nonetheless, this idealistic belief that „all good things go together‟ is not substantiated by research nor 
by concrete country cases. In reality, trade-offs are often made. Hence, in this Chapter I will 
investigate whether double standards can be explained by such trade-offs. More particularly, the 
hypotheses will test whether the EU prefers (1) development and (2) stability (internal and regional) 
over democracy. The democracy-stability dilemma has often been mentioned in scholarly research on 
democracy promotion (see, for example, Knodt and Jünemann 2007), but is mostly seen as a dilemma 
of norms versus self-interests, rather than as a dilemma of norms versus norms. Nonetheless, in many 
cases and especially in conflict-ridden sub-Saharan Africa, the pursuit of stability may also be seen 
from a humanitarian perspective, cfr. the notion of „humanitarian interventions‟ (Wheeler and Dunne 
2001; Frost 2001). Whereas the democracy-stability dilemma is generally accepted, fewer studies 
point to the possibility of a democracy-development dilemma. An exception is Carothers (2010), who 
argues that development personnel are reluctant to see negative measures imposed against developing 
autocratic regimes.  
 
The Chapter begins by identifying how the EU sees the link between democracy, development and 
stability in its discourse. It then touches upon the potential conflict between these three normative 
principles by reviewing the academic literature. In the next section, I will go more deeply into the 
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pursuit of development and stability in the EU‟s policies in sub-Saharan Africa. On the basis of this, 
three hypotheses will be formulated that will guide the case study analysis.  
 
3.2. The democracy-development-stability triangle in EU discourse  
The 1991 Council Resolution on human rights, democracy and development established the link 
between democratic principles and development by stating that „respect for human rights, the rule of 
law and the existence of political institutions that are effective, accountable and enjoy democratic 
legitimacy are the basis for equitable development‟ (Council of the EU 1991). This belief was further 
reflected in the introduction of political conditionality in the Lomé-IV Agreement. The conditionality 
clause in Article 5 of the revised Lomé-IV Agreement (1995) proclaims that cooperation should entail 
respect for and promotion of all human rights and that development policy should be closely linked to 
the respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. The link between democracy 
and development is believed to lie in the concept of human development, which conceives of 
development as the creation of an environment where people can fulfill their full potential (United 
Nations Development Programme 2001: 9). Article 9 of the Cotonou Agreement reiterates these ideas 
and adds that „democratisation, development and the protection of fundamental freedoms and human 
rights are interrelated and mutually reinforcing‟.  
 
Since the mid-1990s, stability has been brought more and more in relation to development. The first 
reflection of this idea was the 1996 Commission Communication on conflict prevention in Africa, 
which emphasised that sustainable development should not be interpreted in a narrow economic sense, 
but should have „structural stability‟ as its ultimate goal (European Commission 1996: 2). The 2000 
Development Policy Statement stated that „poverty and the exclusion which it creates, are the root 
causes of conflict‟ (cited in Hadfield 2007: 52-53). In line with this thinking, an Article on peace-
building, conflict prevention and resolution was included in the Cotonou Agreement (Article 11). The 
European Consensus on Development (2005) establishes a cyclical link between security and 
development: „without peace and security development and poverty eradication are not possible, and 
without development and poverty reduction no sustainable peace will occur‟ (European Union 2006). 
This cyclical vision on the relationship between security and development was added to the Cotonou 
Agreement in its latest revision (2010).  
 
To complete the triangle, the EU also sees democracy and stability as mutually enhancing. The 
European Security Strategy (2003) reflects a belief in the democratic peace theory, which contends 
that democracies will not go to war with each other: „The best protection of our security is a world of 
well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, 
dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights 
are the best means of strengthening the international order.‟ Moreover, the European Commission‟s 
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conflict prevention policies include support for democracy, the rule of law and civil society: „In 
countries showing conflict potential there may be a need to focus external aid on the (re)emergence of 
a favourable political environment‟ (European Commission 2001: 4). The reverse thesis, that stability 
is needed for democracy, is less pronounced in EU discourse.  
 
The belief in the mutually reinforcing link between democracy, development and stability is further 
illustrated by a number of concepts inherent in EU discourse vis-à-vis developing countries, including 
„structural stability‟, „democratic governance‟ and „human security‟. Structural stability was put 
forward by the European Commission in 1996 with a Communication on „The European Union and 
the issue of conflicts in Africa: Peace-building, conflict prevention and beyond‟. Structural stability 
was defined as „a situation involving sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for 
human rights, viable political structures, and healthy social and environmental conditions, with the 
capacity to manage change without to resort to violent conflict‟. In this perspective, economic 
development and democratic principles are inherent in structural stability.  
 
Similarly, the notion of „democratic governance‟, introduced in the 2006 Communication on 
Governance and Development encompasses objectives related to democracy, development and 
stability:  
- Respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms  
- Support for democratisation processes  
- Respect for the rule of law and access for all to an independent justice system  
- Access to information 
- A government that governs transparently and is accountable to the relevant 
institutions and to the electorate 
- Effective institutions 
- Access to basic social services 
- Sustainable management of natural and energy resources and of the environment 
- The promotion of sustainable economic growth and social cohesion in a climate 
conducive to private investment 
- Human security (European Commission 2006c: 5).  
 
The recent focus on „human security‟ should also be seen as part of this conception. A Study Group on 
Europe‟s Security Capabilities convened at the initiative of High Representative for the CFSP Javier 
Solana recommended the EU to pursue human security as a way to become a full-fledged actor on the 
international scene while maintaining a „normative‟ image (Martin 2011: 199). Following this 
recommendation, in the 2008 follow-up strategy to the 2003 European Security Strategy, the EU 
proposes a „people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security‟ (European Union 
2008). In the 2010 revision of the Cotonou Agreement, it is explicitly mentioned that Parties will 
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pursue human security. Human security is based on a comprehensive approach to security, which takes 
people rather than states as a point of departure. Human security includes physical threats to people 
(freedom from fear) but also threats caused by human needs (freedom from want). Covering these two 
components, human security includes economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community 
and political security (Gasper 2005; United Nations Development Programme 1994). Hence, human 
security clearly encompasses development and stability. Moreover, human rights and democratisation 
are also crucial aspects of human security. The report of the Study Group on Europe‟s Security 
Capabilities underlines „the primacy of human rights‟ and „a legitimate political authority‟ as two of 
the five key principles of a human security approach (Study Group on Europe‟s Security Capabilities 
2004: 14-15).  
 
3.3. Conflicting norms 
Writing about the security-development nexus in EU policies, Youngs criticises the EU‟s discourse for 
its lack of a clear vision on the exact causality of the relation and its failure to take into account the 
potential conflict between these goals: „The EU still has no clearly thought-out vision of the balance or 
direction of causality between these two policy goals, but rather an ad hoc approach based on the 
rather easy assumption that “all good things go together”‟ (Youngs 2008d: 420). Similarly, Smith 
points to the lack of prioritisation in the EU‟s definition of „democratic governance‟ (Smith 2008: 
155). This problem has also been highlighted by critics of Normative Power Europe. Sjursen argues 
that, it is one thing to justify a norm, but another to know if the norm is correct in a given context. 
Different norms may collide in a concrete situation, and it is not necessarily self-evident to judge what 
is the right action in a given situation (Sjursen 2006: 243). Similarly, Aggestam claims that, when it 
comes to concrete policies, the „altruistic‟ goals that the EU pursues, namely democracy, development 
and stability, may appear conflicting. For example, the promotion of human rights and democracy may 
have destabilising effects that end up threatening development and stability (Aggestam 2008: 10).  
 
The problem is that the narrative of a mutually reinforcing link between democracy, development and 
stability is based on idealistic expectations rather than on reality or scientific evidence. There are in 
fact many examples where these three goals do not go together. First of all, the argument that 
democracy and development always go hand in hand should not be taken for granted. As White states: 
„While it is common to find Western politicians and political commentators on development waxing 
eloquent about the positive developmental consequences of democratization, there is by no means a 
consensus on the issue among development professionals and analysts‟ (White 1995: 28). Indeed, the 
2002 Human Development Report, despite giving prominence to the centrality of democracy to 
development, recognised there was no strong evidential basis for this claim (Burnell 2011: 23).  
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There are three main perspectives on the relation between democracy and development: the conflict, 
compatibility and skeptical perspective. Studies testing the relation between democracy and 
development have reached inconclusive results on which of these three approaches is dominant.
29
  
 
The conflict perspective claims that economic growth can be hindered by democracy (Sirowy and 
Inkeles 1990). In this view, authoritarian regimes are more able to implement the policies critical for 
rapid economic growth, because of the social and political stability they foster, their insulation from 
outside influence and the single-minded strength they can muster. In contrast, democracy entails a 
number of dysfunctional characteristics for development, such as political instability and the tendency 
for short-term planning inherent in the electoral system (Przeworski and Limongi 1993: 51-55). The 
belief in the link between authoritarianism and economic development has also been termed „Leeism‟, 
after former prime minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew who argued that democracy hindered 
development by provoking disorder (White 1995: 28-29; Sen 1999: 15).  
 
Those propagating a conflict perspective often refer to the „developmental state‟ model. This model 
was proposed in the context of the remarkable economic success of the South East Asian tigers, 
including Taiwan, Thailand and Singapore, in the 1980s. These regimes possessed two main 
characteristics that enhanced their developmental success: (1) a developmentalist ideological 
underpinning, and (2) the capacity to implement economic policies in an effective manner 
(Mkandawire 2001: 290; Sørensen 1995: 402). Given that many developmental states were 
authoritarian at the time of their economic success (Taiwan, South Korea) and often had poor human 
rights records (Indonesia, China, Taiwan), many authors argue that developmental states are 
incompatible with democracy and human rights (Johnson 1999; Fritz and Menocal 2007). Indeed, 
several characteristics defining the success of developmental states are more often found in 
authoritarian countries, including state autonomy and a weak civil society (Leftwich 2000: 161-165).  
 
In contrast, the compatibility (Sirowy and Inkeles 1990) or optimistic (White 1995: 28) perspective 
believes that democracy fosters economic growth. Amartya Sen‟s Development as freedom is perhaps 
the most well-known example of  this view. Sen argues that democracy contributes to development in 
two ways. Firstly, if regularly elected, rulers have an incentive to listen to what people want. 
Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, have few motivations to maximise output and to act in the 
general interest (see also Przeworski and Limongi 1993: 51-57). Secondly, the conceptualisation of 
economic needs may require the exercise of basic political rights (Sen 1999: 152-153).  
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 For three reviews, see Sirowy and Inkeles (1990); Przeworski and Limongi (1993), Doucouliagos and 
Ulubaşoğlu (2008).  
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In this light, the concept of developmental democratic states should be mentioned. Developmental 
democratic states are both developmental (with a minimum annual GDP growth of 4 percent) and 
satisfy the basic democratic criteria (regular free and fair elections, respect for political rights and civil 
liberties) (Leftwich 2000:171-190). Examples are Botswana, Mauritius and Brazil (UNECA and AU 
2011: 109). Developmental democratic states retain the autonomous attributes of the developmental 
state, but add to this an inclusive approach to public policy-making, embracing broad sectors of 
society (Edigheji 2005). In a recent report, the UN Economic Commission for Africa and AU seem to 
suggest that democratic developmental states are desirable in Africa: „an effective developmental state 
requires [...] a democratic socio-political environment that endows it with legitimacy and authority‟ 
(UNECA and AU 2011: 8).  
 
Lastly, the skeptical perspective does not believe in a systematic relationship between democracy and 
development (Sirowy and Inkeles 1990). This perspective assumes that it is not the political regime, 
but the institutional structure and organisations that matter for growth (Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu 
2008: 63). For example, there is substantial evidence that political stability has positive effects on 
economic growth (Alesina et al. 1996; Feng 1997; Xu et al. 2007; Gupta et al. 1998). Moreover, 
studies have proven that good administrative governance, meaning a functioning state administration, 
regulative framework, adequate public finance management, absence of corruption, etc., is conducive 
to economic growth (Börzel et al. 2008: 6; Leftwich 1993; Doornbos 2001).  
 
While the relation between democracy and development is thus debated, the same can be said about 
the relation between democracy and stability. On the one hand, scholarship on the root causes of 
conflict suggests that democracy may prevent conflict. Rebellions or civil war are mostly motivated by 
greed or by grievance. The absence of political rights or the political exclusion of certain ethnic or 
socio-economic groups often causes feelings of grievance, which may be translated into rebellion 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004: 12; Stewart 2000; Stewart 2004: 274-279; Ballentine 2003; Reynal-Querol 
2002). Moreover, democratic systems increase the opportunity costs for rebellion. The more inclusive 
a political system and the more political rights and civil liberties are respected, the higher the 
opportunity costs of rebellion, and the lower the probability of armed conflict (Reynal-Querol 2001).  
 
Nonetheless, severe authoritarianism may also reduce the likelihood of conflict. Authoritarian regimes 
are often more effective and forceful in silencing political dissent (Stewart 2004: 277-278; Gupta et al. 
2007: 590-591; Reynal-Querol 2002: 35). Moreover, elections can become a source of conflict. 
Whereas the literature on the root causes of conflict suggests that ballots may substitute bullets, ballots 
may equally provoke bullets, for example when election results are disputed. In this sense, electoral 
defeat may become a source of grievance for certain actors. Especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where 
party differences are mostly ethnic and politics are characterised by neo-patrimonialism, elections 
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often exacerbate and complicate social divisions (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000: 36; Höglund 2009; 
Orji 2010).  
 
Lastly, the link between democracy and regional stability is reflected in the „democratic peace thesis‟, 
which assumes that democracies are less likely to go to war with each other. This thesis has become 
common sense in the discourse of the international community, as well as in scholarly research, based 
on the observation of the „extreme rarity of joint democratic war, after a century of democratization 
across the globe‟ (Mousseau and Shi 1999: 641). There seems to be a general consensus of the positive 
effects of democracy on peace, even if there remains some debate on the exact reasons for these 
effects (MacMillan 2003: 241; Zinnes 2004). 
 
3.4. The need for trade-offs 
Taking into account the potential conflicts between democracy, development and stability, some 
scholars have suggested that trade-offs should be made. Sørensen argues that, although developmental 
states should be legitimate and responsive, in reality, trade-offs are necessary because all these 
elements cannot be achieved at once. Moreover, he criticises the organisation of elections in conflict-
ridden states (Sørensen 2000: 298-301). Similarly, White argues that there is a need for an „effective 
developmental state‟ that is not necessarily democratic, but focuses on good governance and state 
capacity (White 1998: 25). Grindle makes the case for „good enough governance‟, based on the 
contextual realities of specific countries and the role of governments in poverty alleviation. She argues 
that the governance agenda has grown into a list of items that are nearly impossible to achieve all at 
once, while hardly any attention is paid to potential sequencing or priorities of actions (Grindle 2004; 
Grindle 2007). Good enough governance is based on the idea that „not all governance deficits need to 
(or can) be tackled at once‟ (Grindle 2007: 554). Similarly, Burnell suggests that strategies should be 
adjusted to the situation: „an entrenched authoritarian regime presiding over a functioning state and 
growing economy poses a (set of) challenges(s) very different from a failed state in an economy 
devastated by civil war but enjoying an opportunity to make a “fresh start”‟ (Burnell 2011: 70). 
 
These trade-offs can also be found in donor practice. This was already the case in the 1990s, when 
governments with doubtful democratic credentials but willing to implement economic recovery 
programmes recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, such as 
Ghana‟s Jerry Rawlings and Uganda‟s Museveni, were absolved of the requirement to introduce 
democracy (Cumming 2004: 118). Moreover, when the need for structural adjustment trumped with 
the objective of democratisation, donors often prioritised economic adjustment to political 
participation (Abrahamsen 2000: 30; Geisler 1993: 632). Carothers argues that many development 
practitioners are skeptical of a democracy focus, especially in countries with visible developmental 
success. Donors fear that to insist on democratisation would endanger their relationship with the 
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government and thus put at risk development programmes (Carothers 2010a: 24). As regards the 
dilemma between democracy and stability, it has been argued that donors, although in principle 
supporting „democratic peace‟, often downgrade democratisation and try to pursue the „least bad 
government‟ by focussing primarily on stability (Barnett and Zürcher 2009: 31; Zuercher et al. 2009; 
Barnett 2010).  
 
Although the above-mentioned notions of structural stability, democratic governance and human 
security are based on a rather idealistic conception of the EU‟s policy goals in sub-Saharan Africa, 
recent discourse seems to suggest that the EU is aware of the need for trade-offs. In its 2003 
Communication on Governance and Development, the European Commission states that „Good 
governance is to be analysed and promoted on a country-specific basis. It cannot be addressed on the 
basis of [a] one-size-fits-all model but rather on the basis of existing situations‟ (European 
Commission 2003b: 17). The Communication lists three sorts of situations: difficult partnerships, post-
conflict situations and effective partnerships. For each of these situations, an adjusted approach is 
needed. However, in all three situations, democratisation is a key element of this approach (Ibid.: 17-
31). Moreover, when it comes to the EU‟s development policies, poverty reduction is explicitly noted 
as the primary objective. The Cotonou Agreement, European Consensus, Treaty of Lisbon and Africa-
EU Strategic Partnership all state that poverty reduction is the primary and overarching objective of 
development cooperation.  
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3.5. Development norms  
As was argued in the introduction to this Chapter, the substantive normative principles sustainable 
development, inclusive equality, social solidarity and good governance are all embedded in the EU‟s 
development policies. These normative principles are also firmly embedded in the current international 
development agenda. For example, poverty reduction was put on the agenda of donor countries by the 
World Bank (Finnemore 1998: 89-127). The same has been argued about good governance (Masujima 
2004: 151-152; Abrahamsen 2000: 31). Hence, apart from the EU‟s normative basis, one should also 
take into account the norms that are prevalent in international development cooperation. In what 
follows, I will discuss three development norms: good governance, ownership and aid effectiveness, 
and poverty reduction. It is mentioned how these norms have appeared on the agenda of donors, and 
how this was translated into EU development practice. Furthermore, the example of the UK will be 
discussed as the UK‟s Department for International Development has equally strongly focused on 
international development. Furthermore, I will briefly explain the potential dilemma between 
development norms and democratisation. On the basis of this, I will formulate a hypothesis that will 
guide the investigation of the case studies.  
 
3.5.1. Good governance 
The emergence of good governance as a development norm should be seen against the background of 
the structural adjustment programmes that were introduced as a package of measures in return for 
loans by the IMF and the World Bank in the context of the debt crisis in the 1970s and 1980s. Based 
on the view that the best model is that of a minimal state, with little intervention in the economy, 
structural adjustment programmes included price stabilisation through devaluation, public expenditure 
cuts, deregulation, privatisation and slimming down bureaucracies (Leftwich 1993: 607; Kiely 1998: 
65). However, by the early 1990s it had become clear that structural adjustment had failed in sub-
Saharan Africa. Countries that had implemented structural adjustment did not perform better and in 
some cases even worse than countries without structural adjustment plans (Abrahamsen 2000: 38-39). 
At the same time, several strongly interventionist states in East Asia achieved remarkable development 
performance (Kiely 1998: 65-66). In this context, economists of the New Institutionalist school 
pointed to the importance for the state to create an institutional environment (laws, rules, conventions) 
to make markets more effective (Craig and Porter 2006: 101).  
 
These evolutions made the World Bank reconsider its former plea for a minimal state. In a 1989 report 
Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, the failure of structural adjustment was 
sought in what it called a „crisis of governance‟ in many African countries. This crisis of governance 
was characterised by an inefficient, politicised state apparatus, the gradual breakdown of judicial 
systems and authoritarian governments that were irresponsive to grassroots and nongovernmental 
organisations (World Bank 1989: 30). However, this does not mean that neoliberalism was completely 
119 
 
abandoned. State interventionism was regarded as acceptable, but only to support the market (Kiely 
1998: 68-70; Hildyard and Wilks 1998: 50-51). This became clear in the 1997 World Development 
Report, The State in a Changing World, in which the World Bank emphasised the need for an 
„effective state‟ that is able to provide the goods and services, rules and institutions for markets to 
flourish (World Bank 1997: 1).  
 
Although good governance was part of the wider evolution leading to political conditionality (Moore 
2006: 51), the concept as intended by the World Bank was different from liberal democracy. First of 
all, good governance was a „means to an end‟, rather than a goal in itself. Good governance was meant 
to stimulate economic development by supporting the market (Kiely 1998: 68). It was concerned with 
output and performance, rather than legitimacy.
30
 Secondly, the World Bank conceptualised good 
governance from a predominantly technocratic perspective. In the 1989 report, governance was 
defined as „the exercise of political power to manage a nation‟s affairs‟. World Bank interventions 
therefore focused primarily on civil service reform, public finance management, anti-corruption, etc. 
(World Bank 1992).  
 
The EU, which had followed the emphasis on structural adjustment, adopted a similar approach to the 
World Bank as regards good governance (Brown 2004). Indeed, the first definition of good 
governance in Article 9 of the Cotonou Agreement emphasised the technocratic aspects of governance, 
in line with the World Bank view. Good governance was defined as „the transparent and accountable 
management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and 
sustainable development‟. Moreover, the introduction of good governance as a fundamental element of 
the Cotonou Agreement was aimed at providing the EU with the possibility to suspend aid in the case 
of serious corruption: „The Parties agree that only serious cases of corruption, including acts of bribery 
leading to such corruption […] constitute a violation of that element‟. It was not until 2006, with the 
Commission‟s Communication on Governance and Development, that the EU sought to merge good 
governance with democratic principles, in the concept of „democratic governance‟ (see supra).  
 
3.5.2. Ownership and aid effectiveness 
A second shift in international aid policies was that from conditionality to ownership in the late 1990s. 
In the 1998 report Assessing Aid. What works, what doesn’t and why, the World Bank argued that 
adjustment lending could only work when there was „ownership‟ or strong domestic support for 
reforms. The report recommended to focus development assistance on „credible reformers‟ (World 
Bank 1998: 4 and 52). Many donors followed these recommendations by linking development 
assistance to the commitment and capacity to introduce economic reform (Hoebink 2006; Hout 2007). 
                                                     
30
 For an analysis of the two main views on good governance, see Börzel et al. (2008), Leftwich (1993), 
Doornbos (2001) or Hyden et al. (2004).   
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The focus on ownership was further materialised in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 
process. PRSPs are national development plans that are drafted by the partner governments on the 
basis of a broad-based national dialogue (Uvin 2004: 73). The PRSPs emerged in the late 1990s as a 
condition for debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) scheme, but soon became a 
leading strategy on the basis of which most donors decide their allocation (Fraser and Whitfield 2009: 
82).  
 
The principle of ownership is at the heart of the aid effectiveness agenda, to which most donor 
agencies and recipient countries subscribed with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005). 
The Paris Declaration is based on five key principles: (1) ownership, (2) alignment, (3) harmonisation, 
(4) managing for results and (5) mutual accountability (Fraser and Whitfield 2009: 83-84). The aid 
effectiveness agenda has led to a preference for ways of providing aid that respect country ownership. 
As such, budget support became the preferred aid modality as it enabled governments to implement 
strategies believed to be most appropriate for their country (based on the PRSP), while reducing 
transaction costs (Maxwell 2003: 10; Craig and Porter 2006: 110-111; Renard 2006: 17; Unwin 2004: 
1510-1511).  
 
The EU has firmly committed to ownership. Ownership is a fundamental principle of the Cotonou 
Agreement (Article 2) and CSPs and NIPs are drawn up according to a strategy that shows remarkable 
similarity to the way in which PRSPs are adopted (Fraser and Whitfield 2009: 83). Indeed, on the 
basis of CSPs that are jointly agreed between the delegation of the European Commission and the 
ACP country concerned, NIPs are drafted by the partner country containing the focal sectors and non-
focal sectors (Cotonou Agreement, Annexe IV, Article 4). The respect for ownership is further 
concretised by the EU‟s preference for budget support. Former Development Commissioner Louis 
Michel was a staunch advocate of budget support, which he saw as the most suitable form of 
development aid for fulfilling commitments under the Paris Declaration (Michel 2008c: 22). Another 
example of the EU‟s focus on ownership is its commitment to the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(see Introductory Chapter). The EU strongly supports the APRM, which is one of the elements of the 
Africa-EU Partnership on democratic governance and human rights. Sub-Saharan African countries 
can received 5 percent extra aid from the Governance Incentive Tranche if they participate in the 
APRM (Molenaers and Nijs 2009: 568).  
 
3.5.3. Poverty reduction and Millennium Development Goals 
With the emphasis on poverty reduction and the MDGs, a departure was made from the mere 
emphasis on macroeconomic criteria and privatisation prevalent in the structural adjustment era 
(Fraser and Whitfield 2009: 77). Poverty reduction was inspired by New Labour‟s „Third Way‟ that 
entailed merging neoliberal market economies and social empowerment. Without questioning the 
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importance of macroeconomic stability and neoliberal trade regimes, more attention was paid to how 
to make markets work for the poor (Craig and Porter 2006: 81-85). The consensus around poverty 
reduction culminated at the 2000 Millennium Summit, where 147 member states of the UN signed up 
to the eight MDGs, the first and foremost of which was to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
31
 
(Maxwell 2003: 7; Clemens et al. 2007: 735). The MDGs soon became blended with the PRSP 
process. The PRSPs were seen as the means to achieve the MDGs at country level, while the MDGs 
were the universal goals and targets for poverty reduction (Renard 2006: 5).  
 
The EU followed this shift to poverty reduction and the MDGs. Poverty reduction became the main 
objective of the Cotonou Agreement: „The partnership shall be centred on the objective of reducing 
and eventually eradicating poverty‟. This primacy of poverty reduction now has a Treaty basis with 
the Lisbon Treaty. Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states that: 
„Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the 
long term, the eradication of poverty‟. On the MDGs, the 2005 Consensus for Development states that 
the EU is „determined to work to assist the achievement of [the Millennium Development] goals and 
the development objectives agreed at the major UN conferences and summits‟ (European Union 
2005).  
 
3.5.4. A democracy-development dilemma? 
The dilemma between democracy and development is inherent in political conditionality. The so-
called Samaritan‟s dilemma means that donors want to act as a Good Samaritan by giving aid to poor 
people (Chhotray and Hulme 2008: 45). When their money is spent relatively well, it is difficult from 
a humanitarian point of view to suspend aid, even when there are serious problems related to 
democratic principles. Moreover, donors are under pressure to spend the money at their disposal and 
to show results (Burnell 2011: 65). This makes them look for success stories and focus on countries 
where they have a return on investment (Zorbas 2011: 109-110). There is also the effect of path 
dependency. When donors have invested a lot of aid money in a country, it becomes difficult to 
withdraw from that country, as this means all the invested money will be lost (interview, Filip 
Reyntjens, April 2012). For these reasons, conditionality is not always rigorously applied. As Browne 
notes: „non-compliance does not always lead to the abandonment of programmes – only the 
abandonment of conditions‟ (Browne 2006: 48).  
 
Despite the increased attention for political issues in development cooperation, the norms that are 
currently defining the aid agenda have equally been blamed for their predominantly technocratic 
approach. Indeed, the PRSPs have been criticised for being technocratic and apolitical and for not 
                                                     
31
 The other MDGs are: (2) achieve universal primary education, (3) promote gender equality and empower 
women, (4) reduce child mortality, (5) improve maternal health, (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other 
diseases, (7) ensure environmental sustainability and (8) develop a Global Partnership for Development.  
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paying sufficient attention to the domestic political dynamics that could block or undermine economic 
progress (De Haan and Everst-Phillips 2007; Lazarus 2008: 1207-1210; Craig and Porter 2003). 
Moreover, the provision of budget support is controversial in authoritarian countries, as budget 
support is often perceived as symbolising trust in the overall policies of governments. For this reason, 
most donors include explicitly political criteria in the underlying principles of budget support, such as 
democracy and human rights (Molenaers et al. 2010: 13).  
 
These arguments are particularly relevant for the EU‟s development policies in sub-Saharan Africa, 
given that the EU‟s foreign policy has developed only recently and the European Commission‟s DG 
Development has maintained its poverty focus (Carbone 2007: 48-49; Dearden 2008: 13; Holden 
2009: 41). It has been argued that EU development policy has often been based on a je dépense donc 
je suis logic. The large aid budget at its disposal gives the European Commission a basis for 
autonomous action, based on developmental concerns rather than foreign policy. In this sense the 
Commission may feel the need to affirm its position vis-à-vis the Council of the EU. Moreover, unlike 
bilateral donors the European Commission is not directly linked to the taxpayers, which increases its 
possibilities for autonomous action (Molenaers and Nijs 2011: 419-420). In this sense, it should be 
added that the EDF is not subject to scrutiny from the EP. Moreover, the political expertise at the level 
of the delegations of the Commission has been noted to be limited and the diplomatic framework 
insufficiently developed (Gibert 2011b). Whereas the creation of the EEAS was believed to put 
political concerns to the forefront of external action, this depends to a large degree on the persons in 
their new functions and their background (anonymous interviews, January 2011, January 2012), 
although the exact effect can only be seen in a few years.  
 
There are various examples where the EU has mainly focused on a developmental approach. First of 
all, compared to other donors (the Netherlands and the US), which have adopted aid selectivity criteria 
with rigid political indicators, with the Governance Initiative the EU developed an approach that is 
primarily incentive-based and only accounts for a small part of EU development assistance. Moreover, 
given that the interpretation of governance is so wide (including political, social, economic, cultural 
aspects), non-democratic countries may still receive an incentive tranche (European Commission 
2006c; Molenaers and Nijs 2009: 570-573). Secondly, the EU‟s approach to budget support has until 
recently been primarily technocratic. According to the Cotonou Agreement, countries with transparent, 
accountable and effective public expenditure management, well defined macroeconomic or sectoral 
policies, and open and transparent public procurement are eligible for budget support (Cotonou 
Agreement, Article 61). As a result, the EU has provided budget support to many non-democratic 
countries, including Vietnam, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Chad. Nonetheless, as was noted in the 
Introductory Chapter, the EU is planning to adopt a more pro-democratic stance on budget support. 
General budget support will be changed into „Good Governance and Development Contracts‟, which 
can only be concluded with countries that are committed to fundamental values. Nonetheless, the fact 
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that these conditions do not apply to sectoral budget support implies that a developmental approach 
has not been abandoned completely (European Commission 2011a: 4; Council of the EU 2012a). 
 
3.5.5. Member state examples: the UK 
The EU is not the only donor to have committed to the aforementioned development norms, member 
states have equally followed this trend. Especially the example of the UK is notable here, which has 
taken an increasingly developmental approach to Africa since the coming in office of the New Labour 
government in the late 1990s (Cumming 2004; Abrahamsen and Williams 2001: 250). In 1997, the 
Department for International Development (DfID) was created, independent from the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO). DfID came to dominate the UK‟s policies in sub-Saharan Africa, as its 
actions were strongly focused on sub-Saharan Africa (Porteous 2008: 20-21). It has to be added that 
this dominance of DfID was only possible because the FCO was hardly concerned with sub-Saharan 
Africa: „It was only in the area of development policies that Africa was at the forefront of UK 
concerns‟ (Williams 2010: 38). For example, when Tony Blair convened the Commission for Africa in 
2005, DfID‟s head Hillary Benn was represented, but no one from the FCO (Porteous 2008: 61-63). 
This evolution was further made possible by the enormous increase in aid spending, which made 
DfID‟s budget much larger than that of the FCO. Particularly for Africa, aid spending increased 
sharply from £300 million in 1997-1998 to £1.25 billion in 2006-2007 (Vines 2011: 28; Porteous 
2008: 103). DfID‟s developmental approach was also translated in its strong support for good 
governance, ownership and aid effectiveness, and poverty reduction. A 1997 White Paper, the first 
White Paper on development policy in over 20 years, explicitly mentioned the elimination of poverty 
as the overall aim of DfID (Abrahamsen and Williams 2001: 255-256). In line with this emphasis on 
poverty reduction, the UK‟s aid allocation was based on the poverty needs of countries, as well as the 
government‟s ability to use aid effectively (Williams 2010: 46). Moreover, DfID became one of the 
leading advocates of direct budget support and sector wide approaches (Chhotray and Hulme 2008: 
38; Porteous 2008: 60). By 2010, budget support accounted for about a quarter of all aid provided by 
DfID (Williams 2010: 46).  
 
The evolution towards a UK Africa policy that was strongly based on developmental concerns was 
further nurtured by Prime Minister Tony Blair‟s personal engagement. From 2000 onwards Blair 
started to bring sub-Saharan Africa to the attention of international summits. Under the UK‟s 
Presidency of the G8, 2005 was declared „the Year of Africa‟ (Taylor 2010: 42). Blair was also the 
main driving force behind the Commission for Africa, a seventeen-member commission (of which 
nine Africans) with the assignment to generate new thinking and action on issues of concern to Africa, 
including conflict resolution and peace-building, human development, natural resources, governance, 
etc. (Williams 2005: 532; Porteous 2008: 61-63). Blair‟s commitment to sub-Saharan Africa has also 
been translated to the European level: it was under the UK‟s Presidency of the Council of the EU in 
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2005 that the European Commission adopted its Communication the EU Strategy for Africa: Towards 
a Euro-African Pact to Accelerate African Development, which was the basis of the Joint Africa-EU 
Strategic Partnership (2007) (Khadiagala 2009a: 312). Furthermore, the UK took the lead on the 
partnership on the MDGs in the Joint Africa-EU Strategic Partnership (Chafer 2011a: 174). 
 
Many commentators have criticised DfID‟s leadership on UK Africa policies for being too apolitical, 
downplaying the role of politics and diplomacy. As stated by Porteous: „DfID posed the problems in 
technical terms and proposed technical solutions‟ (Porteous 2008: 132). For example, under pressure 
to come up with „good news stories‟ and meet performance targets, as well as to live up to its 
intentions to respect country ownership, DfID has focused on so-called development success stories, 
while downplaying the potentially negative internal and external policies of these countries (Ibid.: 
117-121). Nonetheless, there was a relatively large consensus in the UK on Labour‟s developmental 
approach, which was supported by the British public, media, NGOs and political parties alike 
(Porteous 2008: 12-13; Chhotray and Hulme 2008: 38 and 42; Gallagher 2009: 441-442).  
 
3.5.6. Hypothesis and operationalisation 
Hence, the EU has firmly attached to good governance, ownership and aid effectiveness, and poverty 
reduction. This may pose a dilemma in the case of non-democratic countries that perform well in the 
development sphere, which can be observed in the discussion on budget support.  
 
This leads me to formulate the following hypothesis:  
H.1. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against countries that are perceived as 
development success stories, and more likely to impose negative measures against countries that are 
not perceived as development success stories. 
 
The emphasis on perception is important because it can be assumed that the EU will base its action on 
perceptions rather than on an objective reality (Fisher 2012). It should be mentioned that this also 
applies to the other hypotheses. While it is impossible to „measure‟ perceptions, I tried to assess this to 
the best extent possible using academic sources, some interviews with policy-makers and leaked US 
embassy cables. Moreover, by looking at the evolution of indicators over time, it can be expected that 
development success is perceived as more impressive when compared to a less successful performance 
in the past or, on the contrary, development failure is perceived as more detrimental when past 
performance was good. Furthermore, donor perceptions can be derived from reactions to deteriorating 
(e.g. development aid suspension) and improving economic governance (e.g. budget support).  
 
„Development success stories‟ will be operationalised as countries where the government has managed 
to achieve good governance, high economic growth, macroeconomic stability and has attracted foreign 
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investment. Moreover, these are countries with well-drafted national development strategies (PRSPs) 
that are progressing in achieving the MDGs and are „on track‟ with the programmes of the IMF and 
World Bank, more particularly the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and the Poverty 
Reduction Growth Facility.  
 
Two quantitative indicators are used to assess good governance: the World Bank‟s Governance 
Indicators „control of corruption‟ and „government effectiveness‟. The control of corruption index 
measures the perception of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. The 
government effectiveness index assesses perceptions on the quality of public services, the civil 
service, policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of the government‟s commitment to 
such policies. The partial reliance on World Bank Governance Indicators is justified by the fact that 
these are composite indicators and can be expected to be more reliable than other indicators. 
Moreover, it is certain that the EU also uses the World Bank governance indicators, for example in the 
assessment of the Governance Action Plans (European Commission 2007b, Annex 7). I will look at 
the evolution of this indicator between 1998 and 2010. Table 8 and 9 (p. 139) include the scores on 
both indicators, summarising which countries have made an improvement or deterioration and which 
countries have remained status quo. Both indicators are presented in percentile ranks, which indicates 
the rank of countries amongst all countries in the world. In case countries had an extremely low or 
high rating on other indicators (such as the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency 
International), this will also be mentioned, as this may influence the perception of the EU. More 
information on good governance was found in qualitative sources, including primary data from 
European Commission documents (the CSP or JAR) and US embassy cables and secondary data 
(press, academic articles).  
 
Basic information on programmes by the IMF and World Bank was found on the website of the IMF,
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in CSPs and in reports by the Bertelsmann Foundation. Where available, secondary sources on 
economic policies of the governments (academic articles, International Crisis Group reports) were also 
consulted. Apart from whether countries have a PRSP, I also considered the relations they have with 
the IMF and World Bank. This is because the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) are often seen 
as the leading organisations determining whether countries are eligible for budget support or not 
(Santiso 2003).  
 
Given the attachment of the EU to African-owned initiatives for socio-economic and good 
governance, I also took into account whether countries participated in the APRM. Information on the 
APRM was found on its website,
33
 as well as in secondary literature. 
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Where available I also added data on the position of the government vis-à-vis donors. In some cases, 
the government was particularly hostile towards donors, whereas in others, government policies were 
particularly forthcoming towards donors.  
 
To measure economic growth I used the following indicators: the GDP growth rate, the GDP per 
capita in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a percentage of the 
GDP and inflation rates. These data were retrieved from the IMF‟s World Economic Outlook (2011). 
In some cases, however, the World Development Indicators were used as information from the IMF 
was not available or incomplete. GDP growth and the percentage of FDI is represented in Table 10 (p. 
140). On foreign investment, Table 11 rates the countries according to the World Bank‟s Ease of 
Doing Business ranking. Table 12 (p. 141) includes the inflation rates of the country cases. Apart from 
quantitative data I also assessed reports by the Bertelsmann Foundation, the International Crisis Group 
and the Economist Intelligence Unit, as well as academic articles on economic policies and US 
embassy cables.  
 
To measure progress on the MDGs I assessed official government reports on the MDGs, but in many 
cases these reports were unavailable or outdated. In these cases, I consulted the MDG Monitor
34
 which 
provides basic information on whether countries are on track, off track or could achieve a goal if 
changes are made. Lastly, the evolution of the HDI between 1990 and 2010 was considered. Table 13 
(p. 141) compares the progress countries have made on the HDI between 1995-2000, 2000-2005, 
2005-2010 and 2000-2010.  
 
Given that not only the European Commission but also member states may be led by development 
norms, it will also be taken into account which member states have bilateral development cooperation 
programmes. These bilateral donors may try to influence the EU in case of bad or good developmental 
performance. Hence, Table 14 (p. 142) summarises the main EU donors per country, as well as the 
amount of ODA provided in 2000-2010. Data on ODA are retrieved from the OECD‟s Creditor 
Reporting System.  
 
3.5.7. Case studies 
3.5.7.1. Eritrea 
Eritrea is not a development success story. Its good governance record has worsened since the 1990s. 
The control of corruption has dropped significantly since the late 1990s, although Eritrea‟s corruption 
record is still lower than that of most other cases. Eritrea‟s score on government effectiveness has 
equally deteriorated. Eritrea does not have a formal development plan. An interim-PRSP was drawn 
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up, but was never formally approved by the government. There are only sectoral strategies including 
in the road sector and in education (European Community and Eritrea 2005: 8 and 17). Eritrea is not 
eligible for budget support as the government does not produce an annual budget. The government of 
Eritrea is believed to spend a disproportionate share of its budget on military expenditure, even more 
than on health (Ibid.: 4). In 2006, Eritrea showed willingness to start the process leading to debt relief 
with the IMF, but this never got started as the requirements on military spending and transparency of 
the budget were unacceptable for the government (US embassy Eritrea 2006a).  
 
Moreover, the government of Eritrea has been outspokenly hostile towards donors and has tried to 
become more self-reliant. For example, in 2005-2006, the government seized food aid from the World 
Food Program under the pretext to become less dependent on donor assistance (US embassy Eritrea 
2008b). Donors have little possibility to audit the economic sector and are often prohibited from 
monitoring their programmes because of restrictions on travelling in the country (International Crisis 
Group 2010a: 8 and 14). Due to the lack of suitable contractors, the absorption capacity of Eritrean aid 
is extremely low (1 percent) (US embassy Eritrea 2008c). For example, an EU-funded programme in 
construction faced difficulties as all the potential implementing companies were either from the 
military or from party officials (US embassy Eritrea 2008d). NGOs have either been expulsed from the 
country because of increased registration difficulties since 2004, or have left because of government 
restrictions and lack of access to fuel (US embassy Eritrea 2008e). In more recent years, the 
government of Eritrea has gradually expulsed most remaining donors. In early 2011, the government 
announced it would only accept projects in the field of health, water and sanitation. In November 
2011, the government suspended all ongoing projects under the 10
th
 EDF under the pretext that the 
national development plan would be revised (European Commission s.d.b.; EU delegation Eritrea 
2011). In this context, development assistance from EU member states is largely restricted to 
humanitarian assistance (anonymous interview, February 2009).  
 
With few exceptions, Eritrea‟s economic growth has been minor or even negative since the mid-1990s. 
Only in 2001, Eritrea‟s GDP grew by almost 9 percent which may be related to the end of the border 
war with Ethiopia. In 2008, Eritrea‟s economy shrunk by almost 10 percent. When GDP growth was 
noted, this was mostly related to the government‟s appreciation of the nakfa, Eritrea‟s national 
currency. Moreover, inflation offsets any growth in GDP (US Embassy Eritrea 2006a). Together with 
the GDP, investments have dropped. Whereas FDI represented 35 percent of Eritrea‟s GDP in 2001, 
by 2010 this was less than 10 percent. According to a 2005 report on the MDGs, Eritrea is below 
target regarding the eradication of extreme poverty and achievement of universal primary education. 
The proportion of people living below the national poverty line and the proportion of children below 
five years suffering from hunger increased between 1993-1995 and 2001-2003 (State of Eritrea 2005: 
6-10).  
 
128 
 
3.5.7.2. Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is seen by donors as a „projection of hope‟ and a flagship country for the new aid agenda 
(Abbink 2009: 18-19). This perception is shared by academics such as Radelet (2010) who included 
Ethiopia as one of the seventeen „emerging‟ African countries, and by the Economist (2011, January), 
which lists Ethiopia amongst the „Lion Kings‟, the fastest growing African economies. Ethiopia‟s 
corruption record is traditionally relatively low because a culture of discipline and performance 
pervades the government and civil service. Service delivery systems function better than in most low-
income African countries (Furtado and Smith 2009: 132). Ethiopia‟s control of corruption rate has 
remained stable since 1998. Regarding government effectiveness, Ethiopia‟s score improved 
significantly in the second half of the 2000s, when compared to the late 1990s. The government of 
Ethiopia is strongly committed to pro-poor growth. The government has adopted three PRSPs since 
2000, all of which were well-received by the donor community and particularly the World Bank and 
the IMF.
35
 Ethiopia is also a member country of the APRM.   
 
Ethiopia‟s growth strategy has been remarkably successful. GDP growth has been 5 percent on 
average in 2001-2005 and even above 10 percent in 2004-2009. Ethiopia‟s GDP per capita nearly 
doubled between 2004 and 2010 and foreign investment has been on the rise since 2000. Moreover, 
Ethiopia has made tremendous progress regarding the MDGs. It is on track regarding MDGs 2-7, 
while the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger could be achieved „if some changes are made‟, 
according to the MDG monitor. The percentage of people living under the poverty line has decreased 
from 42.8 percent in 2000-2001 to 29 percent in 2009-2010 (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
2010: 6). Ethiopia‟s HDI score increased by 35 percent in 2000-2010. Taking into account its progress 
in the past forty years, Ethiopia was the 11
th
 best performer in the world and the first in sub-Saharan 
Africa as regards the HDI (United Nations Development Programme 2010: 3). Nonetheless, 
macroeconomic stability is a problem. In 2006-2009, Ethiopia had an average inflation rate of 18 
percent. Moreover, despite economic progress, food shortages have remained (Abbink 2009: 18-19). 
Furthermore, there are indications that aid is politicised in Ethiopia, especially since the 2005 
elections. A study by Human Rights Watch found that donor-supported government services, 
including micro-credit facilities, agricultural inputs and food aid, were often denied to opposition 
supporters (Human Rights Watch 2010d).  
 
Nonetheless, these problems are largely overlooked by the donor community. The idea is that „If 
things do not succeed in Ethiopia [...], then it will not work anywhere‟ (Abbink 2009: 18-19). This 
approach is strongly visible in the position of the European Commission which, despite the Human 
Rights Watch report, considered in late 2010 a return to general budget support, arguing that all the 
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 These are: the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme (2002-2005), the Plan for 
Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (2006-2010) and the Growth and Transformation Plan 
(2010-2015).  
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technical conditions (public finance management, national development plan, commitment to 
development) were fulfilled. However, the member states opposed a return to general budget support, 
arguing that this would not be appropriate in a climate of growing authoritarianism (anonymous 
interviews, January 2011). Yet many member states have equally built up their development assistance 
in Ethiopia, not in the least the UK, which is a larger donor than the EU. Ethiopia is the UK‟s second 
largest development program in Africa with over 250 staff in Addis Ababa. It has been noted that 
DfID officials are very supportive of the EPRDF‟s economic policies, often ignoring political 
problems (Human Rights Watch 2010d: 84-85). Other major donors include Germany and Italy.  
 
3.5.7.3. Kenya 
After years of economic mismanagement under President Moi, President Kibaki‟s first challenge upon 
election was to put Kenya back on track with good governance and sound economic management, 
which had been the main aspects of his election programme (Shiverenje 2005). First of all, Kibaki 
tried to cope with corruption, which had been a serious concern of donors. Under Moi, several donors 
suspended aid because of corruption, including the IMF in 1998 (BBC News 2003, January) and the 
Netherlands in 1999 (Brown 2007: 320-321). Several improvements were initially made, such as the 
adoption of two anti-corruption laws in 2003, the set-up of an anti-corruption commission, the 
suspension of judges suspected of corruption and Kenya‟s participation in the APRM (Southwick 
2010; US Embassy Kenya 2005c; US Embassy Kenya 2005d). However, after a few years, progress 
stagnated. In 2005, chief of the anti-corruption commission John Githongo resigned after receiving 
death threats for revealing the Anglo-Leasing scandal, a procurement scam involving military defence 
contracts. Kibaki had failed to support Githongo (Southwick 2010). Donor concern over corruption 
thus continued under Kibaki and led to several suspensions of development assistance. In 2004, the 
EU froze £83 million (The Guardian 2004, July) and in February 2005, the delegation of the European 
Commission warned that aid would be conditional upon the government‟s anti-corruption efforts (US 
embassy Kenya 2005e). The UK even went so far as to issue a visa ban on the Minister of Transport in 
2005 because of his alleged involvement in corruption (Agence France Presse 5 August 2005). 
However, Kenya had a moderately good score on government effectiveness, which remained stable 
under Kibaki‟s rule when compared to the period under Moi.   
 
Apart from his efforts in the fight against corruption, Kibaki tried to restore the confidence of the 
donor community by engaging in the PRSP process. Although an interim-PRSP had been produced in 
2001 under Moi, the IMF and World Bank did not immediately resume aid as they perceived the Moi 
government to be corrupt and unwilling to promote sound economic management. President Kibaki 
took up the task of updating the PRSP, which resulted in the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth 
and Employment Creation and an investment programme for the period 2003-2007. With these new 
strategies, Kibaki restored the confidence of the donors (Shiverenje 2005). Moreover, with a 
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privatisation and public procurement bill in 2005, Kenya paved the way for renewed IMF cooperation 
(US Embassy Kenya 2005f). In October 2007, only few months before the December 2007 elections, 
the Kenyan government prepared the ambitious Kenya Vision 2030 programme, which aimed at 
transforming Kenya into a middle-income country by achieving 10 percent GDP growth annually 
(Republic of Kenya 2008a).  
 
These attempts were relatively successful. Whereas Kenya‟s GDP per capita was declining between 
1999 and 2004, after 2004 Kenya‟s GDP was on the rise, with growth rates between 4 and 7 percent in 
2004-2007. Similarly, foreign investment increased after 2004. Nonetheless, progress on the MDGs 
has been less impressive as Kenya‟s economic strategy is strongly concentrated on GDP growth and 
wealth creation rather than on poverty reduction (Shiverenje 2005). In 2004, the government 
introduced MDG-based planning to work towards the realisation of the goals. Nonetheless, whereas a 
lot of progress was made in the field of primary education with the Free Primary Education 
Programme, Kenya is unlikely to achieve the other MDGs. It is considered „off track‟ on the 
eradication of extreme poverty and hunger (Republic of Kenya 2008b), despite its relatively developed 
economy. On the other hand, Kenya‟s HDI improved under Kibaki‟s rule (+11 percent in 2000-2010), 
whereas under Moi the HDI had declined. Despite corruption and resulting aid cuts, EU member states 
remain engaged in the country. The largest donors are the UK, France and Germany.  
 
3.5.7.4. Chad 
Chad cannot be seen as a development success story and President Déby has done little to change this 
perception. First of all, corruption has increased since 2000. Between 2002 and 2010, Chad moved 
from the 20 percent to the 5 percent most corrupt countries in the world. The fight against corruption 
has never been a priority for the government of Chad, since the system has benefited the president and 
those close to him. A national good governance strategy was never really implemented, although a 
Ministry of General State Control and Moralisation was created in 2004 (Bertelsmann Foundation 
2007c: 19; International Crisis Group 2008b: 3; International Crisis Group 2010b: 22; US Embassy 
Chad 2006b). Government effectiveness equally deteriorated significantly between 1998 and 2010. 
Chad is not a member of the APRM.  
 
Chad‟s relations with the IMF and World Bank have been tense because of the government‟s doubtful 
use of the budget. An interim-PRSP wad adopted in 2000 and in 2003, Chad‟s first PRSP was 
approved (Republic of Chad 2003). However, the implementation of the Poverty Reduction Growth 
Facility was hampered by arms purchases and corruption (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007c: 4). Similar 
problems emerged with the World Bank. The latter granted support to an oil pipeline from Chad to the 
sea via Cameroon, an agreement that was conditional on the implementation of the Revenue 
Management Law, which provided that most of the oil wealth would go to poverty reduction. 
131 
 
However, in 2005 the government of Chad unilaterally amended the law to spend part of the oil 
income on defence. The World Bank initially suspended its assistance as a reaction to this decision, 
but in 2006 an agreement was reached that operations would be restored if the government would 
devote 70 percent of the budget to poverty reduction (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007c: 17; 
International Crisis Group 2009b: 4-8). The EU had foreseen budget support to help Chad achieve 
macroeconomic stability before oil revenues would come in. However, the disbursement of the first 
tranche, initially foreseen for 2003, was delayed until 2005 as a result of the suspension of the IMF 
programme, and eventually halted because of the suspension of the World Bank programme 
(République du Tchad – Communauté européenne 2007: 15-16).  
 
Chad had spectacular GDP growth rates in 2001-2004, but this can be explained by the beginning of 
oil extraction in this period. After 2005, there was hardly any economic growth and the economy even 
shrunk in 2008. A similar evolution can be observed in investments, which tripled between 2000 and 
2002, but then dropped to previous levels. According to the 2011 Ease of Doing Business ranking, 
Chad was the worst sub-Saharan African country to do business. Despite oil revenues, Chad‟s social 
indicators have remained amongst the worst in the world (International Crisis Group 2006c: 7). Chad 
is considered off track on achieving the MDGs, except for universal primary education. Some progress 
was however made regarding gender equality, the treatment of HIV/AIDS and access to drinkable 
water (République du Tchad 2010). While Chad‟s HDI improved between 2000 and 2005 (most 
probably because of high GDP growth), it decreased between 2005 and 2010. Chad can be considered 
an aid orphan, with only few donors present. Besides the EU, only France and Germany have 
development programs in Chad. Moreover, Germany decided in 2008 to end activities in Chad by 
2011-2012 because of concerns about good governance (Federal Foreign Office 2011a; HTSPE 
Limited 2008: 84).  
 
3.5.7.5. Niger 
Under President Tandja, improvements were made in the development sphere, but at the same time 
there were reasons for concern about Niger‟s development performance. On the one hand, its 
corruption record improved significantly between 1998 and 2010 as a result of the fight against 
corruption, which included the creation of an anti-corruption commission (Republique du Niger 2007: 
11). Government effectiveness equally improved between 1998 and 2010. On the other hand, there 
were indications that the fight against corruption was used to neutralise political opponents. A year 
before the 2009 presidential elections, Tandja‟s main rival, prime minister Amadou, was arrested on 
corruption charges (US Embassy Niger 2008). Moreover, despite improvements, corruption was still 
rife, and revenues from the extractive industry mainly stayed within Tandja‟s inner circle (anonymous 
interview, February 2012; interview, Jeremy Keenan, January 2012). In addition, public finance 
management was weak. Although the EU had agreed on general budget support for the period 2009-
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2011, a study ordered by the European Commission in 2008 mentioned serious problems regarding 
public finance management, which the government seemed unwilling to tackle (Bauer et al. 2008: 91-
94; anonymous interviews, January-February 2012). In addition, in early 2009, it was clear that the 
agreed performance indicators regarding education had not been met, which made the EU freeze the 
disbursement of a tranche of budget support (anonymous interview, February 2012).  
 
A first Interim PRSP was approved by the IFIs in December 2000 (European Community and Niger 
2008: 22-23). In 2008, the World Bank approved Niger‟s new PRSP, the Stratégie de Développement 
Accéléré et de Réduction de la Pauvreté, which aimed at reaching the MDGs on the basis of an 
average annual growth rate of 7 percent (République du Niger 2007). Whereas Niger‟s growth rate 
was volatile in the 1990s, since 2001 there has been constant economic growth at a pace of 5 percent 
on average. Foreign investments have also increased after the government reduced red tape, made the 
process of acquiring licenses less demanding and privatised a number of state companies (US 
Embassy Niger 2006). However, there has been little progress on achieving the MDGs. Niger is 
considered „off track‟ with regard to all the MDGs, except for the reduction of child mortality and 
combating HIV/AIDS. According to a 2007 report, the proportion of people living in extreme poverty 
hardly decreased between 1993 and 2005, although some progress was made regarding primary 
education, gender equality and maternal health (Institut National de la Statistique Niger 2007: xi). 
Niger‟s HDI, which is one of the lowest in the world, improved by 35 percent between 1995 and 2010. 
France, Belgium and Germany are the only EU donors providing significant development assistance to 
Niger, while Denmark, Spain, Luxemburg and the UK have smaller aid programs.   
 
3.5.7.6. Nigeria 
Although President Obasanjo tried to regain the confidence of donors by showing commitment in the 
fight against corruption and by developing a strategy for growth and poverty reduction, donor 
concerns on corruption have remained, and progress on achieving the MDGs was limited. After 
election in 1999, Obasanjo immediately dismissed 99 officials in the notoriously corrupt customs 
service (Agence France Presse 2 June 1999). An anti-corruption law was signed in 2000 and an anti-
corruption commission was set up. In 2002, a second commission was established, the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), with the mandate to prevent, investigate and prosecute 
financial crimes (Lawson 2009: 84). Throughout 2002-2005, almost 900 policemen and two ministers 
were dismissed (Agence France Presse 23 February 2004; 4 April 2005). In 2006, these efforts led to 
the removal of Nigeria from the list of countries not cooperating in the fight against corruption 
(Agence France Presse 23 June 2006). However, Obasanjo‟s corruption policies were not reflected in 
the World Bank Indicators on control of corruption. Although there was an improvement towards 
2002, by 2010 Nigeria‟s control of corruption was almost on the same level as before 1999. In 2005, 
Nigeria was one of the three most corrupt countries in the world according to Transparency 
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International‟s Corruption Perceptions Index (Agence France Presse 4 August 2005). Moreover, 
Obasanjo‟s anti-corruption efforts were primarily directed against political opponents, such as Atiku 
Abubakar. The EFCC became much more effective under chairman Ribadu, when several governors 
close to the political establishment were impeached. However, Yar‟Adua‟s decision in 2008 to merge 
the EFCC with the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission was 
intended to sideline Ribadu (Amuwo 2009: 51-52; Lawson 2009: 85-86). Government effectiveness 
remained stable in the first years of Obasanjo‟s rule, but worsened in 2009-2010 under Presidents 
Yar‟Adua and Jonathan. Obasanjo was one of the founding fathers of the NEPAD and the APRM, and 
was amongst the first countries to accede to the APRM (Jinadu 2008).  
 
Although an ambitious national development plan was drafted with the National Economic 
Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) (2003-2007), Obasanjo had several discussions 
with the IFIs on the pace of privatisations, government spending and inflation. In 2002, Obasanjo 
pulled out of a standby agreement with the IMF, stating he favoured political stability and democratic 
consolidation over narrow macroeconomic concerns (Agence France Presse 5 March 2002). Despite 
the absence of a formal IMF programme, almost half of Nigeria‟s debt was cancelled by the Paris Club 
in 2005 (Nwozor 2009: 27-28; US Embassy Nigeria 2005). Moreover, privatisation was speeded up at 
the end of Obasanjo‟s rule, for example in the telecom sector (US Embassy Nigeria 2007d).  
 
While Obasanjo achieved macroeconomic stability and economic growth (Rotberg 2007: 39), the 
unequal distribution of oil wealth raised concerns (Taylor 2010: 140; Khakee 2008). Indeed, whereas 
the economy was stagnating under the military regime in the 1990s, since 1999, Nigeria‟s GDP has 
been on the rise. The percentage of FDI, on the other hand, has only marginally improved. Although 
poverty reduction was ranked as the first of four goals of NEEDS (European Community and Nigeria 
2009: 10), Nigeria‟s growth strategy has mainly focused on GDP growth. As a result, Nigeria is 
unlikely to meet the MDGs, despite high oil revenues. It is „off track‟ regarding the eradication of 
extreme poverty and hunger. The MDGs on universal primary education, maternal health and reducing 
child mortality could be reached by 2015, but it is unlikely that the MDGs on HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
other diseases, and gender will be achieved (Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 2010: 4-
6). Information on the HDI is only available for 2005 and 2010, during which Nigeria‟s HDI increased 
slightly (by 5 percent). The Niger Delta, which provides about 75 percent of all government revenues 
from minerals, is severely impoverished, with little access to clean water, electric power, roads, 
hospitals and schools (Rotberg 2007: 34-35). Excluding debt relief, EU member states are only minor 
donors in Nigeria. Only the UK is a large development partner, with more than USD 2,294 million 
provided in 2000-2009. Germany and France have smaller but still substantial envelopes.  
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3.5.7.7. Rwanda 
Under President Kagame, Rwanda has become a „donor darling‟ (Marysse et al. 2007) and is 
perceived as a model for economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. First of all, Rwanda has made 
tremendous progress regarding the control of corruption. It is seen as the „Singapore of Africa‟ with a 
civil service largely free from corruption (Zorbas 2011: 108). In the 2009 Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index, Rwanda was placed the „least corrupt‟ country in East Africa and among 
the top ten performers in Africa (US Embassy Rwanda 2009a). Equally, Rwanda has made major 
improvements regarding government effectiveness. The Rwandan administration functions effectively 
and health and education services are improving, which gives donors the feeling they can „get things 
done‟ in Rwanda (Hayman 2009b: 72). This favourable perception of donors is further strengthened 
by the diplomacy of the government of Rwanda vis-à-vis the donor community. Kagame speaks the 
language of the donors on aid effectiveness, partnership, alignment and national development 
objectives. Government officials demonstrate professionalism, dynamism and ambition and respond to 
the donor community‟s emphasis on target-driven development by focusing on very detailed and 
ambitious performance targets (Zorbas 2011: 108; Ansoms 2011: 247). Moreover, Rwanda 
strengthened its image in the donor community by being one of the first countries to participate in the 
APRM (Jordaan 2006).  
 
President Kagame has developed a very ambitious and forward looking development strategy, Rwanda 
Vision 2020 (1998), which aims to transform Rwanda into a middle-income country with medium 
human development. The strategy was followed in 2007 by the Economic Development and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (Hayman 2009a: 160; Ansoms 2011: 240). With these strategies, Rwanda was able 
to obtain lending from the IMF, which has commended Rwanda‟s strong performance in economic 
growth, low inflation and build-up of foreign exchange reserves (Golooba Mutebi et al. 2003: 221; 
Purcell et al. 2006: 8-16). Moreover, the RPF government has brought substantive economic growth to 
Rwanda, which is notable given the shattered state of the economy after the genocide (Holvoets and 
Rombouts 2008: 17). During the 2000s, Rwanda‟s economy has continued to grow at a pace of nearly 
8 percent on average, leading to a doubling of Rwanda‟s GDP per capita between 2000 and 2010. 
Similarly, foreign investments have increased significantly and now constitute almost 25 percent of 
Rwanda‟s GDP. This can be directly related to Kagame‟s efforts to improve the business environment 
and attract foreign capital. In 2010, Rwanda was recognised as the world‟s top performer in the World 
Bank‟s Ease of Doing Business ranking (US Embassy Rwanda 2009b). However, the strong focus on 
the private sector has also been criticised by those who doubt Kagame‟s commitment to pro-poor 
growth (Uvin 2010: 172; Marysse et al. 2007: 452). Rwanda is not likely to achieve the eradication of 
extreme poverty. In fact, poverty increased in absolute terms between 2001 and 2006 (Ansoms 2011: 
241-242; Abbott and Rwirahira 2010: 11-12; Zorbas 2011: 110). Nonetheless, Kagame has strongly 
invested in several of the MDG-related sectors, including higher education and gender equality 
(Bertelsmann Foundation 2005b). The MDGs regarding universal primary education, most of those on 
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gender equality, child mortality and those concerning HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, are most 
likely to be achieved. Moreover, Rwanda‟s HDI increased by 39 percent in 2000-2010.  
 
For these reasons, donors have increased development assistance, including budget support, in 
Rwanda (Purcell et al. 2006: 8-16). Member states with development programmes in Rwanda include 
the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium, while France, Germany and Spain are smaller donors. DfID‟s 
search for success stories and a personal sympathy of DfID‟s Clare Short for the reform-oriented 
Kagame can explain the explosion of the UK‟s ODA to Rwanda, despite the fact that the UK had 
minor economic or security interests to defend (Marriage 2006: 481; Gallagher 2009: 444; Porteous 
2008: 21-23; Hayman 2010). Rwanda has been held up as one of the UK‟s flagship countries for 
development in Africa, and DfID officials have been quoted saying UK aid to Rwanda is „money well 
spent‟ (Beswick 2011: 1919-1920). Moreover, DfID‟s favourable appreciation of the government of 
Rwanda influences the UK‟s foreign policy towards Rwanda, which often downplays human rights 
violations. For example, the FCO‟s 2010 annual human rights report did not include any information 
on Rwanda (Human Rights Watch 2011d: 4).  
 
3.5.7.8. Guinea 
President Conté‟s years in power were characterised by severe economic mismanagement. Whereas 
Guinea‟s control of corruption rate was on the same par as Ethiopia in 2002, by 2006 Guinea was 
amongst the 8 percent countries with the lowest control of corruption. In the 2006 Corruption 
Perceptions Index, Transparency International ranked Guinea as the most corrupt country in Africa 
(Bertelsmann Foundation 2007a). The high corruption rate is related to the liberalisation of the 
economy under President Conté, which created a system of „crony capitalism‟ where public property 
was used for private benefit. President Conté often said his Ministers were „thieves‟ (International 
Crisis Group 2007d: 2). An audit into the management of the Guinean administration showed that 
more than USD 60 million of public money disappeared between January 2006 and March 2007 
(International Crisis Group 2008c: 2). Government effectiveness equally deteriorated under President 
Conté. 
  
In 2001, Guinea adopted its first PRSP. However, the HIPC did not reach the completion point due to 
Guinea‟s failure to meet the requirements, and loans and budget support from the IMF and World 
Bank were halted in 2002 (Laakso et al. 2007b: 35; International Crisis Group 2005: 12). However, 
the newly appointed prime ministers Diallo (2004) and Kouyaté (2007) tried to regain the support of 
the donors. An IMF-monitored economic programme was implemented in 2004-2005 under prime 
minister Diallo, but the programme was threatened by increasing inflation (Bertelsmann Foundation 
2007a: 11-12). Under Kouyaté, an emergency socio-economic plan was drawn up to which most 
donors pledged funding and which led to limited debt rescheduling and reduction. These efforts 
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however stalled in 2008 when Kouyaté was sidelined by President Conté and Souaré – a close Conté 
ally – was brought to office (International Crisis Group 2008c: 1-5).  
 
Economic growth slowed down in 2003 when compared to the second half of the 1990s. FDI as a 
percentage of the GDP fell from 20 percent in the second half of the 1990s to 14 percent in 2005-2010. 
Although regional instability also contributed to the stagnation of Guinea‟s economy, Conté‟s 
economic policies were equally an important, if not the most important, factor (International Crisis 
Group 2005: 2). The clearest example of Conté‟s failed economic policies was inflation. Since 2001, 
inflation has skyrocketed, with peaks in 2004-2006. In 2006, inflation was 40 percent, one of the 
highest rates in Africa. The high inflation rate has made the lives of the Guinean population even more 
difficult than before, given the rise of prices of basic commodities (Ibid.: 14). It is expected that 
Guinea will not achieve the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger nor the targets concerning 
gender equality. For the other MDGs, it is believed these could be achieved if changes are made, as 
some progress was made regarding education, child mortality and maternal health (International 
Monetary Fund 2011: 7). The HDI is only available starting from 2005. There was a minor 
improvement between 2005 and 2010. France and Germany are the main donors in Guinea, but 
Germany decided in 2001 to stop government-to-government negotiations on development 
cooperation with Guinea, instead working with two-yearly unilateral commitments (Federal Foreign 
Office 2011b). 
 
3.5.7.9. Côte d’Ivoire 
Côte d‟Ivoire‟s poor economic performance since 1999 is a considerable setback compared to the 
booming economy under the leadership of Houphouët-Boigny (1960-1993) (Chirot 2006:63). Whilst 
corruption had already been a concern amongst donors in the late 1990s, leading to several aid 
suspensions, it further increased under President Gbagbo. Furthermore, there was a serious 
deterioration in government effectiveness between 1998 and 2010.  
 
In January 2000, Côte d‟Ivoire announced its intention to draft a PRSP. A Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility was foreseen for 2002-2005, the implementation of which was initially linked to 
progress in the Article 96 consultations. However, in 2002 Côte d‟Ivoire stopped paying back its debt 
and the programme was suspended with the outbreak of civil war in September 2002 (European 
Community and Côte d‟Ivoire 2005: 26). The appointment of technocrat Banny as prime minister in 
2005 was meant to re-establish the confidence of the donors, but Banny lacked the powers to 
implement economic reform (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007b: 10-20). Côte d‟Ivoire was finally able 
to re-establish relations with the IFIs after the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement in 2007. In January 
2009, a PRSP was approved (République de Côte d‟Ivoire 2009: xi-xii; see also Labertit 2010: 138-
139).  
137 
 
 
Côte d‟Ivoire‟s economic growth slowed down from 3 percent on average in 1996-2000 to 0 percent in 
2000-2005. In 2000, Côte d‟Ivoire‟s economy shrunk by more than 4 percent. While the civil war 
blocked economic growth in 2002-2003, Côte d‟Ivoire‟s economy started growing again in 2004, 
despite the ongoing civil war (Labertit 2010: 21). Progress on the MDGs has been hampered by poor 
economic governance and the civil war. Between 1998 and 2008, poverty increased from 33.6 percent 
to 48.9 percent. School attendance stagnated between 2000 and 2008. On the other hand, there has 
been some progress on child and maternal mortality and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS (République de 
Côte d‟Ivoire 2010). Côte d‟Ivoire‟s HDI improved only slightly (5 percent) between 2000 and 2010. 
It should be noted that Ouattara had special credentials in the donor community as a former senior 
official of the IMF who had led the implementation of a structural adjustment programme as prime 
minister under Houphouët-Boigny (International Crisis Group 2004: 3). France is by far the largest 
donor in Côte d‟Ivoire, while Germany and Belgium are smaller donors.  
 
3.5.7.10. Zimbabwe 
In none of the cases under investigation, have government economic policies been so detrimental than 
in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is one of the world‟s clearest examples of a „man-made disaster‟ (Sollom 
2009). Mugabe‟s poor economic governance has plunged Zimbabwe in an economic crisis worse than 
that of countries suffering civil war including Côte d‟Ivoire, the DRC or Sierra Leone (Lyman 2007: 
91). Zimbabwe‟s disastrous economic results since the late 1990s are all the more surprising when 
taking into account that Zimbabwe was once perceived as an economic success story. First of all, there 
was an enormous deterioration in Zimbabwe‟s control of corruption rate. While corruption was rather 
low for sub-Saharan African standards in the late 1990s, by 2010 Zimbabwe was amongst the 2 
percent most corrupt countries in the world. The public sector has become increasingly politicised: 
state agencies and enterprises have become filled with ZANU-PF supporters, and official corruption 
goes unpunished (Bratton and Masunungure 2008: 45-47). In 2005, an anti-corruption commission 
was set up, but the government‟s corruption strategy has become a political strategy to target disloyal 
or dissenting officials (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009b: 24). There has equally been a significant 
deterioration in Zimbabwe‟s government effectiveness.  
 
Moreover, the government has been hostile towards donors and NGOs. The latter were targeted by the 
Private Voluntary Organisations Act, which requires all NGOs to register with the Ministry of Social 
welfare (US Embassy Zimbabwe 2002c). In 2002-2004, there were indications that Mugabe‟s 
government was using food aid as a political tool (Amnesty International 2004c: 43-51; Human Rights 
Watch 2003b). Zimbabwe does not have a PRSP. An attempt was made with the Millennium 
Economic Recovery Programme (2000-2002) and the Ten Point Plan (announced in 2002), but none 
of these programmes was published and could thus not be adopted as a PRSP. Zimbabwe stopped 
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payments to the IMF in 2001. Because of Zimbabwe‟s enormous debt with the IMF, the latter 
withdrew Zimbabwe and suspended its voting rights (World Bank 2005: 8; International Crisis Group 
2003c: 3). The compulsory withdrawal from the IMF was ended in 2006, after Zimbabwe cleared its 
arrears to the IMF. However, the IMF did not restore Zimbabwe‟s voting rights nor its ineligibility for 
IMF general resources, citing the deteriorating socio-economic conditions and the lack of an adequate 
reform package (World Bank 2007: 9). World Bank cooperation was limited due to Zimbabwe‟s 
massive arrears (World Bank 2005: 8). 
 
Economic governance has been used as a political strategy rather than to promote economic growth. 
For example, the Fast Track Land Reform was introduced to boost Mugabe‟s popularity against the 
background of the economic crisis in the 1990s (Laakso 2002: 445). The programme led to food 
shortages in Zimbabwe, since 90 percent of farmers (nearly) stopped their work. Furthermore, 
inflation has increased by enormous salary raises preceding the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 
presidential elections (US Embassy Zimbabwe 2000; International Crisis Group 2002c: 5). As a result, 
Zimbabwe‟s economy shrunk between the late 1990s and 2008. In 2000-2005, Zimbabwe‟s GDP 
shrunk by 7 percent on average. FDI fell by more than 95 percent between 1996 and 2001. Moreover, 
inflation has skyrocketed, with absolute peaks in 2006 (1,096 percent) and 2007 (24,411 percent). Due 
to the economic crisis, Zimbabwe‟s prospects for the achievement of the MDGs are bleak. Its 
population living below the poverty line and underweight children increased between 1995 and 2003. 
Zimbabwe‟s child mortality rate more than tripled between 1994 and 2009 and tuberculosis numbers 
went eightfold between 2000 and 2007. On the other hand, progress was made regarding school 
attendance and literacy. Zimbabwe is off track regarding the participation of women (Zimbabwe and 
UNDP 2010). Zimbabwe‟s HDI almost halved between 1990 and 2010.  
 
The new unity government which took office in 2008 introduced the Short Term Emergency Recovery 
Programme comprising macroeconomic and governance issues to stabilise the economy. Inflation was 
halted immediately after the new government released the Zimbabwean dollar (International Crisis 
Group 2009c: 8). As a result of these measures, the economy started growing again.  
 
From the 1990s, many donors refocused their aid to NGOs. This was a reaction both to the increasing 
authoritarian characteristics of the Mugabe regime and to the lack of development focus of the 
government. Hansen gives the example of Denmark which, as a result of aid cuts, had to drop either 
Zimbabwe or Kenya as a partner country. Although Kenya was equally authoritarian under the Moi 
regime, Kenya was chosen arguing that – unlike Zimbabwe - „Kenya did not let politics totally 
overshadow economic development‟ (Hansen 2011: 250-251). The main donors are UK, Germany and 
Sweden.  
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Table 8. Control of corruption: evolution (Percentile rank) 
 1998 2002 2006 2010 Overall evolution*  
Eritrea 81.0 60.5 49.3 39.2 Significant deterioration 
Ethiopia 29.8 31.7 30.2 28.2 Status quo 
Kenya 12.2 15.6 20.0 18.7 Status quo 
Chad 16.6 20.0 6.3 5.3 Deterioration 
Niger 11.7 9.8 20.5 31.3 Significant improvement 
Nigeria 10.2 1.5 11.7 15.8 Status quo 
Rwanda 25.4 38.0 52.7 70.8 Significant improvement 
Guinea 27.8 35.6 13.2 8.1 Significant deterioration 
Côte 
d‟Ivoire 
42.4 27.3 9.3 9.6 Significant deterioration 
Zimbabwe 31.2 3.9 4.9 2.4 Significant deterioration  
Improvement/deterioration: +/- >10, <20 
Significant improvement/deterioration: +/- >=20 
 
 
            Table 9. Government effectiveness: evolution (Percentile rank) 
 1998 2002 2006 2010 Overall evolution*  
Eritrea 17.1 24.4 7.3 6.2 Deterioration 
Ethiopia 15.6 16.1 31.7 42.6 Significant improvement 
Kenya 34.1 27.3 29.3 35.9 Status quo 
Chad 27.8 17.6 4.9 4.3 Significant deterioration 
Niger 12.7 18.0 18.5 27.8 Improvement 
Nigeria 10.2 12.2 20.0 10.5 Status quo 
Rwanda 16.6 16.6 44.9 54.1 Significant improvement 
Guinea 21.5 14.6 6.8 11.5 Deterioration 
Côte d‟Ivoire 47.8 15.6 8.8 7.2 Significant deterioration  
Zimbabwe 42.0 19.0 8.3 3.8 Significant deterioration  
*Improvement/deterioration: +/- >10, <20 
Significant improvement/deterioration: +/- >=20 
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Table 10. Average GDP growth and Foreign Direct Investment as % of GDP 
GDP 
growth 
(average) 
1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 FDI as % 
GDP 
1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 
Eritrea 1 3 -1 Eritrea 30 26 11 
Ethiopia 5 6 10 Ethiopia 16 24 23 
Kenya 2 4 4 Kenya 13 15 20 
Chad 3 15 1 Chad 17 38 31 
Niger 3 6 6 Niger 12 16 32 
Nigeria 3 11 7 Nigeria 21 25 24 
Rwanda 9 8 7 Rwanda 16 19 21 
Guinea 4 3 2 Guinea 20 18 14 
Côte 
d‟Ivoire 
3 0 2 Côte 
d‟Ivoire 
13 10 10 
Zimbabwe 2 -7 -2 Zimbabwe* 2 0 1,2 
Source: own calculations, on the basis of IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) 2011 
*For Zimbabwe, World Development Indicators were used as the WEO did not provide data 
on foreign investment 
 
 
 
Table 11. World Bank Ease of Doing Business ranking 2011
36
 
Country Doing Business 
2011 
Eritrea 43 
Ethiopia 10 
Kenya 9 
Chad 46 
Niger 38 
Nigeria 15 
Rwanda 3 
Guinea 42 
Côte d‟Ivoire 34 
Zimbabwe 36 
Source:http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings 
 
                                                     
36
 The rank is specific for the 46 ranked countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Earlier scorings than 2011 were not 
available  
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        Table 12. Inflation (averages, 1996-2010) 
 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 
Eritrea 10 18 18 
Ethiopia 2 4 18 
Kenya 9 8 8 
Chad 3 3 4 
Niger 3 3 3 
Nigeria 12 16 10 
Rwanda 7 7 9 
Guinea 4 14 19 
Côte d‟Ivoire 3 3 3 
Zimbabwe 37 247 12754
37
 
Source: own calculations, on the basis of IMF World Economic Outlook 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Human Development Index evolution, 1990-2010
38
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995-
2005 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2000-
2010 
Ethiopia N/A N/A 0,250 0,287 0,328 N/A +15% +15% +31% 
Kenya 0,437 0,435 0,424 0,443 0,47 +2% +4% +6% +11% 
Chad N/A N/A 0,269 0,299 0,295 N/A +11% -2% +10% 
Niger 0,180 0,192 0,212 0,241 0,261 +26% +14% +8% +23% 
Nigeria N/A N/A N/A 0,402 0,423 N/A N/A +5% N/A 
Rwanda 0,215 0,192 0,277 0,334 0,385 +74% +21% +15% +39% 
Guinea N/A N/A N/A 0,323 0,340 N/A N/A +5% N/A 
Côte 
d‟Ivoire 
0,360 0,369 0,379 0,383 0,397 +4% +1% +4% +5% 
Zimbabwe 0,284 0,262 0,232 0,159 0,140 -39% -31% -11% -40% 
        Source: Own calculations, on the basis of UNDP Human Development Report 2010 
 N/A: not available 
  
                                                     
37
 As inflation rates after 2007 were not available, this is the average for 2006-2007. Inflation however decreased 
significantly in 2009. 
38
 Eritrea is not included as the HDI for Eritrea was unavailable before 2011 
142 
 
Table 14. Main EU donors per country and contribution 2000-2010  
(USD million, constant 2010)
39
 
Eritrea Italy: 263  Netherlands: 94  UK: 51  
Ethiopia UK: 1,752   Germany: 854  Italy: 735 
Kenya UK: 1,284  France: 717  Germany: 672  
Chad France: 486  Germany: 248   
Niger France: 666  Belgium: 281  Germany: 210 
Nigeria UK: 2,437  Germany: 296  France: 137  
Rwanda UK: 955  Belgium: 568  Netherlands: 513  
Guinea France: 453  Germany: 216   
Côte d’Ivoire France: 1,212  Germany: 166 Belgium: 62 
Zimbabwe UK: 764 Germany: 241 Sweden: 167 
 Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System 
 
3.5.8. Analysis 
 
H.1. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against countries that are perceived as 
development success stories, and more likely to impose negative measures against countries that are 
not perceived as success stories. 
 
The first part of the hypothesis is strongly confirmed by the cases of Rwanda and Ethiopia, where 
governments are believed to be committed to good governance, poverty reduction, the MDGs and 
economic development. Besides the EU, other donors, including the IFIs, have positively assessed the 
economic performance of both countries. This is not to suggest an undivided success: in the case of 
Ethiopia, a high inflation rate was noted, whereas in Rwanda there was limited progress on poverty 
reduction. Nonetheless, both countries are „relative‟ success stories (when compared to most other 
low-income sub-Saharan African countries) and donors „perceive‟ the overall socio-economic 
evolution as positive. 
 
In Nigeria and Côte d‟Ivoire (2000-2005), the hypothesis is partly refuted. Nigeria was not perceived 
as a development success story, especially in the later years of Obasanjo‟s rule. Although there was 
growth in GDP terms, progress in good governance and social indicators was lacking. In Côte 
d‟Ivoire, the EU resumed aid in 2002 without a significant guarantee that Gbagbo was committed to 
economic development. Here, it was the IMF that followed the EU, rather than the other way around, 
given that IMF programmes were linked to the Article 96 consultations. This becomes even clearer 
when taking into account the 2004 Commission proposal to re-invoke Article 96 consultations. The 
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Communication mentions as one of the reasons for the proposal the failure of the Ivorian authorities to 
conduct an audit in the cocoa sector, financed by the EU (European Commission 2004). Nonetheless, 
despite these concerns about good governance, the Council refused the 2004 Commission proposal.  
 
The hypothesis is strongly refuted by the cases of Chad and Eritrea. In these countries, corruption and 
government effectiveness have seriously deteriorated, there has been low economic growth, poverty 
reduction has hardly been addressed, nor has there been much progress regarding the other MDGs. 
Moreover, Chad and Eritrea have been at odds with the IFIs, and have done little to improve the 
administration of development assistance. In Eritrea, the government is even openly hostile towards 
foreign aid.  
 
The second part of the hypothesis is strongly confirmed by the cases of Guinea and Zimbabwe. In both 
countries, violations of democratic principles were accompanied by poor economic governance, which 
was reflected in increasing corruption, low or negative economic growth, massive inflation and 
decreasing FDI. Guinea and Zimbabwe were noted to be hostile towards foreign aid, and did not 
seriously engage in programmes with the IFIs. In both countries, it can be expected that the EU was 
less reluctant to suspend development assistance, given that there were serious doubts about how these 
funds were spent. Indeed, the EU‟s development aid suspension followed that of the IFIs. In the case 
of Guinea, the fact that macroeconomic governance and sectoral reform were discussed during Article 
96 consultations further points to concerns of the EU in these areas (Council of the EU 2005c). 
Moreover, it should be noted that Germany, as one of the main EU donors in Guinea, was at the basis 
of the Article 96 consultations in 2003. Indeed, Germany was noted to have blocked the adoption of a 
new CSP in 2003, which led the European Commission to open Article 96 consultations (Laakso et al. 
2007a: 84-85). Moreover, in both countries, the continued poor economic governance can explain why 
sanctions have not been lifted. In Zimbabwe, the economic progress made under the unity government 
has recently led to a limited lifting of the sanctions (Council of the EU 2012b; anonymous interviews, 
January-February 2012). 
 
The hypothesis can also be confirmed in the case of Côte d‟Ivoire (2010), where development 
performance had equally been poor, although the civil war also played a role here. However, given 
that aid was only partially resumed because of insecurity, development performance was less 
important here, and the EU‟s attention was focused on stability (see infra).  
 
In Kenya, the hypothesis is less strongly confirmed. On the one hand, under Kibaki notable progress 
was made regarding the fight against corruption, the investment climate and economic growth. On the 
other hand, GDP growth was not spectacular and there was little progress on social indicators. 
Moreover, it is clear that donors questioned the government‟s willingness to tackle corruption, as can 
be observed in EU and UK aid suspensions over corruption.  
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In Niger, a particular situation occurred. At first sight, one would say the hypothesis is refuted, as 
there was progress in terms of reducing corruption, economic growth, the MDGs, etc. However, the 
EU had serious concerns about the administration of its development assistance. A large part of EU 
aid was provided via budget support, and there was unease about the administration of this amount, 
regarding public finance management and performance indicators. Timing is also important here: by 
that time (2009), there had been serious controversy about budget support in political crises. From this 
perspective, it can be concluded that the hypothesis is confirmed.  
  
145 
 
3.6. Stability  
 
„The European Union is heavily concerned by the issue of conflicts in Africa. This is not 
only because the international discussion necessitates an adequate response of the Union, 
not merely because of the moral obligation to reduce human suffering, nor simply the 
obligation to use its resources in the most meaningful way. For the European Union, the 
existence of violent conflicts in Africa is increasingly challenging the achievement of its 
declared policy goals. Fostering peace, stability, democracy and human rights under the 
conditions of conflicts is a nearly impossible task‟ (emphasis added) (European 
Commission 1996: 1).  
 
3.6.1. Conflict prevention, peacekeeping and fragile states 
The emergence of a significant number of civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa following the Cold War 
came under the attention of the European Commission in the early 1990s (Olsen 2009: 245). This 
prompted the European Commission to develop a conflict prevention agenda for Africa, as some have 
suggested in an effort to safeguard its role in external relations in Africa, while the Council was 
increasingly becoming important with the emergence of the CFSP (Sicurelli 2010: 66; Gibert 2011a: 
180). Hence, in 1996 the European Commission issued a Communication entitled „The European 
Union and the issue of conflicts in Africa: Peace-building, conflict prevention and beyond‟ in which a 
conflict prevention policy was outlined based on the objective of structural stability (see supra) 
(European Commission 1996). The Commission‟s strategy was followed by a Council Common 
Position on conflict prevention and resolution in Africa, in which the Council stressed its commitment 
to use all the instruments at its disposal to prevent and respond to conflict in Africa, including 
development assistance, diplomatic and even military action (Council of the EU 1997). This policy 
shift was reflected in the EU‟s aid programmes, which came to include security-related programmes 
such as peace-building programmes, security sector reform, state-building, disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (Vlassenroot and Hoebeke 2009: 5). The Cotonou Agreement 
included an article on peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution (Article 11) and foresaw that 
political dialogue would deal with these topics (Article 8). Moreover, conflict prevention was an 
important chapter of the Africa-EU summit in April 2000 (Smith 2008: 175) and constituted the main 
pillar of the Joint Africa-EU Strategic Partnership (Tóth 2007: 115; Pirozzi 2010: 85).  
 
The focus on internal stability in developing countries can also be seen in the EU‟s focus on fragile 
states. While the concern of the international community for fragile states responds to the perceived 
threat of these states to global security, there is also a humanitarian aspect. Indeed, fragile states are 
often the most conflict-prone, home to the worst humanitarian disasters (spreading diseases, 
malnutrition, refugees), generally have poor economic development and have a destabilising effect on 
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neighbouring countries (Browne 2006: 59-60; Zoellick 2008: 67-68; François and Sud 2006: 144-
145). The 2007 Commission Communication and Council Conclusions on state fragility recognise this 
dichotomy of norms and self-interest by stressing the risk of fragile states to fail in achieving the 
MDGs and for regional and global security (European Commission 2007c: 4; Council of the EU 
2007e).  
 
Sub-Saharan Africa became one of the main areas where the EU tried to appear on the world stage as a 
powerful, yet benevolent, foreign actor, using its newly developed instruments in foreign policy 
(Olsen 2004). Indeed, the first EU Special Representative in 1996 was appointed to the Great Lakes 
(Grevi 2007: 112; Martinelli 2006: 383) and the first autonomous mission under the ESDP was 
deployed in the DRC (Operation Artemis, 2003) (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 202; Howorth 2005: 
194). Between 2003 and 2011, the EU led ten military missions in sub-Saharan Africa (Gibert 2011a: 
182).  
 
Nonetheless, the EU prefers to support African missions, rather than deploying EU missions. Indeed, 
the norms of African ownership is well established in EU discourse on conflict and security in Africa. 
The 2001 Council Common Position on conflict prevention and resolution in Africa clearly states that 
„The primary responsibility for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the African 
continent lies with Africans themselves‟ (Council of the EU 2001h). The EU is the main donor to AU 
peacekeeping operations. It is also a large donor to operations by ECOWAS and the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In order to finance African peacekeeping, the 
African Peace Facility was created in 2007, to which €250 million was granted from the 9th EDF and 
€300 million from the 10th EDF (Youngs 2008d: 424-425; Del Biondo et al. 2012). For example, the 
EU financially supported the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS I and II), the hybrid UN-AU 
mission in Sudan (UNAMID), the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Force 
Multinationale en Centrafrique (FOMUC) of the Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Afrique 
Centrale (CEMAC) (Mangala 2010a: 182). In November 2008, the EU launched EURO RECAMP, by 
which AU leaders are trained to establish a continental decision-making plan for crisis management 
(Sicurelli 2010: 45-51). 
 
3.6.2. Member state examples  
Like the EU, the UK has strongly focused on conflict prevention. This was an important aspect of 
New Labour‟s „ethical‟ foreign policy, which was focused on peace, prosperity and democracy. The 
2000 intervention in Sierra Leone to support the elected government of Kabbah from the insurgency of 
the Revolutionary United Front can to a certain degree be explained by New Labour‟s commitment to 
peace in sub-Saharan Africa (Abrahamsen and Williams 2001: 252). Similarly, the UK‟s DfID has 
been committed to address state fragility (Department for International Development 2005: 22). 
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Furthermore, the emphasis on African peacekeeping has been followed by the main EU member 
states. A UK-French Joint Declaration in 2004 emphasised the need for peace support operations by 
African organisations (Gegout 2005: 432). The three military training schools in Mali, Nigeria and 
Ghana
40
 are all supported with European funds, including from France, Italy, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the UK (Gibert 2010: 158-159). Even Germany, which has traditionally been 
reluctant to engage in peacekeeping in Africa, provides financial support for the AU‟s Peace and 
Security Directorate, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre and the Peace 
Support Training Centre (Klingebiel 2005: 37-39). 
 
3.6.3. The democracy-stability dilemma  
Democracy promotion is a key aspect of the EU‟s approach to conflict prevention and fragile states. 
As part of the EU‟s promotion of „structural stability‟, support for democratisation is seen as „a means 
of establishing viable mechanisms for the peaceful conciliation of group interests‟. This includes 
building a legitimate, effective and representative government (European Commission 1996: 6). The 
EU‟s checklist for root causes of conflict includes several items related to democratisation, including 
checks and balances, inclusiveness of political power, respect for national authorities and civilian 
control over security forces (Youngs 2004b: 306-307). Moreover, the EU considers promoting 
democracy as a key strategy to address state fragility, although dialogue and incentives are preferred 
over sanctions and conditionality (European Commission 2007c: 8-9: Council of the EU 2007f). In 
reality, however, democratisation has only been a small aspect of the EU‟s policies to address conflict 
and fragile states. For example, in the DRC and in Rwanda, the EU has favoured power-sharing 
agreements rather than pushing too hard for free and fair elections (Youngs 2004b). Crawford (2005) 
has argued that political stability rather than democracy is the main aim of EU Africa policies. By 
focusing on stability, the EU would save itself the burden of having to contribute to resolving conflicts 
and providing humanitarian assistance (Crawford 2005: 589). Similarly, in fragile states, the EU has 
focused on a rather technocratic approach to state-building and has not addressed broader issues of 
state-society relations or social cohesion (Castillejo 2011: 4; Hout 2010). This corresponds with 
DfID‟s approach to fragile states, which explicitly focuses on „good enough governance‟ by 
addressing physical security, service delivery and public finance management, but not democratisation 
(Department for International Development 2005: 22). This can also be seen in the recent discussion 
on budget support and political conditionality. While general budget support will only be accessible 
for countries that respect fundamental values, for fragile states, a case-by-case approach is advocated 
meaning these states can receive budget support even if fundamental values are not respected 
(European Commission 2011a: 5-6; Council of the EU 2012a).  
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Research and Training and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre.  
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While these examples seem to suggest a trade-off between democracy and stability, there are equally 
studies that suggest that the EU addresses democratisation precisely as a means to achieve stability. 
Olsen attributed the EU‟s remarkable efforts to support democratisation in South Africa in the early 
1990s to the „widespread understanding in Europe that a continuation of the apartheid regime would 
threaten the stability and thereby the security of the whole South African region‟ (Olsen 1998: 353). In 
Yemen, the EU has promoted democracy out of fear it could become the next failed state and 
destabilise the region (Echagüe and Youngs 2007: 326-329). In Lebanon, the EU focused on 
democratisation and more particularly on the mediation between various political forces, as a means to 
maintain stability (Choucair Vizoso 2008). Moreover, Article 96 has been used as a conflict 
management tool rather than as an instrument to promote democratisation, given its focus on conflict 
situations (Liberia, Côte d‟Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, etc.) (Youngs 2008a: 7).  
 
3.6.4. Hypotheses and operationalisation 
Stability has thus become a key aspect of EU-Africa policies. The EU and its member states have 
focused on conflict prevention, fragile states and peacekeeping. Although democracy is seen as 
condition for structural stability and the prevention of state failure, in practice stability is often 
preferred over democracy, while the EU is more likely to put democratisation higher on its agenda 
where democratic deficiencies are causing instability. What these claims have in common is that 
stability rather than democracy is the main goal of EU policies. 
 
Following this idea, the following hypothesis is formulated:  
H.2. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived as 
contributing to internal stability, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments 
that are not perceived as contributing to internal stability.  
 
I focused on possible ethnic or religious tensions and how these are accommodated by the 
government. Furthermore, I looked at whether the state has effective monopoly on violence over the 
territory and whether there has been a threat of a military coup.  
 
On internal stability I mostly relied on secondary sources, such as International Crisis Group reports, 
academic articles and reports by the Bertelsmann Foundation. Moreover, I used NIPs to see whether 
there was any financial support from the EU for internal stability. Leaked US embassy cables were in 
some cases added to provide an idea of how government policies on internal stability were perceived.  
 
Furthermore, one can expect the EU to prefer positive to negative measures vis-à-vis governments that 
are believed to contribute to regional stability. This preference derives from the EU‟s focus on African 
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ownership in peacekeeping. This will be investigated separately as I observed a serious difference in 
the ability and willingness of governments to cope with internal and regional stability.  
 
The third hypothesis thus reads as follows: 
H.3. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived as 
contributing to regional stability, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments 
that are not perceived as contributing to regional stability. 
 
I took into account whether a government was seen as contributing to regional stability because of 
internal stability, for example by accommodating refugees from neighbouring countries. When 
precisely the contrary was the case, namely where government policies led to increased refugee flows, 
this was also noted. Moreover, it was investigated whether governments actively contribute to regional 
peacekeeping by participating in peacekeeping operations or mediating in neighbouring conflicts. I 
also took into account relations with neighbouring countries and whether governments respect regional 
peace agreements. To assess the importance the EU attaches to this role, I mentioned EU cooperation 
on regional peacekeeping, e.g. via development funding or diplomatic support.  
 
A wide range of secondary sources on the foreign policies of the case study countries was consulted, 
including reports by the Bertelsmann Foundation and the International Crisis Group, academic articles 
and news articles by Agence France Presse. To find out about the EU‟s position on specific regional 
conflicts, I consulted official documents, including NIPs or Council documents. On the participation in 
peacekeeping missions I consulted the UN website on Peacekeeping,
41
 as well as US embassy cables. 
For the accommodation of refugees, I used the Migration profiles added to the CSPs of the 10
th
 EDF 
and, in case the Migration Profile was not available or did not provide the required information, the 
2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook. Moreover, the emigration rate was added (Table 15 on p. 159), 
which refers to the number of people emigrating as a percentage of the total population. This indicator 
was taken from the World Bank‟s Migration and Remittances Factbook (2011).  
 
3.6.5. Case studies 
 
3.6.5.1. Eritrea 
Internal stability Despite its ethnic and cultural diversity, Eritrea has been free from serious inter-
ethnic and religious violence. There are frustrations about the dominance of the Tigrinya ethnic group 
in politics, but this has not been translated into violence. The relative peace in Eritrea has by some 
observers been attributed to intra- and inter-community cooperation at the local level (International 
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Crisis Group 2010a: 17). The government maintains control over the territory and over the bloated 
army,
42
 although it has been noted that discrepancies and tensions between Afewerki and leading 
military commanders have increased in 2008 (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009a: 4).  
 
Regional stability Given its frosty relations with neighbouring countries, the government of Eritrea 
cannot be seen as contributing to regional stability. One exception is the conflict in Sudan, where 
President Afewerki has tried to mediate with support from the EU (Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen 
2007: 60-61; US Embassy Eritrea 2007a). Eritrea has a border conflict with Djibouti, which resulted in 
military confrontation in 2008. Relations with Yemen are also tense because of a 1996 war over the 
Hanish islands (International Crisis Group 2010a: 20). Moreover, Eritrea is suspected of supporting 
several rebellions and opposition movements in neighbouring countries, such as Sudan‟s opposition 
coalition movement, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden Liberation Front (OLF) in 
Ethiopia and Islamist political groups in Somalia. Support for these groups was stepped up in the 
second half of the 2000s (International Crisis Group 2006d: 20; International Crisis Group 2010a: 22; 
Connell 2009: 138). With Ethiopia, a border war was fought in 1998-2000, which ended with the 
Algiers Agreement. In 2002, the Boundary Commission established by the Algiers Agreement ruled 
that Badme, a city formerly administered by Ethiopia, should be ceded to Eritrea. The ruling was first 
accepted, but later ignored by the government of Ethiopia (Bereketeab 2009). The EU supported the 
decision of the Boundary Commission (Council of the EU 2002h) and several EU member states have 
contributed to the UN mission appointed to monitor the border, including Austria, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden (Agence France Presse 16 November 2000). Lastly, although there is 
no violent conflict in Eritrea, the political and socio-economic problems have led to large numbers of 
refugees. Eritrea has an emigration rate of 18 percent in 2010 (World Bank 2011). It has not received 
many refugees from abroad, in 2005 there were only 4,418 refugees on Eritrean territory (UNHCR 
2005).  
 
3.6.5.2. Ethiopia 
Internal stability Ethiopia has enjoyed relative internal stability under EPRDF rule, despite its violent 
history and ethnical diversity (more than eighty recognised ethnic groups). This relative stability has 
been attributed to the system of ethnic federalism, by which Ethiopia‟s decentralised regions enjoy a 
relatively high level of autonomy and self-determination (Clapham 2009: 182). There seems to be 
some admiration within the donor community for the system. As stated by UN Special Adviser for the 
Prevention of Genocide Francis Deng: „Ethiopia [...] can claim credit for being the only African 
country that is trying to confront the problem [of ethnic division] head-on by recognizing territorially 
based ethnic groups [...]‟ (Deng 2009: 364). Nonetheless, the system has equally been criticised for 
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being too centralised in the hands of the Tigray elite of the Tigray People‟s Liberation Front (one of 
the four parties in the EPRDF coalition) (Chanie 2007; Spears 2007: 19). This has provoked 
opposition from Ethiopia‟s largest ethnic group, the Oromo (Clapham 2009: 183-188). The 
government of Ethiopia controls the security forces and maintains control over most of the territory, 
although there are insurgencies by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromia 
Liberation Front (OLF) in the Somali region of Ogaden and in the Oromia region (Abbink 2009: 20). 
The government of Ethiopia has denounced these groups as terrorist organisations (Ousman 2004: 85-
86; Dagne 2002: 66). After an upsurge of violence by the ONLF and OLF in 2007, Amnesty 
International reported mass arrests, torture, rape and extrajudicial executions of alleged ONLF and 
OLF supporters by government forces (Amnesty International 2008b). However, despite these 
problems, „The donor community [...] does not think either that Ethiopia is “fragile” and in fact has bet 
on its continuity (“it must succeed”)‟ (Abbink 2009: 20). This perception has actively been nourished 
by the government of Ethiopia, which has presented itself as the only guarantee to internal stability, 
for example by warning about the potential effects of supporting the opposition, which are critical of 
the system of ethnic federalism (EU-EOM Ethiopia 2005: 7-8; Aalen and Tronvoll 2009: 194; US 
embassy Ethiopia 2006a). During the 2005 elections, the ruling party accused the opposition parties 
CUD and UEDF of wanting to abolish the federal system and „initiate a Rwandan Interahamwe in 
Ethiopia, carrying out ethnic cleansing and genocide‟ (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009: 195).  
 
Regional stability On the one hand, Ethiopia is seen as contributing to regional stability because of the 
belief that a strong, consolidated and relatively stable Ethiopia, with the capacity to maintain regional 
hegemony, is the best option for stability in the Horn (Borchgrevink 2008: 214). Ethiopia 
accommodates a rising number of refugees. In 2006, Ethiopia was hosting close to 100,000 refugees 
from Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea and other sub-Saharan African countries (European Community and 
Ethiopia 2007: 4). The Ethiopian army is one of the main contributors to the United Nations African 
Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) (Williams 2011: 15-16) and also contributed to the United 
Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). On the other hand, Ethiopia has a destabilising influence on 
some of its neighbours. Indeed, the border war with Eritrea has kept on lingering as Ethiopia refuses to 
respect the Algiers Agreement on the border demarcation (see supra). Moreover, in 2006 the 
Ethiopian army invaded Somalia to protect the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) against the 
Islamic Courts Union. The intervention was followed by an AU peace force, AMISOM, which 
remains in Somalia to protect the TFG against Islamist groups. The attack was brutal and caused the 
death of hundreds of civilians, injuries of several thousands of others and the flight of over a third of 
the population (International Crisis Group 2011c; International Crisis Group 2008e: 16). Although a 
number of member states were initially not convinced of supporting the intervention and the 
AMISOM mission, the EU finally supported the intervention – albeit tacitly - and financially 
contributed to AMISOM (Porteous 2008: 82-83; Vines 2010: 1099).  
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3.6.5.3. Kenya 
Internal stability Under Kibaki‟s presidency, Kenya stood as a model for internal stability. As noted 
by Brown: „political violence [was] consigned to the dustbins of Kenyan history‟ (Brown 2009: 391). 
Ethnic tensions were minor and the government retained its monopoly on violence (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2008: 11). Against this background, the post-electoral violence in 2007 seriously 
threatened internal stability. The violence left 1,500 Kenyans dead and approximately 300,000 people 
were internally displaced (Juma 2009: 408).  
 
Regional stability: Kenya is traditionally seen as an active contributor to regional peace. Kenya has 
been actively involved in peace efforts in Somalia. Several peace conferences were organised under 
Moi (Dagne 2002: 70). Under Kibaki, Kenya hosted the talks leading to the formation of the TFG in 
2004 and allowed the government-in-exile to remain on its territory before repatriation in 2005 
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2008: 11; Khadiagala 2009b: 433). The government of Kenya also 
mediated in the conflict in Sudan. Under Kibaki, Kenya hosted several peace talks in 2002-2005 
between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People‟s Liberation Movement (SPLM) as the chair 
of IGAD, including the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Central Intelligence Agency 2011; 
Khadiagala 2009b: 433). Furthermore, before the 2007 electoral crisis, Kenya was seen as exercising a 
stabilising effect on its neighbours. It served as a transit point for the supply of energy and basic 
commodities of its neighbours, including Uganda, South Sudan, Eastern Congo, Rwanda and Burundi 
(Juma 2009: 424). Furthermore, Kenya hosted many refugees from neighbouring countries: around 
240,000 in 2006 (European Community and Kenya 2007: 73). Kenya is also a humanitarian logistics 
hub for the region: all international assistance programmes for the Greater Horn are organised out of 
Nairobi (Juma 2009: 423). Lastly, Kenya delivered police personnel to UNMIL.  
 
With the post-electoral crisis in 2007-2008, this regional role was in danger. As stated by Juma: „a 
country that had hitherto basked in the glory of being a peace broker to Africa‟s longest, deadliest and 
most protracted conflicts in Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, was now 
in dire need of salvation from itself‟ (Juma 2009: 411). Indeed, the violence had an immediate 
destabilising effect on neighbouring countries, which were short of fuel and essential commodities 
because the Mombasa Highway was blocked (International Crisis Group 2008a: 1 and 21; Juma 2009: 
424; Khadialaga 2009b: 432-437). Moreover, whereas Kenya‟s emigration rate was traditionally low, 
during the crisis more than 30,000 people fled the country (Juma 2009: 408).  
 
3.6.5.4. Chad 
Internal stability Chad has faced severe instability most of the time since independence in 1960 
(Mattelaer 2008: 6). Security problems emerged from three main sources. First of all, there was a 
serious risk of a military coup. In May 2004, a delay in payment of the salaries of soldiers led to an 
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attempted coup d’état, followed by a wave of desertions in the highest military ranks (International 
Crisis Group 2006c: 10; Grawert 2008: 608). Secondly, armed opposition groups, most of which 
supported by Sudan, repeatedly attacked the government. A first attack took place in April 2006 
(Marchal 2006: 473). In January 2008, a coalition of rebels launched an attack on N‟Djamena and 
nearly ousted Déby. Because of internal insecurity, there was a rapidly rising number of internally 
displaced Chadians (110,000 in 2009) in the east of Chad. Thirdly, there is the spill-over of the 
conflict in Darfur, which caused cross-border incursions of Sudanese militias and an influx of refugees 
in the east of Chad (Boggero 2009: 27).  
 
President Déby has been unwilling to seriously address internal instability by entering into dialogue 
with the armed rebellion. The agreements with the Front Uni pour le Changement (FUC) and the 
Syrte Agreement with the remaining armed groups in 2006-2007 were only vague and there was a 
considerable reluctance from Déby to implement them (Handy 2008: 4-5; International Crisis Group 
2008b: 12). Moreover, the Chadian army was unwilling to protect refugee camps and to address the 
impunity and banditry permeating the east of Chad (Boggero 2009: 27).  
 
Nonetheless, the donor community feared that an opposition win would result in civil war or clan 
fighting, giving the weakness and divisiveness of the opposition. Leaked US embassy cables indicate 
that both France and Germany shared these concerns (US embassy Chad 2006c). The EU‟s concern 
for stability in Chad can be derived from the EUFOR/Chad military mission on the borders with Sudan 
(2007) and the financial support to the subsequent UN Missions des Nations Unies au République 
Centrafricaine et au Tchad (MINURCAT) police training mission (Tull 2008: 2; Sicurelli 2010: 52).  
 
Regional stability On the one hand, President Déby tried to mediate in the Sudanese conflict, 
particularly in the August 2004 peace negotiations and two peace conferences in January 2006 
(International Crisis Group 2006c: 10; Boggero 2009: 26). Furthermore, Chad was part of the peace 
force of CEMAC in the Central African Republic in 2003 (International Crisis Group 2008b: 29-30). 
Moreover, Chad accommodated a large number of refugees from Darfur, the number of which was 
estimated at 250,000 in 2007 (Mattelaer 2008: 11). Although, as noted supra, the government of Chad 
was unwilling to truly protect these refugees, it has been argued that the presence of such a large 
number of refugees provided the government of Chad with some legitimacy (Boggero 2009: 26). 
Moreover, Chad has delivered police personnel to the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation 
Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and military troops to the United Nations Operation in Côte 
d‟Ivoire (UNOCI). On the other hand, Chad has been in a situation of war with Sudan from 2005 until 
2010. Throughout 2006-2010, several peace agreements were signed between both countries, but 
clashes continued. In 2010, however, relations were normalised and both countries expelled rebel 
forces from their respective territories (International Crisis Group 2010b: 2).  
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3.6.5.5. Niger 
Internal stability After an initial period of relative stability during the first mandate of President 
Tandja, instability rose during his second mandate with the Tuareg uprisings in the north. The Tuareg 
argued that Tandja did not respect the 1995 peace deal, most notably the provisions on the equal 
sharing of uranium wealth. In 2007, a new rebellion took up arms, the Mouvement des Nigériens pour 
la Justice (MNJ) (Keenan 2008: 454). Tandja‟s strategy to contain this rebellion largely consisted in a 
military solution, depicting the Tuareg as bandits and drug traffickers rather than engaging in 
negotations (US embassy Niger 2007b). International human rights organisations accused Nigerien 
security forces of committing war crimes in the fight against the rebellion (Keenan 2008: 450). 
Moreover, when UN representative Robert Fowler started efforts to investigate the situation in 2008, 
he was kidnapped, presumably by a group linked to Al Qaeda. There were indications that the 
government of Niger, which was aware of the diplomat‟s route, „shopped‟ him to the terrorists to 
avoid his investigations (BBC News 2009b, September). Although peace talks were held in May 2009, 
these were believed to be window-dressing by President Tandja (interview, Jeremy Keenan, January 
2012). However, later in 2009 the MNJ laid down arms after Libyan mediation (Grégoire 2011: 215).  
 
Regional stability President Tandja has made some attempts in regional peacemaking, for example by 
mediating in the Côte d‟Ivoire crisis in 2004 (Agence France Presse 15 April 2004) and as a chairman 
of the Community of Sahel and Saharan States. Moreover, during Tandja‟s rule, Niger participated in 
several peacekeeping missions, albeit not as a leading member, including AMIS, UNMIL, UNOCI, 
MONUSCO and UNAMID. However, Niger does not accommodate a large number of refugees. In 
2005, there were no less than 301 refugees in Niger (UNHCR 2005).  
 
3.6.5.6. Nigeria 
Internal stability Internal stability worsened under President Obasanjo (Rotberg 2007: 33). With more 
than 250 ethnic groups, instability has been ascribed to the „failing experiment in federalism‟ in 
Nigeria. Obasanjo‟s 1999 constitution, which endorsed indigeneity, has increased rather than 
decreased intercommunal clashes, especially in Plateau state (International Crisis Group 2006g: 11-
13). From 1999 to 2007, more than 12,000 people were killed and more than three million were 
displaced because of such intercommunal clashes (Rotberg 2007: 37). Political violence has also 
emerged, for example in the context of the local elections in Jos in December 2008 (Bertelsmann 
Foundation 2009e: 17) and even more in the aftermath of the 2011 elections. Moreover, in the Niger 
Delta, insurgencies have arisen over long-standing grievances about the distribution of oil income. 
Obasanjo failed to address the root causes of instability in the Niger Delta, for example by ensuring 
adequate representation in the government or promoting development in the region (US Embassy 
Nigeria 2007a). Although he increased the share of national oil revenues that flows back to the region, 
this was seen as insufficient and did not prevent the rise of a new insurgency in 2006, the Movement 
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for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) (Rotberg 2007: 34-35). Nonetheless, peace and 
security was declared a first priority of the succeeding Yar‟Adua administration (US Embassy Nigeria 
2007b). A Niger Delta Master Plan was set up to securitise the region by promoting rapid economic 
development (Agbu 2010; Lyman 2009: 296). The EU has provided EDF funds to improve the 
security situation in the Niger Delta (European Community and Nigeria 2009: 71-72), but overall the 
EU‟s engagement in internal security in Nigeria has been limited (Youngs 2006: 339). DfID has 
supported the government‟s Niger Delta Peace and Security strategy (2006-2007).43  
 
Regional stability Under Obasanjo, Nigeria appeared as a peacekeeper in sub-Saharan Africa, and in 
West Africa in particular. Together with South Africa, Nigeria played an important role in turning the 
OAU into the AU, and particularly focused on the AU‟s potential role for conflict resolution (Kwasi 
Tieku 2004: 259-260). In West Africa, Nigeria was the driving force behind the ECOWAS 
peacekeeping operation in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Economic Community of West African State 
Monitoring Group or ECOMOG), of which it provided 80 percent in troops and 90 percent in funding. 
Nigeria also contributed most troops of the AU mission in Darfur (Economist Intelligence Unit 2009; 
Obi 2008: 190). In 2007, Nigeria had personnel in 12 of 14 UN peacekeeping operations (Khakee 
2007: 6). Apart from contributing to African peacekeeping, Obasanjo was also an active mediator in 
African conflicts. As such, he mediated in conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda, the DRC and Sudan (US 
Embassy Nigeria 2001d; Gegout 2009: 236), as well as in the event of military and constitutional 
coups in Côte d‟Ivoire, Togo and Sao Tome and Principe (International Crisis Group 2007a: 12; Shola 
Omotola 2008: 39). The EU has supported Nigeria in its international mandates on conflict prevention 
under the „peace and security‟ focal sector of the 10th EDF (European Community and Nigeria 2009: 
71-72). Regional issues are also a major part of the EU-Nigeria Ministerial Troikas. It has been noted 
that the EU has provided more assistance to Nigeria‟s peacekeeping role than to internal stability 
(Youngs 2006: 339).  
 
3.6.5.7. Rwanda 
Internal stability The RPF has been relatively successful in stabilising Rwanda after the genocide. 
Kagame‟s policies of national unity, based on the active suppression of ethnic identities, have brought 
relative peace amongst the Hutu and Tutsi. Moreover, the RPF government has tried to provide 
reconciliation by the revival of the traditional justice system called Gacaca (Silva-Leander 2008: 
1609-1610; Spears 2007: 18). The government of Rwanda has control over the entire territory and 
over security forces. Several analysts however warn for grievances amongst the Hutu population that 
are aggravated by ethnic favouritism (Silva-Leander 2008: 1609-1610; Spears 2007: 18). Nonetheless, 
given the legacy of genocide in Rwanda, donors see the current situation as a relative improvement 
(Marysse et al. 2007; Hayman 2009a: 175; Uvin 2010: 164). Moreover, it is feared that, by pushing 
                                                     
43
 See: OECD Creditor Reporting System: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW 
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too strongly on democratisation, internal stability may be put in danger. After the 2008 elections, 
many donors admitted that fully competitive elections would not be appropriate as they may sharpen 
tensions and provoke future insecurity (Hayman 2011b: 124-125). The EU‟s support for Kagame‟s 
justice and reconciliation policies is clearly shown by EDF-financed projects directed to this aim, most 
notably for the Gacaca justice system (European Community and Rwanda 2003: 31). 
  
Regional stability The current government of Rwanda has been seen both as a spoiler and as a 
contributor to regional stability. On the one hand, Rwanda has been criticised by the international 
community for its role in the DRC, where it supported several rebel movements. In the second 
Congolese war in 1998-2003, Rwanda supported a rebel group, the Rally for Congolese Democracy, 
in the city of Goma. A Congolese probe found that Rwanda and Uganda were responsible for the 
murder of President Laurent Désiré Kabila in 2001 (Hayman 2009a: 172-173). When Kagame openly 
announced that he was contemplating a renewed intervention in the DRC in 2004, the UK and Sweden 
halted disbursements of budget support (Zorbas 2011: 112-113; Purcell et al. 2006: 17-18; Hayman 
2009c: 592). In 2007-2008, the Netherlands and Sweden suspended budget support as a reaction to 
Rwanda‟s support to Laurent Nkunda‟s Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (Hayman 2009c: 
592). On the other hand, the joint Rwandan-Congolese arrest of Nkunda in December 2008 
significantly strengthened the image of Kagame in the donor community. As noted by Zorbas (2011: 
112): „Virtually overnight, the government of Rwanda recast itself from a destabilizing to a 
peacemaking force‟. Moreover, Rwanda has actively presented itself as a „force for peace‟ by 
engaging in AU peacekeeping interventions. With military support from the UK, the Rwandan army 
forms the backbone of AMIS (Beswick 2010b: 745-746). Rwanda has not been an important receiving 
country of refugees. In 2005, the amount of refugees arriving and departing from Rwanda was more or 
less equal: 43,325 refugees were present in Rwanda, while 55,000 had left (European Community and 
Rwanda 2007, Annex 4).  
 
3.6.5.8. Guinea 
Internal stability Despite some frustrations by the Malinke ethnic group, which felt targeted by 
Conté‟s policies of ethnic division in the 1990s, most analyses agree that Guinea enjoyed relative 
internal stability in the early 2000s (International Crisis Group 2009a: 5-6; Arieff 2011: 1; 
International Crisis Group 2003a: ii; Bertelsmann Foundation 2007a). Nonetheless, the political-
economic instability in the country, combined with the health problems of president Conté, fed 
suspicions of a possible military takeover (Yabi 2010: 42).  
 
Regional stability President Conté did not mediate in neighbouring conflicts and had limited foreign 
policy ambitions. There were few African leaders visiting Guinea under Conté‟s presidency, and 
Conté hardly travelled abroad, his main concern being to preserve the territorial integrity of Guinea. 
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However, Guinea participated in the ECOMOG force (1990-1996), which was financially supported 
by the EU (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007a; Smith 2006: 421-422; Youngs 2006: 337-341). It also 
participated in the UNOCI mission. Moreover, in the 1990s and early 2000s, the international 
community viewed Guinea as a factor of stability in the region, as the only country that was relatively 
stable surrounded by unstable states, hosting between 300,000 and 500,000 refugees from 
neighbouring conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. It has been suggested that this is 
why the donor community gave Guinea carte blanche for its flawed elections in 1998. Moreover, in 
2000-2001, Guinea was under attack from Liberian President Charles Taylor‟s forces in Guinée 
Forestière (McGovern 2002: 85-88; Yabi 2010: 37). Nonetheless, by 2005 the UK seemed to consider 
Guinea‟s fragility as a threat to the region‟s stability. For this reason, it appointed an ambassador to 
Guinea (Youngs 2006: 337-341; Gibert 2010: 162). This perception may be related to the sharp 
increase in emigration from 2003 onwards. Due to the dire life circumstances, Guinea had an 
emigration rate that was comparable to Côte d‟Ivoire (5.2 percent). 
 
3.6.5.9. Côte d’Ivoire 
Internal stability President Gbagbo failed to improve internal stability, as he appeared unwilling to 
deal with the root causes of the conflict. Gbagbo was strongly southern-ethnocentric, representative of 
the Baoule and Bete ethnic groups, with a focus on Ivoirité (Owusu-Sekyere 2009: 17). His decision to 
exclude Ouattara‟s party from the December 2000 elections was a continuation of the exclusion of the 
northerners in the political system. Moreover, nationality requirements were even further strengthened 
during his presidency (Bovcon 2009b). Furthermore, Gbagbo was unwilling to implement the peace 
agreements supported by the EU, such as the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra agreements. As noted by 
the International Crisis Group: „The main obstacles to implementation of the accords continue to be 
Gbagbo and his party‟ (International Crisis Group 2003b: 33). The civil war had severe humanitarian 
consequences: in 2006, there were 709,000 IDPs in Côte d‟Ivoire (European Community and Côte 
d‟Ivoire 2008, Annex 4). With the 2007 Ouagadougou Agreement and the creation of the government 
of national unity, Gbagbo showed some willingness to cooperate in conflict resolution, but the 
implementation of the agreement was continuously postponed. Hence, by the time of the 2010 
elections, it had become clear that escaping from the deadlock was impossible under Gbagbo, and that 
Ouattara was a better candidate in this respect. While Ouattara indicated he would seek cooperation 
with the Forces Nouvelles and continue the government of national unity, Gbagbo did not plan to 
continue with the government of national unity after election (anonymous interview, February 2012; 
Labertit 2010: 57). The denial of the election results by Gbagbo led to five months of heavy fighting 
between the troops of Gbagbo and the former rebel forces of the Forces Nouvelles, who rallied behind 
Ouattara. The violence caused the displacement of 350,000 Ivorians (International Crisis Group 
2011b: 1-3).  
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Regional stability Unlike his predecessor Guei who supported Charles Taylor‟s insurgency in Sierra 
Leone, Gbagbo supported anti-Taylor forces (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007b: 21; International Crisis 
Group 2003b: 33). During the civil war, it was impossible for President Gbagbo to play a regional role 
given internal instability. Moreover, the Ivorian civil war was a serious blow to the region, given its 
importance as the economic engine of Francophone West Africa and immigration magnet for less 
developed neighbouring countries (Bovcon 2009b). The post-election fighting in 2010-2011 led to the 
emigration of 200,000 Ivorian refugees to neighbouring countries (International Crisis Group 2011b: 
1-3). Côte d‟Ivoire was at odds with its neighbours and particularly with those in the Sahel which have 
large immigrants communities in Côte d‟Ivoire, including Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal 
(Bertelsmann Foundation 2007b: 21; International Crisis Group 2003b: 33). The 2002 rebellion was 
supported by Burkina Faso. The 2007 Ouagadougou agreement, negotiated by his rival, was therefore 
welcomed by the international community (anonymous interview, March 2012).  
 
3.6.5.10. Zimbabwe 
Internal stability Ethnic tensions are rather low in Zimbabwe. Although the Ndebele group bears 
grievances vis-à-vis the Shona-dominated government, this has not led to violent conflict 
(Bertelsmann Foundation 2009b: 20-25). Discontent in the military has however increased as Mugabe 
increasingly relied on war veterans and youth militia, which enjoyed more privileges than the security 
forces (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009b: 6).  
 
Regional stability In the late 1990s, President Mugabe deployed forces to the DRC to support 
President Kabila against rebellions (International Crisis Group 2002b: 15; Cilliers 2001: 124). 
However, Mugabe refused to withdraw his troops as required by the 2001 Lusaka Agreement. In June 
2001, EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region Ajello met with Foreign Minister 
Mudenge and was frustrated by his refusal to withdraw troops (US Embassy Zimbabwe 2001). 
Moreover, regional stability has been threatened by the rising emigration from Zimbabwe to 
neighbouring countries (especially South Africa) caused by the socio-economic and political crisis in 
the country (International Crisis Group 2002d: 10). In 2010, Zimbabwe had an emigration rate of 
almost 10 percent of the population. Zimbabwe is a member of the AU and the South African 
Development Community (SADC), but has not played an important diplomatic role in these 
organisations, acting mainly as a stumbling block against intensified cooperation and institutional 
reform (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009b: 26). Nonetheless, Zimbabwe has contributed to UN missions 
in sub-Saharan Africa, including UNMIL, UNAMID and UNOCI.  
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Table 15: Emigration rate (2010) 
Country Emigration rate 
Eritrea 18 
Ethiopia 0.70 
Kenya 1.10 
Chad 2.10 
Niger 2.40 
Nigeria 0.60 
Rwanda 2.60 
Guinea 5.20 
Côte d‟Ivoire 5.40 
Zimbabwe 9.90 
Source: World Bank‟s Migration and  
Remittances Factbook (World Bank 2011). 
 
3.6.6. Analysis 
 
H.2. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived as 
contributing to internal stability, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments 
that are not perceived as contributing to internal stability.  
 
The first part of the hypothesis can be confirmed in the cases of Rwanda and Ethiopia, and to a lesser 
degree Eritrea. In Rwanda and Ethiopia, there was relative internal stability, after coming out of 
genocide or civil war. Even though analysts point to grievances amongst some of the ethnic groups, 
the perception seems to be that there is „relative‟ stability and that the situation could be worse under a 
different government. This is less the case in Eritrea where, despite the absence of violent conflict, the 
socio-economic and political crisis seems so serious that almost one fifth of the population is leaving 
the country. Contrary to Ethiopia and Rwanda I did not find any evidence that donors perceived the 
government of Eritrea as contributing to internal stability. However, it could be expected that, if 
violent conflict would occur, the EU might be more prepared to impose negative measures.  
 
The hypothesis is contradicted by the cases of Chad and Nigeria, where the EU was reluctant to 
impose negative measures, despite the fact that the governments were hardly contributing to internal 
stability. The hypothesis is further contradicted by the case of Côte d‟Ivoire (2000-2005), where the 
EU resumed aid in early 2002, while the root causes of conflict, namely the exclusion of northerners in 
the political system, were not addressed. Moreover, in 2004, the Council did not agree to reopen 
consultations under Article 96, although Gbagbo had failed to implement the peace agreements 
sponsored by the EU. However, it should be added that there was a clear difference here between the 
160 
 
European Commission, which favoured a more tough line on Gbagbo, and the Council, that wanted to 
give Gbagbo the benefit of the doubt. In November 2003, Commission President Romano Prodi 
warned that aid could be withheld if no progress was made on the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement 
(Youngs 2006: 348). Moreover, the lack of progress on Linas-Marcoussis was the main reason for the 
Commission to try to restart Article 96 consultations in 2004 (European Commission 2004). The 
proposal was vetoed by Germany and France, which did not want to spoil the ongoing peace 
negotiations in Accra (anonymous interview, March 2007).  
 
The second part of the hypothesis can be confirmed by the cases of Niger, Côte d‟Ivoire (2010) and 
Kenya. President Tandja had waged a war against the Tuareg rebellion in the north, although the 
rebellion had ended just before the 2009 referendum. Côte d‟Ivoire‟s Gbagbo refused to implement the 
peace agreements that were supported by the EU, and the post-electoral crisis in December 2010 was 
further destabilising the country. From this perspective, sanctions in 2010-2011 can be seen as a 
„conflict resolution‟ tool. Similarly, in Kenya, the post-electoral violence was leading to civil war after 
a relatively peaceful period under Kibaki. Hence, the EU‟s threat with sanctions was motivated by the 
concern for internal stability. The fact that the international community focused on power-sharing, 
rather than insisting on a recount or the recognition of the victory of Raila Odinga, can also be 
explained from this perspective (Brown 2009: 400).  
 
In Guinea and Zimbabwe, however, the hypothesis was refuted, as at the moment the EU chose to 
focus on negative measures (2003 in Guinea and 2002 in Zimbabwe), these countries were relatively 
stable.  
 
H.3. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived as 
contributing to regional stability, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments 
that are not perceived as contributing to regional stability. 
 
There is mixed evidence for the first part of this hypothesis. On the one hand, the hypothesis is 
convincingly confirmed by the case of Nigeria, which is perceived as a key contributor to regional 
stability and is supported in this role by the EU. On the other hand, the hypothesis is partly confirmed 
and partly refuted by the cases of Ethiopia, Rwanda and Chad. In fact, the government of Ethiopia has 
been more concerned by its national interests than by regional stability, which can be observed in its 
position in the border war with Eritrea and the 2006 invasion in Somalia. Similarly, Rwanda has 
defied the donor community with its incursions in the DRC, which were condemned by EU member 
states. It is notable that some of these member states, and the UK in particular, have been more willing 
to suspend aid to react to destabilising regional policies than to react to violations of democratic 
principles. However, the governments of Ethiopia and Rwanda have equally tried to appear as 
contributing to regional stability by engaging in peacekeeping operations. Moreover, Ethiopia receives 
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a large number of refugees from neighbouring countries. In Chad, on the one hand, the conflict with 
Sudan threatened regional stability in 2005-2010. On the other hand, Chad tried to mediate in the 
Darfur conflict and has accommodated an enormous amount of refugees from Darfur.  
 
However, the hypothesis is refuted by the cases of Eritrea and Côte d‟Ivoire (2000-2005). With its 
isolated regional position and active support to insurgencies in neighbouring countries, it is unlikely 
that the EU perceives the government of Eritrea as contributing to regional stability. In Côte d‟Ivoire 
(2000-2005), the civil war was threatening regional instability and made it impossible for Gbagbo to 
play a regional role.  
 
The second part of the hypothesis is confirmed by the cases of Côte d‟Ivoire (2010-2011) and 
Zimbabwe. In Côte d‟Ivoire (2010-2011), Gbagbo‟s track record on regional stability was doubtful. 
He did not play a peacekeeping role, and his refusal to truly address internal stability had spillover 
effects in neighbouring countries. In Zimbabwe, the EU imposed negative measures in a context of 
frustration with Mugabe‟s refusal to withdraw troops from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Furthermore, the continued socio-economic and political crisis was causing refugee flows to 
neighbouring countries. This can further explain why negative measures have not been lifted.  
 
The hypothesis is partly refuted, partly confirmed by the cases of Kenya and Niger. On the one hand, 
it is surprising that the EU was so strict against Kibaki, who had been involved in mediation in 
Somalia and Sudan. On the other, the post-electoral crisis was escalating to such an extent that 
regional stability was threatened. In the case of Niger, there was some evidence that President Tandja 
tried to play a regional role, but this was only limited and I did not find any evidence of the 
international community perceiving Tandja as a contributor to regional peace.  
 
The hypothesis is however refuted in the case of Guinea. In the early 2000s, the EU imposed negative 
measures despite the fact that Guinea was perceived as contributing to regional stability because of its 
role as a relatively stable country surrounded by unstable states.  
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3.7. Conclusion  
In this Chapter, I have tried to find out whether double standards can be explained by a conflict 
between the three main normative objectives in EU-Africa policies: democracy, development and 
stability. Although EU discourse seems to suggest that these three normative goals always go together, 
there is plenty of evidence that would suggest the contrary. It was argued that double standards may 
result from two trade-offs: (1) between democracy and development and (2) between democracy and 
stability. Regarding the first, three main development norms were identified that may guide the EU‟s 
development agenda towards sub-Saharan Africa: good governance, ownership and aid effectiveness, 
and poverty reduction. From this perspective, it was argued that the EU might be more reluctant to use 
negative measures against countries that are perceived as development success stories, and less 
reluctant to impose negative measures vis-à-vis countries that are not seen as development success 
stories. On the trade-off between democracy and stability, I expected that the concern for stability may 
influence the EU's position on negative measures in two ways. Firstly, the EU may be more/less 
reluctant to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived/not perceived as 
contributing to internal stability. Secondly, the EU may be more/less reluctant to impose negative 
measures against governments that are perceived/not perceived as contributing to regional stability. 
These three hypotheses were tested for the eleven cases. The findings are summarised in Table 16.  
 
Table 16. Chapter Summary Table: Conflicting norms 
 Development  Internal stability Regional 
stability 
EU most reluctant to impose negative measures 
Chad - - +/- 
Rwanda + + +/- 
Eritrea - + - 
Ethiopia + + +/- 
Nigeria - - + 
Côte d‟Ivoire 2000-
2005 
- - - 
EU least reluctant to impose negative measures 
Niger + + +/- 
Zimbabwe + - + 
Guinea + - - 
Côte d‟Ivoire 2010-
2011 
+ + + 
Kenya + + +/- 
+: hypothesis confirmed 
-: hypothesis refuted 
+/-: hypothesis partly confirmed, partly refuted  
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One conclusion that stands out is that development and internal stability are important factors, whereas 
regional stability is less important. The preference for development seems particularly important in 
explaining why the EU has not been reluctant to impose negative measures. In all the five cases where 
the EU seemed willing to impose negative measures, development performance was weak. It is 
reasonable to assume that the EU would have been more reluctant to impose negative measures if 
these countries had been development success stories.  
 
However, evidence was smaller in the group of countries where the EU has been reluctant to impose 
negative measures. Only Rwanda and Ethiopia were clearly perceived as development success stories, 
while Chad, Eritrea and to a lesser extent Nigeria had poor development performance. Hence, in some 
cases, the EU is reluctant to impose negative measures even when development performance is weak. 
This suggests that, in these countries, there are other reasons for the EU to prefer positive over 
negative measures.  
 
Internal stability played an equally important role, both in explaining why the EU has been reluctant to 
impose negative measures in some cases and in why it has not been reluctant to do so in other cases. 
This is especially clear in Kenya (2007) and Côte d‟Ivoire (2010-2011), where the EU‟s threat or 
adoption of sanctions should be seen as a reaction to the destabilisation of these countries. In this 
sense, negative measures were used as instruments for peace-building as much as for democracy-
building. In the case of Kenya, this can also explain the EU‟s choice for supporting a coalition 
government, rather than a recount or rerun of the election. However, the fact that Guinea and 
Zimbabwe were relatively stable at the time of negative measures indicates that the EU does not 
merely impose negative measures on „conflict cases‟, as suggested by Youngs (2008a: 7).  
 
The preference for positive measures in Rwanda, Ethiopia and to a lesser extent Eritrea should also be 
seen in the light of the relative internal stability in these countries. It is likely that the EU‟s position on 
the instruments to promote democratisation would be different if these countries were unstable. The 
cases of Rwanda and Ethiopia are particularly notable as the governments of both countries have 
convinced the EU that they are the best guarantee for internal stability (Fisher 2011; Fisher 2012), 
even if there are concerns about ethnic grievances. An example of this was mentioned in the case of 
Ethiopia, where prime minister Meles Zenawi threatened that the opposition would abolish the federal 
system, which would result in genocide. It is likely that this perception of the government of Ethiopia 
as the „least bad option‟ for internal stability has made the donor community close an eye towards 
„minor‟ sources of instability and human rights violations committed by security forces in maintaining 
internal stability, including in the Ogaden and Somali region. This stands in stark contrast with the 
Nigerien example, where the donor community did not seem to perceive Tandja‟s government as the 
least bad option. First, this can be explained by the fact that Tandja did not get the Tuareg uprising 
under control, it was only by outside mediation that the rebellion laid down arms. Second, in the case 
164 
 
of Niger, concerns about development performance also played a role. Third, although further research 
would be useful here, it seems likely that the government of Niger was less active and less successful 
in creating donor perceptions that his internal (and foreign) policies were successful.  
 
Surprisingly, the EU has equally been reluctant to impose negative measures on governments that 
were not successful in achieving internal stability, namely in Chad, Nigeria and Côte d‟Ivoire (2000-
2005). However, this does not mean that internal stability played no role in these cases. In Chad, again 
the EU‟s perception of President Déby as the „least bad option‟ for internal stability seems to play a 
role. This is because there is mistrust in the donor community about the opposition and fears of what 
would happen if the government would be toppled by armed forces. In Nigeria, the preference for 
stability over democracy can be seen in the EU‟s focus on non-violent elections, rather than on 
democratic elections (Khaliq 2008: 265-266). This can explain why the EU was more critical about the 
2007 elections than about the 2003 elections. By 2007, the concern had arisen that the faltering 
democratisation process in Nigeria was threatening internal stability, hence the title of a report by 
International Crisis Group, „Failed Elections, Failing State?‟ (International Crisis Group 2007a). 
However, given that a new government came to power that seemed willing to engage in electoral 
reform and promote internal stability, this concern was not translated in negative measures. Similarly, 
the fact that President Gbagbo‟s accession to power in October 2000 was accepted and the lack of 
inclusiveness of the December 2000 elections was ignored, could be informed by the fear that a rerun 
of elections would provoke internal destabilisation. Indeed, the October 2000 elections were followed 
by severe political violence, which could have made the EU reluctant to push for a new round of 
elections. 
 
Lastly, the mixed evidence for the factor of regional stability should be interpreted. The most probable 
explanation is that only few governments were unequivocally perceived as contributing to regional 
stability. In countries where the EU was most reluctant to impose negative measures, only Nigeria was 
without any doubt seen as contributing to regional stability, while the evidence for Rwanda, Ethiopia 
and Chad was mixed. In countries where the EU was least reluctant to impose negative measures, only 
Zimbabwe and Côte d‟Ivoire were clearly not perceived as contributing to regional stability, while for 
Niger, it is not entirely clear how the government was perceived. In the case of Kenya, the EU was 
clearly supportive of Kibaki‟s regional role, but at the same time the violence had immediate 
destabilising effects on neighbouring countries.  
 
However, even in cases where the detrimental role for regional stability was clear, namely in Eritrea 
and Côte d‟Ivoire (2000-2005), the EU was reluctant to impose negative measures. It is notable that 
these were also countries were developmental performance (Eritrea, Côte d‟Ivoire) and internal 
stability (Côte d‟Ivoire) were weak. This suggests that for these cases, other reasons lie at the basis for 
double standards. Moreover, other reasons should be sought to explain the EU‟s decision to impose 
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negative measures in Guinea (2003), given that the government was at that time seen as contributing 
to regional stability. Here, however, it seems that Guinea‟s poor developmental performance was 
particularly important. Indeed, it was Germany – the other main EU donor - that blocked a new CSP in 
2003, which led to the Article 96 consultations.  
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4. Self-interest  
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous Chapter, I have explained how negative measures may be avoided vis-à-vis non-
democratic governments with policies perceived as „good‟ by the EU, including poverty reduction, 
economic growth, regional and internal stability. Nonetheless, there were equally cases where the EU 
avoided negative measures against governments where the EU‟s normative objectives have not been 
conflicting, including Eritrea and Chad. Moreover, even in those cases where conflicting norms could 
be noted, including Ethiopia and Rwanda, it was found that policies were not unequivocally 
problematic. As stated in the Introductory Chapter, there are plenty of reasons to suspect that EU self-
interest may also provide an explanation for double standards. In fact, this is the dominant thesis in the 
literature. Hence, in this Chapter I will investigate the relevance of EU self-interest in explaining 
double standards in the EU‟s reaction to violations of democratic principles in the ten country cases. 
Three forms of self-interest are distinguished: historical, commercial and security interests. For each of 
these factors, there are strong reasons to believe they may influence the EU‟s reaction to violations of 
democratic principles. Historical interests, mostly related to the colonial history of member states, are 
believed to be particularly important in sub-Saharan Africa, where especially France has tried to 
protect its sphere of influence. Commercial interests may have become more important as a result of 
the growing scarcity of raw materials and the growing competition with BRIC countries in this field. 
Lastly, security interests are likely to have an influence because of the growing awareness of the 
potential impact of African insecurity on European security, particularly after the terrorist attacks of 
9/11.   
 
4.2. Historical interests 
Historical interests are key to understanding EU-African relations. Indeed, the very first provisions on 
aid and trade relations between the European Economic Community and some of the sub-Saharan 
African countries were based on the colonial relations of the member states. Former colonial powers 
often see their prior possessions as a „backyard‟ and, as a result, wish to maintain their influence in 
these countries. Close relations with former colonies give the former coloniser a sense of status or 
prestige. This is one of the reasons why former colonial powers often focus development assistance on 
their former colonies. Although very closely related, it is necessary to distinguish historical interests 
from commercial or security interests, or those related to development cooperation. Despite the fact 
that close political relations are often translated in higher flows of development aid, commercial goods 
or even military cooperation, the motivations to protect former colonies are often different from those 
related to development, commercial or security interests. There may also be a purely „irrational‟ 
reason to protect former colonies, related to personal relations or the motivation to maintain a sphere 
of influence. This often supersedes commercial or security interests, which can explain, for example, 
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why France wishes to maintain close diplomatic relations with a strategically insignificant country 
such as Togo (Cumming 2000a). Although I will mostly focus on the historical interests of the former 
colonial powers, I prefer to speak of „historical‟ rather than „colonial‟ or „neo-colonial‟ interests, to 
cover cases in which a country belonged to a sphere of influence without being a former colony. This 
is the case, for example, with France and Rwanda.  
 
The case study analysis will be preceded by a literature review on how historical interests may 
influence the position of the EU and member states vis-à-vis former colonies. Although EU-African 
relations are built on the colonial past, leading to unseen aid and trade benefits, recently there is also a 
trend in the opposite direction. Indeed, as the foreign relations of both member states and African 
countries are evolving, the colonial past is becoming less and less important. Hence, I will start by 
explaining this evolution from a colonial to a more modern relationship. As a second step, I will delve 
into the literature on the Africa policies of the four former colonial powers that are relevant for this 
study (France, UK, Belgium and Italy) to find out to what extent historical interests are still relevant.  
   
4.2.1. EU-ACP relations: from colonies to ‘partners’ 
Historical interests are at the basis of the EU‟s relations with sub-Saharan Africa. For the member 
states with colonial possessions, the Treaty of Rome provided an opportunity to maintain their 
influence in their colonies by establishing strong development links between the EEC and former 
colonies. Hence, Article 131-136 established a form of „associationism‟ between the 22 African 
colonies and territories of France, Belgium and Italy and the EEC, based on French relations with its 
colonies (Bickerton 2011: 30). A free trade area was established between the EEC and its colonies, 
rights of establishment were enacted for citizens and firms, and the EDF was created. This mainly 
French idea was shared by Belgium and, to a lesser degree, Italy, but opposed by Germany and the 
Netherlands, which did not have any colonial possessions in sub-Saharan Africa and wanted to have a 
more global development policy that was not focused on former colonies (Grilli 1993: 8; Cosgrove-
Twitchett 1978: 10-11; Ravenhill 1985: 330). Even after decolonisation, the system of associationism 
survived. In 1962, the Yaoundé Convention was signed with eighteen of the newly independent 
countries, which formed the Associated African and Malagasy States (AAMS). The Convention 
prolonged the close relations between the EEC and its former colonies by establishing free trade areas 
between the EEC and each of the AAMS, and by renewing and expanding the EDF. At the same time, 
the preferential position of the AAMS was diminished to a certain extent by lowering the Common 
External Tariff towards other countries and abandoning the French colonial system of surprix 
(whereby an above market price was paid for products coming from the AAMS) (Grilli 1993: 1-11; 
Cosgrove Twitchett 1978: 17-30; Ravenhill 1985: 47-57).  
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Although there was a developmental and trade dimension to these provisions, the selectivity of the 
partners clearly illustrated that they were based on historical ties rather than need (Holland 2002: 27-
32). Furthermore, the European Commission became staffed with officials who favoured the idea of 
prolonged close relations with former colonies. The Commission‟s DG VIII – responsible for 
associationism – included many French and Belgian ex-colonial civil servants who had close relations 
with African elites. Development Commissioners in this period were all French. Moreover, projects 
were primarily decided on a political basis, with France – not accidentally the largest contributor to the 
EDF - actively lobbying for projects presented by its favoured African partners (Cosgrove Twitchett 
1978: 35-42; Claeys 2004: 114-115).  
 
Against this background, the 1970 Lomé Agreement was believed to break with colonial history and to 
build a relationship based on partnership and equality (Holland 2002: 40; Crawford 1996: 504). For 
many authors, Lomé was the start of a new era in Euro-African relations, based on a more globalist 
outlook, with the EEC‟s relations with developing countries now extended to the whole group of ACP 
countries. The primary reason for this shift was seen in the accession of the United Kingdom to the 
EEC in 1973, which strengthened the camp of member states favouring globalist development policies 
(Ravenhill 1985: 330; Dimier 2006; Parfitt 1996). At the same time, Lomé can also be interpreted 
precisely as the continuation of the EEC‟s attempt to maintain its sphere of influence in former sub-
Saharan African colonies. Indeed, with the Lomé Convention, the EEC had an agreement with 
virtually all the independent countries in sub-Saharan Africa, which entrenched the division of spheres 
of influence between Europe and the United States (Lister 1988: xiv). According to Kroslak, Lomé 
allowed France „to maintain its influence in “her” part of Africa while sharing the cost with its 
European Allies and rivals on the continent‟ (Kroslak 2004: 72). As such, Lomé can be interpreted as 
a compromise between the desire of the UK and France to maintain their spheres of influence. The UK 
wanted to extend the association to its former colonies, but France only agreed to the inclusion of 
African and Caribbean British colonies as signatories of the agreement, insisting that its own relations 
with the AAMS and the francophone African countries would not be affected (Claeys 2004: 117; 
Drieghe 2011: 245-251). Furthermore, development projects were still approved on the basis of 
political desirability rather than developmental strength, the main function being to provide the 
Community with a presence in ACP countries (Lister 1988: 134-153). Also institutionally, a separate 
DG responsible for relations with associated states continued to exist, rather than integrating this DG 
in DG external relations (Ravenhill 1985: 35-36).   
 
However, in the 1980s and 1990s, the relation with the ACP countries drifted away from the colonial 
past towards a „normal‟ partnership. This should be seen in the context of the changed international 
environment, in which sub-Saharan Africa became less important to the EU. After the Cold War, the 
EU‟s attention shifted to Central and Eastern Europe and subsequently to the Eastern and Southern 
neighbourhood. Moreover, the EU developed partnerships with geographically distant regions such as 
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Asia and Latin America, thereby entering in direct competition with the US. As a consequence, the 
unique emphasis on the ACP countries has disappeared and EU-ACP relations have gradually 
normalised (Smith 2004a; Hugon 1999: 120; Mayall 2005). This can be seen in the distribution of EU 
development funds: whereas development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa gradually decreased 
between the 1980s and the early 2000s, there was a strong increase in assistance for European 
countries and, to a lesser degree, North Africa, the Middle East and North, Central and South America 
(Olsen 2004: 426). Furthermore, historical interests in sub-Saharan Africa could not avoid that 
economic and political conditionalities were introduced in the 1980s and 1990s. The Lomé IV 
Agreement (1989) foresaw approximately 10 percent of EDF funding for structural adjustment 
support, which was linked to the implementation of reform programmes approved by the International 
Financial Institutions (Brown 2002: 73-114; Holland 2002: 44). In the revision of Lomé-IV, the „no 
strings attached‟ policy of Lomé was further eroded by introducing political conditionality (Crawford 
1996; Raffer 1998). The Cotonou Agreement put in question the unique position of the ACP countries 
and the principles of contractuality and equality in ACP-EC relations by gradually replacing 
nonreciprocal trade preferences by Economic Partnership Agreements, to be negotiated with different 
regions (Babarinde 2005: 31-32; Holland 2002: 212-213). In this context, there are currently 
discussions on whether the ACP group should be abolished with the expiry of the Cotonou Agreement 
in 2020 (Laporte 2012).  
 
Even in the current context, however, historical interests are believed to influence EU policies vis-à-
vis sub-Saharan Africa. It has been argued that civilian or military interventions under the ESDP in 
sub-Saharan Africa mostly take place at the initiative of those member states that are concerned about 
their sphere of influence (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 168; Biscop and Coelmont 2010: 16; 
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 191). According to some authors, the ESDP‟s focus on sub-
Saharan Africa can be explained by the French desire to remain engaged in sub-Saharan Africa and 
counter the growing influence of the US, while sharing the costs of military and defence cooperation 
(Bagayoko 2011: 132-133). In this respect, it should be mentioned that EU intervention stands more 
chances of being perceived as legitimate than when member states intervene bilaterally (Hyde-Price 
2006: 222-223; Gibert 2011a: 192). Furthermore, although aid allocation is now primarily based on 
needs and performance, EU member states – fully aware of the Commission‟s financial resources – 
continue to use their political weight to influence the European Commission into financing costly 
programmes in former colonies. Moreover, former colonial powers often prefer to send Africa regional 
directors to attend the Africa working group rather than to have their Africa specialists in Brussels 
(Gibert 2011a: 187), which reduces the possibility of socialisation into a more EU-oriented approach 
(Beyers 2007). At the same time, those member states without a colonial history, including Germany, 
the Central and Eastern European Countries and Nordic states have never become truly engaged in the 
EU‟s policies in sub-Saharan Africa (Pirozzi 2010: 97).  
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4.2.2. Member states and their former colonies 
From the above, it is clear that historical interests have become less and less important for EU-African 
relations. But can this also be said about the member states? As has been argued, member states with a 
colonial history have been particularly active in shaping the EU‟s relations with sub-Saharan Africa to 
maintain their spheres of influence. Nonetheless, there seemed to be a difference in the approach of 
France, Belgium and Italy on the one hand, and the UK on the other. In the following, I will therefore 
analyse the Africa policies of the member states with historical interests in sub-Saharan Africa. Most 
attention will go to France and the UK, which are the main former colonial powers in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Since the case studies also include former colonies of Belgium (Rwanda) and Italy (Eritrea), I 
will also discuss potential historical interests of these two member states in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
4.1.2.1. France 
Of all the former colonial powers, France has retained the closest relations with its ex-colonies in sub-
Saharan Africa (Taylor 2010: 51; Bourmaud 2011: 43). The continuation of a special relationship with 
the francophone countries in sub-Saharan Africa was a means for France to project its power overseas 
(rayonnement) and to maintain its international status as a global power (grandeur de la France), 
especially in the light of a diminishing French influence in non-sub-Saharan African former colonies 
after the debacles in Algeria and Indochina (Chafer 2002: 345-346). As was underlined by former 
minister of Foreign Affairs Louis de Guiringaud: „Africa is the only continent where with five hundred 
men France can claim to make History‟ (cited in Bourmaud 2000). This desire to maintain influence in 
sub-Saharan Africa is reflected in a series of concrete aspects of Franco-African relations after 
decolonisation. One way of spreading French influence in post-colonial Africa was the Franc zone, 
which pegged the currency of France‟s former colonies (the franc de la Communauté financière 
africaine or CFA) to the French Franc (Chafer 2002: 346). Secondly, France concluded formal 
defence and military cooperation accords with the newly independent Francophone countries in 
Africa, which allowed France to intervene militarily to protect French nationals, subdue rebellion and 
protect pro-French rulers (Gregory 2000: 437-438). Apart from the military bases, the extensive 
French intelligence services also provided invaluable protection to rulers because of their capacity to 
monitor opposition groups and to foil potential conspiracies (Young 2009: 30). Thirdly, French 
development assistance was used as a way to maintain influence in former colonies (Emmanuel 2010: 
866; Mayall 2005: 310). Aid was strongly concentrated on the former colonies and was only weakly 
related to recipient needs (Hugon 1999: 113-114; Neumayer 2003b: 61). Lastly, attempts were made 
to promote French culture and the French language. The Organisation Internationale de la 
Francophonie (OIF) plays an important role in this regard (Kroslak 2004: 66).  
 
Apart from these formal aspects of French Africa policies, there is also a personal aspect, related to 
patron-client relations between French authorities and sub-Saharan African leaders. Françafrique, a 
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term that was used by former President of Côte d‟Ivoire Felix Houphouët-Boigny to describe his close 
relations with France, refers to the network of relations between French elites and African leaders 
(Verschave 1999). Many of the post-colonial African elites have been educated in French schools or 
served as ministers or members of the National Assembly during colonial rule (Chafer 2005: 8). 
Because of this personal dimension there is also an emotional aspect of Franco-African relations, 
which has been described as the côté relationnel (Cumming 2000a: 301-304). An important actor in 
this regard is the French President and his Cellule Africaine, who has the exclusive prerogative over 
Africa policies (Médard 2008: 316; Cumming 2000a: 321). Furthermore, people like Jacques Foccart, 
who served as Secretary General for African and Malagasy Affairs under President De Gaulle, 
developed strong personal contacts with African leaders (les réseaux Foccart) which dominated 
French Africa policies for years (Gregory 2000: 436-437). With the help of these client leaders, France 
could claim the rank and prestige of a medium size power. For example, African clients made French 
influence stronger in international organisations such as the UN or the World Trade Organisation 
(Emmanuel 2010: 876; Claeys 2004: 120-121; Kroslak 2004: 64-65). Although there clearly is a 
commercial dimension to la Françafrique (as can be observed in close relations with oil producers like 
Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville), Françafrique supersedes commercial interests. For example, France 
had close relations with Togo‟s Eyadema or Chad, where France does not (or no longer in the case of 
Chad) have oil interests (Hugon 2007: 31). The close relations between French leaders and African 
dictators such as Omar Bongo (Gabon) and Eyadema (Togo) shows that Françafrique was little 
concerned with democratisation (Chafer 2005: 8). 
 
Nonetheless, similar to EU-African relations, historical interests have become less important for 
French Africa policies in the 1990s and 2000s. The end of the Cold War downgraded French 
ambitions to assume global power status. As a result of the accelerating process of globalisation, 
power shifted from the nation-state, territorial control and military strength to economic, financial and 
commercial power. In this context, the economic marginalisation of sub-Saharan Africa reduced the 
potential benefits of maintaining a sphere of influence in Africa. At the same time, the debt crisis and 
the economic and political fragmentation of several West and Central African states made it costly for 
France to maintain its sphere of influence. Moreover, globalisation increased the need to develop ties 
based on economic interest, which drew France to the larger economies on the African continent, 
including South Africa, Nigeria and Angola (Chafer 2005: 12-18; Claude 2007: 916). In the military 
sphere, European integration and closer cooperation with NATO and the UN brought with it a pressure 
for increased multilateralism in French Africa policies (Chafer 2002: 353). Furthermore, a change of 
the guard in France and some sub-Saharan African countries further drifted Franco-African policies 
towards change. In the late 1990s, the system of cohabitation between French President Chirac and the 
socialist prime minister Lionel Jospin, who did not have a Franco-African network, further reduced the 
importance of historical interests in Franco-African relations (Touati 2007: 3; Leymairie 2002). In 
addition, the 1990s marked the death of some of the protagonists of Françafrique, including former 
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President of Côte d‟Ivoire Houphouët-Boigny (1993), François Mittérand (1996) and Jacques Foccart 
(1997) (Cumming 2000b: 365; Charbonneau 2006: 217).  
 
This was clearly reflected in the formal aspects of Franco-African relations. First of all, like other 
donors France adhered to political and economic conditionality. In 1990, French President Mitterand 
gave his famous speech at the Franco-African summit in La Baule, where he declared that French aid 
would be linked to ‘efforts qui seront accomplis pour aller vers plus de liberté’ (Bolle 2001: 1). 
Similarly, in 1993 prime minister Balladur proclaimed that French aid would be linked to the 
structural adjustment policies of the IFIs and would thus become less based on bilateral relations. The 
decision in 1994 to give in to international financial pressure by devaluating the CFA franc should also 
be seen in this regard (Médard 2008: 318; Chafer 2002: 347-348; Marchal 1998: 358). Secondly, 
France increased development assistance to non-African former colonies (Lebanon, Vietnam) and to 
non-former colonies with which it aimed to have close economic and political relations such as Cuba, 
Kenya and South Africa (Gabas 2005: 246-247; Chafer 2005: 17). Thirdly, France reduced its military 
presence in Africa. French troops were significantly reduced
44
 and replaced by support to help African 
states build their own armies and French contributions to UN or EU military missions (Marchal 1998: 
363-364; Gregory 2000: 441-442; Bourmaud 2011: 48-49). Fourthly, „institutional clientelism‟ was 
reduced with a number of institutional changes. The cooperation ministry, traditionally the privileged 
ministry of francophone Africans, was integrated in the large Direction Générale de la Coopération 
Internationale et du Développement (Médard 2008: 318; Leymairie 2002).  
 
Despite this evolution, sub-Saharan Africa was still regarded as a key element of French foreign 
policy. As noted by Bourmaud, in the context of globalisation it was believed Africa was the only way 
„France could still shine‟ (Bourmaud 2011: 52). First of all, the informal elements of Françafrique had 
not lost significance. Indeed, despite the speech at La Baule, President Chirac (1995-2007) maintained 
friendly relations with non-democratic sub-Saharan African leaders including Bédié (Côte d‟Ivoire), 
Eyadéma (Togo) or Bongo (Gabon). Secondly, despite institutional reorganisation, the Cellule 
Africaine was not abolished. Thirdly, France still played a large role in military interventions in 
francophone sub-Saharan African countries, by insisting on EU military missions to the DRC and 
intervening bilaterally in Côte d‟Ivoire (2002-2004) (Claude 2007).  
 
When Sarkozy became President in 2007, observers predicted a radical breach in French Africa 
policies. In contrast to his predecessors, Sarkozy had little affinity with Africa, and his party‟s 
campaign had propagated an end to the clientelist networks and a transparent Africa policy based on 
democracy and human rights. This lack of affinity became clear in July 2007, when Sarkozy delivered 
a speech in Dakar where he referred to Africans as „peasants‟ and declared that colonialism was not 
the cause for all of Africa‟s problems. The speech was interpreted as an insult by a large part of the 
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 Between 1998 and 2006, military cooperants were reduced from 614 to 282 (d‟Ersu 2007: 88).  
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African elites and led to a freeze in Franco-African relations (Taylor 2010: 60-65). One effort to break 
with the colonial past was the renegotiation of military agreements with African countries, which were 
also made public (Tisseron 2011: 102-103). The loss of French interest in sub-Saharan Africa is 
further reflected in a decline in development aid to former colonies, a reduction of French diplomatic 
representation, a decrease in high-level visits and a departure of French small businesses in sub-
Saharan Africa (Barrios 2010).  
 
However, despite this discursive shift, the informal elements of Françafrique seem to have survived. 
Indeed, Sarkozy maintained close relations with President Bongo from Gabon (an old friend) or 
President Nguesso from Congo-Brazzaville (Foutoyet 2009: 47-58). In March 2008, Secretary of State 
for Cooperation Bockel was replaced after Bongo had complained about his remarks that France 
should stop providing assistance to oil producing countries where populations live in misery 
(Bourmaud 2011: 53; Moncrieff 2012: 12). Moreover, Sarkozy‟s informal advisor on Africa Robert 
Bourgi has been described as a „new Foccart‟. In the context of presidential elections in Gabon after 
the death of Omar Bongo in 2009, Bourgi publicly declared he supported the candidacy of the former 
president‟s son Ali Bongo (Mengara 2010: 60). Furthermore, the reduction in military cooperation has 
not impeded the French military from maintaining a significant presence on the African continent. 
French troops have reconfigured in four bases in different sub-Saharan African regions: Dakar (West 
Africa), Libreville (Central Africa), Djibouti (East Africa) and La Réunion (South Africa) (Chafer 
2011a: 172). Moreover, the amount spent on promoting French culture abroad has not diminished 
(Barrios 2010: 2). Recent examples such as the military coups in Mauritania (2009), Madagascar 
(2008) and Guinea (2008) also show the continuing reluctance of French leaders to publicly denounce 
democratic breakdown in its sphere of influence. Moreover, due to its continuing desire to maintain 
influence in Africa, France continues to work on regional affairs with those countries where it has 
good relations with the government (Chafer 2011a: 170). Last but not least, despite the formal shift 
away from political aid allocation, the top beneficiaries of French aid in sub-Saharan Africa remain 
francophone countries, as can be observed in Table 17 below.   
 
Table 17. Top three sub-Saharan African aid recipients of France 
 2000-2004 2005-2006
45
 2009-2010 
France DRC 
Côte d‟Ivoire 
Senegal 
Congo-Brazzaville 
Cameroon 
Senegal 
Côte d‟Ivoire 
Congo-Brazzaville 
Cameroon 
Source: OECD-DAC Peer Review report 2008, OECD-DAC‟s Aid at a glance 2009-2010 
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 In 2005, Nigeria was number 1 recipient of French aid in sub-Saharan Africa. However, this is undoubtedly 
related to the enormous debt cancellation in 2005-2006. For this reason, Nigeria was excluded from the table.  
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4.1.2.2. The United Kingdom 
Despite expectations that it would maintain a permanent role in its vast colonial estates, the UK did 
not retain a strong interest in its former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa (Young 2009; Taylor 2010: 
35). The UK‟s Africa policies following decolonisation have been described as „damage limitation‟ 
and „reactive rather than proactive‟. Sub-Saharan Africa was mainly seen as a source of trouble, 
instead of opportunity (Williams 2004: 41). This clearly contrasts with the French approach to Africa. 
As was stated by Cumming: „For France, Africa plays a crucial role in enhancing its rank in the 
international pecking order, while for the UK, Africa is much more centrally a development issue‟ 
(Cumming 2011: 68). The difference between French and British attention for Africa clearly derives 
from the aid budget: in 1987, sub-Saharan Africa was receiving only $325 million in aid from the UK, 
compared to $2,046 from France (Cumming 2004: 108). The UK focused instead on Europe, the 
former Soviet Union and East Asia. African embassies were reduced in size and number, and the UK‟s 
Africa policy came to be perceived as synonymous with aid policy. Only few former colonies in sub-
Saharan Africa, namely South Africa, Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone, attracted some interest in the UK‟s 
foreign policy (Williams 2004: 42; Gallagher 2009: 438). 
 
The UK did not cultivate any personal ties with sub-Saharan African leaders equivalent to the French 
réseaux. The British rationale was that „Britain should never hold sentimental or moral relations with 
other nations as sovereign respected partners, but rather, should develop her own “interests”‟ (Engdahl 
2004: 6-8). Hence, British colonisation was mainly driven by commercial and material gain, rather 
than to build spheres of influence. As a result, the UK governed its sub-Saharan African colonies 
through indirect rule, as opposed to the French direct rule, and did not attempt to form any kind of 
assimilation with its ex-colonies after decolonisation. During the Cold War, the UK made alliances 
with African leaders predominantly for strategic and commercial reasons. British leaders often 
developed personal relations with opposition members, rather than with their sub-Saharan African 
counterparts. Personal relations only played a minor role in the UK‟s aid allocation (Cumming 2000a: 
308-326; Mayall 2005: 314).  
 
Another difference with French policies in its former colonies is military cooperation. British 
disposition for intervention only endured a few years, during which the military intervened to stem 
mutinies in Uganda, Kenya and Taganyika. However, in 1964 the British commander of the Nigerian 
army refused to intervene on behalf of Nigerian leaders after scandal-ridden national elections (Young 
2009: 27). After this, British military involvement was minor, although there are some British military 
advisors and training teams working with the armed forces in former colonies (Chafer 2011b: 74).  
 
The increased attention for sub-Saharan Africa of the New Labour government was related to other 
reasons than historical interests. Rather than a renewed attention for its colonial history, the UK‟s re-
engagement with sub-Saharan Africa from 1997 onwards can be explained by (1) a growing concern 
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for humanitarian issues (mainly conflict and development) and (2) the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (Taylor 
and Williams 2002: 553). Indeed, there was little historical perspective in New Labour‟s new focus on 
sub-Saharan Africa. As was argued by Porteous, Africa was regarded as „a blank sheet on which for 
the first time the UK was inscribing a splendid and ambitious design‟ (Porteous 2008: 133). Indeed, 
the renewed attention for sub-Saharan Africa was not confined to the African Commonwealth. Instead, 
countries like Ethiopia, Rwanda and Mozambique, which were not former colonies, became priority 
partners of the UK. The latter two countries were even allowed as members of the Commonwealth 
(Power 2009; Porteous 2008: 60). One exception, however, is the UK intervention in Sierra Leone in 
2000 which, besides an example of New Labour‟s ethical foreign policy as noted in the previous 
Chapter, was also noted to be driven by „the usual partnership between the former colonial power and 
the former colony‟ (Gibert 2011a: 180). Moreover, with France, the UK seems to have an implicit 
policy of „division of labour‟ implying that the UK will focus on its former colonies in sub-Saharan 
Africa, while France will be allowed to dominate policies on former French colonies. This can explain 
the low-profile of France in discussions within the Council of the EU on Zimbabwe and the passive 
stance of the UK in discussions on former French colonies (Chad, Côte d‟Ivoire) (Olsen 2009: 255).  
 
4.1.2.3. Belgium  
Belgium is the former coloniser of the DRC (1885-1960) and of current Rwanda and Burundi (1924-
1962). Belgium‟s policies in the DRC have certainly been inspired by historical interests, to such a 
degree that Belgian interventions in the country have been associated with the Françafrique system 
(Mengara 2010: 58). According to Gibert, Belgium is closer to France‟s understanding of the EU‟s 
role in Africa than to that of the UK (Gibert 2011a: 181-182). Indeed, Belgium‟s long-standing 
support for dictator Mobutu in the DRC was frequently criticised and Belgian authorities are the main 
suspect in the assassination of the nationalist former prime minister Patrice Lumumba (Ewans 2003). 
Despite these neo-colonial characteristics of Belgium‟s policies towards the Great Lakes, political 
conditionality was initially applied quite rigorously by Belgium in its former colonies. In 1990, 
Belgium suspended virtually all aid to Mobutu‟s Zaire in response to the killings of a number of 
students by security forces at Lumumbashi University (Renard and Reyntjens 1995: 97-98). The 
liberal-socialist-green coalition government that took office in 1999 reaffirmed Central Africa as a top 
priority, leading to an increase in development assistance and high-level ministerial visits to the region 
(Hayman 2010: 343-346; Agence France Presse 9 October 2003). Belgium was strongly involved in 
conflict resolution during the civil war in the DRC (1998-2003) and played a large role in influencing 
EU engagement in the country (Nasra 2011).  
 
However, Belgium‟s position on political conditionality has depended strongly on the personal 
strategies of the responsible foreign minister. This can be noted in recent policies vis-à-vis the Kabila 
government in the DRC. Whereas Louis Michel (1999-2004) favoured an approach of engagement and 
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was often criticised for being too close to the regime, his successor Karel De Gucht was not afraid to 
risk diplomatic relations with his public criticism on governance in the DRC. For example, Belgium 
took the initiative to put pressure on the organisation of elections in 2004 (De Tijd 2004, September). 
In November 2004, President Kabila refused to meet the Foreign Minister, after the latter had publicly 
criticised the quality of Congolese politicians (De Morgen 2005, February). The public opinion 
(especially the Flemish part) seemed supportive of De Gucht‟s more confrontational strategies, while 
the francophone political parties seemed more in favour of engagement (De Tijd 2005, February). 
However, when relations reached a low when Congo withdrew its ambassador from Belgium in 2008, 
the Belgian Prime Minister made it a priority to re-establish diplomatic relations (De Morgen 2008, 
May). His successor Didier Reynders (December 2011-present) seems much less willing to press the 
Congolese authorities on democracy issues, which could be witnessed in his silent stance after the 
problematic presidential elections in 2012.  
 
While former colonies remain a priority in Belgium‟s development cooperation, their importance has 
declined in recent years. The DRC‟s share of Belgian ODA declined from 19.6 percent in the 1980s to 
only 4 percent in 2002-2003. The share of Rwanda and Burundi shrunk from 4.7 and 3.6 percent to 1.4 
and 1.1 percent (Develtere 2005: 132-133). Nonetheless, of all sub-Saharan African countries, the 
DRC, Rwanda and Burundi remain the primary recipients of Belgian ODA (see Table 18 on p. 180).  
 
4.1.2.4. Italy 
Italy acquired a part of today‟s Somalia (Italian Somaliland, 1889-1936) and Eritrea (1890-1936). In 
1936, Italy briefly conquered Ethiopia to form Italian East Africa. Italian East Africa was briefly 
expanded when Mussolini‟s troops occupied part of British Somaliland in 1940. However, in 1941, the 
British-led East Africa Campaign forced the Italian troops into defeat, making an end to Italy‟s 
possessions in the Horn of Africa. After decolonisation, Italy did not maintain significant political 
influence, although leaving an imprint on the Horn of Africa‟s institutional, social and economic 
structure (Calchi Novati 2009: 236-239). Italy lacked the will and tools to exercise power over client 
states in Africa. As a result, despite colonial history it has not played a major role in conflicts in the 
Horn of Africa, such as the Ethiopian-Eritrean war or the Somali conflict (Calchi Novati 1994; Calchi 
Novati 2008: 44; Calchi Novati 2010: 3-14). Moreover, after the September 2001 attacks, Italy has 
become less and less relevant in the politics of the Horn of Africa (Calchi Novati 2008: 52). Whereas 
Italy‟s development assistance used to be directed towards its former colonies or occupied territories 
(Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia), since the 1980s and 1990s, development spending has been redirected to 
Mediterranean countries where it has stronger commercial and security interests (Carbone 2008: 65). 
Hence, while Eritrea was the third largest receiver of development assistance in 1997-2001, since 
2002, neither Somalia nor Eritrea feature at the top of Italy‟s aid beneficiaries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
On the other hand, Ethiopia has remained in the top 3 since the 2000s.  
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Table 18. Top three sub-Saharan African aid recipients of UK, Belgium and Italy 
 1997-2001 2002-2006 2007-2008 2009-2010 
UK Tanzania 
Uganda 
Mozambique 
Nigeria 
Tanzania 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
Ethiopia 
Tanzania 
Ethiopia 
Nigeria 
DRC 
Belgium DRC 
Tanzania 
Rwanda 
DRC 
Nigeria 
Cameroon 
DRC 
Rwanda 
Cameroon 
DRC 
Rwanda 
Burundi 
Italy Uganda 
Mozambique 
Eritrea 
Nigeria 
DRC 
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia 
Mozambique  
Sierra Leone 
Congo-Brazzaville 
Liberia 
Ethiopia 
Source: OECD-DAC Peer Review reports and the 2009-2010 OECD-DAC‟s  
Aid at a glance donor profiles.  
 
4.2.3. Historical interests and double standards in EU democracy promotion  
It is likely that former colonisers play a large role in EU democracy promotion vis-à-vis former 
colonies, but it is not clear to what extent and in what way. Laakso and others observed that former 
colonial powers are always the most active member states in discussions on Article 96 (Laakso et al. 
2007a: 57-58) . However, Jünemann and Knodt point to the double role historical interests may play in 
democracy promotion. On the one hand, historical interests have resulted in member states taking a 
low profile in discussions on human rights. On the other, member states with a certain imperial history 
in a country may also take a higher profile on human rights issues (Jünemann and Knodt 2007: 354-
355).  
 
4.2.4. Hypothesis and operationalisation 
Following the description of historical interests in the relations of the EU and member states with 
former colonies in Africa, it can be assumed that member states may be concerned about maintaining 
their sphere of influence. From this perspective, it can be expected that the EU will be less likely to 
antagonise governments that are willing to continue the status quo, and less reluctant to antagonise 
governments that try to break away from this sphere of influence.  
 
Hence, the following hypothesis will be tested: 
H.4. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that protect the sphere of 
influence of member states, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments that do 
not protect the sphere of influence of member states. 
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To apply this hypothesis to the case studies, I focused on (1) whether a country belonged to the sphere 
of influence of one of the member states and (2) whether the government helped to maintain or 
endangered that sphere of influence. This is investigated by looking at colonial history and bilateral 
government-to-government relations between former colonial power and former colony. To speculate 
about the potential role of member states in decision-making on negative measures at EU level, the 
bilateral reaction of former colonial powers to violations of democratic principles in former colonies 
was assessed. It is reasonable to assume that, if member states are reluctant to use negative measures 
in bilateral relations, they will also try to avoid negative measures at the EU level. However, I will 
also look into broader bilateral relations, for example on regional security or corruption. Indeed, if the 
former coloniser does not refrain from criticism on issues of corruption or regional security, the same 
argument could be made about democratisation. Although democratisation is distinct from these other 
issues, it points to the same logic: historical relations are put at risk by raising concerns about 
government policies. For France, whether countries belong to its sphere of influence was determined 
on the basis of colonial history as well as institutionally, by looking at whether a country is part of the 
CFA zone, is home to a French military basis, and whether its elites have close relations with people in 
the government.  
 
Given that historical interests are investigated here, I will not restrict myself to the post-2000 period. 
Indeed, if historical interests played no role in the 1990s, it is unlikely they will in the post-2000 
period. 
 
The case study analysis is mainly based on secondary sources, including academic articles and press 
articles. I also consulted official websites,
46
 and in some cases information on the position of former 
colonial powers was derived from US embassy cables.  
 
4.2.5. Case studies 
4.2.5.1. Eritrea 
Italy is the former coloniser of Eritrea, but after World War II Eritrea was proclaimed an autonomous 
unit federated to Ethiopia (Calchi Novati 2008: 44; Young 2009: 25). However, Italy did not retain 
significant political influence over Eritrea after decolonisation. Although Italy supported Eritrean 
independence from Ethiopia in 1993, Eritrea did not receive the support it might have expected in the 
light of colonial relations. For example, this was clear in Italy‟s stance in the border war with Ethiopia, 
where Italy did not favour one side or another, and was therefore even perceived as favourable of 
Ethiopia by part of the Eritrean public opinion (Calchi Novati 2008: 43-53). Moreover, after the 
imprisonment of eleven dissidents in September 2001, historical interests did not prevent Italy from 
                                                     
46
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representing the EU in a demarche criticising this violation of democratic principles. The lack of close 
relations between Eritrea and Italy is clearly shown in the reaction of the government of Eritrea to the 
demarche: Eritrea expelled the Italian ambassador, after which the Eritrean ambassador in Italy was 
ordered to leave Rome (Associated Press Worldstream 2 October 2001; Africa News 3 October 2001). 
Relations were however normalised in September 2002 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 10 
January 2003). Italy does not have a bilateral cooperation programme in Eritrea anymore and channels 
all aid through multilateral agencies (anonymous interview, February 2009). Although the Italian 
embassy in Eritrea is maintained for historical reasons and because there are still some Italian citizens 
in Eritrea, the Italian interest for Eritrea is limited (anonymous interviews, January 2012).  
 
4.2.5.2. Ethiopia 
Ethiopia was never colonised. Italy had been awarded Ethiopia at the Conference in Berlin in 1885 and 
a protocol of friendship was signed in 1893, but this was unilaterally abrogated by Ethiopian emperor 
Menelik as he argued that Italians had interpreted the treaty as making Ethiopia a protectorate of Italy. 
The Italians were finally defeated in the Battle of Adwa in 1896 (Milkias and Metaferia 2005: 16-18). 
There was a brief Italian occupation in 1936, when Mussolini‟s troops annexed Ethiopia to their newly 
created colony of Italian East Africa, but Italian troops were defeated by the British in 1941.   
 
4.2.5.3. Kenya 
Kenya was a UK colony until 1963. However, diplomatic relations with the UK have often been 
strained. During Moi‟s Presidency in 1992-1994, the UK High Commissioner took a robust line on the 
need for political conditionality and actively established contacts with Kenyan opposition parties 
(Cumming 2000a: 260). At the end of Moi‟s rule, however, the UK was noted to be amongst the 
donors that pushed least strongly on democratisation (Brown 2007). Under Kibaki, there were often 
diplomatic disputes because of criticism on corruption. Against this background, during the 2007 
elections the UK was seen as anti-government and pro-opposition (US Embassy Kenya 2008b; 
anonymous interviews, January-February 2012). Moreover, Kenya was amongst the member states 
that were least supportive of Kibaki‟s claim for victory (Youngs 2008a: 8). During the final tally of the 
vote, the UK tried to put pressure on the electoral commission to conduct a recount before announcing 
the winner (Brown 2009: 392). In January 2008, a Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that „the UK‟s 
view is that the elections are disputed‟ (Agence France Presse 28 January 2008). The UK was the first 
donor to raise the possibility of an aid cut, and also threatened with the imposition of smart sanctions 
against those who sabotaged the mediation process (Brown 2009: 394-397). Moreover, the UK was 
the leading donor in coordinating international support for the Kriegler and Waki Commissions on 
elections and post-election violence (House of Commons 2009).  
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4.2.5.4. Chad  
Chad was part of the French colonial empire until 1960. Chad is part of the CFA zone and houses a 
French military base Epervier, which is the second largest in Africa after Djibouti (Moncrieff 2012: 
20). The presence of this military basis can hardly be justified as necessary for the protection of 
French citizens on Chadian territory, the number of which amounts to no more than 1,000. Instead, 
French military presence seems mainly motivated by political reasons, namely to maintain its 
influence in Chad and protect the Chadian government against insurgencies. Because the French 
military intervened on many occasions in Chad in the 1960s and 1980s, it feels a certain attachment to 
the country and friendly relations have developed. President Déby has always been very forthcoming 
to the French army, granting them free movement on Chadian territory and leaving most of their 
operations free from taxes (International Crisis Group 2006c: 17-18). Diplomatic relations between 
France and President Déby have always been close. To begin with, the coming of power of Déby‟s 
Mouvement Patriotique du Salut in 1990 was made possible after the withdrawal of French support to 
his predecessor Habré (May and Massey 2002: 75). In the 1990s and early 2000s, President Déby 
helped France to maintain its sphere of influence in francophone Africa, by supporting President 
Nguesso in Congo-Brazzaville (1997), Kabila in the DRC (1998) and the military overthrow of 
President Patasse in the Central African Republic (2003) (International Crisis Group 2006c: 17-18).  
 
Because of its close relations with Déby, France has been reluctant to express criticism about Chad‟s 
democratic record. For example, France provided financial support for elections that were largely 
fraudulent in 1996 and 1997 (International Crisis Group 2008b: 2-3), although it did not finance the 
2001 elections (May and Massey 2002: 84). Moreover, France did not voice any criticism about the 
2005 referendum by which Déby secured a third term. Xavier Darcos, Minister of Development, 
Cooperation and the Francophonie, even congratulated President Déby on the outcome of the 
referendum (Marchal 2006: 474-475). Furthermore, France provided military protection against rebel 
attacks in April and November 2006 (International Crisis Group 2008b: 17).  
 
However, this changed somewhat from late 2006 onwards. By then, the French had realised that their 
special relationship with Déby made a solution with the opposition difficult and that an EU approach 
would be more effective. Moreover, a new ambassador took position, Bruno Foucher, who seemed 
more willing to abandon the special relationship with Chad in favour of a more Europeanised 
approach (US Embassy Chad 2006a). Hence, the French supported the 2007 political agreement 
mediated by the European Commission delegation. Nonetheless, it is believed that the French 
insistence on the EUFOR Tchad/CAR mission in 2007-2008 was, besides humanitarian reasons, also 
informed by the desire to support the government against the rebellion by enhancing stability in the 
east of the country (Chafer 2011b: 79). The French desire to keep Déby in power was further 
illustrated by the reaction to the attempted coup d’état in February 2008. France sponsored a non-
binding resolution in the UN condemning the rebel attacks and urging the UN to provide support to 
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the government (Agence France Presse 3 February 2008). Although French troops primarily 
evacuated French nationals and the intervention was much less robust or partisan than that in 2006 
(Barrios 2010: 4), it is believed they also supplied military assistance to the government, as well as 
intelligence on rebel movement. (Moncrieff 2012: 25). Although the French government – under 
pressure from certain parliamentarians - asked for clarification about the disappearance in 2008 of 
opposition leader Saleh, a serious investigation has never been conducted, nor has there been a clear 
explanation about what the French government knows about the missing opposition leader (Moncrieff 
2012: 35).  
 
4.2.5.5. Niger 
Niger was a French colony until 1958. Niger is part of the CFA zone, but there is no French military 
basis in Niger, although there is an active military agreement (Gregory 2000: 438). After President 
Tandja came to power in 2000, France pleaded in the EU and the IFIs to have multilateral aid resumed 
to Niger (Assemblée Nationale 2000a). France maintained good relations with Nigerien president 
Tandja. It has been much more reluctant than the EU to condemn the 2009 referendum. In a meeting 
with the US ambassador in Niger, the French ambassador stated that, although France was concerned 
about the announcement of the referendum, Paris had asked him to deliver the message in a low-key 
manner because the situation was too delicate for the French government. Unlike other donors, the 
French ambassador was in favour of continuing donor support for the 2009 elections (US embassy 
Niger 2009a) and attended the President‟s swearing-in ceremony (US Embassy Niger 2009b). 
However, after the referendum, a foreign ministry spokesman called Tandja‟s moves „repeated attacks 
on democracy‟ and warned that the events could lead to European aid suspension given that they were 
in contradiction with the Cotonou Agreement (Agence France Presse 15 July 2009; 4 August 2009). 
On 10 August 2009, France urged Niger to „return to a democratic path‟ (Agence France Presse 10 
August 2009). France, however, did not suspend bilateral assistance (anonymous interview, March 
2012). 
 
4.2.5.6. Nigeria 
Nigeria was a colony of the UK until 1960. Relations with the UK have been volatile since 
decolonisation. For example, a defence pact signed in 1961 had to be abrogated after mass student 
demonstrations against the pact (Whiteman 2008: 256-262 and 274-275). Furthermore, Nigerians were 
angered by the UK position during the Biafra secession in 1967. The UK reacted only belatedly as 
there was a lot of sympathy in the British media about the secession. This points to an important 
aspect in UK policies vis-à-vis Nigeria. There is a powerful Nigerian diaspora in the UK, estimated at 
151,000 in 2009 (Office for National Statistics 2009). Nigerians lobbied against the execution of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa in 1995. The UK imposed economic sanctions during General Abacha‟s military 
dictatorship between 1993 and 1999. The UK was reluctant to impose more extensive economic 
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sanctions, but this was also related to commercial interests. Khaliq observes a change with the Labour 
government in 1997, when the UK started to take a tougher line against Nigeria (Khaliq 2008: 261-
264). Under Obasanjo, there has been close diplomatic cooperation between the UK and Nigeria, for 
example on Zimbabwe or Nigeria‟s hosting of a Commonwealth summit in 2003 (Agence France 
Presse 6 August 2001; 6 September 2001). The UK was also at the forefront of pushing for debt relief 
for Nigeria in 2005 (Youngs 2006: 339). However, rather than a consequence of historical interests, 
these close relations were informed by the belief in Obasanjo as a trustworthy leader. Moreover, the 
UK has publicly expressed concern about the electoral process in Nigeria. After the 2003 elections, the 
UK stated it was „disturbed by reports of the serious fraud and irregularities in some states‟ (Agence 
France Presse 29 April 2003). Moreover, when Obasanjo tried to solicit a third term in office in 2006, 
UK and US officials advised him to retire (Sklar et al. 2006: 101). Although there was no severe 
criticism by the UK on the 2007 elections, Whiteman noted a slight froideur in UK-Nigerian relations 
(Whiteman 2008: 270-271). The UK was at the forefront of donors pleading for electoral reform to 
ensure credible elections in 2010, although this remained largely internal to the UK High Commission 
in Abuja, as there was little attention in the public opinion for Nigeria‟s electoral problems (US 
Embassy Nigeria 2009a; US Embassy Nigeria 2010).  
 
4.2.5.7. Rwanda 
Rwanda was placed under German rule in 1884, but was administered by Belgium after the defeat of 
the Germans in 1924. After decolonisation in 1962, Belgium maintained strong political, cultural, 
social and economic ties with the regimes of Kayibanda (1962-1973) and Habyarimana (1973-1994) 
and was one of the most important donors in this period. However, Belgian-Rwandan relations have 
soured under RPF rule. First of all, Belgium is seen by the RPF regime as indirectly responsible for the 
genocide, by constructing artificial „racial‟ distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi, introducing identity 
cards and raising the stature of the Tutsi to one of privileged power. Secondly, Rwandans blame 
Belgium for not having intervened to prevent the genocide. Belgium immediately withdrew its troops 
after ten soldiers were killed when escorting the prime minister and exerted pressure in the UN to halt 
an international mission (Hayman 2010: 343). Thirdly, Rwanda‟s support to insurgencies in the DRC 
has been a cause for concern in Belgium. Rwanda‟s support to Laurent Nkunda in 2007-2008 was 
openly criticised by the Belgian Foreign Minister (De Morgen 2008, November). 
 
On the one hand, Belgium has been reluctant to criticise violations of democratic principles in 
Rwanda, especially under Foreign Minister Louis Michel, who publicly praised the 2003 elections, 
challenged the concerns of the EU-EOM and, during an October 2003 visit, launched a new aid 
initiative (Youngs 2004b: 314). On the other hand, even under Foreign Minister De Gucht, who is 
known for his open criticism about democracy and good governance in the DRC (see supra), there 
was hardly any public criticism about violations of democratic principles in Rwanda. One exception 
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was in 2005, when Belgian priest and human rights activist Guy Theunis was arrested (De Standaard 
2005, September). This can be explained by the lack of leverage Belgium has in relation to the current 
government precisely because of the past (Piccolino 2010: 123). It is believed that, if Belgium would 
speak out too strongly on democratisation, Rwanda would simply break diplomatic relations 
(interview, Filip Reyntjens, April 2012). Recently, a new strategy on the basis of engagement and 
positive conditionality has been tried out. The new bilateral cooperation agreement between Belgium 
and Rwanda includes an incentive tranche, worth €40 million, which can only be granted if there is 
progress on democracy, human rights and good governance (De Morgen 2011, May).  
 
Although France does not have a colonial past in Rwanda, Rwanda belonged to the French sphere of 
influence in Africa, at least prior to the genocide. France was the main donor and had a military 
cooperation agreement with Rwanda (Hayman 2009a: 162; Utley 2005: 27). It has been argued that, at 
the time of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, France had replaced Belgium as the main partner of the 
Hutu regime (Cilliers 2001). However, French-Rwandan relations cooled under President Kagame. 
France was suspected of giving backing to Hutu President Habyarimana and of helping those guilty of 
genocidal atrocities escape during Opération Turquoise, the controversial French military operation in 
1994 (Chafer 2002: 354; Cilliers 2001: 124). Over the course of 2002-2009, mutual accusations were 
made about the role played by the RPF and France during the genocide (Agence France Presse 15 
February 2003; 18 March 2004; 1 August 2004; 24 November 2006; 8 December 2007; 6 August 
2008; 29 November 2009). Diplomatic relations were restored with President Sarkozy‟s visit to 
Rwanda in February 2010 (Moncrieff 2012: 14). This has made it easier for France to speak out on 
democratisation, but – similarly to the Belgian case – such criticism has been responded with fierce 
criticism (interview, Filip Reyntjens, April 2012). For example, when the French ambassador voiced 
concerns about the 2003 elections, this was met with a furious response from Kagame (Youngs 2004b: 
312).  
 
Under President Kagame, Rwanda has moved closer to the Anglophone camp, and is now considered 
as an ally of the US and UK (Gegout 2009: 233; interview, Filip Reyntjens, April 2012). Rwanda has 
joined the East African Community, opened English schools and introduced English as an official 
language (Agence France Presse 29 November 2009). In November 2009, Rwanda, despite not being 
a former UK colony, became a member of the Commonwealth (Reyntjens 2010: 2).  
 
4.2.5.8. Guinea  
Guinea is a former French colony, but after decolonisation Guinea chose to remain outside the French 
sphere of influence. When Guinea gained independence from France in 1958, association with France 
was turned down in a referendum (International Crisis Group 2003a: 2). Consequently, in the first 
years of independence, Guinea maintained a level of mistrust vis-à-vis its former coloniser. President 
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Sékou Touré (1958-1984) accused France and other Western powers of plotting against the Guinean 
revolution (Arieff 2009: 333), leading to a suspension of all aid to Guinea (Smith 2006: 416). 
Relations improved significantly under President Lansana Conté who, unlike his predecessor, did not 
take an explicitly anti-colonial stance and re-established relations with the West. However, although 
France re-engaged with Guinea, the country largely remained outside the French sphere of influence as 
it was especially the US that started close military cooperation with Conté (International Crisis Group 
2003a: 16). As was mentioned supra, the French reaction to the 2008 military coup can be interpreted 
as informed by historical interests. France did not immediately suspend bilateral aid, as it seemed to 
confide in the junta‟s promise to organise elections as soon as possible (Afrik News 2009, January). It 
was only after the crackdown of security forces on an opposition rally in September 2009 that France 
suspended its military cooperation and re-examined its bilateral aid (Gibert 2010: 120). President 
Condé‟s election in 2010 was welcomed by France, which could be related to the fact that Condé spent 
a large part of this life in France (anonymous interview, February 2012). Several aid projects were 
immediately resumed in March 2011, at the occasion of a visit of the new president (Jeune Afrique 
2011, March). 
 
4.2.5.9. Côte d’Ivoire 
Côte d‟Ivoire is without doubt one of the most important former colonies of France. It has been 
described as the „epitome of Françafrique‟ under President Houphouët-Boigny, who ruled from 
decolonisation in 1960 until 1993 (Bovcon 2009a: 284). There is a French military basis in Abidjan. 
However, the French military did not intervene in 1999 to protect President Bédié against a military 
coup by Robert Guei, given the policy of non-interventionism of prime minister Jospin (Médard 2008: 
320). Guei was given the benefit of the doubt, and the French reaction to the coup remained limited to 
a partial suspension of military cooperation (Le Pape and Vidal 2002: 312-317). At an initial stage, 
France was quite critical about Guei‟s intent to stand in the 2000 presidential elections and to exclude 
the candidacy of Ouattara. In a public declaration, it was stated that every candidate should have the 
possibility to run for elections. However, when this was denounced as „neo-colonialist‟ by the 
Ivorians, the French Minister for Cooperation declared in the press that France had not wanted to 
depart from its neutral position: ‘Nous n’entendons pas établir la liste des candidats’. Hence, although 
Ouattara was excluded from the elections, the French took the position that the elections were legal, 
given that they were held according to Ivorian laws. Moreover, 800 million francs in budgetary 
support were set aside on the eve of the elections, thereby breaking the Abidjan doctrine that provided 
that France would only grant budgetary support to countries with an agreement with the IFIs (Le Pape 
and Vidal 2002: 318-319; International Crisis Group 2003b: 28-29).  
 
The French initially supported Laurent Gbagbo, not in the least President Chirac‟s socialist coalition 
partners, who were keen on having a socialist president in Côte d‟Ivoire (Moncrieff 2012: 10). 
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Personal relations also play a role here: Gbagbo had spent six years in Paris in voluntary exile in the 
early 1980s. During this time he established close contacts with Guy Labertit, who was at the time 
member of the anti-colonialist socialist party Parti socialiste unifié, but later joined the Parti 
socialiste. It is believed that Gbagbo returned France a favour for his acceptance, notably the 
continuation of economic (see infra) and military cooperation. Despite the fact that the programme of 
Gbagbo‟s party Front populaire ivoirien included the removal of the French military basis, Gbagbo 
did not raise the issue once in power (interview, Karel Arnaut, March 2012). However, since the 
December 2000 elections were so flawed, bilateral aid was not resumed until April 2001 (Le Pape and 
Vidal 2002: 318-319; International Crisis Group 2003b: 28-29).  
 
Nonetheless, French diplomatic relations with Gbagbo became strained in subsequent years. After the 
September 2002 attack, the French protected Abidjan and lent logistical support. In 2003, the UN 
mandated French forces to support the regional forces of ECOWAS in implementing the Linas-
Marcoussis accords. Operation Licorne was established, a 4,000 strong force which created a neutral 
buffer zone at the demarcation line. In a way, French military involvement in the Ivorian crisis was 
seen as a breach from former French military policy in Africa. France did not immediately resort to 
military action and when it did, it sought to avoid imposing internal order and acted on the basis of a 
UN mandate (Utley 2005: 33). Hence, rather than pushing the rebellion back to Burkina Faso (which it 
was perfectly capable of), the French military intervention stopped in Bouaké. This allowed the 
rebellion to establish itself in the north of the country (d‟Ersu 2007: 87-89). President Gbagbo and 
many with him interpreted this limited application of the defence agreements as a sign of betrayal 
(International Crisis Group 2003b: 28-29). This resulted in a violent anti-French campaign by the so-
called Young Patriots, who accused the French of supporting Ouattara, launched a violent attack on 
the French military base in October 2002 and reacted violently to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement by 
attacking French official buildings, schools, etc. (International Crisis Group 2003b: 27-31). However, 
Franco-African relations were restored during 2003, and in February 2004 Gbagbo brought a visit to 
Paris. At that time, it seemed that France would appear willing to allow a re-election of Gbagbo 
(d‟Ersu 2007: 96).  
 
Nonetheless, Franco-Ivorian relations reached a low later in 2004. In April 2004, Franco-Canadian 
journalist André Kieffer was killed. An investigation later revealed senior members of the Gbagbo 
regime to be involved in the murder (Moncrieff 2012: 13). In November 2004, the French destroyed 
the Ivorian air force after the French military base in Bouaké was attacked by two Ivorian air planes. 
The attack was followed by violent anti-French protests, which were believed to be instigated by 
President Gbagbo (Bovcon 2009a: 286; Klaas 2008: 118). As a result of the growing hostility against 
France, the French position in Côte d‟Ivoire became untenable. French development cooperation was 
de facto halted and only one agent from the Agence Française de Développement stayed in the country 
(Youngs 2006: 348). These events also impacted on the French position in the conflict. By 2005, the 
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French tried to put forward the person of prime minister Banny, who had clear presidential ambitions, 
to replace Gbagbo. This strategy however proved unsuccessful as Gbagbo sidelined the French by 
entering into direct dialogue with the rebels, which eventually led to the Ouagadougou Peace 
Agreement (d‟Ersu 2007: 100-103). After the Ouagadougou Agreement, France and Côte d‟Ivoire 
normalised relations (development assistance, diplomatic contacts). This was also related to the arrival 
in power of president Sarkozy, who aimed for a new start after relations between Gbagbo and Chirac 
had turned hostile (Labertit 2010: 44-45).   
 
However, this changed after the 2010 elections. France immediately recognised the victory of Ouattara 
on 4 December and was at the forefront of international action to force Gbagbo to step down. For 
example, it is believed that France convinced the Union Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique de 
l’Ouest to impose sanctions on Gbagbo and his supporters by limiting the authorisation of bank 
accounts to Ouattara supporters only (anonymous interviews, January 2012). Not surprisingly, after 
Ouattara took office, France was quick to strengthen ties with the new president and to re-establish its 
presence in Côte d‟Ivoire. Despite the formal closure of the military basis in July 2008, a strong 
military presence was maintained to organise Ouattara‟s personal security and a big aid and relief 
package was prepared (Jeune Afrique 2012, January; Moncrieff 2012: 22 and 30-31). There are several 
explanations for this pro-Ouattara approach. Of course, the downturn in Franco-Ivorian relations made 
France more antagonistic towards the Gbagbo regime. In addition, although Ouattara was traditionally 
seen as part of the Anglophone camp, he had developed friendly relations with Sarkozy, whom he had 
known when he was Africa director of the IMF (d‟Ersu 2007: 95). The forcefulness of the French 
approach could be interpreted as a way to gain the confidence of Ouattara (interview, Karel Arnaut, 
March 2012).  
 
4.2.5.10. Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe was a UK colony until gaining independence as South Rhodesia in 1965, when it came 
under white minority rule by Ian Smith. The UK advocated for international sanctions against the 
minority regime and mediated the Lancaster House Agreement which ended the civil war in 1979. 
During the transition period that followed before elections were held in 1980, the UK took over 
control of the territory. The UK‟s relations with Mugabe have from the onset been dominated by the 
land reform question. This was also the major stumbling block during the Lancaster House 
Agreement. The agreement provided special safeguards for white Zimbabweans for the first ten years, 
while the UK government agreed to contribute to the costs of the land resettlement programme 
(Thomas 2003: 697; Taylor and Williams 2002: 549). In 1998, a donor conference was held during 
which a land reform programme was agreed, but in 2000, Zimbabwe‟s draft constitution provided for 
land acquisition without compensation unless paid for by the UK. White-owned farms were forcefully 
invaded by war veterans and in September 2000, Mugabe undertook a fast-track land scheme resettling 
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150,000 farmers. These decisions were ill-received by the UK, which had from the beginning insisted 
on a land reform policy based on market principles. The UK therefore refused to meet its promises to 
fund land reform (Taylor and Williams 2002: 549-550 and 553-554). In September 2001, the Abuja 
Agreement was signed, which provided that Zimbabwe would end all farm invasions, while the UK 
agreed to provide funds to compensate resettled farmers (International Crisis Group 2001: 3; Tordoff 
and Young 2005: 417-418). However, the Abuja agreement was ignored by the Mugabe government, 
further feeding mistrust by the UK.  
 
The UK has been a key advocate of negative measures as a reaction to violations of democratic 
principles in Zimbabwe. It took the lead in advocating for negative measures within the 
Commonwealth group. This led to the suspension of Zimbabwe from its organisation‟s councils and 
targeted sanctions against Mugabe and about 70 of his closest associates after the 2002 presidential 
elections (Makumbe 2002: 87-88).  
 
This position should first of all be seen in the light of Mugabe‟s land reform policies, which had 
seriously affected white farmers (Porteous 2005: 291). However, to this the unprecedented interest 
from British NGO‟s, the media and the parliament in the situation in Zimbabwe should be added 
(Porteous 2005: 291; Porteous 2008: 111). As stated by Cargill: „From a purely strategic point of view, 
what happens [in Zimbabwe] is of limited interest to the United Kingdom, yet domestic pressure 
forces engagement‟ (Cargill 2010: 31). The Zimbabwean community in the UK was estimated at 
130,000 in 2009 (House of Commons 2010). A Zimbabwe Diaspora Focus Group was established 
after repeated approaches of UK-based Zimbabweans to the FCO (Cargill 2011: 16).  
 
4.2.6. Analysis 
 
H.4. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that protect the sphere of 
influence of member states, and more likely to impose negative measures against governments that do 
not protect the sphere of influence of member states. 
 
The first part of this hypothesis is strongly confirmed by the cases of Chad and Côte d‟Ivoire (2000-
2005). France has aimed to keep Chadian President Déby in power at all costs. This is mainly related 
to the traditional close relations between President Déby and France. Although France has recently 
placed more emphasis on democratisation, negative measures are avoided as the preference is for a 
continuity of the Déby regime. There is also a link with the previous Chapter here: it is likely that 
France managed to convince the other EU member states and the Commission that President Déby is 
the only guarantee for stability. Indeed, diplomatic cables from the US ambassador reporting on 
meetings with the French ambassador indicate that the latter tried to convince the US ambassador of 
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this idea. It can be assumed that this was equally tried with the German ambassador and the delegation 
of the European Commission.  
 
Moreover, the fact that the EU‟s aid suspension in Côte d‟Ivoire in 2000 was only of short duration is 
a direct consequence of French historical interests. Indeed, although France attempted to break with its 
interventionist Africa policies by not intervening directly to protect the regime in power in 1999 and 
2002, the French still preferred to give Gbagbo the „benefit of the doubt‟ rather than to insist on an 
inclusive democratisation process that could have led to a change in power. The quick lifting of EU 
sanctions in February 2002 was a direct consequence of French pressure. Indeed, after Gbagbo had 
lobbied the French government to advocate within the EU for a resumption of aid, Chirac managed to 
convince Commissioner Nielson to resume cooperation (Le Pape and Vidal 2002: 318-319; 
International Crisis Group 2003b: 28-29). Moreover, the French attempt to improve relations with 
Gbagbo in early 2004 was translated into the blocking of the reopening of Article 96 consultations in 
March 2004. Indeed, France and Germany were noted to have opposed the proposal of the European 
Commission (anonymous interview, March 2007 and February 2012).  
 
However, the hypothesis could not be confirmed by the cases of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria and 
Rwanda. In Eritrea, Italy risked a break in diplomatic relations by addressing the crackdown on dissent 
in 2001. Moreover, officials involved in EU decision-making on Eritrea have indicated that Italy did 
not try to protect Eritrea from negative measures (anonymous interviews, January 2012). In Ethiopia, 
there was no former colonial power that could have influenced the EU‟s position on how to react to 
violations of democratic principles. Italy has been in favour of engagement in Ethiopia, but was not 
noted to be a crucial player in interviews with aid officials and diplomats from EU member states in 
Addis Ababa (January 2011). The UK has not been in favour of negative measures in Nigeria, but I do 
not believe that this position was informed by the desire to maintain its sphere of influence. In fact, 
Nigeria had not been part of the UK‟s sphere of influence after decolonisation. Moreover, the UK 
advised Obasanjo to retire in 2007. Rwanda used to be part of the Francophone (Belgian and French) 
sphere of influence, but is now much more closer to the Anglophone sphere of influence. From this 
perspective, there is no reason for France and Belgium to decide against negative measures in Rwanda, 
at least not to protect historical interests.  
 
The second part of the hypothesis is partly confirmed by the cases of Niger and Guinea. French 
relations with these governments were not as close when compared to the Déby regime in Chad. There 
is no military basis in neither Niger nor Guinea. Compared to President Déby who has been in power 
since 1990, President Tandja only assumed power in 1999, hence there were less examples of Tandja 
„rendering services‟ to France. Moreover, although Conté was much closer to France than his 
predecessor, as a US ally Guinea could be seen as part of the Anglophone sphere of influence. This 
can explain why France, although it was not in favour of sanctions against both countries, did not veto 
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sanctions at EU level. In the case of Niger, although France was initially cautious to criticise Tandja‟s 
decision to stay in power, by August 2009 it was on the same line as the other member states and the 
European Commission. While the exact reasons for this shift are unknown, it can be expected that 
France was convinced because of the wide international consensus on sanctions against Tandja (see 
also next Chapter). In the context of the Article 96 consultations against Guinea in 2003-2004, France 
was „not keen to use Article 96 but did not press its position at the moment of the Council‟s decision 
in 2004‟ (Laakso et al. 2007b: 46). Similarly, despite the fact that France developed close relations 
with the new president Condé in Guinea, this did not prevent the French from aligning with the 
position in the Council that full aid can only be resumed after legislative elections (anonymous 
interview, February 2012).   
 
However, the hypothesis is refuted by the case of Kenya. The UK has not been concerned about the 
maintainance of a sphere of influence in Kenya. This can be observed in the UK‟s vocal criticism on 
corruption. Moreover, the UK was the first to threaten with sanctions after the elections in December 
2007, and was even accused of supporting the opposition.  
 
The hypothesis is strongly confirmed by the case of Côte d‟Ivoire (2010-2011). Interviews have 
revealed that France was the main proponent of EU sanctions against President Gbagbo and his 
government after the December 2010 elections. The fact that the list of people and entities under 
sanctions was so extensive and included sanctions on the import of cocoa, was primarily the result of 
French pressure (anonymous interviews, January 2012). As I have argued, the fact that France was so 
keen on Gbagbo‟s removal from power should be seen in the context of the deteriorated bilateral 
relations between France and Côte d‟Ivoire from the mid-2000s onwards.  
 
The hypothesis was confirmed in the case of Zimbabwe. The anti-Western stance of the government of 
Zimbabwe and the failure to honour the land reform agreement clearly informed the UK‟s preference 
for negative measures. Moreover, this position has been translated to the EU level. The UK has been 
described as the most active member state in the Council on Zimbabwe and has advocated for tough 
sanctions. After the September 2001 Abuja agreement, the UK preferred to wait and see, but when 
progress in the implementation of the agreement stalled, the UK resumed support for meaningful EU 
action (International Crisis Group 2002b: 15). The UK has also been opposed to lift the sanctions, 
even though some progress was made after the 2008 GPA. During discussions on the renewal of 
sanctions in February 2012, the UK was noted to be the main opponent of easing the sanctions 
(anonymous interviews, January-February 2012).    
 
However, the importance of the land reform question should not be exaggerated. The Zimbabwean 
case showed that, apart from government-to-government relations, the domestic public may also be a 
determining factor when it comes to negative measures against a former colony. Similar evidence was 
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found in the case of Nigeria, where UK policies are influenced by an important Nigerian diaspora. In 
the case of elections in Nigeria, this does not seem to have reached the Nigerian public as much as the 
crisis in Zimbabwe. Hence, former colonial relations do not always lead to policies based on the desire 
to maintain spheres of influence, but may also lead to negative measures to give in to pressure from 
the public.  
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4.3. Commercial interests 
At first sight, one would expect commercial interests to play a minor role in EU relations with sub-
Saharan Africa, given the marginalisation of the subcontinent in the world economy. In 2005, sub-
Saharan Africa‟s share in the world GDP was only 1.4 percent, although the African population 
accounted for 11.5 percent of the world total. Sub-Saharan Africa‟s GDP per capita was the lowest in 
the world (Bigsten and Duvall 2008: 16). This economic marginalisation is also reflected in the 
evolution of EU trade with the ACP region. Excluding South Africa, the share of ACP countries in EU 
imports has been 3.2 percent on average over the last five years, while the ACP‟s share of EU exports 
was only slightly higher at 3.5 percent. By way of comparison, China on its own accounts for 18.8 
percent of imports into the EU and 8.4 percent of EU exports. Only South Africa (place 17), Nigeria 
(21) and Angola (46) figure in the top 50 of countries importing into the EU.
47
 Moreover, as was 
argued in the previous subchapter, the marginalisation of sub-Saharan Africa in the world economy 
led to a reassessment of the relations between the EEC, France and sub-Saharan Africa, away from a 
partnership based on historical interests.  
 
At the same time, commercial interests have been noted to play a role in French policies in sub-
Saharan Africa, particularly during the presidency of Sarkozy who, as mentioned supra, saw sub-
Saharan Africa more in terms of economic benefit than in terms of historical interests (Barrios 2010: 
1). During official visits, Sarkozy was often accompanied by large business delegations. Moreover, 
Sarkozy had personal ties to the owners of companies active in sub-Saharan Africa such as Bolloré 
and Bouygues (Moncrieff 2012: 16-17; Mengara 2010: 64). For the UK, however, commercial 
interests in sub-Saharan Africa were considered to be small: „aid rather than trade was the prime focus 
of British efforts in Africa under the Labour government‟ (Vines 2011: 27). In 2006, the UK‟s exports 
to sub-Saharan Africa were only 1.8 percent of total exports and 1.6 percent of total import, and these 
percentages drop by two thirds when South Africa is removed from the equation (Gallagher 2009: 
444).  
 
4.3.1. Raw materials 
Despite the relatively low importance of most ACP countries as trade partners of the EU, sub-Saharan 
African soil possesses many strategic commodities that are becoming increasingly scarce, including 
coltan, diamonds, gold, uranium, casiterite and wolframite (Williams 2010: 39). This has increased the 
geopolitical importance of the subcontinent, as can be observed in a growing diversity in economic 
partners (Hugon 2007: 63). The EU is fully aware of the growing scarcity of certain raw materials and 
of the increased competition with other international actors in this respect. In 2008, the European 
Commission developed the raw materials initiative, meant to ensure access to and affordability of 
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 See European Commission‟s DG Trade website: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-
relations/statistics/ (last consulted 26 June 2012).  
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mineral raw materials. The text states that „Emerging countries are also pursuing strategies towards 
resource-rich countries with the apparent aim of securing privileged access to raw materials‟, referring 
to China‟s and India‟s increased economic engagement with Africa (European Commission 2008e: 5). 
In a supporting document, the European Commission includes a graph of resource-rich countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa, including hydrocarbon-rich countries (oil producers), mineral-rich countries 
(Guinea, DRC, Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, South Africa), as well as countries where new oil and 
mining projects have started (Mali, Niger, the Central African republic, Zimbabwe, etc) (European 
Commission 2008d: 13). In a 2011 Communication, the European Commission mentions 14 critical 
raw materials that are at risk of shortage. Sub-Saharan African countries are amongst the main 
producers of five of these critical raw materials, including antinomy (South Africa) beryllium 
(Mozambique), cobalt (DRC and Zambia), platinum (South Africa and Zimbabwe) and tantalum 
(Rwanda, DRC) (European Commission 2011f: 21-22).  
 
4.3.2. Energy sources 
Of these raw materials, energy sources (oil, gas, uranium) are of primordial importance. Energy has 
become a foreign policy priority of the EU, as cheaper oil is becoming less and less easily available, 
while global demand has boomed (Engdahl 2004: 258-259). The EU will increasingly come to rely on 
imported oil given that oil production will not keep pace with the growing consumption and North Sea 
oil reserves will run out by 2030-2050 (Youngs 2008b: 1; European Commission 2002b: 8). Import 
dependency, at 75 percent in 2002, could rise to 90 percent by 2020 for oil and to 70 percent by 2030 
for natural gas. Moreover, EU oil imports are little diversified: the majority comes from the Middle 
East. Diversification of oil supply is thus a clear priority for the EU (Haghighi 2007: 160; European 
Commission 2011d). In this respect, the energy potential of sub-Saharan Africa is notable. By the mid-
2000s, sub-Saharan Africa had the highest rate of new oil and gas discoveries in the world, while its 
production increased by up to a third when compared to the mid-1990s. New offshore drilling 
technology and the rise in oil prices rendered exploration in the Gulf of Guinea more feasible and 
profitable. Oil from this region is attractive because of its high quality (low sulphur content), easy 
shipping routes (unlike in Central Asia or the Middle East) and off-shore production, which can be 
exported straight to Western markets. Moreover, most African governments offer Western investors 
relatively generous production-sharing agreements (Youngs 2009c: 127-128). West Africa accounts 
for about 6 percent of global oil supplies and 3 percent of the world‟s proven reserves (Hueper 2005: 
248-249). For certain member states, Africa is particularly important for oil supply. Because of the 
many investments in Africa of the Total Group, 20 percent of France‟s oil imports comes from the 
African continent (Hugon 2007: 57).  
 
External energy policies have strongly remained in the hands of the member states (Belyi 2008: 205). 
At the EU level, external energy policies have only developed very recently. It was only in 2006, when 
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energy prices began to hit record highs and following a European Commission Green Paper, that the 
European business community started lobbying for an EU external energy policy (Youngs 2008c: 120; 
Youngs 2009c: 154 and 164). The EU has mainly concentrated on the Middle East, North Africa and 
Central Asia for its energy supply, while sub-Saharan Africa‟s energy potential has been largely 
overlooked. The EU‟s external energy policies mainly focus on developing a „Southern Corridor‟ for 
oil and gas in the Caspian and Middle East regions, for example with the planned Nabucco pipeline 
(European Commission 2006a: 5; European Commission 2011d: 5 and 10). As a result, the EU has 
been bypassed by more concerted US and Chinese efforts in sub-Saharan Africa. By the early 2000s, 
the EU‟s primary role in African energy was fast disappearing, while the influence of the US, China, 
Russia and other companies including from Korea, India, Malaysia or Saudi Arabia was on the rise. 
This is somewhat strange given the comparative advantage of European companies because of colonial 
history (Youngs 2009c: 126-129; Klare 2009). In recent years, however, the EU seems to have become 
aware of its declining position in the rat race for Africa‟s energy sources. It is in this context that the 
Joint Africa-EU Strategic Partnership should be regarded (Campbell 2008: 91; Schoeman 2011: 45). 
The Partnership is meant to re-engage with the continent, including in the energy sphere (Youngs 
2009c: 133). With the strategy, an Africa-EU Energy Strategy was established, and the EU increased 
external assistance in the energy sector. However, it has been argued that, compared to Russia or the 
Middle East, EU energy policies in Africa are much more development-oriented, focusing on energy 
poverty, regional interconnections and the increasing use of renewable energy in Africa (Hadfield and 
Youngs 2008: 4; Youngs 2009c: 131). Furthermore, in contradiction to the proposition that the EU 
would engage in a rat race with China, pressure from European enterprises afraid of losing contracts to 
Chinese companies had little effect on the trilateral dialogue between the EU, Africa and China, which 
emphasised Chinese cooperation with Africa as a major opportunity for Africa (Carbone 2011: 214).  
 
4.3.3. Commercial interests versus democracy promotion 
As was argued in the Introductory Chapter, double standards in EU democracy promotion are often 
attributed to the EU‟s commercial interests. Given the increased interest in Africa‟s scarce resources, 
one could expect this to be equally the case in the EU‟s reactions to violations of democratic principles 
in sub-Saharan Africa. As former High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana 
stated: „The scramble for territory of the past may be replaced by a scramble for energy...[...] Thus, our 
energy needs may well limit our ability to push wider foreign policy objectives, not least in the area of 
conflict resolution, human rights and good governance ...The scramble for energy risks being pretty 
unprincipled‟ (cited in Youngs 2008b: 6). Similarly, a French policy-maker was quoted saying France 
was willing to support political reform, „with the key exception of oil producing states where 
European interests would suffer from assertive democracy promotion policies‟ (Ibid.). An extreme 
form of prioritisation of commercial interests is the idea of „regime change‟ where governments 
endanger commercial interests, particularly in the oil sector. An early example of this is Congo-
197 
 
Brazzaville, where France/Elf was accused of plotting a coup in 1992 to oust a government because of 
its negative influence on oil contracts (Youngs 2009c: 128; Soares de Oliveira 2007: 260). This idea 
has also resonated in US neo-conservative circles, where some have argued that regime change would 
be beneficial for energy interests in the case of autocrats who heighten oil prices by introducing 
nationalist policies. In a less extreme form, however, one could expect energy importers to support 
democratic reform in oil producing countries where non-democratic rulers endanger Western energy 
interests (Youngs 2008b: 14). This is especially relevant in the context of an increasing „resource 
nationalism‟ in producers of raw materials, oil or other, where governments actively try to enlarge the 
domestic gains of the extraction of resources. Examples of such policies can be found in Zimbabwe, 
Zambia, the DRC and Nigeria (The Economist 2012, February; Bremmer and Johnston 2009). 
Resource nationalism has often been linked to non-democratic politics of producer states (Youngs 
2008b: 14).   
 
4.3.4. Hypothesis and operationalisation 
In the above, it was noted that the commercial importance of most sub-Saharan African countries for 
the EU is rather small, but may still play a role for some member states with particular commercial 
interests and for those sub-Saharan African countries that possess scarce raw materials, particularly 
energy resources. Hence, the following hypothesis will be tested: 
 
H.5. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures in countries where EU commercial interests 
are important and where governments serve EU commercial interests, and more likely to impose 
negative measures against countries where the EU only has minor commercial interests or where the 
government does not serve EU commercial interests.  
 
To investigate this hypothesis, I looked at trade and investment relations between the member states 
and the ten case studies. Trade data were gathered from the Eurostat online database, where I retrieved 
the value of EU trade with the ten countries by Broad Economic Categories (BEC) over the period 
2000-2010. On the basis of these data, I calculated the percentage of import and export per member 
state for the period 2000-2010. The total amount of import and export, as well as the main trade 
partners within the EU, are listed in Tables 20 and 21 on p. 204 and 205. By taking the total value of 
trade flows between 2000 and 2010, a general picture is drawn of the main trade partners, rather than 
the evolution over the years. This is justified by the fact that trade volumes were rather constant over 
the years. Data regarding FDI were also retrieved from the Eurostat online database. The total amount 
for 2000-2009 was calculated and the main investors were listed in Table 23 on p. 206. Apart from the 
overall trade flows, I also took into account the volume of trade in energy sources (see Table 22 on p. 
205). For this I used country fiches from DG Trade available for 2005, which included the value of 
import for each category. These country fiches were also used for information on the main product 
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imported into the EU. It should be noted that for many member states, data on FDI were missing for 
specific years. For example, France and the UK did not provide data on FDI before 2003. It was 
difficult to overcome this problem because the OECD database, to my knowledge the only other 
database providing data on FDI per partner country, also had these shortcomings. Apart from the 
quantitative data on trade and investment flows, I also assessed government policies that may or may 
not serve commercial interests, including legislation on foreign investment, national ownership, 
diversifying between European and non-European investors, etc. For this I relied on secondary 
sources, namely academic articles and press articles.  
 
4.3.5. Case studies 
4.3.5.1. Eritrea 
Eritrea is a negligible commercial partner of the EU. Of the ten country cases, it was the least 
important partner in terms of trade, and the second least important partner in terms of investment. 
Furthermore, Eritrea is not an energy supplier to the EU. FDI of the member states in Eritrea was 
negligible, only Italy had some investments in the period under review (€21 million), which may be 
related to President Afewerki‟s visits to Italy in 2003-2004 to attract Italian investors (BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts 18 March 2003; 22 May 2004). It should however be added that in 2009, 
disinvestments were made for €11 million. Italy was also Eritrea‟s main trade partner in the EU, 
counting for almost half of EU exports and imports.  
 
4.3.5.2. Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is a medium trade partner of the EU, in terms of trade it is comparable to Guinea. Ethiopia‟s 
exports are dominated by coffee (European Commission 2005). The main destinations for Ethiopian 
products are Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium. The main exporting partners were Italy, 
Germany, France and the UK. Investment has been limited: Ethiopia was only at place 6, although it is 
the second most populated sub-Saharan African country. Italy, the UK and Germany were the main 
investors in Ethiopia.  
 
4.3.5.3. Kenya 
Of the country cases, Kenya was the third most important trade partner of the EU, after Nigeria and 
Côte d‟Ivoire. Kenya mainly exports agri- and horticultural products: flowers, coffee, tea, etc. 
(European Commission 2005). Kenya‟s main trade partner in the EU is the UK. In second place comes 
the Netherlands, which is the main importer of Kenyan flowers. EU investment in Kenya has been 
substantial: only Nigeria had a larger amount of EU FDI. The UK and France were the main investors. 
After a visit by China‟s president to Kenya in 2006, the government of Kenya granted exclusive rights 
over six of the eleven available oil exploration blocks to the China National Offshore Oil Company 
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(CNOOC), with no competitive bidding. This caused controversy in Europe as European competitors 
(including Spanish Cepsa and Swedish Lundin International) suspected favouritism. Some blocks were 
eventually ceded to Cepsa and Lundin, but at a fee to CNOOC (Fiott 2010: 5; Chege 2008: 30). 
However, in October 2007, Swedish Lundin nonetheless managed to obtain an oil exploration deal 
(Reuters 2007, October).  
 
4.3.5.4. Chad 
Despite the potential of Chad‟s oil wealth (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007c: 14), EU-Chadian 
commercial relations are rather small. In terms of imports into the EU, only Eritrea and Rwanda were 
smaller trade partners. Given that European firms (Elf, Total and Shell) pulled out of Chad‟s oil 
extraction in 1999-2000 (Youngs 2009c: 149), the amount of Chadian oil imported into the EU is 
negligible. The main importers of Chadian products are the UK, France and Portugal. Export from the 
EU into Chad is largely dominated by France. France is also the only member state with some 
investments in Chad, the amount of which is, however, rather small.  
 
4.3.5.5. Niger 
Overall, Niger is a minor trade partner of the EU. Trade relations with Niger are more or less on the 
same level as with Chad. However, Niger is commercially important to France as one of the world‟s 
largest uranium suppliers. This can be seen in the French dominance in EU imports from Niger (90 
percent). France was also the only EU member state with some investments in 2002-2010, although 
the balance of investments and disinvestments in this period was negative (-€6 million). As a journalist 
from Der Spiegel noted: „Niger is to the nuclear industry what Saudi-Arabia is to the oil industry‟. 
Nigerien uranium provides the fuel of 58 nuclear reactors in France, which is highly dependent on 
nuclear power. Uranium exploitation in Niger is largely in the hands of the French company Areva, 
which is almost entirely owned by the French government (Der Spiegel 2010, February; Shaffer 2009: 
131). Areva has been mining uranium in Niger since the 1970s. Until 2006, Areva had a monopoly on 
uranium extraction from Niger, but in 2007, Niger opened up its market to international competition, 
leading to bids from China, South Africa, Canada, Australia, India, the UK, etc. (Keenan 2008: 457). 
Moreover, the Nigerien government expelled Areva‟s Director of Foreign Operations Dominique Pin 
in July 2007, accusing him of supporting the Tuareg rebels. A high-level diplomatic mission was 
dispatched from France to Niger, after which a new agreement on mining concessions was reached 
(Afrik News 2009, May; Agence France Presse 26 July 2007). Under the new agreement, however, 
Niger sold its oil at a much higher price than it used to (Agence France Presse 4 August 2007). When 
Sarkozy visited Niger in March 2009, uranium formed the main topic of his visit (Agence France 
Presse 24 March 2009). An agreement on a new uranium mine was concluded, which was believed to 
become the world‟s second largest uranium mine, expected to produce 5,000 tonnes of uranium 
annually (BBC News 4 May 2009; US embassy Niger 2009h). It has been suggested that the French 
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silence about Tandja‟s plans to run for a third term was a trade-off for the new uranium contract. 
Grégoire believes that Sarkozy, during his visit in March 2009, gave his support to the constitutional 
coup to ensure the uranium contract (Grégoire 2011: 219-220). Niger is also a 10 percent stakeholder 
and crucial partner in the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project (see infra). Proposals for oil extraction 
were made in 2008, but none of the European oil companies found them profitable (Augé 2011: 189-
196).  
 
4.3.5.6. Nigeria 
Of the ten case studies, Nigeria is by far the most important commercial partner of the EU. In 2000-
2010, the EU imported almost €100 billion from Nigeria, which is about ten times the amount 
imported from Kenya. EU exports in the same period were smaller, but still considerable: €77 billion. 
Moreover, the EU‟s imports from Nigeria are dominated by oil and gas: in 2005, 91.2 percent of 
products imported into the EU were oil and gas products (European Commission 2005). Nigerian gas 
accounted for 4 percent of total EU imports (European Commission 2011e: 3). EU-Nigerian trade has 
increased significantly in recent years: between 2004 and 2010, EU imports from Nigeria almost 
tripled (from €5.2 billion in 2004 to €14.6 billion in 2010). This is largely the result of the EU‟s 
attempts to diversify its energy imports and to reduce dependence on Russia. Nigeria‟s proven oil 
reserves are estimated at 36 billion barrels; natural gas reserves are well over 100 trillion cubic feet; 
the seventh largest in the world. Nigeria‟s current oil production is around 1.6 million barrels a day on 
average (US State Department 2010; Nigerian Guardian 2011, March).  
 
The main EU member states importing from Nigeria are Spain, France, the Netherlands and Portugal. 
Exports to Nigeria mainly come from the Netherlands, the UK and France. For the UK, Nigeria is the 
second largest market for exports in Africa (UK Trade & Investment s.d.). However, due to 
investments from Dutch Shell and France‟s Total and Technip in the oil sector, Dutch and French 
investments easily surpass those of the UK (see Table 19 on p. 200). French investments in Nigeria are 
as large as those made in all other West African countries taken together (Khakee 2007: 6-7). French 
commercial interests in Nigeria have led to a move away from its traditional sphere of influence, 
which was the main message during the visit in 2009 of French prime minister Fillon to Nigeria 
(Agence France Presse 19 May 2009). The UK‟s investment in Nigeria is dominated by British Gas 
and Centrica. Smaller investors include Germany and Italy, which is present with its major oil 
company ENI (Khakee 2007: 7).  
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Table 19. Top 3 EU investors in Nigeria, 2002-2010, € million  
Country Volume 
Netherlands 3.943 
France 2.149 
United Kingdom 1.608 
Source: Eurostat online database 
 
While energy supply has gained importance, this could become even more important with the planned 
Trans-Saharan gas pipeline, which would be able to transport up to 30 billion cubic metres of Nigerian 
gas to EU markets (Africa Research Bulletin 2008, September-October; European Commission 
2006a). Although investors have been hesitant because of insecurity in the Niger Delta, Repsol 
(Spain), Gas Natural (Spain) Total (France) and ENI (Italy) have expressed interest in building the 
pipeline (Augé 2011: 199-201). A Memorandum of Understanding was agreed between Nigeria, Niger 
and Algeria in July 2009. President Jonathan has confirmed that the pipeline will be operational in 
2015 (Energy & Corporate Africa 2011, July). The European Commission strongly supports the 
pipeline (Council of the EU 2007d), which should be seen in the light of the above-mentioned 
competition between the EU and the emerging powers over energy supplies. Russia first offered to 
build the pipeline, but the EU made a counteroffer, thus preventing Russia from gaining control over 
the potential alternative to Russian supplies of natural gas (Volman 2010: 12; BBC News 2008, 
September).  
 
However, the governments of Nigeria have not served EU commercial interests to the best extent 
possible. First of all, the Nigerian government has proved incapable to meet financial commitments in 
joint ventures (Soares de Oliveira 2007: 243). Secondly, although Obasanjo originally followed anti-
nationalist policies of privatisation and liberalisation (Amuwo 2009: 55), during his second term an 
emerging resource nationalism could be noted. New quotas on minimum Nigerian participation in oil 
licenses were approved (Youngs 2008b: 14; Obi 2010: 450). His successor Jonathan continued these 
policies by signing the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development law in April 2010, aimed 
to increase local content in the oil and gas industry. Moreover, between 2003 and 2007, Nigeria‟s 
main oil contracts went to Asian rather than to European companies (Obi 2010: 451; Youngs 2008b: 
14). Thirdly, international companies have faced an ever-rising tax from the federal government: by 
the mid-2000s the Nigerian government was collecting 95 percent of its profits, the highest take in the 
whole of Africa (Youngs 2008c: 123-124; Youngs 2009c: 166). Fourthly, President Obasanjo has 
done little to improve the security situation in the Niger Delta, which has seriously affected Western 
oil interests. This will further be discussed infra.  
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4.3.5.7. Rwanda 
Rwanda is only a minor commercial partner of the EU; only Eritrea was less important in terms of 
trade and investment. Although Rwanda produces 9 percent of the world‟s tantalum – a scarce raw 
material according to the EU - exports to the EU have been dominated by coffee (80 percent) (Van 
Teeffelen 2012; European Commission 2005). Rwanda‟s imports from the EU mainly come from 
Belgium, Germany and France. FDI from EU member states is also minor: only France (€4 million) 
and Germany (€6 million) had some investments in 2002-2010.  
 
4.3.5.8. Guinea 
Guinea is a medium trade partner of the EU, with imports and exports comparable to that of Ethiopia. 
Given Guinea‟s mineral wealth, the main products exported into the EU are aluminium (67.5 percent) 
and diamonds (9.2 percent) (European Commission 2005). The main importers of Guinean goods were 
Spain, the UK, France, Belgium and Ireland. EU exports to Guinea mainly came from France, the 
Netherlands and Belgium. FDI from member states was minor in Guinea: only France (€26 million) 
and Belgium (€16 million) invested small amounts. Unlike his predecessor Sékou Touré who turned to 
the Soviets rather than allowing Western companies to invest in the Guinean economy, under Conté, 
foreign investment was encouraged (Duarte 1999: 7-8). European companies were little involved in 
Guinean mining, but during the post-Conté transition period, there were attempts to gain important 
mining contracts (Yabi 2010: 45). France has been at the forefront of these efforts. In early 2011, 
infrastructure company Bolloré won the contract for refurbishing and running the port in Conakry, 
amidst a controversial procedure given that a Bolloré subsidiary communications company had 
advised Alpha Condé during the elections (Moncrieff 2012: 17).  
 
4.3.5.9. Côte d’Ivoire 
Côte d‟Ivoire is the second most important commercial partner of the ten country cases. The port of 
Abidjan is the second largest in sub-Saharan Africa and Côte d‟Ivoire is the world‟s main cocoa 
producer (Labertit 2010: 21). Côte d‟Ivoire‟s main importers within the EU are the Netherlands and 
France. Although Côte d‟Ivoire is an oil exporter, petroleum only accounted for a minor part of EU 
imports from Côte d‟Ivoire, which were dominated by cocoa beans, paste or butter (50.7 percent) 
(European Commission 2005). France was also the main member state exporting to Côte d‟Ivoire. 
France and Luxembourg were the main investors in Côte d‟Ivoire, with investments over €400 million 
in the period 2002-2010. Italy (Edison) and Ireland (Tullow) were granted oil concessions in 2007 
(Labertit 2010: 50).  
 
Despite Gbagbo‟s nationalist and anti-French discourse, French commercial interests were never really 
damaged. Although several small companies left, the larger companies (Bouygues, Bolloré) managed 
to maintain their interests (Hugon 2007: 64). France remained the pre-eminent commercial partner of 
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Côte d‟Ivoire and bilateral exchanges increased by 17.5 percent between 2005 and 2006. Most of the 
contracts of French firms, including Bouygues, Bolloré and France Télécom, were renewed (Bovcon 
2009b; Labertit 2010). In 2008, for example, Bolloré won the contract to manage Abidjan‟s new port 
(Moncrieff 2012: 29). Some argue that there was a link between the French business community and 
Ouattara, based on friendships established during his period as prime minister in the 1990s (Moncrieff 
2012: 27-31; Labertit 2010: 24 and 60). It has also been suggested that Ouattara‟s past in the IMF 
made him closer to the new generation of neoliberal French politicians, including President Sarkozy 
(Bovcon 2009b). Indeed, after Ouattara was invested as the new President of Côte d‟Ivoire, France 
immediately started to discuss new investments in Côte d‟Ivoire (anonymous interview, January 
2012).  
 
4.3.5.10. Zimbabwe 
Once on the same level as Kenya in terms of exports to the EU, the economic crisis has seriously 
affected Zimbabwe‟s commercial relations with the EU. Even taking this into account, Zimbabwe is a 
medium trade partner of the EU. The main importing partners were the Netherlands, the UK, Germany 
and Italy. Zimbabwe mainly exported agri- and horticultural products to the EU, including tobacco, 
sugar and cut flowers. EU exports to Zimbabwe were largely dominated by the UK and Germany, 
which each accounted for about one fourth of imports from Zimbabwe. FDI came in the first place 
from the UK, which invested about €276 million in Zimbabwe from 2002 to 2009. However, foreign 
investors have been discouraged by increased government meddling in how foreign firms operate in 
the country. The most flagrant example is the 2007 Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Bill 
that gave the government far-reaching powers regarding how foreign companies operate in the country 
(Bertelsmann Foundation 2009b: 14-15; International Crisis Group 2007c: 5). Zimbabwe possesses 
large reserves of platinum and is responsible for 3 percent of world production (European Commission 
2011f). In 2006, one of the world‟s largest diamond mines was discovered in Marange, but initially the 
diamonds were not considered compliant with the Kimberley process, which made it impossible for 
European companies to import them because of human rights and corruption (VOA News 2011, June). 
In 2008, UK prime minister Gordon Brown discouraged London-based multinational Anglo-American 
to open a platinum mine in Zimbabwe, stating that „where businesses are helping the Zimbabwean 
regime, they should reconsider their position now‟ (BBC News 2010, June).  
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Table 20. Overview export (2000-2010, €billion) 
Country Export Main partners 
Eritrea 0.9 Italy (43%), France 
(8.4%) 
Ethiopia 6 Italy (24%), Germany 
(17%), France (11%), UK 
(11%) 
Kenya 13 UK (24%), France (12%), 
Netherlands (12%) 
Chad 2 France (49%), Germany 
(10%), Belgium (9%) 
Niger 3 France (44%), Germany 
(12%), Netherlands (10%) 
Nigeria 77 Netherlands (22%), UK 
(18%), France (16%) 
Rwanda 1 Belgium (24%), Germany 
(22%), France (10%) 
Guinea 5 France (28%), 
Netherlands (20%), 
Belgium (13%) 
Côte d‟Ivoire 15 France (50%), Italy (8%), 
Netherlands (7%)  
Zimbabwe 2 Germany (25%), UK 
(24%), Netherlands (11%) 
Source: own calculations, based on Eurostat online database 
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Table 21. Overview import (2000-2010, €billion) 
Country Import Main partners 
Eritrea 0.06 Italy (49%), France 
(13.4%) 
Ethiopia 3 Germany (31%), Italy 
(17%), Belgium (11%), 
Netherlands (11%) 
Kenya 11 UK (36%), Netherlands 
(28%) 
Chad 1 UK (26%), Portugal 
(20%), France (19%), 
Netherlands (12%) 
Niger 1 France (92%) 
Nigeria 100 Spain (33%), France 
(19%), Netherlands 
(11%), Portugal (11%) 
Rwanda 0.4 Germany (40%), 
Belgium (17%) 
Guinea 5 Spain (25%), Italy 
(17%), Belgium (15%), 
France (15%) 
Côte d‟Ivoire 28 Netherlands (23%), 
France (22%), Germany 
(15%) 
Zimbabwe 5 Netherlands (20%), UK 
(20%), Germany (17%)  
Source: own calculations, based on Eurostat online database 
 
Table 22. Energy producers: import of petroleum and uranium (2005), €billion 
Country Total import 
Nigeria 8 
Côte d‟Ivoire 0.1 
Chad 0.1 
Niger 0.1 
Source: European Commission (2005) 
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Table 23. Overview FDI (2000-2009, € million) 
Country Total FDI flows Main investors 
Eritrea 6 Italy 
Ethiopia 122 Italy, Sweden, Germany 
Kenya 1 074 UK, France, Germany, Italy 
Chad 165 France 
Niger -4 France 
Nigeria 7 826 Netherlands, France, UK 
Rwanda 11 Germany, France 
Guinea 37 France, Belgium 
Côte d‟Ivoire 910 France, Luxembourg, UK 
Zimbabwe 315 UK, Sweden, Germany 
Source: Eurostat online database 
 
 
4.3.6. Analysis 
 
H.5. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures in countries where EU commercial interests 
are important and where governments serve EU commercial interests, and more likely to impose 
negative measures against countries where the EU only has minor commercial interests or where the 
government does not serve EU commercial interests. 
 
The first part of the hypothesis could not be confirmed. To begin with, this appears clearly from the 
cases where the EU was reluctant to impose negative measures. In most of these countries, EU 
commercial interests were minor: only Nigeria and Côte d‟Ivoire were notable commercial partners of 
the EU, while Rwanda, Eritrea, Chad and Ethiopia were of minor commercial importance. Moreover, 
in Nigeria, President Obasanjo‟s policies during his second term affected EU interests in the oil 
industry, while in Côte d‟Ivoire, upon election there was no guarantee that President Gbagbo would 
serve the commercial interests of the member states, and France in particular.  
 
The second part of the hypothesis is contradicted by the cases of Niger, Côte d‟Ivoire (2010-2011), 
Guinea, Kenya and Zimbabwe. First of all, these countries were more important commercial partners 
than most countries where the EU was more reluctant to impose negative measures. Secondly, the 
governments that faced negative measures did not significantly put at risk the EU‟s commercial 
interests. In the case of Niger, although some would argue that President Tandja‟s uranium deals with 
the Chinese made him a less trustworthy partner for the French, a new uranium deal was closed only 
few months before the EU adopted sanctions measures against Tandja. Moreover, the French were 
initially opposed to negative measures. Although there may have been some frustration about resource 
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nationalism in Zimbabwe, it is unlikely that this would make the EU more prone to impose negative 
measures. EU commercial interests in Zimbabwe are – after all – only minor. The main products 
imported from Zimbabwe did not include any scarce raw materials. From this perspective, historical 
interests and development norms can be expected to be more important than commercial interests. 
Similarly, although it may be argued that the 2006 oil contract to the Chinese in Kenya made the EU 
less reluctant to threaten with negative measures, I did not find those member states of which 
companies had lost the contract to be more actively pushing for negative measures. Moreover, a few 
months before the December 2007 elections, one of the companies had gained a new contract. 
Furthermore, the Netherlands, which was the most important importer of Kenyan flowers, put the 
implementation of the power-sharing agreement back on the agenda of the Council in May 2009 
(Council of the EU 2009l; anonymous interview, December 2010). This cannot have been influenced 
by commercial interests, as there were no signs that these interests were threatened in 2009. Similarly, 
the French push for sanctions against Côte d‟Ivoire in 2010 seems to have been instigated by 
deteriorated political relations with President Gbagbo, rather than by commercial relations, as French 
commercial interests were largely maintained under Gbagbo. In Guinea, new commercial contracts 
were granted to France under the new government in 2010, yet this did not affect the EU‟s position on 
negative measures, which has been to wait with the lifting of aid sanctions until free and fair 
legislative elections have taken place. 
 
In the case of Côte d‟Ivoire, Guinea and Zimbabwe, another element should be mentioned that is in 
contradiction with the proposition that commercial interests are dominant. In these countries, 
economic sanctions have directly harmed the commercial interests of member states. In Côte d‟Ivoire, 
France acted against its commercial interests by supporting far-reaching sanctions against Gbagbo in 
2010, including economic sanctions in key sectors of the economy, such as cocoa, the banking sector, 
Côte d‟Ivoire‟s two crucial ports and oil. These sanctions also affected French commercial interests 
and were therefore resisted by the French business community. For example, in February 2011 France 
closed two Ivorian filiales of the French banks BNP/Paribas and Société Générale. Although some EU 
member states
48
 were opposed to comprehensive sanctions in the cocoa and maritime sector because 
this would affect their trade interests and would have humanitarian consequences, sanctions were 
nevertheless adopted in these sectors, although the scope and duration was reduced (anonymous 
interview, February 2012). In Guinea (2009), a fisheries agreement was halted, which would have 
allowed European boats to have access to Guinean waters.  
 
An even more recent example is the discussion on the easing of sanctions against Zimbabwe in 
February 2012. Given that diamonds from Zimbabwe‟s Marange mine were declared compliant with 
the Kimberley Process in November 2011, Belgium, an important diamond importer, pushed to lift 
sanctions on the Zimbabwe Mining Development Cooperation, a state company that is on the list of 
                                                     
48
 The Scandinavian countries, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands 
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companies of which financial assets are frozen. However, due to opposition from the UK and, to a 
lesser degree the Netherlands and Germany, the Zimbabwe Mining Development Cooperation was not 
removed from the list of sanctioned companies (anonymous interviews, January 2012).  
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4.4. Security interests 
Lastly, I will look at security interests as an explanation for double standards in EU reactions to 
violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa. On the one hand, there are reasons to 
believe that the EU would hardly have any security interests in sub-Saharan Africa. In terms of 
geographical proximity, sub-Saharan African security does not have such direct consequences for 
European security, when compared to the European neighbourhood. Indeed, this was the main 
perception after the Cold War, which can explain why the international community was reluctant to 
intervene in African humanitarian crises in this period. On the other hand, this perception has changed 
with the terrorist attacks of 9/11. After the attacks, the international community, and the US in 
particular, started to see specific regions in sub-Saharan Africa as potential fronts in the global war on 
terror. The war on terror has led to a dichotomy between partners versus enemies or „rogue states‟, 
which has been compared to the division of East and West during the Cold War. Moreover, the EU‟s 
extensive military involvement in the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden shows that the EU fears 
the consequences of piracy for its commercial interests. Furthermore, the EU‟s increasing concern 
over migration derives from new provisions in the Cotonou Agreement and specific development 
projects on the issue. Lastly, the EU is also working on the fight against organised crime. These 
examples, which will further be elaborated in the following paragraphs, show that self-interested 
security issues have become increasingly important in EU relations with sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
4.3.1. Sub-Saharan Africa’s security importance  
After the Cold War, sub-Saharan African countries, to put it bluntly, „were transformed from Cold 
War pawns, into irrelevant clutter‟ (cited in Abrahamsen 2000: 33). Africa became of secondary 
importance in the security agenda of the EU and the US (Taylor 2010: 25; van de Walle 2009: 4). This 
resulted in reducing aid volumes to sub-Saharan Africa (Olsen 2004: 426), as well as to the closure of 
member states‟ embassies, such as UK embassies in the DRC, Gabon and Liberia (Abrahamsen 2000: 
33). Moreover, the international community was reluctant to intervene in conflicts in sub-Saharan 
Africa and where it did, such as in Rwanda or Somalia, troops were immediately withdrawn after 
some casualties. Mere humanitarianism proved an insufficient motivation for intervention (Porteous 
2008: 28-29; Taylor 2010: 26; Kraxberger 2005).  
 
However, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 changed the perception of the international community. Security 
problems were no longer seen as merely „African‟ problems, but were increasingly viewed as having a 
potential global impact. The predominant concern were the many „failed states‟ in sub-Saharan Africa, 
which were seen as safe havens for terrorist groups (Picciotto 2004: 543-547; Kraxberger 2005: 55). 
Moreover, it was believed that the widespread conditions of conflict and poverty, the denial of 
political rights and the large percentage of Muslims could contribute to a radicalisation of the African 
population (Herbst and Mills 2003: 30-31; Clapham 2003: 25). As a consequence, sub-Saharan Africa 
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became a front in the US‟s war on terror. Right after 9/11, National Security Advisor Condoleezza 
Rice stated that „Africa is critical to our war on terror‟, while US ambassador to the UN Susan Rice 
called Africa „the world‟s soft underbelly for global terrorism‟ (Taylor 2010: 27). As a result, US 
military presence was bolstered in the two regions that were envisaged as the main breeding grounds 
for terrorism: the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. In 2002, the US launched the Combined Joint Task 
Force – Horn of Africa and the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI). With the first, 1,800 US troops were 
deployed to Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti to provide technical assistance to local armies and deter and 
counter threats in Somalia, Kenya and Yemen (van de Walle 2009: 7-8). In 2003, USD 100 million 
was announced for the East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative, the bulk of which was destined for 
military and security training (police, border control, aviation) (Kagwanja 2006: 82-83). The PSI 
focused on enhancing the border capacities of Niger, Chad, Mali and Mauritania against the movement 
of international terrorists. In 2005, these efforts were enhanced through the Defence Department‟s 
Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans Sahara and the State Department‟s Trans-Saharan Counter-
Terrorism Initiative, which is larger in terms of funding and includes, apart from the original PSI 
countries, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal and Nigeria (Taguem Fah 2007: 105-106; van de Walle 
2009: 7-8). In 2007, these activities were brought under a newly created African Command 
(AFRICOM) (van de Walle 2009: 7-8; Volman 2003: 576-577).  
 
The collapse of the Somali state has facilitated the emergence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. This 
poses a particular problem for the EU since the Gulf of Aden is the main trade route between Europe, 
the Middle East and Asia, with approximately 16,000 ships yearly navigating in this area (Pham 2010: 
326 and 330). Especially energy vessels are under threat because of their highly valuable cargo and 
wealthy owners (Weitz 2009: 2). There has been an unprecedented response from the international 
community to these threats. The most notable are the US‟s Combined Task Force 151, NATO‟s 
Operation Open Shield and the EU‟s Operation Atalanta, but other nations, including China, India, 
Japan, Malaysia, Turkey and Russia, have equally conducted anti-piracy operations (Weitz 2009: 3; 
Stevenson 2010: 30).  
 
African migration has increasingly been perceived as a threat to the international community, and to 
the EU in particular. Civil war has led to the emigration of millions of persons to the EU. From 1997 
to 2005, Somalia has consistently provided the largest numbers of asylum seekers in the UK, while 
large numbers of asylum seekers have also fled from wars and economic devastation in the DRC, 
Sierra Leone, Sudan, Angola and Eritrea (Porteous 2008: 85). Migration into the EU further increased 
after 2000 because of economic growth and the post 9/11 reinforcement of US migration services 
(Adepoju et al. 2009: 43-45).  
 
Furthermore, weak states are often conducive to organised crime. This phenomenon is particularly 
visible in West Africa, where porous borders, widespread corruption, conflict and post-conflict 
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situations, difficult economic and social conditions and impunity form the breeding ground for illicit 
cross-border crime with implications for Europe, including drugs trafficking, internet crime, human 
trafficking and the smuggling of illegal goods. Especially cocaine trafficking from South America via 
West Africa to Europe has become a lucrative business, since cocaine prevalence has decreased in the 
US and increased in Western Europe (Philip de Andrés 2008; UNODC 2005; Wannenburg 2005). 
Hence, those donors affected by organised crime, including the EU and the US, have worked with 
governments from sub-Saharan African countries to increase their capacity in the fight against 
organised crime. For example, apart from counter-terrorism activities, the PSI also focuses on 
enhancing border control to prevent drug trafficking (Taguem Fah 2007: 105-106).  
 
Lastly, African insecurity has also threatened the energy supply of the EU, the US and other energy 
importers. Oil supplies have been reduced as a result of oil theft, vandalism, seizures of oil facilities 
and riots (Barnes 2005: 4). As a result, oil importing countries and particularly the US are training the 
security forces of oil producing states and conduct naval operations in the Gulf of Guinea (Volman 
2003: 577; Klare and Volman 2006: 299-301; Taylor 2010: 142-143).  
 
4.3.2. The response from the EU 
The increased perception of African security as a threat to global security has also been reflected in 
EU-Africa policies. This can firstly be seen in the growing use of development money for purposes 
serving EU interests. The Instrument for Stability (IfS), for example, was set up in 2007 to finance 
rapid interventions to prevent instability. Its long-term component deals with transnational threats 
(European Commission 2008h). Furthermore, the transfer of responsibilities and staff from DG 
Development to the newly created EEAS can also be interpreted as an indication that development 
funds will be increasingly used for self-interested security purposes (Del Biondo et al. 2012). 
Moreover, the war on terror has become an element of the Cotonou Agreement after the 2005 revision. 
According to Article 11a, Parties firmly condemn all acts of terrorism and commit to combat 
terrorism, exchange information on terrorist groups and on means and methods to counter-terrorist 
acts. Furthermore, an article on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) was added, in which 
cooperation on the countering of proliferation of WMD was recognised as an „essential element‟, 
meaning that development assistance can be suspended if governments do not cooperate in this area 
(Hadfield 2007: 60-61). Moreover, the EU sponsors counter-terrorism activities by regional 
organisations. For example, the IfS financed a programme to support the counter-terrorism capacities 
of the AU (European Commission 2007a).  
 
Both the 2003 European Security Strategy and its 2008 follow-up mention piracy as a severe threat to 
EU security interests (European Union 2003: 5; European Union 2008: 8). This is reflected in the 
deployment of EU security forces to stem the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. In December 2008, 
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the EU launched Operation Atalanta as the first naval operation within the framework of the ESDP. 
Although its main aim was to protect shipments belonging to the World Food Programme and to 
AMISOM, its mandate also includes activities aimed to deter the capture of fishing vessels, including 
the deterrence, prevention and repression of piracy and the protection of vulnerable shipping (Council 
of the EU 2010i). Moreover, under the IfS the EU is financing a project on „Critical maritime routes‟ 
aimed at strengthening the governments of countries along crucial piracy hotspots in the fight against 
piracy (European Commission 2009c: 43-45).  
 
Similarly, organised crime has increasingly been perceived as a security threat to the EU (European 
Union 2008; Council of the EU 2010g; European Council 2010). In March 2010, a „Strategic and 
concerted action to improve cooperation in combating organised crime, especially drug trafficking, in 
West Africa‟ was adopted. The EU has worked with ECOWAS on organised crime, for example by 
providing small amounts of the EDF to help ECOWAS with the implementation of its action plan on 
drugs and organised crime. A special dialogue with ECOWAS takes place on these issues. Moreover, 
€4.3 million from the IfS has been dedicated to the fight against air and maritime-based trafficking 
(Council of the EU 2010h).  
 
Furthermore, migration has become entrenched in EU development policies. The Cotonou Agreement 
foresees in its Article 13 that EU member states and ACP countries will accept the return and 
readmission of their nationals residing illegally on the territory of an ACP or EU member state and 
that bilateral agreements governing specific obligations may be concluded (Adepoju et al. 2009: 62-
65). A Spanish-British proposal to make development aid conditional on third countries‟ cooperation 
on migration control was rejected at the 2002 Seville Council, but it was agreed that, in case a non-EU 
state demonstrates an „unjustified lack of cooperation in joint management of migration flows‟, a 
reassessment of the relations with that country may follow (Lavenex and Kunz 2008: 445). Moreover, 
the EU has set up specific projects to support countries in the formulation of an effective migration 
policy and to combat illegal emigration. A budget line was set up in 2001 specifically dedicated to 
cooperation with third countries in the field of migration. In 2003, the Aeneas programme was 
established to assist countries in their efforts to better manage migration flows. The programme 
stressed in particular on stimulating third countries‟ readiness to conclude readmission agreements and 
on assistance in coping with the consequences of such agreements (Niessen 2004: 4; Lavenex and 
Kunz 2008: 445). 
 
Further evidence of the increased concern for African security problems affecting the EU can be found 
in the regional focus of the EU‟s Africa policies. Indeed, the EU‟s recent strategies on security and 
development are specifically directed to those regions where security problems have the greatest risk 
of spill-overs to the EU: the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. For the Horn, a Communication on Security 
and Development, the first of its kind, was approved in 2006 (European Commission 2006b). The 
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2006 Communication emphasises the geostrategic importance of the Horn and the potential spill-overs 
of conflict in the region to the EU: „Cross-border dynamics, such as illegal migration and trafficking 
of arms, drugs and refugee flows, are factors contributing to instability and tensions that spread 
throughout the Horn of Africa and beyond, and could even reach the EU‟ (European Commission 
2006b: 5). The Communication was followed by an EU Policy on the Horn of Africa in 2009 (Council 
of the EU 2009m), and a Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa in November 2011 (Council of 
the EU 2011e). Although the focus on the security threat in the Sahel came somewhat later, the EU has 
recently supported regional conferences on the nexus between security and development in the Sahel 
(Renard 2010). In October 2011, an EU strategy on security and development in the Sahel was 
approved, which announced an additional €150 million for the three main countries in the Sahel 
(Niger, Mali, Mauritania) (European Union External Action Service 2011: 8). A project financed by 
the IfS in 2009-2011 promotes the capacity of law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities in the 
Sahel to improve cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism (European Commission 2009c: 
41-42).  
 
4.3.3. Member states’ policies 
The above-mentioned security threats have equally been recognised by the member states, which have 
responded with increased military assistance to combat these issues. Even member states that 
previously had little focus on sub-Saharan Africa have become involved. For example, in response to 
the perceived security threat in Africa, Spain adopted an Africa Plan in 2006, stepped up bilateral 
funds to sub-Saharan Africa and opened six new embassies and field offices (Meyer 2010). Whereas 
the EU has primarily focused on a „soft‟ strategy to promote terrorism by building capacities of 
regional organisations and linking security and development, some of the member states have chosen a 
more direct approach. Indeed, France, Germany, Italy and Spain deployed forces to the American 
military base in Djibouti (Kagwanja 2006: 82). Moreover, the UK closely works with the US on 
counter-terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa, building alliances with Ethiopia, Kenya and most of the 
countries in the Sahel (Porteous 2008: 82-83). The Horn of Africa is a particular focus of the UK, 
given that the four men convicted of an abortive bomb attack in July 2005 in London were all born in 
the Horn of Africa (Williams 2010: 39). The UK was noted to be „discreetly involved‟ in US counter-
terrorism operations such as the Combined Joint Task Force in Djibouti (Porteous 2008: 82-83). The 
National Security Strategy (2008, updated in 2009) mentions the terrorist threat in East Africa 
(Williams 2010: 38-41).  
 
In recent years, terrorism has reached the heart of France‟s traditional sphere of influence, namely the 
Sahel, where Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is active. AQIM has kidnapped several 
French citizens in the Sahel. After a failed hostage rescue attempt in July 2010, AQIM declared war on 
France. As a reaction to this threat, President Sarkozy stated that France was at war with AQIM and 
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military and intelligence forces were dispatched to the Sahel (Arieff 2012: 21). Although Mauritania is 
France‟s key partner in the war on terror, French security personnel was equally deployed in Niger, 
Mauritania and Burkina Faso (Leymairie 2010; Keenan 2010).  
 
Furthermore, the main EU member states have stressed the need to fight organised crime in sub-
Saharan Africa. At a summit in Lancaster House (2003), France and the UK issued an Action plan on 
organised crime in Africa, in which they emphasised that they would support African states in fighting 
transnational criminal networks (Gegout 2005: 433).  
 
When it comes to migration, the Southern member states are the most affected and thus the most 
active. Spain, Italy, Greece and France have signed bilateral agreements with several African 
governments, offering development funds in exchange for a commitment by the governments to 
combat illegal migration and accept the return of illegal migrants (Adepoju et al. 2009: 62-65).  
 
4.3.4. The link with double standards: non-democratic allies  
As noted in the Introductory Chapter, it is generally assumed in the literature that EU security interests 
are at the basis of double standards in the reaction to violations of democratic principles. To begin 
with, it was only as the global security threat was reduced in the 1990s, that political conditionality 
was introduced in the aid policies of most donors. During the Cold War, authoritarian leaders were 
supported as long as they remained trustworthy partners of the „West‟ (Dunning 2004: 410-411; 
Crawford 2001: 12-13; Uvin 1993: 63-64). It has been suggested that the war on terror can explain 
why non-democratic governments that are perceived as allies in the war on terror, including Ethiopia 
and Uganda, are tolerated by the West (Christian Aid 2004; Fisher 2012). The same can be argued 
about governments that present themselves as reliable allies in the fight against illegal migration, 
organised crime, etc.  
 
4.3.5. Hypothesis and operationalisation  
In the above I have identified the following security threats of the EU in Africa: (1) the war on terror, 
(2) piracy, (3) migration, (4) organised crime and (5) security of energy supply and production. In 
countries where cooperation with the government on one of these issues is important, the EU may be 
reluctant to impose negative measures. On the contrary, when the EU does not have cooperation on 
security issues with a non-democratic government, it may be more willing to impose negative 
measures.  
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Hence, the following hypothesis will be investigated: 
H.6. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived as 
important allies in the fight against security problems affecting the EU, and more likely to impose 
negative measures against governments that are not perceived as important allies in the fight against 
security problems affecting the EU. 
 
Given that these five security issues are not relevant in all ten countries, two aspects will be 
highlighted: (1) whether security interests are an issue for the EU in a country and (2) whether the 
government has cooperated with the EU on these issues.  
  
Terrorism To assess the relevance of this factor, the potential for home-grown terrorism was 
considered, depending on the Muslim population and previous experiences with terrorism. The share 
of the Muslim population was often highlighted in reports and articles as a sign of potential for 
terrorism. Moreover, I also took regional dynamics into account, namely the country‟s location vis-à-
vis those areas in Africa that are perceived as terrorist breeding grounds (the Sahel, the Horn). Where 
relevant, I assessed the cooperation of the authorities in the war on terror. Information on the 
percentage of Muslim population was retrieved from the CIA World Factbook. On the cooperation of 
governments in the war on terror, I consulted International Crisis Group reports, academic articles, 
Agence France Presse articles and US embassy cables.  
 
Piracy This factor is only relevant in those countries located close to the two „piracy hotspots‟, the 
Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Guinea. Countries may cooperate militarily with the EU (e.g. the training 
of security forces) or by prosecuting suspected pirates. Information on cooperation with the EU in the 
fight against piracy was found in programmes financed by the IfS. On cooperation with the member 
states, information could be found in US embassy cables and in academic literature.  
 
Migration To measure the relevance of this factor, I tried to find out whether cases were important 
countries of origin or transit for African migration to the EU. To track migration flows into the EU, I 
used EUROSTAT data on migration by citizenship. In case EUROSTAT data were incomplete, data 
from the OECD migration database were added. These data are presented in Table 24 on p. 225. 
Although the evolution in migration flows is not presented in this table, I will sometimes refer to the 
evolution, namely in case of large increases. In addition to data on migration flows, when available the 
migration profiles that are attached to the CSPs were consulted. These migration profiles gave an idea 
of whether a country was perceived as an important country of origin or transit. To assess cooperation 
with the EU, I looked at migration programmes with the EU, of which information was available in 
the NIPs, Migration Profiles or documents from specific budget lines (e.g. ANEAS). On cooperation 
with the member states, information was found in documents from and websites of the International 
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Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UN ODC), as 
well as in US embassy cables.  
 
Organised crime To find out whether organised crime is an issue in the country, I consulted the 
website and reports of the UN ODC. On cooperation with the EU on these issues, I used the NIPs and 
documents on the IfS and, where available, information on political dialogue (reports, interviews). 
Further information was found in US embassy cables.  
 
Security of energy supply and production This factor was only relevant in energy producers and points 
to the government‟s preparedness to ensure the security of Western companies in the oil, gas and 
uranium sector. I mainly used secondary literature and US embassy cables to investigate this factor.  
 
4.3.6. Case studies 
4.3.6.1. Eritrea 
Eritrea is a country with an estimated 40 percent Muslim population. Its government is targeted by the 
Eritrean Islamist Jihad Movement, which the US believes is one of Al-Qaeda‟s main allies in the Horn 
of Africa (Rabasa et al. 2006: 45). Eritrea‟s location close to Somalia makes it important in the fight 
against terrorism. Initially, Eritrea positioned itself as a reliable ally in the war on terror. Eritrea 
immediately denounced the 9/11 attacks and expressed support to the US government. It was amongst 
the few African countries to support the intervention in Iraq. An American military base in Eritrea was 
even considered (Adebajo 2003: 180-181; Reid 2005: 484-485). However, the US focused mainly on 
Eritrea‟s arch-enemy Ethiopia for its counter-terrorism activities in the Horn, which led to a 
deterioration of US-Eritrean relations. Moreover, because of Eritrea‟s alleged support to the Al-
Shabaab militia in Somalia and its troubled relations with major US allies Djibouti and Ethiopia, 
Eritrea is now perceived as an unreliable partner in the war on terror. After a UN report gave proof of 
Eritrea‟s support to the Somali militia, the US considered including Eritrea in the list of states 
sponsoring terrorism. Finally, it was agreed to designate Eritrea as a country „not cooperating fully in 
the fight against terrorism‟, which implies restrictions on US military assistance. Eritrea was strongly 
opposed to Ethiopia‟s intervention in Somalia in 2006 (see supra), which was tacitly supported by the 
EU and the US because of fears for the emergence of an Islamist regime in Somalia (International 
Crisis Group 2010a: 24-25; Connell 2009: 139).  
 
Emigration from Eritrea into the EU has more than tripled since 2000, a direct consequence of the dire 
life circumstances and lack of political freedom in the country. Refugees face heavily patrolled 
borders, mine-fields and shootings, but the political situation in the country as well as the forced and 
indefinite conscription have made many refugees take the risk (Human Rights Watch 2009: 65; Reid 
2009: 212). The main receiving countries in Europe are Germany, Italy, the UK and Scandinavian 
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countries (Eritrea and European Community 2009, Annex 4). I did not find any evidence of 
cooperation between the EU and Eritrea on the fight against organised crime, illegal migration or 
piracy.  
 
4.3.6.2. Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is considered as the key ally of the UK and the US in the war on terror in the Horn of Africa. 
In contrast to Eritrea, it has been able to retain the confidence of the US and the status of the most 
reliable partner in the region (Clapham 2009: 189-190). There is a genuine commitment to the war on 
terror amongst the predominantly Christian Ethiopian elite. First of all, there have been previous 
terrorist attacks on Ethiopian territory, namely the attack on former Egyptian president Mubarak in 
1995 in Addis Ababa (Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen 2007:65-66; Dagne 2002: 62). Moreover, the 
participation in the war on terror provides an opportunity for the government of Ethiopia to prevent 
anti-Ethiopian Islamist groups from expanding influence (Ousman 2004: 85-86; Dagne 2002: 66). As 
a result, Ethiopia was one of the five African countries in the US‟s „coalition of the willing‟ and 
receives US counter-terrorism assistance via the East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (Shinn 2005: 
111-112). Ethiopian security forces have invaded Somalia to disrupt the activities of Al Ittihad, an 
anti-Ethiopian Islamist group that is accused by the US of ties with Al-Qaeda (Dagne 2002: 64-67). 
Ethiopia is also the main backer of the TFG in Somalia established in 2004 and favoured by the EU 
and the US, which fear a takeover of Islamist groups in Somalia. Ethiopian forces have supported the 
TFG in its fight against the Islamic Courts Union, which is believed to have been infiltrated by Al-
Itihaad and to provide an entry point for Al-Qaeda in the region (International Crisis Group 2006d: 
20). Western concerns about the advance of radical Islamism in the Horn have especially increased 
since early 2006, when a regional war between Ethiopia, the Islamic Courts Union and Eritrea 
appeared increasingly possible (Borchgrevink 2008: 214). Although member states initially opposed 
the 2006 Ethiopian intervention to fight the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia, the UK managed to 
convince the other member states, which shows that concerns for terrorism prevailed in this case 
(Porteous 2008: 82-83; International Crisis Group 2006d: 23; International Crisis Group 2008d: 20-
27). A further factor to take into account is Ethiopia‟s internal stability. Ethiopia provides an „anchor 
of stability‟ in the volatile Horn of Africa. It is believed that, should civil war erupt in Ethiopia, this 
could have spill-overs to neighbouring countries, which could provoke the spread of radical Islamism 
throughout the Horn of Africa (Borchgrevink 2008: 214).  
 
Ethiopia‟s emigration rate is not particularly high, when taking into account its population: there are 
less people emigrating from Ethiopia than from Eritrea, despite the fact that its population is about 16 
times larger (World Bank 2011). Moreover, the Ethiopian government has an active migration policy 
and EU-Ethiopian cooperation on illegal immigration has been fruitful. A migration mission was 
carried out in 2007-2008 and a cooperation platform on Migration and Development was set up, with 
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the aim to bring together migration and development actors to manage migration more effectively 
(European Commission s.d.a.; European Community and Ethiopia 2007: 4). As part of the East Africa 
Migration Route Initiative, the EU is financing a project on the East African Migration Route via the 
ANEAS budget line, of which Ethiopia is a target country. The UK, the Netherlands, Italy and Malta 
are co-sponsors of the project (International Centre for Migration Policy Development 2008: 7; 
EuropeAid s.d.). Moreover, Italy has financed a project to tackle illicit drug trafficking through Bole 
International Airport at Addis Ababa via UN ODC (UN ODC 2012a).   
 
4.3.6.3. Kenya 
Kenya is a key target of terrorist attacks because of its long-standing relations with the US, significant 
tourist sector and large expat community. Nairobi hosts the headquarters of the United Nations 
Environment Program and the United Nations Habitat Program, a large number of Western embassies 
and several international businesses (Rosand et al. 2009: 95; Lyman 2009: 286; Juma 2009: 423). In 
1998, 200 Kenyans and 12 Americans were killed in a car bomb attack on the US embassy in Nairobi 
(Whitaker 2008: 255) and in 2002, an anti-Israeli attack on a Kenyan hotel took place (Agence France 
Presse 28 November 2002). As a result, the government of Kenya has been keen on cooperating in the 
war on terror: it was quick to condemn the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and immediately pledged to work 
with the US to combat terrorism (Agence France Presse 12 September 2001; 21 September 2001). 
Several institutions have been set up by the government, including an Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, a 
Joint Terrorism Task Force, a National Counter-Terrorism Centre and a National Security Advisory 
Committee (Whitaker 2008: 256-257; Barkan 2004). Kenya has ratified the twelve international 
counter-terrorism conventions and enacted the Witness Protection Bill in 2004. A Suppression of 
Terrorism bill, presented in 2003, was however defeated in parliament (Kagwanja 2006: 78-79). 
Kenya has helped to establish the TFG in Somalia and has maintained support to the TFG. In October 
2011, Kenya sent troops to Somalia to fight the Al-Shabaab, which were accused of abductions on 
Kenyan territory (International Crisis Group 2012). Kenya is part of the US‟s East African Counter-
Terrorism Initiative. The port of Mombasa is an important base for US marines fighting Al Qaeda in 
the Horn of Africa (Otenyo 2004: 80). There has also been cooperation between Kenya and the UK on 
counter-terrorism, although this has been hampered by the troubled relations between Kenya and its 
ex-coloniser (US Embassy Kenya 2005a; US Embassy Kenya 2005b).  
 
Kenya is a crucial EU partner in the fight against piracy along the coast of Somalia, although the 
government‟s willingness to cooperate has diminished over the years. Concretely, Kenya supports the 
EU naval mission by prosecuting suspected pirates, which is of crucial importance to the EU given the 
lack of capacity in the region to bring pirates to trial. In March 2009, the EU and Kenya signed an 
agreement facilitating the transfer to Kenya of suspected Somali pirates detained as part of the EU‟s 
Atalanta mission. The EU financially supports Kenya to support the added burden of the piracy cases 
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through the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (US Embassy Kenya 2009b). However, the memorandum 
expired in September 2010 and the Kenyan government did not show an interest in concluding a new 
one (anonymous interviews, January 2012).  
 
Kenyan migration into the EU was comparable to that of Ethiopia. The UK was the main recipient of 
Kenyan migrants. However, Kenya has emerged as a centre for irregular migration and the 
government has made weak efforts to address this problem (European Community and Kenya 2007: 
75). As a result, Kenya has been recognised – together with Ethiopia - as a key target country of the 
East African Migration Route Initiative mentioned supra (International Centre for Migration Policy 
Development 2008).  
 
4.3.6.4. Chad 
Chad is located in the Sahel region which, as noted supra, is seen as a potential breeding ground for 
terrorism. Chad has a Muslim population of 53.1 percent. However, Chad is largely secular. For 
example, it is forbidden for political parties to proclaim an exclusive fundamental religious 
programme. Moreover, the government of Chad has an ambiguous relation with the Islamic 
community. As Boggero states: „The Chadian stance on Islamic extremeism can truly seem sincere 
rather than rhetorical (Boggero 2009: 26). Chad participates in the PSI and is seen as a US ally in the 
region. In 2004, the PSI reached its first success when Chadian forces captured and killed members of 
the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), which was the predecessor of AQIM 
(Lyman 2009: 292). Migration from Chad to the EU is negligible (European Community and Chad 
2007b: Annexe 9 and Annexe 4).  
 
4.3.6.5. Niger 
Niger‟s cooperation in the war on terror is important because of its location in the Sahel, porous 
borders in the north and large share of Muslim population (80 percent). Since the disappearance of 
European tourists in the Algerian Sahara in 2003, it is assumed that terrorists from the GSPC (now 
AQIM) are active in Niger (Keenan 2004: 477). President Tandja was receptive to counter-terrorism 
training and cooperated with the US in the PSI. In 2005, Niger restored a military presence in its desert 
region in the north with US assistance (Lyman 2009: 292). These efforts were reduced due to the 
sanctions in 2009, after which the government turned to the Algerian-led counter-terrorist coalition 
comprised of Algeria, Niger, Mali and Mauritania (US embassy Niger 2009c). Even more so than with 
the US, Niger was inclined to cooperate with France on counter-terrorism. France deployed maritime 
surveillance aircrafts to Niger and started capacity-building in the justice and security sector in 2009 
(France Diplomatie 2010). This cooperation has become more important from 2010 onwards as Areva 
employees were kidnapped by AQIM in Arlit and AQIM started explicitly attacking the French in its 
communications (Tisseron 2011: 101-106).  
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To a certain extent, the Tuareg uprising in the north in 2007-2009 endangered French uranium 
interests. In 2008, four Areva employees were kidnapped by the MNJ (Augé 2011: 200; Grégoire 
2011: 215). As noted in the previous Chapter, President Tandja failed to get this uprising under 
control, but in 2009 the MNJ laid down arms after negotiations by Libya.  
 
Migration from Niger into the EU is low, but Niger is a transit country for irregular sub-Saharan 
African migrants on their way to Europe (Styan 2007: 1177). The Nigerien government lacks the 
capacity to control migratory flows: legislation falls short and institutional and operational capacity is 
inadequate and limited. Moreover, Tandja‟s government was not cooperative in the fight against 
illegal migration: it perceived illegal migration as a problem of underdevelopment and saw benefits in 
the transit status because of service delivery on transit routes. Although Niger did not conclude any 
readmission or return agreement under President Tandja, repatriations were organised with France and 
the Netherlands. Moreover, Niger received support from several programmes on transborder 
cooperation, including technical capacity-building under an ANEAS programme and support for 
regional dialogue, financed by the IOM. Moreover, Italy carried out a project on transborder 
cooperation with Niger (European Community and Niger 2008, Annexe 4). The 2008 CSP for Niger 
foresaw a small amount for cooperation on migration (European Community and Niger 2008: 51), but 
this never materialised because there was no real interest from the government (anonymous interview, 
February 2012).  
 
4.3.6.6. Nigeria 
Nigeria is particularly vulnerable for home-grown terrorism. As stated by Lyman: „if there is a prize 
target for terrorism in Africa, Nigeria should be it‟ (Lyman 2009: 293). Nigeria has the largest Muslim 
population in Africa, over 65 million, representing 50 percent of the population. The introduction of 
the Sharia law in most northern states has heightened tensions between Muslims and Christians, but 
the Islam practised in northern states is not radical: there are only few militant groups. However, since 
late 2003 a militant group referred to as „Taliban‟ has been involved in attacks on police stations and 
other government offices. Moreover, given the location of northeastern Nigeria within the Sahel and 
the southern limits of the Sahara, northern Nigeria is regarded as vulnerable to becoming a terrorist 
sanctuary (Mikkel 2008: 287; Obi 2006: 99). In addition, a taped message, purportedly by Bin Laden, 
singled out Nigeria as a new possible theatre for Al-Qaeda operations (Barnes 2005: 6; Keenan 2004: 
480 and 491). To a large extent, fears about Nigeria‟s terrorist potential have become reality since 
2009 with the bomb attacks by the Boko Haram movement. There are suspicions that this movement 
has links with international terrorist groupings such as Al-Qaeda (Bagaji et al. 2012: 38; Omede 
2011). For these reasons, as well as because of Nigeria‟s important regional role, Nigeria is considered 
a priority state in the battle against terrorism (Youngs 2006: 338).  
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The Nigerian government lent strong diplomatic support to Washington after the September 11 attacks 
and supported military action in Afghanistan. Nigeria also played a leading role in forging an anti-
terrorism consensus amongst sub-Saharan African states (US State Department 2010). Furthermore, 
the Nigerian government worked with the US to crack down on the financial assets of terrorists and 
shared intelligence with the US (US Embassy Nigeria 2001a; US Embassy Nigeria 2001b; US 
Embassy Nigeria 2001c). Nigeria has also been involved in the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism 
Initiative (Herskovits 2007: 129; Taguem Fah 2007). The UK has equally focused on counter-
terrorism training in Nigeria and was part of the counter-terrorism working group that pushed the 
government of Nigeria to pass anti-terrorism legislation in 2008 (US Embassy Nigeria 2009a; US 
Embassy Nigeria 2007c). However, there are equally examples where the government of Nigeria was 
reluctant to cooperate with the UK and the US in the war on terror. First of all, Nigeria was opposed to 
the military intervention in Iraq (Adebajo 2003: 187). Secondly, counter-terrorism legislation was 
repeatedly postponed and was finally adopted in 2011 (Reuters 2011, February). 
  
Nigerian emigration to the EU is much higher compared to that of the other countries under 
investigation, which relates to the large population in Nigeria, as well as human trafficking in the 
country. The main destinatories for Nigerian migrants were the UK, Spain and Italy. Various EU 
programmes have been approved in 2009-2011 to fight illegal migration and to better manage 
migration flows.
49
 Moreover, bilateral programmes on human trafficking are supported by Italy and 
the UK (US Embassy Nigeria 2002b). In addition, the government of Nigeria increased collaboration 
with law enforcement agencies in the Netherlands, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Portugal and the 
UK (US Embassy Nigeria 2009b). Bilateral readmission agreements have been concluded with Italy, 
Ireland, Spain and the UK (Khakee 2007: 6).  
 
Furthermore, the situation in the Niger Delta has endangered EU oil production. Local protest 
movements including the MEND (see previous Chapter) often finance their activities by siphoning and 
selling oil, extorting „protection‟ funds or kidnapping foreigners for ransom (Klare 2009: 45; Rotberg 
2007; Soares de Oliveira 2007: 243). This has seriously affected oil production and exports. Between 
2005 and 2006, Nigerian oil exports fell by 25 percent because of the violence (Rotberg 2007: 35). 
The risk is particularly high for Shell, which has the largest share of onshore activities. In 2004, there 
were rumours that Shell was planning to abandon its onshore holdings (Soares de Oliveira 2007: 247-
252). In 2008, Shell had to close an off-shore oil production vessel after it was attacked by rebels 
(Youngs 2009c: 166). As noted in the previous Chapter, Obasanjo‟s government failed to address the 
root causes of the insurgencies in the Niger Delta. Moreover, there was evidence that high level 
political authorities facilitated the illegal export of oil (UN ODC 2008: 8).  
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 See website of EU delegation in Nigeria: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/nigeria/projects/case_studies/index_en.htm (last accessed 2 July 2012) 
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Apart from insecurity in the Niger Delta, the shipping of oil to the US and Europe is further affected 
by the recent upsurge of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. In 2008, Nigeria had the highest negative rating 
for maritime security (US Embassy Nigeria 2009a; Lyman 2009: 297). The Nigerian authorities have 
been noted to try to counter these attacks (Vrëy 2009: 24). To ensure security in the region, member 
states with oil interests, including the UK, France and the Netherlands, have supported the US‟s Gulf 
of Guinea Energy Security Strategy (Youngs 2009c: 130 and 141). Moreover, as part of its military 
cooperation, the UK helped build a maritime facility in Lagos (US Embassy Nigeria 2009a). 
 
Lastly, Nigeria is home to widespread criminal activities including internet fraud and cocaine 
trafficking (UN ODC 2005: 13 and 24). There have been many improvements in the combat against 
drug trafficking under Obasanjo, for example in April 2002 a National Drug Law Enforcement 
Agency was set up (US Embassy Nigeria 2002a). The anti-corruption commission EFCC also has the 
mandate to prosecute internet fraud (Lawson 2009: 84-90). On the other hand, cooperation on these 
issues has been hampered by the fact that political actors are often complicit in these criminal practices 
(UN ODC 2008: 7-8 and 28). The EU financed a regional centre in Nigeria on organised crime and set 
up several projects to address cocaine trafficking (European Commission 2009c: 35; European 
Commission 2007a). The UK‟s DfID has equally supported the Nigerian government in the fight 
against drugs trafficking.
50
 
 
4.3.6.7. Rwanda 
Rwanda has not been scrutinised by the international community for its potential for terrorism, nor can 
it be considered a key ally in the war on terror. It is less strategically located than Kenya and Ethiopia 
and only has a minor Muslim population (4.6 percent). Nonetheless, Rwanda has cooperated in the 
war on terror. For example, Rwanda participated in regional initiatives on counter-terrorism 
cooperation such as the East Africa Standby Brigade and hosted AU meetings on law enforcement 
issues. Moreover, the government of Rwanda developed counter-terrorism response strategies and 
cooperates in projects to combat financing of terrorism (US embassy Rwanda 2008; UN ODC 2012a). 
Migration flows from Rwanda into the EU were noted to be low (Republic of Rwanda and European 
Community 2007, Annex 4).  
 
4.3.6.8. Guinea 
Because of the large Muslim majority in Guinea (80 percent), the government of Guinea has been 
reluctant to fully align with the US in the war on terror, as could be witnessed in 2003 when Guinea 
voted against the intervention in Iraq by the US and UK (Glickman 2003: 170). However, compared to 
the Horn and the Sahel, there has been little emphasis on counter-terrorism in West Africa, at least 
before the attacks of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Migration flows from Guinea to the EU have been 
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substantial taking into account its population. In 1998-2010, migration flows were similar to those 
coming from Ethiopia, which has a population of at least eight times that of Guinea. The rise in 
emigration flows after 2003 indicates that the political-economic crisis is at the basis of these flows. 
Guineans mainly migrated to Spain and France, and to a lesser degree to Germany. Moreover, Guinea 
is an important transit country for irregular migrants due to its porous borders, undeveloped 
infrastructure, poverty and socio-political crises. It has low operational and administrative capacity to 
manage these migration flows. The IOM and Belgium have set up pilot projects to help the 
government to strengthen the management of migration flows (International Organisation for 
Migration 2010a). Efforts to fight human trafficking have been hampered by the poor capacity and 
endemic corruption of Guinea‟s judicial system (US embassy Guinea 2007). Moreover, during the 
second term of President Conté‟s mandate, the country became a hub for drug traffickers in West 
Africa. This was the consequence of stronger law enforcement in neighbouring Guinea-Bissau, which 
stood in contrast with the impunity in Guinea (IRIN News 2008, October). Investigations ordered by 
the military junta in 2009 showed that Conté‟s son and numerous top security officials had been 
involved in drug trafficking (Wyler and Cook 2009: 25). Although an anti-drug unit was created in the 
police, the unit was marred by corruption (US embassy Guinea 2008a). In 2008, an agreement was 
signed with Spain to allow Spanish and other European ships to patrol the coast to identify ships 
trafficking persons and narcotics (US embassy Guinea 2008b). 
  
4.3.6.9. Côte d’Ivoire 
Côte d‟Ivoire has a 38.2 percent Muslim population. Given that, until the recent attacks by Boko 
Haram in Nigeria, there had been little attention for West Africa in the war on terror, this was not an 
important issue in EU relations with Côte d‟Ivoire. Migration flows from Côte d‟Ivoire into the EU 
have been substantial and there has been a notable increase following the eruption of civil war in 2002. 
France is the main destination for Ivorian migrants, followed by Italy. Côte d‟Ivoire has also been host 
to organised crime with implications for the EU, including internet fraud, money laundering and drug 
trafficking. These problems have been exacerbated by the civil war and the political crisis in the 1990s 
and 2000s (UNODC 2008: 5 and 22). However, because of the security situation there was no 
cooperation between the EU and Côte d‟Ivoire on these issues (anonymous interview, February 2012). 
For example, Côte d‟Ivoire‟s migration profile mentions the need to cooperate with the Ivorian 
authorities on migration but recommends to wait until the situation is stabilised (European Community 
and Côte d‟Ivoire 2008: Annex 4). Other responsible agencies including the UN ODC have equally 
experienced difficulties in doing their work due to the political division and the absence of sufficient 
government control in the north (UNODC 2012b).  
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4.3.6.10. Zimbabwe 
With a Muslim minority of 1 percent, Zimbabwe is not scrutinised for potential home-grown 
terrorism. Paradoxically, despite Zimbabwe‟s anti-Western stance and the sanctions, Zimbabwe has 
cooperated with the US on intelligence-sharing, combating money laundering and other means of 
financing. An anti-terrorism unit was set up by SADC in Zimbabwe‟s capital Harare in 2007. 
However, Southern Africa is not a major front in the war on terror, and therefore counter-terrorism 
cooperation has been limited (Lyman 2009: 288-290). Migration from Zimbabwe into the EU more 
than doubled between 2000 and 2005, and peaked to over 8,000 migrants in 2004. Practically all 
Zimbabweans go to the UK. The government‟s capacity to cope with irregular migration has been 
lacking. However, since 2006, the government has worked with the IOM on overcoming its weak 
approach to migration. This has enabled a Draft National Migration Management and Diaspora Policy, 
which foresees the adoption of legislation that directly addresses trafficking and smuggling and the 
implementation of joint border management strategies with neighbouring countries (International 
Organisation for Migration 2010b: 35 and 53).   
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Table 24. Overview migration into EU, 1998-2009 
Country Total number  Average yearly 
migration 
Main destinations 
Eritrea 22,762 1,897 Italy, Sweden, 
Germany 
Ethiopia 32,959 2,746 Germany, Italy 
Kenya 40,029 3,336 UK, Germany 
Chad 2,425 202 France 
Niger 7,443 620 Germany, France 
Nigeria 208,413 17,368 UK, Spain, Italy 
Rwanda 4,422 368 Germany, 
Netherlands, UK 
Guinea 34,093 2,841 Spain, France, 
Germany 
Côte 
d‟Ivoire 
58,211 4,850 France, Italy 
Zimbabwe 34,269 2,856 UK 
Source: Eurostat database, completed with OECD database.
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4.3.7. Analysis 
 
H.6. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures against governments that are perceived as 
important allies in the fight against security problems affecting the EU, and more likely to impose 
negative measures against governments that are not perceived as important allies in the fight against 
security problems affecting the EU. 
 
The first part of the hypothesis is confirmed in the case of Ethiopia and, to a lesser degree, Nigeria and 
Chad. Ethiopia is perceived as a key ally in the war on terror, and has cooperated in the fight against 
illegal migration. Security interests are especially important here given Ethiopia‟s geostrategic 
position in the Horn of Africa, where EU security interests are most affected (terrorism, piracy, ...). 
Apart from Ethiopia‟s direct cooperation with the US and the UK on counter-terrorism, its regional 
role and internal stability (see previous Chapter) are also seen as contributing to prevent an Islamist 
regime from emerging in Somalia. This has most likely been taken into consideration when partially 
resuming budget support in 2006-2007, which coincided with the rise of Islamist groups in Somalia. 
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 Information for Ireland is unavailable before 2008, for UK Eurostat data since 2006 were missing, but could 
be completed with OECD data for Kenya (2006, 2008) and Nigeria (2007-2009). For the other countries, the 
amount of migrants to the UK was underestimated for lack of data.   
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Apart from Ethiopia, Chad and Nigeria are also considered as allies in the war on terror. The role of 
these countries is however less crucial than that of Ethiopia, given that the EU has only belatedly 
focused on terrorism in West Africa and the Sahel. In the case of Chad, I tend to believe that French 
historical interests are more important than Déby‟s role in the war on terror in explaining the weak 
reaction to violations of democratic principles, especially in the period 2000-2006. Nigerian 
cooperation in the war on terror has been considered as crucial given its regional role and potential for 
home-grown terrorism. Moreover, the government cooperates on illegal migration, the fight against 
piracy and organised crime. Although cooperation on some of these issues has been hampered by 
corruption, the government of Nigeria seemed generally committed to the fight against security issues. 
 
However, the hypothesis is contradicted by the cases of Eritrea, Rwanda and Côte d‟Ivoire (2000-
2005). Especially in Eritrea, double standards cannot be explained by the fear to lose a partner on 
counter-terrorism issues. In fact, although the government of Eritrea initially showed itself willing to 
cooperate in the war on terror, it is now regarded as contributing to terrorism by supporting the Al-
Shabaab militia in Somalia. Moreover, the dire life circumstances and the lack of fundamental 
freedoms have led to increased migration flows into the EU and there has not been cooperation on 
these issues. While the reluctance to impose negative measures in 2001 could be seen as informed by 
concerns over potential cooperation on the war on terror, this seems unlikely given that the EU‟s 
position has remained unchanged over the years. Indeed, despite evidence of Eritrea‟s support to the 
Al Shabaab, the EU signed a new CSP with Eritrea in 2009.  
 
Moreover, although the government of Rwanda has cooperated on counter-terrorism, it is not a crucial 
ally such as Ethiopia, Nigeria and Chad, nor have illegal migration or organised crime been important 
issues. Furthermore, the reluctance to impose negative measures against Côte d‟Ivoire in 2000-2005 
cannot be attributed to security interests. When taking office, Gbagbo did not have a track record of 
security cooperation with the EU or its member states. Similarly, when a reopening of Article 96 
consultations was refused in 2004, there had not been any cooperation on security issues. 
 
The second part of the hypothesis is confirmed by the cases of Zimbabwe, Guinea and Côte d‟Ivoire 
(2010-2011). In Zimbabwe and Guinea, security interests did not play an important role in relations 
with the EU at the time the EU considered negative measures in the beginning of the 2000s. Counter-
terrorism, piracy, securing energy supply and organised crime are only a minor issue in these 
countries, although in recent years drugs and human trafficking have become an issue in Guinea. In 
both cases, the increase in migration flows should also be noted, as these were related to the direct 
result of the socio-economic and political crisis. This may have made the EU perceive internal 
problems in both countries as more problematic, as they were equally affecting EU security interests. 
In Côte d‟Ivoire, there were concerns about illegal migration and organised crime, but it was 
impossible to cooperate with the government due to the security situation. Moreover, the conflict had a 
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negative effect on these security problems. From this perspective, it is not surprising that the EU 
adopted sanctions in December 2010, given that there was no important security cooperation at stake.  
 
The hypothesis is however contradicted by the case of Kenya. In Kenya, Kibaki was considered as a 
key ally in the war on terror, yet the EU did not try to keep him in power when controversy arose 
about the election results in December 2007. In fact, Kenya‟s contribution to the war on terror is 
equally as important as that of Ethiopia, given its strategic location in the Horn and its vulnerability for 
terrorist attacks. Moreover, despite Kenya‟s cooperation in the fight against piracy from 2009 
onwards, the EU did not shy away from criticising the lack of progress in the implementation of the 
power-sharing agreement.  
 
In the case of Niger, the hypothesis is partly confirmed, partly refuted. On the one hand, Niger 
cooperated in the war on terror, although it should be added that the threat of AQIM only reached its 
peak in 2010, after the 2009 referendum. On the other hand, the security of Areva was threatened by 
the Tuareg rebellion, which was inadequately addressed by President Tandja‟s government. Moreover, 
the government‟s commitment in cooperation on illegal migration was doubted.  
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4.4. Conclusion 
 
In this Chapter, I have tried to find out whether the EU‟s self-interest can explain double standards in 
the EU‟s reaction to violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa. Three forms of self-
interest were distinguished: historical, commercial and security interests.  
 
These factors were investigated in separate sections, in which the relevance of each factor was 
investigated via literature review, leading to an hypothesis to guide the case study research. These 
hypotheses were investigated separately for each case, and conclusions were drawn for each of the 
three factors. The question then arises which form of self-interest is most important. I have 
summarised the conclusions on the validity of the three hypotheses in Table 25 below. From this table, 
it becomes clear that historical and security interests are an explanatory factor, whereas commercial 
interests are not. In fact, in none of the cases was the hypothesis on commercial interests confirmed.  
 
Table 25. Chapter Summary Table: Self-interest 
 Historical Commercial Security 
EU most reluctant to impose negative measures 
Chad + - + 
Rwanda - - - 
Eritrea - - - 
Ethiopia - - + 
Nigeria - - + 
Côte d‟Ivoire 
2000-2005 
+ - - 
EU least reluctant to impose negative measures 
Niger +/- - +/- 
Zimbabwe + - + 
Guinea +/- - + 
Côte d‟Ivoire 
2010-2011 
+ - + 
Kenya - - - 
+: hypothesis confirmed 
-: hypothesis refuted 
+/-: hypothesis partly confirmed, partly refuted 
 
Historical and security interests have - to a greater or lesser extent - explanatory value in six out of 
eleven cases. At the same time, even these factors are not „necessary‟ to explain double standards, 
given that the hypotheses were contradicted by the cases of Rwanda, Eritrea and Kenya. Historical and 
security interests are especially important in explaining why the EU has not been reluctant to impose 
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negative measures, while these factors are less powerful in explaining why the EU has been reluctant 
to impose negative measures. Hence, when the EU does not have a lot at stake in terms of historical or 
security interests, it is more likely to impose negative measures. The reverse thesis can also be 
confirmed. When the EU does have historical or security interests that could be threatened by 
imposing negative measures, it will refrain from negative measures. However, the evidence for this 
proposition is smaller. First of all, there are two cases where these factors cannot explain the EU‟s 
preference for positive measures: Eritrea and Rwanda. Secondly, the EU‟s self-interest in cases where 
historical and security interests did play a role should not be overestimated: in most cases, only one of 
the three hypotheses was confirmed. At the same time, the latter points to the strong influence of some 
factors. Indeed, security interests in itself seemed an important reason for the EU to refrain from 
negative measures in Ethiopia and Nigeria. The same goes for historical interests, which was shown in 
the case of Côte d‟Ivoire. Similarly, in the case of Chad, it was noted that historical interests were 
more important than security interests.  
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5. Expectations about effectiveness  
5.1. Introduction 
The two factors and six related hypotheses investigated in the previous Chapters do not suffice to 
explain double standards in the EU‟s reaction to violations of democratic principles in the ten country 
cases. Eritrea is a case in the point. From a normative perspective, there is no clear reason for the EU 
to be reluctant to impose negative measures. Although there is internal stability, Eritrea‟s foreign 
policies are perceived as detrimental to regional stability and development performance has been 
weak. Nor does EU self-interest provide an explanation: hypotheses on historical, commercial or 
security interests largely fell short in explaining the EU‟s preference for positive measures. Interviews 
with EU officials dealing with Eritrea suggested that the main reason why the EU has been reluctant to 
impose negative measures on Eritrea is because it is believed such an approach would not work.   
 
This confirms a number of other studies on EU democracy promotion, which claim that doubts about 
effectiveness may influence the EU‟s choice of instrument for democracy promotion (see Introductory 
Chapter). It has been argued that the focus of negative measures on sub-Saharan Africa can be 
explained by the fact that these countries are poor and aid dependent, which makes donors perceive 
negative measures as most effective (Crawford 2001: 210). As stated by Smith: „these are the cases 
where it is [...] easiest to show that you are doing something about human rights‟ (Smith 2001: 193). 
However, as I have explained earlier, the leverage of the OECD donors has diminished with the advent 
of non-traditional donors. Hence, in this Chapter it will be argued that even in aid dependent countries, 
the EU‟s leverage should not be overestimated. 
 
To assess the importance of considerations of effectiveness, I will examine the literature on the 
effectiveness of aid conditionality and sanctions. From these studies, it can be assumed that negative 
measures will be most effective when (1) the leverage of the sanctioning actor/actors is large and (2) 
negative measures have some resonance within the country. Regarding the first proposition, in some 
countries the EU alone may have sufficient leverage to encourage democratisation, whereas in others, 
the position of other actors is more important than that of the EU. As regards the second proposition, I 
will look at the domestic position of the government, as it is believed negative measures can only work 
when the government is already severely weakened.   
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5.2. Other actors 
5.2.1. The literature on other actors 
It is generally assumed that negative measures can only work if the country cannot count on any 
support from third actors: „the pressure associated with the usage of a “stick” depends on the third 
country‟s resources and alternatives, both in economic and political terms‟(Kotzian et al. 2011: 997). 
For donors, this means that a coordinated action stands more chance to success than unilateral 
sanctions (Stokke 1995; Mackie and Zinke 2005: 8). Based on observations of political conditionality 
in 29 countries (1990-1995), Crawford found considerable evidence for this hypothesis. For example, 
a coordinated action in Kenya, Malawi, Lesotho, Guatemala and Haiti was largely successful, whereas 
unilateral action in the case of Cameroon, Guinea, Syria and Indonesia did not produce the desired 
effect (Crawford 2001: 205). In another study of 1055 instances of aid sanctions in 158 aid recipients 
(1990-1999) it was concluded that donor coordination was the most important factor in determining 
success (Emmanuel 2010: 864).  
 
However, such a coordinated action is not easy to achieve, since donors have their own priorities and 
interests (Ibid.: 862). As stated by Uvin: „unwilling governments can always turn themselves to other 
bilateral or multilateral donors so as to bypass a too insistent donor‟ (Uvin 1993: 73). Most of the 
larger donors, including Canada, the US, Japan, Norway and the EU member states apply political 
conditionality in their aid relations (Stokke 1995: 22; Gillies 1996). The main donors in sub-Saharan 
Africa are the US, the UK, France, the EU and the International Development Association (IDA, the 
World Bank‟s fund for the poorest countries).52 Within this group of donors, it has been noted that the 
US is strongly led by concerns about the war on terror and oil supply (Klare and Volman 2006), while 
the World Bank is prohibited from allocating or suspending assistance on the basis of internal politics 
of partner countries (Hout 2007: 25).  
 
As regards the member states, it should be noted that, apart from having a say in decisions on EU 
negative measures, they also have their bilateral policies. Whereas CFSP measures also apply in 
bilateral relations, in the case of aid suspensions, there is no obligation for member states to suspend 
bilateral assistance when this is done at EU level (Laakso et al. 2007a: 32). As I have discussed in the 
previous Chapters, the UK and especially France have on some occasions been hesitant to apply 
negative conditionality. It should be noted that the French reluctance to use negative measures is not 
only related to its self-interest but points to a more general aversion to negative measures as a strategy 
to promote democratisation. Indeed, even in Zimbabwe, which does not belong to the French sphere of 
influence, France was opposed to the invocation of Article 96 (Laakso et al. 2007a: 70). On the 
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http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/development/37b_en.htm (last accessed 27 April 2012) 
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contrary, the Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland, Demark), the Netherlands and Germany, have a 
tradition in being more active on human rights issues (Olsen 2011: 94). 
 
While coordination amongst the „traditional‟ donors (those in the OECD-DAC) is already difficult to 
achieve, this is even more the case with non-OECD donors and economic partners. The BRICs and 
many Arab countries have been noted as actors that are ready to offer the same carrots without the 
accompanying threat of sticks (Kotzian et al. 2011: 997). Especially non-democratic powers such as 
China and Russia often provide economic and political support to countries that are under pressure 
from Western donors (Burnell 2011: 245-268). For sub-Saharan Africa, the role of China is 
particularly important. China is now Africa‟s second-largest trading partner, after the US and ahead of 
France. China‟s growing presence on the African continent was reflected in November 2006 when a 
major summit was organised, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, during which major financial 
and economic support was pledged. (Callaghy 2009: 65-68).
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 Moreover, China has often been ready 
to position itself as an alternative partner to countries that are regarded as „pariah states‟, including 
Sudan and Zimbabwe (Tull 2009: 332).  
 
Furthermore, African organisations have increasingly become actors in their own right when it comes 
to the promotion of democratisation. In her analysis of three cases of Article 96 consultations (Guinea-
Bissau, Togo and the Central African Republic), Mbangu (2005) found that the active involvement of 
the ACP Group and of neighbouring countries was crucial for the success of the procedure. This factor 
was also underlined by Mackie and Zinke (2005: 8). Many African regional organisations have 
evolved from purely economic organisations to political organisations engaged in the promotion of 
peace and democracy. The replacement of the OAU with the AU in 2002 was crucial in this regard 
(Manby 2004). At the subregional level, especially ECOWAS has evolved into a political organisation 
(Yabi 2010: 10-14). Both organisations prohibit unconstitutional changes to power, and a military 
coup automatically leads to sanctions by the two regional organisations (Clapham 2005). Although 
there is more reluctance to use diplomatic pressure or impose sanctions beyond clear-cut situations of 
military coups, the prohibition of unconstitutional changes to power has increasingly been interpreted 
in a broader sense. For example, in 2005 both ECOWAS and the AU put pressure on Togolese 
president Faure Gnassingbe, who was imposed by the military after the death of his father (Mac-
Ogonor 2009). In contrast, other African subregional organisations including IGAD and SADC have 
been more reluctant to intervene in the domestic affairs of member states (Weldesellassie 2011: 26; 
Hamill and Hoffman 2009).  
 
Lastly, I should mention those organisations bringing together former colonial powers and former 
colonies, such as the Commonwealth Group of Nations (Commonwealth) and the Organisation 
Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF). The Commonwealth formally underlined its attachment to 
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democracy and human rights in the 1991 Harare Declaration. Similarly, the heads of state of the OIF 
declared their belief in democratic values at the 1991 Chaillot Summit. Both organisations provide 
democracy assistance and electoral observation, and may apply sanctions in case of unconstitutional 
changes of government, although this has happened only rarely. For example, the OIF suspended Togo 
from the organisation and suspended assistance after the 2005 succession of the president (Sharma 
2011; Julia 2008). Commonwealth sanctions have been applied against Nigeria (1995-1999), Pakistan 
(1999-2004, 2007-2008), Fiji (2000-2001, 2006-present) and Zimbabwe (2002-present) (BBC News 
2009a, September).  
 
5.2.2. Hypothesis and operationalisation 
It was noted that negative measures are more likely to be effective when jointly imposed by the most 
important economic and diplomatic partners. Hence, it can be assumed that the EU will prefer a 
coordinated action to unilateral measures, given that the first would stand more chances to success. 
When other actors are unwilling to impose negative measures, the EU may be reluctant to go it alone. 
The first hypothesis thus reads as follows:  
 
H.7. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures when there are no or few other international 
actors prepared to impose negative measures, while it is more likely to impose negative measures in 
case of a coordinated action by international actors  
 
To investigate this hypothesis, I looked at the political and economic support of the main non-EU 
international actors. First of all, I investigated the position of the donors, focusing on the top five of 
donors in each country. For this I used the „aid at a glance‟ profiles of aid recipient countries, which 
are available on the website of the OECD and include a top 5 of the main donors for 2009-2010. The 
top 5 for each country is included in Table 26 on p. 243. Apart from the donors, I also took into 
account the relations of governments with African regional organisations and non-OECD donors. 
Information on the position of international actors was mostly derived from secondary literature 
(academic and press). To a lesser extent, primary sources were also used, such as US embassy cables, 
the African Economic Outlook
54
 or official sources from the individual actors. 
 
5.2.3. Case studies 
5.2.3.1. Eritrea 
Eritrea is internationally isolated. First of all, it is not well integrated in African regional organisations. 
Eritrea withdrew from IGAD in 2007 because of IGAD‟s support to Ethiopia‟s Somalia policy 
(International Crisis Group 2010a: 23). In 2009, it suspended its membership from the AU after the 
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latter called for sanctions against Eritrea for supporting Al-Shabaab (BBC News 2009, May). 
Moreover, the AU Commission has condemned Eritrea for violating the African Charter on People‟s 
and Human Rights. In 2002, the Commission ruled that the imprisonment of the eleven dissidents was 
in violation of the Charter. In 2007, the Commission held that the detention of 18 journalists 
constituted numerous violations of the Charter and called for release or trial of the prisoners (Human 
Rights Watch 2009: 79-81). Relations with the US have become tense because of the US‟s close 
relations with Ethiopia and Eritrea‟s support to the Al-Shabaab (International Crisis Group 2010a: 24-
25). After a new law on NGO activity in Eritrea in 2005, USAID had to halt its activities (BBC News 
2005, August). Most donors have scaled down development programmes in Eritrea, either because 
they were forced to by the Eritrean authorities or because of concern about human rights. Even the UN 
and the World Bank have recently terminated activities in Eritrea (European Commission s.d.b) 
 
Nonetheless, Eritrea has received economic and diplomatic support from other, mostly non-OECD 
actors. In January 2002, there were talks on the improvement of economic relations between Eritrea 
and China (BBC News Monitoring Africa 11 January 2002). In 2007, the government of Eritrea 
granted licenses to Chinese firms to explore gold and other minerals (Agence France Presse 3 October 
2007). A Canadian mining company, Nevsun Resources, started mining gold in 2008.
55
 Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Iran, Qatar and Libya have also provided economic assistance to Eritrea (BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts 18 April 2002; 8 March 2003; 6 July 2002; 4 July 2003; Human Rights Watch 
2009: 85). Diplomatic relations with Iran were established in 2006 (US Embassy Eritrea 2006b).  
 
5.2.3.2. Ethiopia 
Ethiopia‟s main donors and strategic partners are the US and the UK. The US has been reluctant to  
criticise violations of democratic principles in Ethiopia. In the context of the post-electoral violence in 
2005, the US did not suspend aid. Acting Ambassador Vicky Huddleston stated in January 2006 that 
the US would not follow the EU‟s aid freeze, given that US assistance was primarily focused on 
humanitarian assistance and poverty-oriented development programmes (World Markets Analysis 10 
January 2006). The UK, on the other hand, was the first to suspend budget support in 2005 (Agence 
France Presse 18 January 2006). Moreover, after the 2010 parliamentary elections, the UK issued a 
declaration that was much more critical than that of High Representative Ashton (UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office 2010). The decision to suspend budget support in 2005 was a joint decision by 
all budget support donors (World Bank, African Development Bank, Sweden, EU, Canada, Ireland, 
Germany, UK) (Borchgrevink 2008: 211). The World Bank played a particularly important role in 
making the EU resume assistance in 2006-2007. As it was uncomfortable with the 2005 aid 
suspension, it established the Protection of Basic Services programme to compensate for the loss of 
income (Furtado and Smith 2009: 138). The only donors that did not return to business as usual in 
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2006-2007 were Denmark and Sweden. These donors have chosen to remain outside controversial 
government-led programmes such as the Protection of Basic Services programme, while channelling 
most aid through UN organisations (Sweden) or focus merely on democracy promotion (Denmark) 
(Olsen 2011: 98; anonymous interview, January 2011). Most other donors have redirected budget 
support via the Protection of Basic Services programme (Human Rights Watch 2010d: 29).   
 
Given that Ethiopia is a „regional hegemonic power‟ (Mazrui 2009: 98) and plays an important role in 
the AU (of which headquarters are located in Addis Ababa), it is unlikely that the AU will speak out 
against Ethiopia. Indeed, the AU praised the 2005 parliamentary elections (Agence France Presse 10 
August 2005; 15 September 2005). Moreover, Ethiopia strongly dominates IGAD (Weldeselassie 
2011: 27). Furthermore, since the early 2000s, Ethiopia has strengthened cooperation with China, 
Russia, Iran and Turkey, including military assistance (Agence France Presse 16 February 2000; 2 
December 2002; 3 April 2003; 8 June 2002; 2 March 2005). China is particularly active in granting 
investments, cheap tenders for infrastructure, ICT work, business deals, etc. (Abbink 2009: 19).  
 
5.2.3.3. Kenya 
The main donors in Kenya are the US, the World Bank and the UK. The US is the first donor in Kenya 
and a key diplomatic partner (Barkan 2004: 88). In 2009-2010, the US provided over five times more 
aid than the EU. The US has traditionally played an important diplomatic role in Kenya. For example, 
it is believed that the US put pressure on the ruling party to cede power to Kibaki after the latter won 
the 2002 presidential elections (Brown 2007). After the December 2007 elections, donors were 
initially divided over how to respond to the crisis. The US and World Bank country director Colin 
Bruce (who had a good personal relationship with Kibaki) initially recognised Kibaki‟s victory, but 
later on pressured Kibaki and Odinga to arrive at a power-sharing deal. When Kofi Annan started to 
mediate, donors took a coordinated stance by threatening with aid sanctions should the parties not 
come to an agreement. The US did not favour aid sanctions, but considered travel sanctions against 
Kenyan politicians and businessmen believed to support the violence (Brown 2009: 394-398; Fraser 
and Whitfield 2009: 96). Moreover, the US closely followed up on the implementation of the power-
sharing agreement and even imposed visa bans against officials who obstructed the reform process 
(Agence France Presse 4 August 2009; 26 October 2009). The Commonwealth equally supported the 
power-sharing deal and agreed to provide assistance to its implementation (Commonwealth Secretariat 
2008). Apart from the OECD members, China, India and the United Arab Emirates have become 
increasingly important economic partners. Chinese exports to Kenya have grown at a rate of 2,084 
percent between 1996 and 2008. China remained silent about the post-electoral violence (Fiott 2010: 
1-7).  
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5.2.3.4. Chad 
The main donors in Chad were the US, France, the EU, the African Development Bank and Germany. 
France is without doubt the actor with the closest relations with the government and thus the largest 
potential leverage. However, as was discussed in Chapter 4, France has been reluctant to use negative 
measures to encourage democratisation in Chad. The US seemed more concerned about the deepening 
democratic crisis in Chad and, as could be observed in diplomatic correspondence from the US 
embassy in Chad, was contemplating a scenario without President Déby. However, the US did not 
impose any negative measures. Germany was a smaller donor and was not particularly in favour of 
negative measures because it mistrusted the opposition (US embassy Chad 2006c). The AU has not 
been involved in Chad‟s internal affairs, as it generally agrees with the position of the government of 
Chad that the political crisis was merely an attempt by rebels to topple an elected government 
(International Crisis Group 2008b: 31). Chad has many non-European economic partners, which are 
primarily involved in the mineral industry. Oil extraction has been managed by Malaysian and 
American companies. China has invested in the oil sector, despite the Chadian recognition of Taiwan 
and China‟s close relations with Sudan. China‟s investments in the oil sector have further increased 
after the resumption of diplomatic relations in 2006 (International Crisis Group 2009b: 15). India has 
also increased investment (AfDB et al. 2011a: 13).  
 
5.2.3.5. Niger 
The decision to impose negative measures to react to the 2009 political crisis in Niger was coordinated 
amongst the main actors. Especially the US and ECOWAS played an important role. The US, the 
second donor in Niger, denounced the August 2009 referendum, suspended development assistance 
and imposed travel sanctions on Tandja‟s supporters in December 2009 (Agence France Presse 23 
December 2009). Apart from the donors, ECOWAS took a remarkably strong stance on the 2009 
referendum. In May 2009, an ECOWAS Advisory Body warned about possible sanctions if Tandja 
went ahead with the referendum (US Embassy Niger 2009d). In June 2009, ECOWAS deployed a 
mission to Niger to convince Tandja to step down, and in August, a four-member ad-hoc ministerial 
committee was sent to Niger (Africa Research Bulletin 2009, August). In October 2009, ECOWAS 
suspended Niger‟s membership after Tandja ignored a request to postpone the elections (Afrol News 
2010, October). Although France was initially reluctant to criticise the referendum, it finally aligned 
with the position of ECOWAS, the US and the European Commission, as noted in the previous 
Chapter. However, as the third largest donor, France did not suspend bilateral assistance (anonymous 
interview, March 2012). The World Bank, the fourth largest donor, did not suspend aid until the 
military coup in February 2010 (World Bank 2012). Niger has maintained diplomatic relations with 
China, Iran and Pakistan. Economic cooperation with China has increased in recent years, not only in 
the uranium and oil sector, but also in development cooperation (health, infrastructure, education) 
(AfDB et al. 2011b: 14).  
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5.2.3.6. Nigeria 
The main donors in Nigeria are the World Bank, the US, the UK and the EU. The US is a key 
diplomatic partner, provides military assistance to Nigeria and is a more important oil importer than 
the EU (Lubeck et al. 2007: 4; Carmody 2005: 100; Mikkel 2008: 286). The UK and the US are more 
important diplomatic partners than the EU, which derives from the fact that both actors advised 
Obasanjo to retire in 2006 (Sklar et al. 2006: 101; Mikell 2008: 302; Herskovits 2007: 128). The main 
donors have been on the same line on the EU as regards the 2003 and 2007 elections. In 2003, there 
was a consensus amongst Germany, France, Canada, the UK and the US that „a strict “free and fair” 
test would doom Nigeria to failure‟ (US Embassy Nigeria 2002c). Moreover, the flawed elections in 
2007 were endorsed by the US (Herskovits 2007: 128). Furthermore, as a regional powerhouse and the 
main driver behind ECOWAS, Nigeria enjoys the support from most neighbouring countries. It should 
be noted that Nigeria‟s neighbours share the concern of the donors about stability in Nigeria (Tar 
2007). Hence, the 2003 and 2007 elections were endorsed by neighbouring countries. ECOWAS 
observers were cautious not to criticise the 2007 elections (BBC News 2007, April). Moreover, 
cooperation with China was strengthened under Obasanjo. A Strategic Partnership was signed between 
both countries in 2005 (Srinivasan 2008: 343-354). Moreover, oil companies from China, Brazil, 
India, Norway and Korea have entered the Nigerian oil market (Obi 2010: 446). 
 
5.2.3.7. Rwanda 
There is a general reluctance amongst donors to use negative measures to respond to violations of 
democratic principles in Rwanda (Hayman 2011b: 124-127). The US, which is the largest donor, 
enjoys close relations with Rwanda, and has refrained from openly criticising Kagame on issues 
related to democratisation (Zorbas 2011: 110-111). Only smaller donors, such as Sweden and the 
Netherlands, have used negative conditionality as a reaction to Rwanda‟s democratic record (Hayman 
2011b: 124-27). Moreover, Rwanda is well integrated in regional organisations, including the East-
African Community, the AU and the Commonwealth. Rwanda‟s democratic record did not hamper 
admission into the Commonwealth, despite concerns expressed by a report from the Commonwealth 
Human Rights Initiative (Reyntjens 2010: 2). The Commonwealth observer report on the 2010 
presidential elections noted some „areas of  concern‟, but pointed to Rwanda‟s history of genocide and 
„the understandable need to guard against any such tendencies re-emerging‟ (Commonwealth 
Secretariat 2010: 30). Rwanda also maintains strong relations with China and has actively sought to 
attract Chinese investment (Zhan in The New Times 2011)  
 
5.2.3.8. Guinea 
At the time of EU aid suspension in 2003-2004, there were no sanctions from other donors or from 
regional organisations. US assistance increased and in 2003, a new US embassy was opened in 
Guinea, the size of which surprised many observers. This was related to Guinea‟s strategic role as a 
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supporter of anti-Taylor forces in Liberia with US military assistance (International Crisis Group 
2003a: 16; Arieff 2009: 338-340; Smith 2006: 434). Similarly, France, Guinea‟s main donor, 
increased bilateral assistance after EU aid was suspended. Only Germany and Canada suspended 
bilateral assistance in the early 2000s as a consequence of the bad administration of development 
assistance by the Guinean government (Laakso et al. 2007a: 86). Moreover, within the ACP group, 
there was opposition to the invocation of Article 96 consultations in 2003 (Laakso et al. 2007b: 47).  
 
Nonetheless, other actors became more involved from the mid-2000 onwards, and especially after the 
2008 military coup. ECOWAS became involved in Guinea‟s internal affairs in 2007, when the crisis 
was worsening because of mass demonstrations. ECOWAS brokered the deal to appoint Kouyaté as a 
prime minister in 2007. Moreover, ECOWAS immediately suspended Guinea after the military coup 
in 2008 and imposed an arms embargo after the September 2009 massacre (Yabi 2009: 46-47). The 
AU suspended Guinea after the military coup in December 2008 (International Crisis Group 2007d: 
16). Nonetheless, China was less willing to criticise the military junta. In October 2009, right after the 
shooting of peaceful demonstrators in September 2009, a huge mining and oil deal was agreed 
between China and Guinea (BBC News 2009, October).  
 
5.2.3.9. Côte d’Ivoire 
Apart from the EU, the main donors in Côte d‟Ivoire are France, the IMF, the World Bank and the US. 
After the 1999 coup d’état, all these donors suspended their development assistance. In Chapter 4, it 
was mentioned that France was initially supportive of Laurent Gbagbo and set aside budgetary support 
on the eve of the 2000 elections, but from 2002 onwards, French development assistance was reduced 
due to the anti-French protests, deteriorating official relations and the security situation. France was 
without doubt the main force behind the international sanctions after the December 2010 elections. As 
was mentioned in Chapter 3, the programmes of the IFIs were linked to the progress in the Article 96 
consultations. Although the World Bank had resumed its assistance by the time of the December 2010 
elections, it was immediately suspended again in December 2010 (Cook 2011: 15). The US suspended 
non-humanitarian aid following the December 1999 coup, and did not lift these restrictions after the 
2000 elections, given the lack of credibility of the electoral process. Ivorian eligibility for the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was withdrawn in March 2004 because of the violent 
crackdown on demonstrators. These sanctions were not lifted until Gbagbo ceded power to Ouattara in 
2011 (US State Department 2011b).  
 
ECOWAS was strongly opposed to the 1999 military coup and mediated the restoration process that 
led to the October 2000 elections. The September 2002 coup attempt was firmly condemned by 
ECOWAS, which expressed support and solidarity with Gbagbo and negotiated a ceasefire (Shola 
Omotola 2008: 39; Blé Kessé 2005: 165-155). In January 2003, an ECOWAS force of approximately 
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1,500 peacekeeping troops was sent, in implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (US State 
Department 2011b). Moreover, it was as President-in-office of ECOWAS that Blaise Compaoré 
mediated the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (Council of the EU 2007c). At a summit in December 
2010, ECOWAS endorsed Ouattara‟s victory and suspended Côte d‟Ivoire from all its decision-
making bodies, threatening with military intervention (IRIN News 2011, February).  
 
The AU equally played a role with the mediation of the Pretoria Peace Agreement by South Africa in 
2005 (International Crisis Group 2006f: 23). After the December 2010 elections, the AU stood firmly 
behind Ouattara, urged Gbagbo to step down and suspended Côte d‟Ivoire from all its activities. On 
behalf of the AU, Kenyan prime minister Odinga and AU Chairman Mutharika travelled to Abidjan in 
January 2011 (Cook 2011: 12-14). By the time of the 2010 elections, Gbagbo had lost the support of 
African countries, with the exception of Angola and Zimbabwe (interview, Karel Arnaut, March 
2012). The Chinese position was not very clear, although China was suspected to be more pro-
Gbagbo. Russia, on the other hand, recognised the election of Gbagbo and blocked a UN statement 
backing Ouattara (Financial Times 2011, January).  
 
5.2.3.10. Zimbabwe 
In the case of Zimbabwe, there is a clear division between the position of OECD donors and that of 
African regional organisations. The main donors in Zimbabwe, including the UK, US and Australia, 
suspended development assistance and imposed travel sanctions on members of Mugabe‟s 
government. Furthermore, the Commonwealth suspended Zimbabwe from its councils and imposed 
travel sanctions (Del Biondo 2009: 133). The US has been particularly critical towards Mugabe‟s 
government. In 2005, Zimbabwe was included in the US‟s list of „outposts of tyranny‟. Like the EU, 
the US refused to lift sanctions after the GPA. Moreover, upon election President Obama called for a 
new approach to topple Mugabe‟s government (Hansen 2011: 263). The IFIs had earlier suspended 
programmes because of non-compliance with conditions and failure to repay arrears (see Chapter 3). 
On the contrary, SADC has been reluctant to openly criticise Mugabe and has explicitly opposed 
international sanctions (Phimister and Raftopoulos 2004). This position is related to the fact that most 
neighbouring countries see Mugabe as a liberation leader (International Crisis Group 2002e: 13). 
SADC‟s position has had a considerable impact on the effectiveness of EU sanctions. For example, in 
2007, SADC mobilised other African countries to boycott the EU-Africa summit in case Mugabe was 
not allowed (Khadiagala 2009b: 315). From 2008 onwards, however, SADC started mediating, which 
resulted in the GPA.  
 
Zimbabwe has been able to count on the support of Russia and China. In 2008, these countries blocked 
a UN resolution to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe (Hansen 2011: 253). Especially with China, 
Zimbabwe has been able to build economic relations (Friedrich Ebert Foundation 2004: 10; Youde 
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2007: 11). At the same time, the success of Mugabe‟s „look east‟ policy should not be overestimated. 
For example, when President Hu Jintao did an Africa tour in 2006, he did not visit Zimbabwe 
(International Crisis Group 2006e: 6).  
 
Table 26. Top 5 main donors, average 2009-2010
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Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Chad Niger Nigeria Guinea Rwanda Côte 
d’Ivoire 
Zimbabwe 
EU IDA US US EU IDA France US France US 
Global 
Fund 
US IDA EU US US EU IDA IDA UK 
Israel UK UK France France UK US Global 
Fund 
IMF EU 
Norway AfDF Japan AfDF IDA Global 
Fund 
AfDF EU US Global 
Fund 
Japan EU IMF Germany Canada EU Germany UK EU Australia 
Source: OECD, aid at a glance 
 
5.2.4. Analysis 
 
H.7. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures when there are no or few other international 
actors prepared to impose negative measures, while it is more likely to impose negative measures in 
case of a coordinated action by international actors.  
 
The first part of the hypothesis was partially confirmed. Indeed, in Chad, Rwanda, Ethiopia and 
Nigeria, the main donors, African regional organisations and non-OECD economic partners, have 
been opposed to negative measures.  
 
However, the hypothesis is refuted by the cases of Eritrea and Côte d‟Ivoire. Eritrea is isolated 
amongst the regional organisations and Western donors, although it still receives some diplomatic and 
economic support from China and a number of Arab countries. In the case of Côte d‟Ivoire (2000-
2005), some of the key donors, including the US, did not resume their bilateral development assistance 
in 2002, while the IFIs only did so on the basis of the EU decision to resume assistance. Hence, a 
coordinated approach for more extensive negative measures would have been possible. Similarly, in 
2004, the US imposed sanctions, while the EU did not.  
 
                                                     
56
 Note: IDA is the International Development Association, the World Bank‟s fund for the world‟s poorest 
countries. The AfDF is the African Development Fund, the concessional window of the African Development 
Bank. The Global Fund is a public-private partnership dedicated to attract and disburse resources to prevent and 
treat HIB/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.  
244 
 
The second part of the hypothesis is confirmed by the cases of Niger, Côte d‟Ivoire (2010-2011) and 
Kenya. In all three cases, the EU‟s negative measures (or threat thereof) were a coordinated action 
involving the main donors and regional organisations. In Niger and Côte d‟Ivoire, ECOWAS was 
particularly active. In Kenya, all donors aligned around the mediation mission by the AU.  
 
In Zimbabwe, however, the hypothesis could only partly be confirmed: although the majority of 
donors and the Commonwealth were on the same line as the EU, regional organisations were opposed 
to negative measures.  
 
In the case of Guinea, the hypothesis offers no explanation for the EU‟s decision in 2003 to invoke 
negative measures, while it does help to explain why sanctions were adopted in 2009. The EU‟s 
decision to invoke the Article 96 procedure and to suspend aid in 2003 was a unilateral action, as the 
main donors had not restricted aid, nor had regional organisations become engaged in democracy 
promotion. The decision to impose negative measures after the September 2009 massacre can however 
be explained by referring to other actors: all the donors and regional organisations were on the same 
line regarding the need for a coercive approach.  
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5.3. EU leverage 
 
5.3.1. The literature on leverage 
As was noted supra, it has been suggested that international actors focus negative measures on aid 
dependent countries because of the leverage they expect to have with their aid. However, the extent of 
leverage donors have with development assistance depends on the relative importance of aid benefits 
for the sanctioned country. Stokke hypothesised that aid sanctions are more likely to be effective under 
the following circumstances: (1) the recipient government is highly dependent on aid, (2) the 
sanctioning donor provides a large proportion of aid and is strategically important to the recipient, and 
(3) the sanctioning donor is a large donor and the recipient country is a small country (Stokke 1995: 
44-45). Hufbauer and others confirm this hypothesis: they argue that donors mostly impose sanctions 
against smaller economies in the belief that this stands more chance of success (Hufbauer et al. 2007: 
90-91). According to some studies, however, the importance of aid dependency should not be 
overestimated. Crawford found that domestic factors and the lack of donor coordination were more 
important than aid dependency (Crawford 2001: 202-203). Emmanuel only found a weak effect of aid 
dependence, which was overshadowed by the importance of donor coordination (Emmanuel 2010: 
864-865). Hazelzet (2005: 12) recognised that aid dependence was a factor, but added that certain 
governments simply do not care about their population, regardless of the level of development 
cooperation they enjoy.  
 
The level of leverage through aid may also depend on the modality via which aid is provided. Budget 
support is generally seen as an instrument providing more leverage over the policies of recipient 
governments when compared to project aid (Hayman 2011a: 678). Commissioner Louis Michel 
emphasised this in a 2006 paper on budget support, where he argued that budget support has the 
advantage of improving dialogue on „an overall vision of all the country‟s political priorities‟ (Michel 
2008c). The current plans to transform general budget support into „Good Governance and 
Development Contracts‟, including political objectives related to the „fundamental values‟ of the EU, 
also point in this direction (European Commission 2011a; Council of the EU 2012a).  
 
Apart from the purely economic conception of leverage, political leverage should also be taken into 
account. Although not unrelated to economic leverage, political leverage depends on the diplomatic 
relations between the sanctioning actor and the target country. This points to the „foreign policy 
paradox‟: while states have more leverage vis-à-vis allies than adversaries, they are more reluctant to 
use this leverage, because of the interests at stake (Knodt and Jünemann 2007: 22; Drezner 1999). 
Indeed, Portela argues that the lack of effectiveness of EU sanctions against Haiti (2001) could be 
related to the fact that Haiti belongs to the US‟s sphere of influence (Portela 2010: 146).  
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The extent of political leverage of the EU in sub-Saharan Africa is not entirely clear. On the one hand, 
the EU has only played a limited political role in sub-Saharan Africa, while member states have often 
followed their own bilateral policies (see supra). From this perspective, one could assume that the EU 
has less political leverage than its member states, and the former colonial power in particular. On the 
other hand, the EU may also have more political leverage than former colonisers, as it is perceived as a 
more neutral actor. As has been mentioned previously, this is exactly why in some cases former 
colonisers prefer EU action to potentially controversial bilateral policies (Hyde-Price 2006: 222-223; 
Gibert 2011a: 192). Given that political leverage depends on diplomatic relations, the EU‟s position on 
certain political issues of concern to the partner country (e.g. regional issues) may play a role. In some 
countries, however, the extent of leverage of international actors can be questioned altogether, as 
negative measures may have counterproductive effects. Some governments are outrightly hostile 
towards criticism from external actors, and use negative measures to mobilise nationalist sentiment 
against foreign intervention, which is known as the „rally-around-the-flag‟ effect (Risse and Sikkink 
1999: 23; Uvin 1993: 71-73; Fierro 2003: 102).  
 
5.3.2. Hypothesis and operationalisation 
The EU‟s leverage was noted as a potentially influential factor. If the EU has only minor leverage vis-
à-vis a country, it can be expected to refrain from using negative measures. Hence, the following 
hypothesis will be tested: 
 
H.8. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures in countries where it lacks leverage, while it is 
more likely to impose negative measures when it has substantial leverage  
 
Firstly, I will focus on the EU‟s potential leverage through its aid. I will not take into account the level 
of trade between the EU and the partner countries, given that trade embargoes are only very rarely 
adopted. One indicator that was taken into account was the general aid dependence of each country: 
ODA per capita (which measures the relative amount of aid, taking into account the population) and 
ODA as a percentage of GDP (which indicates the share of aid in relation to the total income). In both 
cases, data were retrieved from the World Development Indicators.
57
 These data are presented in Table 
27 on p. 252. As a second step, I looked at the potential of EU economic leverage, by calculating: (1) 
EU ODA as a percentage of total ODA and (2) EU ODA as a percentage of GDP. For this I used the 
OECD Creditor Reporting System for ODA figures, and the IMF World Economic Outlook for data 
on the GDP. Table 28 (p. 252) includes EU ODA as a percentage of GDP for each year since 2000, 
while Table 29 (p. 253) includes the average percentage of EU ODA as total ODA and GDP for 2000-
2010. Furthermore, I took into account whether general budget support is provided.  
 
                                                     
57
 See World Bank website: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
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The EU‟s political leverage is more difficult to assess, but as a proxy indicator I looked at the reaction 
of the governments to the EU‟s various instruments to promote democratisation. Moreover, when 
difficulties in diplomatic relations with the member states obstruct EU political leverage, this was also 
noted.  
 
5.3.3. Case studies 
5.3.3.1. Eritrea 
Eritrea was the most aid dependent country of the ten country cases in 2000 and 2005. Moreover, 
given that there are few other donors in Eritrea, EU aid represents a large share of its income, although 
Eritrea does not receive any budget support from the EU. At the time of the diplomatic conflict 
between the EU and Eritrea over the imprisonment of the eleven dissidents in 2001, EU aid 
represented no less than 8 percent of Eritrea‟s GDP. The share of EU development assistance has 
further increased since the early 2000s. However, this does not mean that the EU has substantial 
leverage vis-à-vis the Eritrean government, which has resorted to a policy of self-reliance and is 
hostile to foreign aid, as was underlined in Chapter 3. Eritrea‟s hostile attitude towards foreign donors 
has resulted in a decrease in aid dependence from 32.1 percent in 2005 to 7.7 percent in 2010.  
 
The EU‟s political leverage – and that of any other donor – also seems limited. As Reid argues: „It 
seems unlikely that change will come about through “external” pressure, whether from the opposition 
abroad or from the “international community” (Reid 2009: 219). The immediate expulsion of the 
Italian ambassador after the Council Presidency demarche on political prisoners in 2001 clearly 
illustrates this lack of political leverage (Calchi Novati 2008: 53). Despite the hostility of the 
government of Eritrea towards external pressure, it has been willing to engage in political dialogue 
under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement. For the government, political dialogue provides a forum to 
discuss regional issues, such as the border war with Ethiopia (anonymous interviews, February 2009 
and February 2012). In this light, the EU‟s political leverage could increase if it would put pressure on 
Ethiopia to honour its obligations in the border war with Eritrea according to the ruling of the 
Boundary Commission. However, the EU has not pushed Ethiopia on the issue (Bereketeab 2009: 
119). 
 
5.3.3.2. Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is an aid dependent country; aid represented about 12 percent on average of its GDP in 2000, 
2005 and 2010. However, given that there are many other donors, EU aid does not represent a very 
large share of its GDP. Over the period 2000-2010, EU ODA represented 11.4 percent of total ODA 
and 2.1 percent of Ethiopia‟s GDP. Nonetheless, before 2005 a large part of the EU‟s aid was provided 
via general budget support. Hence, the decision in 2005 to suspend budget support could have been 
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motivated by the belief to have some economic leverage vis-à-vis the government. The share of EU 
aid in Ethiopia‟s GDP has reduced over the years, most likely because of an increase in investments 
from emerging countries and in ODA from other donors. In this sense, the US and UK, Ethiopia‟s first 
donors and diplomatic partners, probably have more leverage than the EU. However, the political 
leverage of donors, and of the EU in particular, is very small in Ethiopia. As stated by Borchgrevink: 
„the Ethiopian regime is independent-minded, proud, and unwilling to bow to the whims and wishes of 
donors and the international community in general‟ (Borchgrevink 2008: 216). This could be 
witnessed in the reactions of prime minister Meles Zenawi to external criticism about internal affairs. 
When donors suspended budget support in 2005, Zenawi reacted they could go home if they were not 
interested in supporting the development of the country (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009: 204). Moreover, 
both EU-EOMs (2005, 2010) have been accused of partiality after releasing their reports. Chief 
observer of the EU-EOM in 2005 Ana Maria Gomes was called a „self-appointed colonial viceroy 
with a clear bias in favour of the opposition‟ (Agence France Presse 1 September 2005). Similarly, 
after a critical preliminary report, Chief observer of the EU-EOM to the 2010 elections Thijs Berman 
was prevented from presenting his report in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. This was 
unprecedented in the history of EU election observation (Council of the EU 2010b). On the other 
hand, the government of Ethiopia has engaged in political dialogue under Article 8 of the Cotonou 
Agreement (anonymous interviews, January 2011).  
 
5.3.3.3. Kenya 
Given its relatively developed economy (compared to most other cases), Kenya is little dependent on 
foreign aid. Its aid dependency rate has fluctuated around 5 percent. Moreover, the EU is not the main 
donor. In 2009-2010, the EU was only the seventh donor in Kenya. EU aid represented less than 1 
percent of Kenya‟s GDP in 2000-2010. Although the EU, as one of the few donors, was providing 
budget support at the time of the 2007 elections, the pending tranche of €40 million was disbursed 
because of bureaucratic procedures, as was mentioned in Chapter 2. It is doubtful that the EU has 
extensive political leverage in Kenya. Kenya‟s main donors and diplomatic partners are the UK and, 
even more so, the US. Indeed, there is currently no Article 8 political dialogue with the EU because of 
a lack of interest from the Kenyan side. Moreover, the EU was unable to prolong the Memorandum of 
Understanding on piracy at the time of expiration in 2010 (anonymous interviews, January-February 
2012).  
 
5.3.3.4. Chad 
Chad‟s dependence on EU aid has greatly diminished with the start of oil production in 2002. 
Nonetheless, aid dependence remains relatively high (comparable to Ethiopia). Moreover, the EU was 
one of the few donors. Over the period 2000-2010, EU aid represented 22 percent on average of total 
ODA and 2.7 percent of Chad‟s GDP. In contrast to most other countries, there are reasons to believe 
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that the EU had political leverage in Chad. Gilles Desesquelles, head of the delegation of the European 
Commission from 2006 until 2011, organised political dialogue in 2006-2007 leading to the 2007 
political agreement. Moreover, Desesquelles had regular contacts with President Déby (anonymous 
interviews, February and May 2012).  
 
5.3.3.5. Niger 
Despite uranium revenues, Niger is relatively dependent on ODA, with an aid dependency rate 
comparable to that of Ethiopia. Moreover, the EU is the main donor and aid per capita is relatively 
low. The EU provided one fifth of Niger‟s total ODA in 2000-2010 and 4.3 percent of its GDP. 
Moreover, a significant share of ODA was provided in the form of direct budget support (€93 million) 
(European Commission 2008f). However, it is not clear whether this economic leverage was also 
translated in political leverage. For example, the Nigerien government was reluctant to engage in 
political dialogue under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement (anonymous interview, March 2012). 
Moreover, the government seemed unwilling to give in to the EU‟s demands to step down after its 
second mandate.  
 
5.3.3.6. Nigeria 
The EU‟s economic leverage in Nigeria is negligible. Nigeria is not an aid dependent country: it 
received USD 2 per capita in 2005, which is fourteen times less than the sub-Saharan African average 
of USD 28 (Khakee 2007: 2). EU aid as a share of GDP was insignificant in 2000-2010. Moreover, the 
EU is not the main donor in Nigeria: aid represented only 7 percent of total ODA in 2000-2010, with 
the UK and US providing much bigger amounts. When interrogated in the EP about the EU reaction to 
the 2007 flawed elections, Benita Ferrero-Waldner argued that sanctions would be useless given that 
the EU‟s financial funding only represents „a mere 0.2 percent of the oil revenue and the total 
international aid to Nigeria‟ (Ferrero-Waldner 2007). Besides economic leverage, political leverage 
was also limited. For this reason, Khakee questions if the EU could have done more than focusing on 
election observation and assistance (Khakee 2007: 2-4). It is only recently that the EU significantly 
upgraded its partnership with Nigeria, namely with the Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward that started in 
2009 (see Chapter 2). 
 
5.3.3.7. Rwanda 
Rwanda is highly dependent on foreign aid: of the ten cases under investigation, it was the most 
dependent on aid. The EU is an important donor and a large share of the EU‟s development assistance 
is provided in the form of general budget support. EU development assistance represented 12.7 percent 
of total ODA and 3.7 percent of Rwanda‟s GDP in 2000-2010. Nonetheless, political leverage is 
restricted by the role of many member states in the 1994 genocide. This puts donors in a weak 
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bargaining position vis-à-vis the government given the guilt still felt by some of the donors about the 
genocide (Hayman 2009b: 71). Because of genocidal history, the US and UK have become the main 
diplomatic partners of Rwanda, but even the leverage of these donors should not be overestimated. 
Donors have the idea that positive measures are the most adequate instrument to promote 
democratisation: „in the face of Rwanda‟s history and the pride of the government, donors have much 
more leverage when they act as “friends” of the regime and engage positively with it; there is pressure 
to democratise, but Rwanda does not take kindly to being pushed‟ (Ibid: 71). The lack of donor 
leverage is not limited to democratisation, but includes Rwanda‟s foreign policies. Marriage quotes 
DfID‟s First Secretary: „The thing is that the international community will not be able to influence the 
government of Rwanda on security policy. The government of Rwanda will not compromise its 
security interests‟ (Marriage 2006: 484). Despite this apparent lack of political leverage, Rwanda has 
engaged in frequent political dialogue under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement, which has been 
described by several interviewees as relatively fruitful (anonymous interviews, January 2012).  
 
5.3.3.8. Guinea 
Guinea is not aid dependent, its aid dependency rate was around 5 percent, comparable to that of 
Kenya. EU aid only represented about 1 percent of Guinea‟s GDP. Moreover, under Conté Guinea was 
openly hostile towards foreign aid, at one point President Conté was quoted saying he did „not need 
the white man‟s money‟ (cited in Laakso et al. 2007b: 28). Nonetheless, ODA was an important 
source of foreign currency. When external aid was decreasing in Guinea, inflation was rising (Ibid.: 
27-28). The limited leverage of the EU was shown in the uncooperative attitude of the Guinean 
government during the Article 96 consultations. Guinea accused the EU of not having respected the 
requirement to step up political dialogue before resorting to Article 96, and did not appear after the 
first invitation in April 2004 (Laakso et al. 2007a: 86). 
 
5.3.3.9. Côte d’Ivoire 
With an aid dependency rate of around 3 percent in 2000 and 2010, Côte d‟Ivoire is not an aid 
dependent country. EU aid only represented a minor share of Côte d‟Ivoire‟s GDP, but this may also 
be related to the fact that EU aid has been reduced in the late 1990s as a response to corruption, the 
1999 military coup and subsequently the civil war. Nonetheless, in 1999-2000, Côte d‟Ivoire was 
receiving sizeable balance of payments support under the Stabex programme for its coffee products 
(around USD 100 million). Moreover, in 2001, the International Financial Institutions linked the 
resumption of assistance to Côte d‟Ivoire to the progress of the Article 96 consultations (European 
Community and Côte d‟Ivoire 2005: 26).  
 
From 2002 onwards, however, EU aid became of minor importance, as it was mainly limited to 
humanitarian aid and programmes in direct support of the population, given the security situation. A 
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new CSP and NIP were only signed and implemented after the 2007 Ouagadougou Peace Agreement 
(anonymous interview, February 2012). As regards political leverage, it seems that the EU initially 
had some political leverage vis-à-vis President Gbagbo, who was willing to engage in the Article 96 
consultations in 2001, which were described as a „success‟ because a number of reforms were 
introduced (Arts 2005: 174). This could be related to the fact that Gbagbo was new in office and 
sought international legitimacy after a dubious election victory. However, the EU‟s political leverage 
diminished in subsequent years, as Gbagbo, who was the main holder of power in the country, realised 
ceding to donor pressure would endanger his position. In this context, one of the arguments for the 
Council to defeat the Commission proposal to reopen Article 96 in 2004 was that Gbagbo was 
unwilling to negotiate with the EU, while the role of the prime minister was limited (anonymous 
interview, March 2007). Political leverage was even further reduced in the context of the December 
2010 elections. Given that donor demands implied that President Gbagbo would have to step down, he 
was unwilling to give in to these demands.  
 
5.3.3.10. Zimbabwe 
EU aid to Zimbabwe has not been an important part of the country‟s income, neither before nor after 
aid suspension. Zimbabwe was not an aid dependent country, its aid dependence rate was less than 3 
percent, the second lowest of the ten cases. Nonetheless, the EU is an important donor in Zimbabwe. 
In 2000-2001, EU aid represented almost one third of total ODA in Zimbabwe, although there was no 
direct budget support provided by the EU. Politically, however, the EU lacks leverage in Zimbabwe, 
as the sanctions are seen as instigated by Mugabe‟s arch-enemy: the UK. Mugabe presented the 
sanctions as a punishment for his land reform policies (Laakso 2002: 452) and the main cause for the 
economic crisis (Lyman 2007: 92). To a certain degree, this has worked to gain domestic support 
(International Crisis Group 2007a: 18; Raftopoulos and Mlambo 2009: 3). The lack of political 
leverage was clear from the attempt to start political dialogue under Article 8 of the Cotonou 
Agreement, which was refused by the government (see Chapter 2). Moreover, the hostility of Mugabe 
vis-à-vis conditionality was clearly seen during the Article 96 consultations. The consultations were 
concluded without any satisfactory result as Zimbabwe was opposed to international observers to the 
2002 elections. Zimbabwe argued that the EU had no right under the Cotonou Agreement to require 
the deployment of an EU election observation team (ACP Group and Council of the EU 2002).  
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Table 27. Aid dependency, 2000-2010 
ODA per capita 
(USD) 
2000 2005 2010 ODA % 
GDP 
2000 2005 2010 
Eritrea 48 78 31  27.9 32.1 7.7 
Ethiopia 10 26 43  8.5 15.7 11.9 
Kenya 16 21 40  4.1 4.1 5.1 
Chad 16 39 44  9.6 9.0 7.3 
Niger 19 40 48  11.7 15.4 13.6 
Nigeria 1 46* 13  0.4 6.5* 1.1 
Rwanda 40 63 97  18.7 22.6 18.5 
Guinea 18 22 21  5.0 7.5 5.1 
Côte d‟Ivoire 21 5 43  3.6 0.6 3.9 
Zimbabwe 14 30 59  2.8 6.8 10.6 
*The high number for Nigeria in 2005 is related to debt relief 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 
Table 28. EU ODA as a percentage of the GDP, 2000-2010  
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Eritrea 7.8 8.1 5.9 7.7 3.5 8.3 1.1 6 0.4 4.5 0 
Ethiopia 2.4 3.3 4.1 1.5 2.5 1.7 3.1 1.5 1.7 0.4 0.5 
Kenya 1.9 1.2 0.1 0.5 1.4 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.09 0.9 0.4 
Chad 7.6 4.7 0.05 6.1 0.7 3.5 0.9 1.9 1.1 1.7 1.6 
Niger 12.9 0.22 4.8 6.2 2.1 9.1 2.1 0.8 5.3 0.2 1.5 
Nigeria 0.2 0.3 0.03 0.05 0.5 0.1 0.09 0.1 0.00009 0.0001 0.06 
Rwanda 8.4 0.7 5.1 7.9 0.9 2.6 2.1 2.0 5.1 2.7 1.8 
Guinea 0.7 2.7 7.8 1.2 0.3 0.07 1.8 2.9 N/A 0.2 0.3 
Côte 
d‟Ivoire 
1.3 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 
Zimbabwe 1.2 0.8 1.2 0.4 0.8 1.2 0.8 1.8 0.7 1.3 0.7 
Source: own calculations, on the basis of OECD creditor reporting system and IMF World Economic 
Outlook 2011 
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Table 29. EU aid as percentage of ODA and GDP, average 2000-2010 
 Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Chad Niger Nigeria Rwanda Guinea Côte 
d’Ivoire 
Zimbabwe 
% of 
ODA 
18.2 11.4 9.0 22.4 20.2 7.0 12.7 10.7 13.2 18.2 
% of 
GDP 
4.8 2.1 0.7 2.7 4.3 0.1 3.6 1.0 0.5 1.0 
Source: Own calculations, on the basis of OECD creditor reporting system and IMF World Economic 
Outlook 2011  
 
5.3.4. Analysis 
 
H.8. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures in countries where it lacks leverage, while it is 
more likely to impose negative measures when it has substantial leverage.  
 
The first part of the hypothesis can be confirmed. At first sight, one would assume the EU to have 
substantial economic leverage in Rwanda, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Especially in Eritrea, EU development 
assistance accounts for a substantial share of ODA and GDP. However, the EU lacks political leverage 
in these three countries. First of all, the governments of Rwanda, Ethiopia and Eritrea are not open to 
criticism on internal issues. Moreover, in the case of Ethiopia and Rwanda, both countries are closer to 
the US and UK in terms of regional cooperation and development cooperation. In Eritrea, the 
government does not seem concerned about whether donors support the country or not.  
 
The hypothesis is further confirmed by the case of Nigeria, where it is clear that the EU‟s political and 
economic leverage is small.  
 
The hypothesis is however refuted by the cases of Chad and Côte d‟Ivoire (2000-2005), where the EU 
was reluctant to impose negative measures, although it had economic and political leverage. Although 
Chad is an oil producer, EU aid nevertheless represents a considerable share of its GDP. In the case of 
Côte d‟Ivoire, the resumption of assistance from the IFIs was linked to the Article 96 consultations. 
Moreover, in both cases, the EU had some political leverage, but did not use this leverage to push for 
more thorough democratic reform.  
 
However, the second part of the hypothesis is refuted. In the case of Niger, it could be argued that the 
EU had more leverage than other donors because it was providing substantial budget support. 
However, economic leverage was not translated into political leverage given the low interest of Niger 
in engaging in political dialogue. A more likely interpretation of events is that the EU was 
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uncomfortable with the budget support programme in the light of the 2009 political crisis, given the 
risks of disbursing budget support in such a context.  
 
In Guinea, Zimbabwe, Côte d‟Ivoire (2010-2011) and Kenya, the hypothesis is refuted. These are all 
countries that are little dependent on aid and where the EU‟s political leverage was limited. However, 
in the cases of Guinea (2009), Côte d‟Ivoire (2010-2011) and Kenya, the EU‟s decision to threaten 
with negative measures, regardless of its leverage, should be seen in the light of the position of other 
actors. Given that negative measures were a coordinated act, the EU reasoned that they could be 
successful. The lack of economic leverage in these cases can explain why the strongest negative 
measures, including CFSP sanctions with severe economic repercussions, were taken in Zimbabwe 
and Côte d‟Ivoire (2010-2011). As aid provided too little leverage in these cases, a stronger „stick‟ was 
needed. 
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5.4. Domestic position of the government 
5.4.1. The literature on the domestic position of the government 
It is widely recognised that external pressure alone has little effect on democratisation. Democracy is 
most likely to come from within. What donors can do, however, is „tip the balance‟ in situations where 
domestic circumstances are conducive to democratisation. From this perspective, the EU would be 
more likely to impose negative measures when a government is already under severe domestic 
pressure to democratise. Stokke identifies four ways in which the domestic position can be threatened: 
(1) the loss of monopoly on coercive powers, (2) the loss of popular support and the emergence of 
discontent in influential sectors of society (trade unions, organised businesses, traditional leaders), (3) 
a deteriorating economy and (4) the presence and strength of an alternative leadership (Stokke 1995: 
42-43). Hufbauer and others found a relationship between weaker states and the effectiveness of 
sanctions (Hufbauer et al. 2007: 100). Crawford found that negative measures were more likely to be 
effective when combined with internal pressure, and less likely to be effective against military-backed 
governments that are able to resist external pressure. The state of the economy played a less important 
role, as aid sanctions were ineffective in some economically weaker states. This can be explained by 
the strong sense of self-preservation of some governments, which often resort to state resources or 
force in case of a situation of civil strife between government and non-government forces (Crawford 
2001: 197-201).  
 
5.4.2. Hypothesis and operationalisation 
It was noted that negative measures are more likely to be effective when the government is already 
severely weakened. From this perspective, it can be assumed that the EU will take into account the 
domestic position of the government when deciding on whether to impose negative measures.  
 
The next hypothesis thus reads as follows: 
H.9. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures when the domestic position of the government 
is strong, while it is more likely to impose negative measures when the domestic position of the 
government is weak.  
 
The following factors were taken into account: the potential of a military coup or armed insurgencies, 
the presence of pro-democratic forces (opposition, civil society, dissident voices within the 
government), anti-government protest and the state of the economy. On the presence of pro-
democratic forces, I consulted academic articles and the reports by the Bertelsmann Foundation and 
the International Crisis Group. Bertelsmann Foundation reports were also used to identify the 
possibility of a military coup and armed rebellion. Information on the state of the economy was based 
on the information from Chapter 3.  
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5.4.3. Case studies 
 
5.4.3.1. Eritrea 
Despite the poor state of the economy and the economic hardship amongst the population, the 
domestic position of the government of Eritrea remains strong. The population seems to accept that 
there is no alternative to the ruling regime. There is no legal opposition and there is hardly any 
independent civil society. The opposition abroad is in wide disarray and few of its leaders are 
respected in Eritrea (Reid 2009: 211). Dissident voices within the ruling party were imprisoned in 
2001 and those who are fed up with the lack of civil-political rights and the economic circumstances 
tend to emigrate rather than to demonstrate (Reid 2009: 219). Nonetheless, the position of the 
government may weaken due to the military, as discrepancies and tensions between Afewerki and 
leading military commanders have increased in 2008 (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009a: 4).  
 
5.4.3.2. Ethiopia 
The domestic position of the government of Ethiopia and ruling party is strong and has only become 
stronger in recent years. First of all, it should be noted that the EPRDF is a strong and durable alliance 
because of its highly-centralised and disciplined internal structure and the absolute dominance of the 
TPLF and Meles Zenawi in the coalition. The only notable disagreement was on relations with Eritrea 
in 2001, which was answered by a swift removal of dissenting voices from the party (Fisher 2011: 
354). In contrast, the opposition is divided and unstable, and the majority of parties participating in the 
elections are subsidiary and affiliated parties of the EPRDF (Tronvoll 2009: 462; Bertelsmann 
Foundation 2011: 14). While the opposition joined forces in two broad coalitions in the 2005 
elections, after the elections the opposition was divided about the strategy to take, while many CUD 
leaders were imprisoned (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009: 195-196). Moreover, the new coalition that 
emerged in the preparation of the 2010 elections, Medrek, was hindered by the EPRDF from building 
a base of support in rural areas (Bertelsmann Foundation 2011: 15). During the 2005 elections, civil 
society played an important role by protesting against the elections and engaging in voter education 
and domestic observation. However, civil society and the independent media have weakened since the 
2005 elections, because of a reduced openness to critical voices, as well as new legislation curtailing 
civil-political rights (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009: 199-202). Moreover, the EPRDF managed to regain its 
power base after the 2005 elections. Between 2005 and 2010, the membership base of the EPRDF 
exploded from 600,000 members to 5 million members (Bertelsmann Foundation 2011: 14). This 
could be observed in the 2008 local and 2010 parliamentary elections, when the ruling party won all 
but a few seats (Tronvoll 2010). Furthermore, the government has maintained firm control over the 
security forces since 1995 (Bertelsmann Foundation 2011: 5) and, as was shown in Chapter 3, there 
has been sustained economic growth, especially since the mid-2000s.   
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5.4.3.3. Kenya 
The domestic position of Kibaki‟s government was weakened after the December 2007 elections. The 
parliamentary elections, held together with the presidential elections, were won by Odinga‟s ODM, 
with 102 against 78 seats. The strength of the opposition had already become clear in 2005 when the 
constitution proposed by Kibaki was rejected in a referendum after a strong campaigning by the 
opposition and civil society. Civil society organisations are relatively strong in Kenya (Whitaker and 
Giersch 2009). Despite pressure from opposition and civil society, however, the government had 
retained its monopoly on violence and there had not been any evidence of a coup threat in previous 
years (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008: 11). The economic situation had improved, although 
corruption remained a serious problem.  
 
5.4.3.4. Chad 
The constant threat of a military coup or overthrow by rebellion groups severely weakened the 
government in the 2000s. The non-armed opposition, however, is so fragmented that no party offers a 
true alternative to President Déby‟s Mouvement patriotique du salut. Political parties are either 
associations for the promotion of their leader or factions that on occasion revert to politico-military 
struggle (May and Massey 2002). Moreover, many opposition leaders have been co-opted by the 
President, which has reduced their credibility in the eyes of the population. Another strategy of the 
ruling regime has been to create small parties that are controlled by the government (International 
Crisis Group 2008b: 9). Moreover, civil society is very weak in Chad (anonymous interviews, March-
April 2012; Bertelsmann Foundation 2007c: 6). The extent of corruption in Chad has contributed to its 
fragility, as the demands of rebellion groups included an improvement of economic governance 
(International Crisis Group 2008b: 12-13).  
 
5.4.3.5. Niger 
The government of Niger had been weakened in the context of the 2009 referendum. There was strong 
domestic opposition to President Tandja‟s plans to seek a third term. In late 2008, 20 NGOs created 
the Front Uni pour la Sauvegarde des Acquis Démocratiques to advocate against a prolongation of 
Tandja‟s Presidency. There were frequent manifestations against the change of the constitution. 
Moreover, given Niger‟s history of military coups (1996, 1999) and a 2002 army mutiny, some 
observers feared a military coup, although no political interventions by the military or mutinies were 
noted in the last years of Tandja‟s rule. Although the government had access to resources from 
uranium extraction, the state of the economy had weakened the government‟s position. In 2005, mass 
demonstrations were held against the cost of living, organised by the umbrella group of civil society 
organisations Coalition Equité/Coalition contre la Vie Chère (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009d: 7-8). 
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5.4.3.6. Nigeria 
On the one hand, Nigeria has a vibrant civil society and an assertive parliament (Mikkel 2008: 302; 
Suberu 2007: 107; Rotberg 2007: 31-32). The first could be observed in the 50,000 strong Domestic 
Election Observation Group, formed by civil society organisations to monitor the 2007 elections, 
which called for a cancellation of the results (Amuwo 2009: 53; International Crisis Group 2007a: 6). 
The latter could be seen in 2006, when Obasanjo‟s attempts to change the constitution were defeated 
in parliament (Mikkel 2008: 302). Nonetheless, the opposition is hampered by the lack of a strong 
party system. Nigeria‟s political parties have been described as „weak, faction-ridden, personality-
driven institutions‟ (Suberu 2007: 101). Competition occurs mostly between factions (often within one 
party), rather than between parties. Parties lack a clear ideology and focus instead on religion, 
ethnicity and money politics. Parties are seen as tools for promoting sectionalism and opportunism 
(Shola Omotola 2009: 628-629; Sklar et al. 2006: 101-102). Moreover, opposition parties hesitate 
between allying with the PDP or building a challenge to the PDP dominance (Sklar et al. 2006: 112). 
Hence, in the campaign of the 2007 elections, only very few parties led an issue-driven campaign, 
while most declared to continue Obasanjo‟s policies (Amuwo 2009: 52). The government is weakened 
by the many upsurges of violence throughout the country, and in the context of the 2007 elections 
there were rumours that the military might take power (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007d: 7). The lack 
of equal distribution of oil wealth has contributed to the weakening of the government, given the threat 
of insurgent groups in the Niger Delta.  
 
5.4.3.7. Rwanda 
Given the fact that the main political parties and civil society organisations have been forbidden, 
political parties and civil society are weak in Rwanda (Longman 2011: 31-34). Moreover, the 
government has firm control over the security forces (Bertelsmann Foundation 2009c: 5 and 16), and 
the growing economy may provide a source of strength for the government.  
 
5.4.3.8. Guinea 
At the time when the EU decided to adopt sanctions in 2003, President Conté was seriously ill (Laakso 
et al. 2007b: 42). The government was further weakened by a potential military coup: in 1996 there 
had been a tentative of coup d’état and there had been rumours about a next attempt in 2000 
(McGovern 2002: 94). The attacks in Guinée Forestière (see supra) and the economic crisis and high 
food prices provided a further source of instability. However, the opposition was divided, weak and 
purely ethnically based (International Crisis Group 2003a: 8). Current president and long-time 
opposition leader Condé was criticised within Guinea for having spent so much time abroad. There 
was a relatively strong tradition of civil society and trade unions in Guinea, which together with the 
faltering economy led to the weakening of the government, especially in 2006-2007 when massive 
demonstrations took place. Civil society organisations joined forces in the National Forum of Guinean 
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Civil Society Organisations. In March 2006, a National Consultation was held bringing together 
political parties, civil society organisations, trade unions, women and youth groups, during which a 
transition was discussed (International Crisis Group 2006b: 3-6). After the military coup, opposition 
parties formed the Forces Vives, which enjoyed strong support from civil society (International Crisis 
Group 2009a: 4). 
 
5.4.3.9. Côte d’Ivoire 
Côte d‟Ivoire does not have a strong civil society, which is partly due to the climate of intimidation 
since 1999 (Bertelsmann Foundation 2007b: 16). However, the lack of inclusiveness of Gbagbo‟s 
government when taking power in 2000 was a clear source of weakness, as was reflected in the many 
protests of supporters from Ouattara‟s party RDR. The 2001 municipal elections made clear that 
Ouattara and his party had more support than expected, notably in Abidjan and in Southern cities, 
where Gbagbo was believed to stand strong (interview, Karel Arnaut, March 2012). Gbagbo‟s 
government was further weakened after the September 2002 coup attempt, after which he lost control 
over the north of the country. Despite the civil war, the economy did not entirely collapse, although 
economic activity in the north was affected by the security situation (Labertit 2010). Gbagbo‟s 
position was further challenged after the December 2010 elections, which were won by the opposition. 
After losing the elections, Gbagbo was relying purely on his security forces, which at that time were 
still loyal to him, as well as a large number of „Young Patriots‟ (International Crisis Group 2011a: 10).   
 
5.4.3.10. Zimbabwe 
From the 1990s onwards, the government of Zimbabwe had become increasingly unpopular. This was 
related to the growing authoritarianism of the government but also to the economic crisis. The 
National Constitutional Assembly, an umbrella group including trade unions, human rights 
organisations, church groups and small opposition parties was formed in 1997 (Laakso 2002: 447; 
Raftopoulos 2009: 210). After repeated trade union protests in the late 1990s, the government was 
forced to draft a new constitution. The defeat of the government‟s proposal for constitution in the 2000 
referendum made clear that support for the government was diminishing. Furthermore, in the 2000 
parliamentary elections, the MDC nearly won the elections with 57 of 120 seats (International Crisis 
Group 2000: i). The government‟s monopoly on violence has eroded in recent years because of its 
reliance on war veterans and youth militia, which are better paid and enjoy more privileges than the 
security forces. This has increased discontent amongst the security forces (Bertelsmann Foundation 
2009b: 6).  
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5.4.4. Analysis  
 
H.9. The EU is less likely to impose negative measures when the domestic position of the government 
is strong, while it is more likely to impose negative measures when the domestic position of the 
government is weak.  
 
The first part of this hypothesis was confirmed in the cases of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Rwanda. In these 
three countries, the government‟s position is strong because of the forceful suppression of dissent and 
firm control over the security forces. In Ethiopia, although the opposition and civil society appeared 
stronger than expected in the context of the 2005 parliamentary elections, their position weakened in 
recent years, and even after the 2005 parliamentary elections, the ruling party had a clear majority. 
This stands in clear contrast to countries like Zimbabwe (2000, 2002, 2008), Kenya (2007) and Côte 
d‟Ivoire (2010-2011), where there was a dispute over which party had won the elections.  
 
In Nigeria, Chad and Côte d‟Ivoire (2000-2005), the hypothesis was refuted. In these countries, the 
domestic position of the government was weak, either because of a strong opposition (Côte d‟Ivoire), 
armed insurgencies (Nigeria, Chad, Côte d‟Ivoire) or a military coup (Nigeria, Chad). Nonetheless, the 
EU was reluctant to impose negative measures.  
 
The second part of the hypothesis is confirmed by all the cases. In Zimbabwe and Côte d‟Ivoire (2010-
2011), EU negative measures were taken against regimes that had severely weakened, were under 
severe pressure from the public and from the opposition, and could only remain in power via electoral 
fraud. In Niger, there were strong protests from civil society organisations and the opposition in the 
context of 2009 political crisis. The adoption of negative measures in Guinea should be seen in the 
light of the illness of the president and the possibility of a military coup. Indeed, Laakso and others 
have emphasised that the EU believed that the regime could collapse quickly (Laakso et al. 2007b: 
42). Moreover, when sanctions were adopted in 2009, there were strong protests from civil society and 
the opposition against the military regime. The situation in Kenya after the December 2007 elections 
was such that the government‟s position was severely weakened: there were signs that the opposition 
had won, there was severe political violence and protests from opposition supporters and civil society.  
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5.5. Conclusion 
In this Chapter, I have tried to find out whether double standards in the EU‟s reaction to violations of 
democratic principles in the ten sub-Saharan African countries studied in this dissertation can be 
explained by considerations about the effectiveness of negative measures. It was hypothesised that the 
EU would take three factors into account when assessing the effectiveness of negative measures: (1) 
the position of other actors, (2) the potential leverage of the EU and (3) the domestic position of the 
government. On the basis of these factors, three hypotheses were tested. The validity of the hypotheses 
for each case is summarised in Table 30. While all three hypotheses had some explanatory value, the 
position of other actors and the domestic position of the government seems most able to explain 
double standards.  
 
Table 30. Chapter Summary Table: Effectiveness 
 Other 
actors 
EU leverage Domestic 
position 
EU most reluctant to impose negative measures 
Chad + - - 
Rwanda + + + 
Eritrea - + + 
Ethiopia + + + 
Nigeria + + - 
Côte d‟Ivoire 
2000-2005 
- - - 
EU least reluctant to impose negative measures 
Niger + - + 
Zimbabwe +/- - + 
Guinea (2003) - - + 
Guinea (2009)  + - + 
Côte d‟Ivoire 
2010-2011 
+ - + 
Kenya + - + 
+: hypothesis confirmed 
-: hypothesis refuted 
+/- hypothesis partly confirmed, partly refuted 
 
With some exceptions, the EU imposed negative measures as a coordinated action with the main 
actors or did not impose negative measures when such a consensus was lacking. While one could 
argue that the EU could have tried to act as a leader by attempting to provoke a „snowball effect‟ when 
consensus was lacking (Stokke 1995: 44; Crawford 2001: 204), the possibility to do this depends on 
the EU‟s leverage as well as on the interests and perception of other actors. Hence, in Chad this was a 
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possibility, while in Rwanda, Ethiopia and Nigeria, it was not. In the case of Eritrea and Côte d‟Ivoire 
(2000-2005), however, the EU was more reluctant to impose negative measures than other actors. In 
both cases, the position of the US is particularly important. This suggests that other factors prevented 
the EU from imposing negative measures. In the case of Eritrea, the position of other actors did not 
make EU action more effective given that none of the international actors had an impact on the 
internal affairs of the government. In the case of Côte d‟Ivoire, French historical interests provide a 
better explanation for the EU‟s position. As regards the cases where the EU was less reluctant to 
impose negative measures, it is notable that only in two countries, Guinea (2003) and, to a lesser 
degree, Zimbabwe, international consensus was lacking. In the case of Guinea, the US and France did 
not follow, while in Zimbabwe, African regional organisations were reluctant to impose negative 
measures. This cannot be explained by the EU‟s own leverage in these cases, as it was seen that EU 
leverage was limited. Negative measures in this case seem based on calculations about the domestic 
position of the government, or on other factors, unrelated to expectations about effectiveness.   
 
As regards the EU‟s leverage, it is notable that, with the exception of the above-mentioned examples 
of Guinea and Zimbabwe, the EU imposed negative measures regardless of its leverage. However, this 
can be explained by the position of other actors. In Niger, Côte d‟Ivoire (2010-2011), Kenya and 
Guinea (2009), negative measures were a coordinated act, hence the EU‟s leverage was less important.  
 
EU leverage was equally small in countries where no or only limited negative measures were taken. 
The cases of Rwanda, Eritrea and Ethiopia are particularly interesting as in these countries the EU, 
despite having some economic leverage, hardly has any political leverage. This is related to the 
strength of the US and UK as a diplomatic partner in some cases (Rwanda and Ethiopia), but also to 
the harsh reaction to any attempt of donors to interfere in the domestic process.  
 
The last hypothesis concerned the domestic position of the government. This factor seemed 
particularly powerful in explaining why the EU did impose negative measures, while it was less able 
to explain why the EU did not impose negative measures. Indeed, in all the cases where the EU 
imposed negative measures, the government was weakened, either because of pressure from civil 
society, the opposition or the general public, an economic crisis, illness of the President, a threat of 
military coup or armed insurgencies.  
 
This points to a paradox in the application of negative measures. While one would assume negative 
measures to be applied more frequently in less democratic countries, the contrary seems the case. It is 
exactly in these countries where civil society and the opposition are strong, that the EU is more likely 
to impose negative measures. While this can be explained by the increased likelihood of success in 
case of domestic opposition to the government, it also points to a second effect of prodemocratic 
forces, namely the ability of these groups to alert Western public opinion and governments (Risse and 
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Sikkink 1999: 5). In countries where the government manages to silence pro-democratic forces, the 
democratic process seems to find itself in a deadlock situation. In these cases, donors are likely to 
refrain from negative measures in the belief such an approach would not work, and at the same time, 
there is less pressure to do so.  
 
However, in Chad, Nigeria and Côte d‟Ivoire (2000-2005), the EU was reluctant to impose negative 
measures, although the domestic position of the government was weak. In the case of Chad and 
Nigeria, this can be explained by the EU‟s fear for instability (see Chapter 3). In these cases, the 
government has mainly been threatened by armed insurgencies, a military coup and ethnic or religious 
violence. Hence, the EU may fear that, should the government be overthrown, this may result in ethnic 
clashes. This is however not the case in Côte d‟Ivoire where there was little guarantee that Gbagbo‟s 
government would bring stability to the country and there was a strong opposition that proved a threat 
to the government. Here, the decision to impose relatively light negative measures seems mainly 
instigated by French historical interests (Chapter 4).   
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6. General conclusions 
 
6.1. Summary  
 
This dissertation has sought to address the following research question:  
 
Which factors can explain double standards in the EU’s reactions to violations of democratic 
principles in sub-Saharan Africa?  
 
To answer this question, I have started by investigating the degree to which double standards have 
been applied by the EU in its reactions to violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The main part of the dissertation was then dedicated to the search for explanations for these double 
standards. Based on an extensive overview of the literature on political conditionality and EU 
democracy promotion, I have argued that most studies see the EU‟s self-interest as the main 
explanation for double standards in the choice of instruments for democracy promotion. Although 
some studies suggest that, apart from self-interest, considerations about effectiveness also inspire the 
EU in its decision to choose positive or negative measures to promote democracy, this explanatory 
factor has been under-researched.  
 
Importantly, I observed an empirical gap in current research. Existing studies on EU democracy 
promotion have mostly focused on regions where member states‟ security and commercial interests 
are strong (e.g. the neighbourhood, China, Russia). In contrast, EU relations with sub-Saharan Africa 
are – more often than elsewhere – inspired by „humanitarian‟, „ethical‟ or „normative‟ objectives. Even 
„hard‟ foreign policy issues including energy or conflict are often framed from a developmental 
perspective in EU-Africa policies. In this sense, it should be mentioned that the European 
Commission‟s DG Development was until recently responsible for EU-Africa policies. At the same 
time, the EU‟s policies in sub-Saharan Africa are often seen from a self-interested perspective, namely 
when member states try to protect their spheres of influence or in the context of the war on terror.   
 
Although some studies have focused on the motivations for EU negative measures as a reaction to 
violations of democratic principles in sub-Saharan Africa, several empirical gaps remain. Generally, 
there are few recent studies: most research focused on the 1990s. Moreover, in studies focusing on the 
period since 2000, comparative research has been lacking. 
 
I then advanced three main factors as an analytical framework that could be used to guide my research: 
norms, self-interest and effectiveness. The norms versus self-interest dichotomy is well-known and has 
been particularly relevant in studying EU foreign policy, hence the debate on Normative Power 
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Europe. It also reflects the dilemma posed in the EU‟s relations with sub-Saharan Africa, which – as I 
have just argued – are inspired by both norms and self-interest. However, only few studies 
acknowledge the possible problematic aspects of the EU‟s normative agenda in sub-Saharan Africa, 
which is centred around the triple objective of democracy, development and stability. Indeed, there are 
plenty of reasons to doubt the EU‟s apparent assumption that „all good things go together‟. Academic 
research and country practice show that (1) democracy might collide with development and (2) 
democracy might collide with stability. How the EU deals with these dilemmas and the possible trade-
offs that are made in concrete cases thus formed the first question in the dissertation. A second 
contribution I have made with my research is to move beyond the norms-and-interest dichotomy by 
looking at considerations of effectiveness of negative measures. It is emphasised in both EU policy 
discourse and studies on the application of negative measures that sanctions are an instrument of „last 
resort‟. However, this factor had been given little attention, and had never been investigated 
systematically.  
 
Taking this trichotomy of explanatory factors (norms, self-interest and effectiveness) as an analytical 
framework for my empirical research, I chose to focus on ten country cases: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Guinea, Côte d‟Ivoire and Zimbabwe. The choice for these cases was 
first and foremost related to the puzzle on which my research was based: while similar violations of 
democratic principles have occurred in these countries from 2000 onwards, the EU has reacted 
unevenly to these violations. Moreover, the countries differ with regard to the three explanatory 
factors of my analytical framework. The cases include both important and insignificant commercial 
partners, countries with different colonial histories, key allies and non-allies in the war on terror, 
development success stories and development disasters, fragile countries and stable countries, 
peacemakers and peace spoilers, aid dependent and non-aid dependent countries, etc.   
 
After the Introductory Chapter, the second Chapter had the two-fold aim to (1) introduce the ten 
country cases and (2) to demonstrate the research puzzle: the existence of double standards in the EU‟s 
reaction to violations of democratic principles. On the basis of a comprehensive analysis of a wide 
array of qualitative and quantitative sources, the Chapter showed that similar violations of democratic 
principles have indeed led to different reactions from the EU. In some cases (Chad, Rwanda, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Côte d‟Ivoire 2000-2005), the EU was reluctant to impose negative measures, while 
in others (Niger, Zimbabwe, Guinea, Côte d‟Ivoire 2010, Kenya) this was not the case. The rest of my 
dissertation then tried to explain these double standards, based on the analytical framework outlined 
above.  
 
In the three subsequent Chapters, I investigated the contribution of each of the three main factors 
identified in the introduction: norms, self-interest and effectiveness. For each of these factors, three 
hypotheses were distilled from the literature and then tested on the case studies. In Chapter 3 
269 
 
„Conflicting norms‟, I argued that, although EU discourse seems to suggest that democracy, 
development and stability are mutually reinforcing, the reality is that democracy may threaten 
stability, while non-democratic countries may prove developmental and stable. From this perspective, 
it was hypothesised that double standards could result from the trade-off between (1) democracy and 
development and (2) democracy and stability (regional and internal). It was concluded that 
development and internal stability were indeed often preferred over democracy, while the preference 
for regional stability was less clear. Development norms were especially important in explaining why 
negative measures were sometimes imposed: the EU was more keen on imposing negative measures 
when development performance was limited. Nonetheless, there were equally cases where democracy 
was preferred over internal and regional stability (Guinea 2003) and where positive measures were 
preferred even if developmental performance and internal stability were weak (Chad, Eritrea, Nigeria).  
 
Chapter 4 then focused on the aspect of „self-interest‟ and aimed to find out whether double standards 
were caused by historical, commercial and security interests of the EU and its member states. The 
main conclusion of the Chapter was that historical and security interests can explain double standards, 
while commercial interests cannot. However, historical and security interests had more explanatory 
value in explaining why the EU did impose negative measures than in explaining why it was reluctant 
to impose negative measures. Although there was less evidence for the thesis that the EU is more 
reluctant to impose negative measures when there are historical and security interests at stake, this 
could be explained by the strength of historical (Côte d‟Ivoire) and security (Ethiopia, Nigeria) 
interests in some cases.  
 
Chapter 5 then addressed the question whether expectations about effectiveness can explain double 
standards. It was hypothesised that the EU would take three main considerations into account when 
deciding on whether to impose negative measures: (1) the position of other actors, (2) its own leverage 
and (3) the domestic position of the government. At first sight, the explanatory value of the position of 
other actors and the domestic position of the government seemed stronger than the EU‟s leverage. 
However, it was argued that the first and second factor were related: the EU may be willing to impose 
negative measures despite the lack of leverage in case of a coordinated action by the main actors. The 
domestic position of the government was particularly important in explaining why the EU has imposed 
negative measures. It seems that negative measures were mainly used when the government had 
already been weakened. When the domestic position of the government was strong, the EU was 
unlikely to use negative measures.  
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6.2. Conclusions  
In the empirical Chapters, the cases were analysed on the basis of the hypotheses. The main 
conclusions were thus based on the analysis across cases, while there was little room for analysing the 
importance of several factors within the cases. This is what I will do in the following part. The relative 
importance of each factor is summarised in the following table. On the basis of this overview, I will 
then move on to the main conclusions regarding the application of the analytical framework on the 
case studies.  
 
  Table 31: Summary of the findings 
 Norms Self-interest Effectiveness 
EU most reluctant to impose negative measures 
Chad - + - 
Rwanda + - + 
Eritrea - - + 
Ethiopia + + + 
Nigeria + + + 
Côte d‟Ivoire 
2000-2005 
- + - 
EU least reluctant to impose negative measures 
Niger + - + 
Zimbabwe + + - 
Guinea (2003) + + - 
Guinea (2009) + + + 
Côte d‟Ivoire 
2010-2011 
+ + + 
Kenya + - + 
+:  explanatory value 
-: no explanatory value 
 
In Chad, the EU‟s reluctance to impose negative measures is primarily self-interested. Conflicting 
norms do not provide an explanation, given that the government of Chad did not promote internal 
stability nor development, while its contribution to regional stability was mixed. Moreover, given the 
weak position of the government and the potential leverage of the EU, expectations about 
effectiveness are not an important factor. Within self-interest-based motives, there is a clear 
dominance of historical interests, namely the French desire to maintain its sphere of influence, while 
security interests also play a role.  
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In Rwanda, however, the EU hardly has any self-interested motivations to avoid negative measures. 
Historical interests play a minor role given the tense diplomatic relations with those member states 
that formerly considered Rwanda as part of their sphere of influence. Moreover, commercial and 
security interests are minor. On the contrary, the EU‟s approach can be explained by referring to 
conflicting norms, notably the fear to sacrifice internal stability and development for the sake of 
democratisation. Moreover, expectations about effectiveness should also be mentioned, given the 
support Rwanda enjoys from other actors, the limited political leverage of the EU and the strong 
domestic position of the government.  
 
In Eritrea, there is only one factor that can explain the EU‟s reluctance to impose negative measures, 
namely the EU‟s expectation that negative measures would not be effective. EU self-interest is not a 
good explanation: historical and commercial interests are low, and Eritrea does not cooperate in the 
fight against terrorism or migration. Moreover, the EU‟s normative objectives are not conflicting in 
the Eritrean case: the country is not performing well economically and is considered to endanger 
regional stability, although it has been relatively stable internally. Hence, considerations of 
effectiveness provide a better explanation: the EU hardly has any leverage in Eritrea, and the domestic 
position of the government is strong.  
 
In Ethiopia, a combination of norms, self-interest and expectations about effectiveness can explain the 
EU‟s reluctance to impose negative measures. There are of course important security considerations 
given Ethiopia‟s role in the war on terror and in the fight against migration. In addition to this, 
however, there is a clash in normative objectives, and democracy is traded for internal stability and 
development. Moreover, given the strong domestic and international position of the government, as 
well as the lack of leverage, it is also believed that negative measures would not work.  
 
Similarly, in Nigeria, a combination of norms, self-interest and effectiveness can explain the EU‟s 
approach. Although the hypotheses emphasising historical and commercial interests were refuted, the 
EU‟s security interests in Nigeria are so important that it cannot be denied that self-interest plays a 
role here. In the same line of reasoning, although internal stability and development were a concern, 
Nigeria‟s role in promoting regional stability is considered as crucial. Moreover, expectations about 
effectiveness also play an important role (no support from other actors, lack of leverage).  
 
The EU‟s reluctance to impose negative measures against Gbagbo‟s government in Côte d’Ivoire 
(2000-2005) was inspired by the French self-interested consideration that President Gbagbo should be 
given the benefit of the doubt. The other factors provide no clear explanation, given that there were no 
guarantees that Gbagbo was committed to economic development, while internal stability was 
severely under threat because of the lack of inclusiveness of the 2000 elections. The hypotheses on 
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expectations about effectiveness were refuted as other actors had equally suspended aid, the EU had 
some leverage and the government was weakened.  
   
The case of Niger cannot be adequately explained by referring to self-interest. Although historical 
interest may have been less important than in other countries, the EU had some security interests (the 
fight against terrorism), as well as considerable commercial interests (uranium). Normative objectives 
provide a better explanation for this case, namely the government‟s ineffective and inhuman approach 
to internal stability, its limited contribution to regional stability and problems with the administration 
of development assistance. Moreover, expectations about effectiveness may play a role, given that 
there was a consensus amongst the main international actors and the domestic position of the 
government was weakened.  
 
The case of Zimbabwe can be explained by the combination of norms and self-interest. Apart from the 
fact that Mugabe‟s government was becoming increasingly authoritarian, bad economic governance 
was provoking an economic crisis and there were concerns about regional stability. Moreover, 
Mugabe had been challenging historical interests with the land reform programme and there was little 
cooperation on security issues. However, it is unlikely that the EU seriously considered the expected 
effectiveness of negative measures, given that African actors were not on the same line and Mugabe 
was unlikely to give in to Western pressure.  
 
Similarly, the decision in 2003 to impose aid sanctions against Guinea was informed by norms and 
self-interest. Although Conté‟s government was seen as a factor of regional stability, economic 
governance was very poor. The fact that historical, commercial and security interests were low may 
have made it easier for the EU to adopt negative measures. Whereas expectations about effectiveness 
only played a minor role in 2003, the decision to impose sanctions in 2009 can be explained by 
expectations about effectiveness. Whereas negative measures in 2003 were primarily a unilateral 
decision, in 2009 they were part of a coordinated act.  
 
The harsh negative measures imposed against Côte d’Ivoire in 2010-2011 can be explained by self-
interested factors, notably the French concern to restore its sphere of influence. Normative objectives 
also play a role, given that the political crisis was endangering internal and regional stability, and 
economic progress was halted by the civil war, which was directly related to the political crisis. 
Moreover, it is likely that expectations about effectiveness were considered. Although the EU in itself 
had little leverage, the fact that the weak domestic and international position of the government may 
have made the EU more willing to impose negative measures.  
 
Lastly, in Kenya, self-interest is not a good explanation for the reluctance to impose negative 
measures. The EU acted somewhat against its self-interest given that Kibaki had been a trustworthy 
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ally in the war on terror and piracy. In this case, normative objectives should be taken into account, 
namely the concern for internal and regional stability, which were endangered by the crisis 
surrounding the December 2007 elections. To a lesser degree, Kibaki‟s track record on economic 
development had not been that impressive. Moreover, the EU may have expected negative measures to 
be an effective tool in this case: the domestic and international position of the government was 
weakened after the crisis.  
 
The overarching conclusion is that the adoption of high-cost negative measures seems to be ad hoc: 
different factors play in different cases. There is no „necessary‟ condition under which negative 
measures will take place or not, nor a combination of conditions. In most cases a combination of 
motives, rather than one single factor can explain the EU‟s preference for positive or negative 
measures. Here I tend to follow Brown (2001) who argues that, while researchers, policy analysts and 
the general public often expect states to be led by one single motive (e.g. either norms or self-interest), 
the reality is that in most cases, a mix of motives determine state behaviour. Moreover, in concrete 
situations there is hardly ever the dilemma between either norms or self-interests, rather „they involve 
striking a balance between different conceptions of the good for oneself and others, and between short-
, medium- and long-term conceptions of one‟s own interests‟ (Brown 2001: 22).  
 
However, while it is not possible to designate one single dominant factor, my research does place the 
predominant assumption that double standards are almost inevitably self-interested into perspective. 
Contrary to what was expected, I found that pure self-interest is an insufficient explanation for double 
standards. Only in Chad and Côte d‟Ivoire (2000-2005) was self-interest the only explanatory factor. 
In other cases, it was rather a combination of self-interest with norms or expectations about 
effectiveness that offered an explanation for the EU‟s behaviour. Indeed, although it cannot be denied 
that self-interest played a role in Ethiopia, the EU‟s preference for positive measures should also be 
seen in the light of the belief that the current regime is the best guarantee for internal stability and 
development, as well as the conviction that negative measures would not work. Similarly, the fact that 
Nigeria is seen as a key partner for regional stability should be added to the self-interested concern 
about its cooperation in the war on terror, the fight against piracy, organised crime etc. Moreover, the 
fact that the EU‟s leverage is limited, without the support from other actors, should also be taken into 
account. Furthermore, although the comprehensive sanctions package designed to force Gbagbo to 
step down in 2010-2011 was clearly driven by the French concern about its sphere of influence, this 
package would not have been approved if it was not expected that it would actually reach this goal. 
Furthermore, by 2010-2011 it had become clear that the civil war would not end with President 
Gbagbo still in function. Similarly, while self-interest played a role in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe‟s 
disastrous economic policies should also be taken into account. If Zimbabwe would have been a 
development success story, or a key actor in regional stabilisation, there might have been another 
outcome.  
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Moreover, the idea of self-interest as an explanatory factor for the reluctance to impose negative 
measures was contradicted by a number of cases. In Kenya, for example, one would have expected the 
EU to „reward‟ Kibaki‟s government for his relatively good cooperation in the fight against terrorism 
and piracy, yet this was not the case. From a purely self-interest-based perspective, it would appear 
strange that France aligned with the decision to impose sanctions against Niger, a former colony and a 
crucial uranium supplier. The case of Eritrea further contradicts the dominance of self-interest. If 
security interests would dominate the decision on whether to adopt negative measures, then there is no 
reason why negative measures would be avoided against Eritrea, which is believed to endanger EU 
security interests in the Horn of Africa. Another example where self-interest failed to provide an 
answer is Rwanda. The EU has been surprisingly mild against Rwanda, although historical interests 
are threatened under the current regime, and commercial and security interests are minor.  
 
Although self-interest alone is thus an insufficient factor in explaining double standards in the EU‟s 
reaction to violations of democratic principles, some of the cases show a remarkably high importance 
of historical interests. Indeed, although one could argue that – more than fifty years after 
decolonisation – historical interests would be substituted by commercial or security interests, this was 
not the case. Indeed, I found that, where historical interests played a role, they were a crucial factor in 
explaining the EU‟s reaction. This was the case in Chad, Côte d‟Ivoire and Zimbabwe. However, this 
effect mainly seems to play under certain conditions and in colonies that seem „important‟ for the 
former coloniser. For Côte d‟Ivoire, the fact that it is such a large and relatively developed country 
plays a role. Moreover, an emotional aspect may play here, given that Côte d‟Ivoire was once the heart 
of la Françafrique under Houphouët-Boigny. Risking diplomatic relations with such a country is 
much more painful when compared to Guinea, which had traditionally been outside the French sphere 
of influence. For Chad, its strategic location next to Sudan, combined with the traditionally close 
relations between France and Déby make it more important. In contrast, relations between France and 
President Tandja were more recent. For the UK and Zimbabwe, the land reform question makes this 
case exceptional. However, the case of Zimbabwe also showed that historical interests may work in 
two ways. On the one hand, member states want to maintain their sphere of influence. On the other, as 
the former colonial power they often find themselves under pressure (from public opinion, the 
parliament, civil society, other international actors, etc.) to „do something‟ about violations of 
democratic principles. From this perspective, it is not surprising that the most costly negative measures 
(namely in Zimbabwe, Guinea 2009, Côte d‟Ivoire 2010-2011) were those advocated by the former 
colonial power. 
 
However, this then raises the question why former colonies were able to translate their bilateral 
position to the EU level. It seems that in most cases where historical interests played a role, member 
states either lacked a clear preference about the adequate instrument to promote democratisation or 
they reasoned from a „spheres of influence‟ perspective by letting the former colonial power dominate 
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the discussions. Chad is an example of the former, whereas Côte d‟Ivoire is an example of the latter. 
In a meeting with the US ambassador in 2006, French ambassador Berçot explained his attempt to get 
European governments to take an interest in Chad, „but the response had been lack of interest and an 
instant reflex to leave the costs and burdens to France‟ (US Embassy Chad 2006d). Although Germany 
is represented in N‟Djamena, it only has a small embassy, overshadowed by that of France (US 
Embassy Chad 2010). In terms of development cooperation, Germany maintains a small aid 
programme that will be ended in 2011-2012 (Federal Foreign Office 2011; HTSPE Limited 2008: 84). 
In 2009, however, the UK considered posting an officer to Chad, as it was dissatisfied with the full 
support France provided to Déby and wanted direct, on-the-ground information on the Déby regime 
and „alternatives to it that may emerge‟ (US Embassy Chad 2009). This points to the role of embassies 
in providing intelligence. From this perspective, the relatively small size of Germany‟s embassy 
compared to that of France may explain why Germany seemed to share the French mistrust of the 
opposition.  
 
In a similar vein, France has been able to dominate EU policies vis-à-vis Côte d‟Ivoire. This is more 
surprising than the case of Chad, given that many other member states, including the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK, Belgium and Denmark have diplomatic representation in 
Côte d‟Ivoire. Hence, the position of these member states seems based on the neo-colonial assumption 
that France should deal with the issue given that Côte d‟Ivoire belongs to its sphere of influence 
(d‟Ersu 2007: 87). This can explain why Germany aligned with the French position to refuse the 
opening of Article 96 consultations in 2004. A similar logic was followed in Zimbabwe, where France, 
although favouring positive measures, did not veto negative measures, thereby respecting the 
agreement made with the UK in Saint Malo about the division of spheres of influence (Laakso et al. 
2007a: 71). 
 
It is surprising that, in the context of the growing importance of energy supplies and the „scramble for 
African resources‟, commercial interests have not appeared as a significant factor. There may be 
several explanations for this. First, it may be argued that commercial interests are – after all – not that 
large in most sub-Saharan African countries. Second, in the one country where commercial interests 
were most significant, notably in Nigeria, commercial interests were not necessarily in conflict with a 
democracy promotion agenda. Indeed, the oil interests of European companies have not been served to 
the best extent possible under the recent Nigerian governments, which have granted many contracts to 
non-European companies and have demanded greater shares of national benefit from the extraction of 
oil and gas. This is something one could expect to occur more and more often in the context of the 
increased scramble for African resources.  
 
Against this background, this dissertation has proposed the aspect of conflicting norms as an 
additional explanatory factor. This factor seemed particularly powerful. Indeed, the need for 
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development success stories has without any doubt inspired the EU‟s reluctance to impose negative 
measures against Ethiopia and Rwanda, two countries that have made enormous progress in the 
development sphere, under forward-looking governments with a clear developmental agenda and a 
strong focus on internal stability. In both cases the current impression of well-run (one could say well-
governed) countries stands in stark contrast with their histories of civil war and – in the case of 
Rwanda – genocide. Furthermore, the emergence of Nigeria as a regional peacemaker is all the more 
important when compared to the period under the former military regime. On the contrary, Guinea, 
Côte d‟Ivoire and Zimbabwe went from relatively good development performers to development 
laggards, which was reflected in growing corruption, reduced government effectiveness, a break with 
the IMF and World Bank, low or negative GDP growth, reduced foreign investment, low or no 
progress regarding the MDGs, etc. Moreover, in Guinea and Zimbabwe, the relative internal stability 
during the Conté and Mugabe regimes was less notable, as internal stability had not been that much of 
an issue. In these countries, the EU may have been less reluctant to suspend development assistance. 
This puts the UK‟s position on negative measures in Zimbabwe further into perspective. Indeed, the 
international sanctions against Mugabe and his government have become a flagship example of the 
UK‟s ethical foreign policy, given the impression of Zimbabwe as a state that is failing in all respects 
(Abrahamsen and Williams 2001: 249). Similarly, in the case of Côte d‟Ivoire (2010-2011), it may 
have been more easy to convince member states of costly negative measures because of the situation 
of civil war, which was causing internal and regional instability and was harming economic growth. 
Moreover, although there was economic development in Niger during President Tandja‟s presidency, 
it was not considered a development success story, there were indications that EU money was not well 
spent and Tandja failed to deal with the Tuareg uprising.  
 
The finding that the EU seems prepared to trade democracy for development is notable. On the one 
hand, it is in line with the idea of the EU as a predominantly „developmental‟ actor, especially under 
the responsibility of the European Commission‟s DG Development. Although attempts have been 
made to assume a more political agenda, the lack of diplomatic capacity has hampered this shift 
(Gibert 2011b). At the same time, the prioritisation of development contradicts the EU‟s own narrative 
that development is not possible without democracy. Does this indicate that there has been a paradigm 
shift away from the ideal state model of market economies combined with liberal democracy towards 
other forms of governance, such as the developmental state model? It is notable that precisely these 
countries where a trade-off between democracy and development was made, namely Ethiopia and 
Rwanda, have been associated with developmental states, either in research (see Asche and Fleischer 
2011; Longman 2011; Hayman 2009a on Rwanda) or by their own governments (see Zenawi 2006). 
Moreover, these governments openly advocate that liberal democracy does not necessarily fit their 
developmental state model. Meles Zenawi has indicated that a long period in power is necessary to 
achieve developmental goals (US Embassy Ethiopia 2006b), while President Kagame prefers 
„performance legitimation‟ based on economic results over seeking votes in competitive elections 
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(Longman 2011: 41). There seems to be a genuine admiration for these models in the donor 
community, namely by aid workers who seem surprised by „how good things work‟ in these countries, 
especially when coming from conflict-ridden countries (Carothers 2010a). However, to suggest a 
paradigm shift is exaggerated. As the new proposals on EU budget support suggest, political 
conditionality is not off the table, not even in countries with sound economic development. Rather, 
there has been a trade-off between democracy and development in practice, while discourse has 
largely remained unchanged.  
 
As mentioned above, the concern for stability somehow played in every case, with few exceptions. 
This may not be surprising. First of all, there is a linkage here between self-interest and normative 
objectives. Supporting internal and regional stability is a way of „helping yourself while helping 
others‟. It is no coincidence that attention for fragile states has emerged in the context of the war on 
terror, which coincided with the realisation that African security problems may have an impact on 
global security. At the same time, perceiving developing countries as a security threat may also be a 
way of legitimising development assistance in a context of aid fatigue (Abrahamsen 2005). Moreover, 
there is a clear humanitarian and developmental reason for the preference for stability, given the 
devastating economic and humanitarian consequences of civil war (see Collier 1999; Stewart and 
Fitzgerald 2001). To conclude, the „stability first‟ principle is shared by development and foreign 
policy. From this perspective, the concern for stability in Ethiopia and Kenya, two key allies in the war 
on terror with a crucial location in the Horn of Africa, can be seen from two angles. On the one hand, 
donors fear the consequences of regional destabilisation for the war on terror, the fight against piracy 
and migration flows into the EU. Moreover, in Kenya in particular, internal instability may have 
security consequences for European citizens, given the relatively large number of European citizens 
(tourists, diplomats, etc.) residing in Kenya. However, even in these countries, the concern for stability 
is not entirely self-interested. In Ethiopia, donors have high regards of the system of ethnic federalism 
that seems to hold the country together. In Kenya, the crisis in 2007-2008, as was discussed in Chapter 
3, provoked a flow of IDPs and refugees and had devastating economic and security implications for 
neighbouring countries.  
 
Furthermore, I identified expectations about effectiveness as an explanatory factor for the EU‟s 
reluctance to impose negative measures. In Eritrea, this factor stood out as the main explanation for 
the EU‟s approach. The relative importance of expectations about effectiveness points to the EU‟s 
reluctance to resort to the sanctions weapon. Furthermore, it suggests that the EU does not apply 
negative measures – and sanctions in particular - merely to „do something‟ to please the public and 
send a signal to other norm violators, but because it actually believes in the potential of this 
instrument. Again, the relatively limited politicisation in decision-making on negative measures in 
some countries may explain this reluctance to use negative measures. It seems that negative measures 
were imposed where a tip-the-balance effect was likely to occur, namely in cases where the 
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government was severely under domestic and international pressure. The position of other actors 
seems particularly relevant. Regional organisations, in particular ECOWAS and the AU, have become 
increasingly active in reacting to political crises. Furthermore, in most cases, the EU was reluctant to 
impose negative measures against governments in a relatively strong domestic position, while it was 
less reluctant to do so in countries were the government was already weakened. This points to a 
paradox in the EU‟s application of negative measures: the more democratic a regime (in the sense of 
openness to civil society, journalists, etc.), the less likely that negative measures will be imposed. 
However, in this regard, international and domestic pressure was also found to affect the outcome. 
Given the importance of other actors, the question could be raised whether the EU has been under 
pressure from these other actors to impose or not to impose negative measures. Similarly, it could be 
argued that the EU‟s willingness to impose negative measures when there is domestic pressure from 
civil society and the opposition is a reaction to pressure from these domestic actors, which are often 
able to influence donor governments, either directly or indirectly via transnational advocacy.  
 
One finding that superseded the different hypotheses was the importance of perception. The success of 
countries like Ethiopia and Rwanda in attracting donor funding lies in the effectiveness of their 
governments in convincing donors that they have to support the foreign policy and internal agenda of 
the government. If they succeed in doing so, some degree of „slippage‟ is most likely to be allowed, 
not only regarding democratisation but also in the field of internal and regional security. Hence, 
although Rwanda and Ethiopia on some occasions posed a threat for regional stability and despite 
grievances amongst some ethnical groups, the main idea seems to be that these are strong states and 
trustworthy allies in regional politics. Recipient governments are no passive bystanders in this process, 
but actively feed the perception that they are the best guarantee for economic development, internal 
stability, the war on terror, regional stability, etc. Furthermore, the idea that positive measures are 
more effective than negative measures is also a perception that is strengthened by the governments‟ 
forceful reaction to criticism. This active image management of partner countries runs counter to the 
idea that developing countries are weak and donors do as they please. It is surprising that the countries 
that have been most effective in image management, Ethiopia and Rwanda, are aid dependent. It could 
even be argued that non-aid dependent countries have fewer incentives to engage in image 
management (Fisher 2011: 352-353). Apart from the recipient governments, other international actors 
may equally influence the perception of the EU. As such, the large presence of DfID, USAID and the 
World Bank in Ethiopia and Rwanda may equally explain why the EU – just like those other donors – 
perceives these countries as „examples‟. Similarly, it is no surprise that the EU and France have been 
taking the same line regarding the position to assume in Chad. It seems that France has convinced the 
European Commission and other member states (Germany in particular) of the fact that there is no 
alternative to the current government.  
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A last element that should be noted is path dependency. The robustness of negative measures in 
Zimbabwe can be interpreted from this perspective. Mugabe has been depicted so negatively by the 
donor community, media and civil society organisations that there is no way back. Especially in UK 
circles, the question of what to do about Zimbabwe is off the table, and the search for an alternative 
strategy to negative measures is avoided. To quote an FCO official: „People in the FCO don‟t want to 
hear about options for what to do with Zimbabwe or to understand what is really happening there – the 
whole thing is just such a mess‟ (cited in: Gallagher 2009: 441). Moreover, this image of Mugabe as a 
„useless dictator‟ has also been picked up by the media and public opinion, which makes it more 
difficult for the UK (and hence EU) to lift the negative measures as long as Mugabe remains in place. 
This clearly appeared in recent discussions in February 2012 when, despite the position of some 
member states that sanctions should be eased given the progress in development and the lack of 
effectiveness of the sanctions, only a limited lifting of the sanctions was agreed. An analogy can be 
made here with the US embargo against Cuba, which has survived for more than fifty years, despite 
the clear lack of effectiveness of this strategy (Nincic 2011: 113).  
 
Furthermore, path dependency may also work the other way around. Once developing countries have 
received the status of „success stories‟ or „oasis of stability‟, it is difficult to back away from this 
rhetoric. Suspending aid would bring attention to all the money already invested in the country, while 
it is often easier to dismiss small outbursts of criticism in the logic that „the show must go on‟. Of 
course, this can only work when donors can keep up the perception of success stories in the public 
opinion, against the concern raised by human rights organisations, or when there is no real interest 
from public opinion. In this sense, it is no surprise that the UK‟s flagship countries (Ethiopia and 
Rwanda) are no former colonies, unlike countries that are not regarded as success stories (Kenya, 
Zimbabwe). These effects of path dependency can help to explain why partner countries can 
sometimes derive from the norm and still go unpunished.   
 
6.3. The importance of specific actors in decision-making 
In the empirical analysis of the cases, I only referred to those member states that hold a particular 
interest in the countries concerned, e.g. former colonial powers or countries with a commercial or 
security interest. However, in a number of cases I found that other EU actors equally played a role in 
the decision-making, often regardless of their self-interest. These other actors included member states, 
the European Commission or key persons. As regards the other member states, I discovered that in 
some cases, the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Germany sometimes acted as „Normative 
Powers‟. In Zimbabwe, for example, the UK was far from the only member state favouring a hard line. 
Indeed, a leaked cable from the US embassy in Zimbabwe noted Germany and Denmark as the 
hardliners on Zimbabwe in 2002 (US Embassy Zimbabwe 2002b). According to Laakso and others, 
the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Germany and the UK all favoured negative measures against 
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Zimbabwe. Especially the role of Sweden should be noted, given that it held the Council Presidency in 
the first half of 2001 (Laakso et al. 2007a: 70).  
 
In Guinea, the role of Swedish Special Representative Hans Dahlgren was notable. As was argued by 
Laakso and others: „the concurrence of Denmark‟s incumbency as EU President, a Dane in the role of 
Commissioner, and Dahlgren‟s role strengthened the voice of these two member states‟ (Laakso et al. 
2007a: 84). While these actors have helped to place the political crisis in Guinea on the EU‟s agenda, 
the role of Germany eventually seemed decisive. In June 2003, Germany refused to sign a new 
Country Strategy Paper in the EDF committee (Laakso et al. 2007a: 84-85). The European 
Commission then proposed to invoke Article 96 consultations to have a legal basis to suspend 
development assistance (Laakso et al. 2007b: 46).  
 
In the case of Kenya and Rwanda, the Netherlands played a role in agenda-setting. In Kenya, the 
Netherlands took the initiative for Council Conclusions in 2009. In Rwanda, the few public 
declarations the EU has made about violations of democratic principles occurred during the Dutch 
Presidency in the second half of 2004.  
 
In a number of case studies, the European Commission particularly shaped the EU position on 
negative measures. This was the case in Eritrea. The lack of strong preferences about what do to in 
Eritrea amongst member states has enabled the European Commission to take a lead on Eritrea, which 
can explain why engagement is preferred. It is notable that most of the member states present in 
Eritrea (UK, the Netherlands, Germany) were frustrated by this approach (US Embassy Eritrea 
2007b), but did not express this frustration by strongly opposing the position of the Commission. 
When meeting President Afewerki on development cooperation in 2008, Louis Michel was criticised 
by the UK and German ambassadors. Michel reportedly responded that the European Commission is 
simply the executive branch of the EU and is not in a position to put conditions on foreign aid (US 
Embassy Eritrea 2008c). Those member states that were most frustrated by the Commission‟s 
approach have long left, including Denmark, whose embassy closed in 2001 (Olsen 2011: 98). 
Similarly, in Ethiopia, the European Commission is strongly in favour of engagement, even more so 
than the member states. This was recently seen when the member states opposed the Commission‟s 
plan to return to general budget support (see Chapter 3).  
 
Given that negative measures are rather exceptional, there should be sufficient „push (f)actors‟ in order 
to have negative measures. As regards push actors, Smith argues that some member states should push 
for EU action: „EU action depends on member states‟ agreement; without it, some countries will not 
be targeted‟ (Smith 2007: 157). However, the role of the European Commission also matters, since it 
was found to take a lead when development programmes were under threat. This was the case in Niger 
(2009), as I have argued in Chapter 3.  
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In sum, individual member states with low self-interest and/or the European Commission can in some 
cases define the EU‟s general approach. As regards member states, the Nordic countries (Sweden, 
Finland, Denmark), Germany and the Netherlands have a tradition in being active on human rights 
issues and have development cooperation offices and embassies in many sub-Saharan African 
countries (Olsen 2011: 94). The position of Germany is especially important in this regard, as it has 
diplomatic representation and development cooperation in most African countries (Gibert 2011a: 182). 
Given the lack of hard economic and strategic interests in most sub-Saharan African countries, values 
shape Germany‟s Africa policy much more than self-interest. This can explain the relatively strict 
implementation of political conditionality by Germany in the 1990s (Mair 1998; Mair 2002; Hofmeier 
2002; Engel 2005). Even writing in 2007, Golaszinski did not expect a „realpolitical‟ German policy to 
emerge given the lack of economic relations and military threat with and from sub-Saharan African 
countries (Golaszinski 2007: 12-13). The importance of Nordic countries, the Netherlands and 
Germany was clearly reflected in the recent discussions on EU budget support and political 
conditionality (see Introductory Chapter). Especially the Netherlands and Germany pushed for 
increased political conditionality in EU budget support (anonymous interviews, January-February 
2012).  
 
However, this „push‟ by Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Germany has been exercised unevenly. 
For example, Germany pushed for negative measures in some cases (Guinea, Zimbabwe), whereas in 
others (Chad, Eritrea), it did not. Similarly, the Netherlands pushed for negative measures in Kenya 
and Rwanda, but to my knowledge it has not done so in other cases. This uneven effect can be 
explained by the role of ambassadors, as well as domestic pressure. According to diplomats accredited 
to Nairobi, the role played by the Netherlands in EU policies in Kenya was related to the strong 
interest of the Dutch ambassador. In Guinea, the German ambassador in Conakry was strongly in 
favour of the decision not to endorse Guinea‟s CSP in the EDF committee, while his successor (July 
2003-July 2006) was opposed to the decision (Laakso et al. 2007a: 85). In the case of Rwanda, the 
Netherlands is under substantial domestic pressure, given that the Netherlands engages in development 
cooperation activities in Rwanda, and Victoire Ingabire, the leader of the Forces Démocratique 
Unifiées who was arrested when trying to participate in the 2010 presidential elections, spent 
seventeen years in the Netherlands (Radio Nederland Wereldomroep 2011, September; Zorbas 2011: 
111).  
 
The importance of personalities is particularly interesting, given that it played on several levels. At 
country level, the head of the delegation of the European Commission - now EU - may play an 
important role. This was the case in Chad, where a change in head of EU delegation in 2006 led to 
increased efforts of democratisation, although positive measures were still preferred. Whereas his 
predecessor Cremeur had hardly focused on democratisation, Gilles Desesquelles started political 
dialogue which led to the August 2007 political agreement. In Ethiopia, the EU was more vocal on 
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democracy issues when Tim Clarke was head of delegation than under his successor Xavier Marchal. 
The background of the heads of delegation also plays a role: Marchal‟s profile was predominantly 
developmental (agriculture), while Clarke‟s experience included more political issues (anonymous 
interview, January 2012). In Chad, Desesquelles had previous experience with political dialogue in 
other countries as head of delegation, while his predecessor had not. The importance of personalities is 
supported by the research of Gibert, who found a „human dimension‟ in EU policies in West Africa. 
She argues that, while EU policies in Africa have become more political on paper, due to the lack of 
transformation of the delegations from an essentially technical to a more diplomatic mission, their role 
in political and security matters depends on the willingness and determination of the head of mission 
to encourage the delegation to acquire capacities in political analysis (Gibert 2011a: 183). Although 
this may have changed with the transformation from European Commission to European Union 
delegations, this factor could still play a role given that in many EU delegations, the same head of 
delegation – often a former Commission official – remained in function, often without additional staff 
from the EEAS or member states. This was mentioned in several interviews with staff members from 
delegations and member states‟ embassies.  
 
The role of personalities also plays at the highest levels of decision-making, namely the Commissioner 
responsible for Development and presidents and foreign ministers in member states. Although the 
changing context and learning mechanisms also play a role, Commissioners Paul Nielson, Louis 
Michel, Karel De Gucht and Andris Piebalgs had a different view on political conditionality. Under 
Nielson (1999-2004), conditionality was applied much more enthusiastically when compared to 
Michel‟s time in office (2004-2009). Louis Michel favoured political dialogue and was a staunch 
proponent of budget support, even in non-democratic countries. Again, the background of these key 
decision-makers plays a role: as a Belgian Foreign Minister, Michel was known for his pragmatic 
approach towards Belgian former colonies (e.g. the DRC, see Chapter 4). In comparison, Michel‟s 
successor Karel De Gucht (2009-2010) was known to be quite critical towards African countries that 
fail to respect human rights and democratic principles, which was shown during his time as Belgian 
Foreign Minister. The recent Commission proposals on budget support and political conditionality 
suggest that current Commissioner Andris Piebalgs (2010 onwards) is less reluctant than Michel to 
apply political conditionality. In the case of France, President Chirac (1995-2007) had a more neo-
colonial view on French Africa relations. However, the cohabitation between President Chirac and 
socialist prime minister Lionel Jospin (1997-2002) led to a less interventionist approach in the crisis in 
Côte d‟Ivoire. President Sarkozy‟s lack of affinity with sub-Saharan Africa and his personal 
preference for a pragmatic approach based on commercial and security rather than historical interests 
was also believed to play a role in defining his Africa policies. In individual countries such as Chad, 
Sarkozy‟s Presidency concurred with a shift to a more Europeanised approach. In the UK, Prime 
Minister Tony Blair‟s focus on sub-Saharan Africa was also inspired by a personal conviction. Even 
the leadership of the Department for International Development seemed influential: as was discussed 
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in Chapter 3, Clare Short‟s personal enthusiasm about promising African leaders such as Paul Kagame 
and Meles Zenawi played a role in the UK‟s position towards these countries.  
 
6.4. Validity of the findings 
By choosing a relatively large number of cases, I have tried to ensure potential for generalisation to 
other sub-Saharan African countries where violations of democratic principles have taken place since 
2000. However, this then raises the question whether these conclusions are also valid in other regions. 
As was noted in the introduction, the sub-Saharan African context is quite particular. First, the 
commercial and security interests of member states in sub-Saharan Africa are likely to be smaller than 
in other regions. Second, as I have argued in Chapter 4, French attempts to maintain its sphere of 
influence have been more successful in sub-Saharan Africa than in other former colonies, indicating 
that this particular form of self-interest is more likely to occur in former French colonies in sub-
Saharan Africa. Third, there is an institutional difference with other regions (except for the Caribbean 
and the Pacific), given that the European Commission‟s DG Development (now DG DEVCO) is 
responsible for relations with sub-Saharan Africa, which is more „development oriented‟ than other 
DGs. Moreover, Louis Michel‟s focus on engagement and dialogue is also particular for the ACP 
context. This difference, however, may change with the EEAS.  
 
Furthermore, my research focused on the EU, which raises the question whether these conclusions can 
be applied to other donors. There are many who argue that for the EU, and for the European 
Commission in particular, development cooperation is its way of affirming Normative Power and 
appearing as a „force for good‟ in the world. Compared to other donors, however, the EU is less 
vulnerable to pressure from public opinion (Molenaers and Nijs 2011: 419-420). Indeed, the 
Commission (and now EEAS) has important decision-making powers regarding democracy 
promotion, while it is not directly accountable to the public. Moreover, the EP does not have a say in 
the spending of EDF funding. Hence, at least in the period investigated in this dissertation, EU 
decision-making was less politicised than that of most other donors. This is an important difference 
with, for example, the US, where development cooperation is much more scrutinised by Congress. For 
this reason, the US – unlike the EU – does not often provide budget support (OECD 2006: 63-67). 
Compared to the former colonial powers, the EU may be less vulnerable to historical interests, while 
negative measures at the EU level may be perceived as more legitimate than interventions by the 
member states (Hyde-Price 222-223; Gibert 2011a: 192). Indeed, although there were many cases 
where strong historical interests were translated into the EU‟s approach, there were equally cases 
where the position of the EU differed from that of the former coloniser (Niger, Guinea). Former 
colonial powers are also more likely to be influenced by the public opinion, given that political, 
economic and humanitarian crises in former colonies are more often picked up by the media. In 
Chapter 3, cross-comparisons were often made with the UK‟s DfID, which is equally seen as little 
284 
 
vulnerable to pressure from public opinion and from the FCO. In the case of Rwanda, the lack of 
pressure from diaspora has made it easier for DfID to pursue autonomous policies, based on 
developmental concerns (Zorbas 2011: 111). In this regard, it should be mentioned that current 
Secretary of State for International Development Andrew Mitchell has publicly voiced his hopes that 
the UK would become a development superpower (Beswick 2011: 1912) 
 
Moreover, clear differences can be expected between the EU on the one hand and the Nordic 
countries, the Netherlands and Germany on the other. The latter seem to have concerns over 
democracy higher up their agenda. Moreover, in some of these countries, decision-making is more 
politicised. In the case of Germany, for example, the parliament has to agree with each programme of 
general budget support (anonymous interview, February 2012). In the Netherlands, it seems that the 
parliament closely scrutinises development assistance, as was the case with Rwanda.  
 
6.5. Suggestions for further research 
This dissertation started from the observation that there has only been limited research so far on the 
possible motivations of donors in the application (or non-application) of negative measures in sub-
Saharan Africa. While recent research has focused on individual cases (e.g. Fisher 2012; Reyntjens 
2010; Hayman 2009b), comparative studies are still lacking. I would therefore encourage other 
researchers to fill this empirical gap and conduct comparative research on negative measures against 
developing countries. Although I have only focused on the EU, there has equally been little 
comparative research on other donors. It would be particularly interesting to focus on the US, which 
does not have an explicit ethical or normative foreign policy, is generally seen as a laggard in the aid 
effectiveness agenda and has a more politicised decision-making process on negative measures. While 
this dissertation has examined the motivations of EU member states, it has done so only in a limited 
way, namely to comprehend or speculate about their position within the EU. It would, however, be 
relevant to look at specific member states‟ bilateral decisions on negative measures. As regards aid 
suspension, this remains a bilateral competence and member states have not always followed the EU‟s 
aid suspension. Although French and UK Africa policies have been discussed extensively in the 
literature (see Chapter 4), these studies touch on all aspects of French and UK Africa relations, rather 
than on aid conditionality in particular.  
 
It would even be more original to focus on those member states that are often forgotten in the 
literature: the Nordic countries, Germany and the Netherlands. Especially Germany is an interesting 
player, given its wide presence in sub-Saharan Africa, combined with a rather low self-interest in most 
sub-Saharan African countries. Given that Germany is the largest contributor to the EDF (Council of 
the EU 2006: 34), research on how it may influence decision-making on EU aid suspensions seems 
important.   
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Moreover, the Nordic countries have in other studies also been mentioned as drivers in political 
conditionality, such as in Kenya in the early 1990s (Olsen 1998: 353-357). It would be interesting to 
see how and under which conditions these member states may influence the EU‟s position on political 
conditionality. The literature on small member states provides an interesting approach in this regard 
(Olsen 2011; Nasra 2011).  
 
Apart from those member states that may push for negative measures, those that traditionally pull 
towards positive measures should not be overlooked. Besides France, these are Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and Belgium. With a few exceptions (Calchi Novati 2008 on Italy, Meyer 2010 on Spain), I did not 
find many studies on the Africa policies of these member states, despite their colonial history in Africa 
(Italy, Belgium, Spain, Portugal), potential interest in energy supply (Italy with ENI, Spain with 
Repsol) and concerns about illegal migration. The new member states, which are starting to establish 
embassies in sub-Saharan Africa, may also become influential. The history of these member states, 
which only recently experienced democratic transition, makes them more prone to encourage 
democratisation abroad. Here, Polish efforts to create a European Endowment for Democracy are 
notable (Petrova 2012). Still, the interest of these member states in sub-Saharan Africa of course 
remains relatively small, when compared to the Eastern Neighbourhood.  
 
When trying to analyse the influence of member states on the European level, one should not only take 
into account decision-making in Brussels but also within the member states. Given that the little 
politicisation in EU decision-making on some countries has made the EU more prone to focus on 
developmental concerns, it would be interesting to see whether this is also the case in some of the 
member states, where public opinion can be expected to be more important. In Chapters 4 and 5, the 
importance of public opinion, pro-democratic forces and transnational activism came to the fore. In the 
case of historical interests, it was concluded that former colonial powers are sometimes more likely to 
impose negative measures when they are under pressure from public opinion. The latter may include 
the general public, diaspora groups or a vocal parliament. Moreover, in the last Chapter, I found that 
the EU is more likely to impose negative measures when there is significant pressure from domestic 
pro-democratic forces. While I have put only limited focus on public opinion and domestic pro-
democratic forces, I believe both elements merit further attention in the study on the motivations for 
the EU (and other international actors) to impose negative measures. There is already an important 
literature on how transnational advocacy networks may provoke norm diffusion (e.g. Risse et al. 1999; 
Keck and Sikkink 1998), but to my knowledge these theories have not or rarely been applied to the 
EU‟s democracy promotion or to the issue of double standards. Nonetheless, one of the earliest 
volumes on human rights and foreign policy mentions the role of public opinion as a potential cause 
for double standards: „It is true that this domestic push to include human rights in foreign policy is 
likely to result in the human rights of some individuals and groups abroad being taken up with more 
enthusiasm than others‟ (Vincent 1986: 142). Studies on individual EU member states have sometimes 
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taken into account the pressure exercised by public opinion (Feliu 2004; Cumming 2000a). While the 
EU is an extremely complicated case to investigate the effect of transnational advocacy networks, 
given the many levels and institutions at which public opinion and advocacy groups may exercise 
pressure, it seems worthwhile to engage in this endeavour. Research could, for example, focus on two 
case studies, one where transnational advocacy has had little effect on the policies of donors (e.g. 
Rwanda, Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea) and one where advocacy has influenced donors (e.g. Kenya, 
Zimbabwe). Focusing on a small number of cases would allow to identify the main actors pushing for 
democratic reform within the country (opposition, civil society, trade unions, etc.) and within the 
member states (diaspora, NGOs, parliament, media, etc.). In this regard, especially the UK seems an 
interesting donor to investigate. In Chapter 4, the importance of public opinion and diaspora groups in 
the UK was underlined when discussing the case of Zimbabwe. Several studies have acknowledged 
the potential influence of African diaspora groups on UK Africa policies (Cargill 2011: 16; Styan 
2007: 1185-1186), but the extent to which this influenced the UK‟s democracy promotion has not been 
sufficiently investigated.  
 
In doing this, it would be useful to take institutional factors into account. Indeed, given the influence 
of development norms on decision-making on negative measures, it would be interesting to see 
whether „turf wars‟ may emerge between development cooperation agencies and Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs. Furthermore, the influence of nongovernmental organisations and national parliaments 
deserves further attention. Earlier studies have indicated that the difference between French and UK 
practices of political conditionality stems from the fact that the UK parliament has a larger say in 
Africa policies when compared to France (Cumming 2000a). It would be interesting to compare the 
role of the parliament in the position on negative measures in other member states. Especially 
Germany stands out in this regard. As I have argued earlier when referring to budget support, the 
German federal parliament has an important influence on development assistance.  
 
Related to this is the potential impact of institutional changes within the EU. Indeed, the establishment 
of the EEAS will without any doubt have an impact on the relation between development and foreign 
policies, and many would argue this will be in the direction of more foreign policy rather than more 
development. It will be interesting to see, in a few years‟ time, whether this will be the case. 
Moreover, the growing role of the European Parliament in foreign policy could also be considered 
(Smith 2004b). In the light of current discussions on whether to include the EDF in the EU budget 
(Maxwell and Herbert 2012), the EP may become more important in the future.  
 
I have indicated that perceptions can be influenced by actors (diplomats, aid workers) in the field. 
Extensive field work with aid officials and diplomats could reveal how this happens and to what extent 
socialisation may influence donor perceptions, to the degree that these perceptions might even 
supersede previous preferences and self-interested motivations. Comparative case study research 
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would be advisable, comparing countries where intensive donor coordination takes place (more 
chances to socialisation) to countries where donor coordination is less developed (less chances to 
socialisation).  
 
Such efforts could also respond to another question raised in this dissertation: is the EU a leader or a 
follower in the use of negative measures as a reaction to violations of democratic principles? In 
Chapter 5, this question was raised when discussing the importance of other actors and EU leverage in 
EU decision-making. In cases where the EU in itself does not have significant leverage, other actors 
may push the EU towards negative measures, or pull the EU towards positive measures. Similarly, in 
cases where the EU has leverage, it may push or pull other actors towards its preferred strategy. 
Comparative research could investigate under which conditions the EU may be successful in 
influencing the strategy of other actors. In doing this, the position of African regional organisations 
seems particularly important. Especially ECOWAS has in some cases taken an explicitly pro-sanctions 
stance. It is most likely that further political integration and the socialisation of norms in these 
organisations will make this role even more important in the future. While research has mostly focused 
on EU support for regional integration in the security sphere (e.g. Sicurelli 2010), it seems equally 
important to focus on how the EU and regional organisations cooperate in democracy and human 
rights. More specifically, the question could be raised whether ECOWAS has become a „leader‟ in 
international sanctions in political crises in West Africa.  
 
Furthermore, my research has revealed that partner countries, even aid recipient countries, are no 
passive bystanders when it comes to aid conditionality. This reflects earlier research on African 
agency (Fisher 2011; Fisher 2012; Whitfield 2009). Again, comparative case study research could 
investigate under which conditions recipient countries are able to influence donor positions on 
negative measures. Moreover, as many of those countries where negative measures have been applied 
were located in West Africa, it would be interesting to investigate this particular factor in West 
African countries: why have these governments not been able to avoid negative measures? These 
examples of field research should also take into account the possible influence of personal preferences 
and capabilities. As was noted supra, personal preferences can sometimes explain donor behaviour, 
but I was not able to systematically investigate this in my research. Comparative case study analysis 
could reveal under which circumstances this effect is likely to occur.  
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6.6. Personal reflections on the findings  
 
„Operating with the term structural stability [...] means to give expression to the fact 
that working towards economic development alone is insufficient for an effective 
policy of peace-building and conflict prevention, that the policy goals sustainable 
development, democracy and human rights, viable political structures, healthy social 
conditions and healthy environmental conditions are interdependent which implies the 
need for a comprehensive approach‟ (European Commission 1996).  
 
As I have argued, while EU policies rely on a belief in the mutual link between democracy, 
development and stability, trade-offs are easily made, to the detriment of democracy. The above-
mentioned quote from the European Commission‟s 1996 Communication on Conflict Prevention in 
Africa reiterates that democracy is a vital aspect of sustainable peace and development. This quote 
suggests that downgrading democratisation entails a number of risks that may prove to „do harm‟ 
(Manners 2008: 58) in the long term.  
 
It is clear that, by focussing on internal stability and development rather than on democracy, the EU 
ignores its self-proclaimed agendas of structural stability, human security and democratic governance, 
which are based on the nexus between democracy, development and stability. Indeed, the notion of 
„structural stability‟ sees democracy as one of the root causes of stability. In Chapter 3 it was noted 
that restrictions of civil-political rights may cause serious grievances amongst the population, which 
may lead to conflict. Similarly, the EU does not respect its objective of „human security‟, which 
entails a focus on human rights and a legitimate political authority (Study Group on Europe‟s Security 
Capabilities 2004: 14-15). Lastly, despite the recent shift towards a more political interpretation of 
governance (cfr. the recent focus on „democratic governance‟), the main focus of the EU has been on 
the technocratic and socio-economic aspects of governance. To the extent that political governance is 
considered, the EU underlines political stability rather than democracy.  
 
The democracy-stability trade-off is accompanied by some serious risks. I found plenty of examples 
where civil-political rights were restricted for the sake of stability. The clearest example of this is 
Rwanda, where liberal democracy is subordinated to national unity and reconciliation and political 
rights can only be tolerated to the extent that they do not pose a threat to internal stability. However, 
this entails that governments may dismiss dissenting voices as a threat to national security. In 
Ethiopia, the violence against demonstrators in 2005 was justified as preventing a genocide in the 
country. In Chad, the turmoil that followed the February 2008 coup attempt was abused by the 
government to arrest three members of the opposition. In Côte d‟Ivoire, Gbagbo accused his main 
opponents, Robert Guei and Alassane Ouattara, of having plotted the September 2002 attack. In 
Guinea, armed attacks in Guinée forestière in 2000 were used to justify the postponement of 
289 
 
legislative elections (McGovern 2002). While for some countries, including Rwanda and Ethiopia, 
these violations of democratic principles are tolerated for the sake of internal stability, several authors 
have pointed to the longer-term risks of grievances amongst marginalised ethnic groups (see Reyntjens 
2010; Silva-Leander 2008 on Rwanda, Abbink 2009 on Ethiopia).  
 
As regards the prioritisation of development over democracy, there is the risk that development aid is 
politicised. This seemed to be the case in Ethiopia, where Human Rights Watch found that public 
services had been denied to opposition supporters. Moreover, governments may also violate 
democratic principles for the sake of development. This strategy was unsuccessfully attempted by 
Niger‟s President Tandja, who built his campaign around the idea of Tazarche (Let‟s continue). As the 
US ambassador to Niger stated in a leaked cable: „Tandja says he wants to leave a clear conscience 
that he has left the country of Niger in good hands and that the wealth from the nation‟s natural 
resources (oil, uranium) benefits the people‟ (US embassy Niger 2009f). Apart from trying to remain 
in power to continue a developmental project, non-democratic governments also often violate 
democratic principles in the pursuit of economic development. In Rwanda, a programme of forced 
villagisation in 1999 led to the displacement of tens of thousands of people (Marriage 2006: 482). A 
more recent example is Ethiopia, where the government has recently started a drastic programme of 
forced displacement in the Gambella region (Human Rights Watch 2012).  
 
In both situations of trade-offs, and especially in the trade-off between democracy and development, 
there is a risk that is inherent in the Normative Power Europe principle, namely that identity politics 
become more important than altruism, or that „being good‟ becomes more important than „doing 
good‟. One could argue that the EU, by promoting itself as a Development Power Europe, has become 
more driven by this normative self-image than by the desire to bring development in the world. Vogt 
refers to this as the bodybuilder problem. For bodybuilders, the size of their muscles becomes more 
important than what these muscles can be used for, because they believe that the shape of their body 
will ensure respect in the eyes of the others (Vogt 2006: 173-174). Applied to development assistance, 
the image created through development activities becomes more important than the impact of these 
activities. From this perspective, the EU has incorporated development norms and now acts according 
to these norms, ignoring realities that may run counter to its developmental agenda. Although this 
argument could also be made about actors that are not generally seen as normative powers, such as the 
US, the fact that the EU provides such a large part of its aid via budget support makes it more 
vulnerable to such claims. At the same time, the recent shift to more conditional budget support shows 
that the tides are turning, albeit to a limited extent. However, the main drive here was public opinion, 
rather than an acknowledgement of the risks involved in non-political budget support. Furthermore, 
the EU acts somewhat against its belief in the democratic peace theory by supporting non-democratic 
governments that are not genuinely committed to peacebuilding in the region. This was observed in 
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the case of Rwanda, Ethiopia and Chad, where – despite efforts to present themselves as peacebuilders 
– governments have on occasions exercised a destabilising influence on neighbouring countries.  
Furthermore, the prioritisation of security interests has potential negative effects. It has been argued 
that governments have increasingly used terrorism for political ends, defending old security paradigms 
that prioritise regime stability over human security (Makinda 2006; Kagwanja 2006). Indeed, in 
several countries anti-terrorism legislation has been introduced, which provides an opportunity for 
governments to suppress opponents or insurgencies by designating these groups as terrorist 
organisations. In Ethiopia, for example, anti-terrorism legislation is increasingly being used to stifle 
the independent press and the opposition. As was mentioned in Chapter 3, both the ONLF and OLF 
were depicted as terrorist organisations (Kagwanja 2006: 78). An Amnesty International report found 
that from March to December 2011, at least 108 opposition party members and six journalists were 
arrested for alleged involvement with terrorist groups (Amnesty International 2011a). The most 
striking application of the law was in December 2011, when two Swedish journalists were found 
guilty by an Ethiopian court on charges of „supporting terrorism‟ after they had met with members of 
the ONLF (Amnesty International 2011b). Similar tactics were used by Eritrea‟s Afewerki, who 
labelled his dissident party members as terrorists (Kagwanja 2006: 78) and accused the exiled 
opposition group Alliance of Eritrean National Forces of links with Al Qaeda (Adebajo 2003: 181). 
When interviewed about the arrest of the dissidents in 2001, Afewerki declared: „It had nothing to do 
with views, ideas, opinion but our national security was in danger. We had to take the appropriate 
measures to defend the nation and its sovereignty‟ (cited in Kibreab 2009: 39). Similarly, Zimbabwe‟s 
Mugabe assigned terrorist status to journalists writing about political violence (Whitaker 2007: 1028).  
 
While the predominance of the former colonial power in EU decision-making on former colonies may 
seem logical, it is also often problematic. In some cases, the former colonial power may have more 
leverage than the EU, namely when it enjoys close relations with the government. However, in many 
situations the opposite occurs: relations are problematic precisely because of colonial history. 
Moreover, apart from the recipient governments, negative measures may also be perceived as a form 
of neo-colonialist intervention by the population. This was the case in Zimbabwe, where negative 
measures were highly unpopular amongst part of the public opinion. Hence, while former colonial 
powers may try to „use‟ the EU to address their second-order concerns in the belief that this will be 
perceived as more legitimate (Hyde-Price 2006), the opposite appears to be true. Because these 
interventions are so obviously driven by the former colonial power, they are perceived as less 
legitimate.  
 
Lastly, the EU‟s focus on positive measures as the most effective strategy for democracy promotion 
also entails a number of risks. The EU‟s hope that positive measures could be an effective strategy to 
encourage democratisation has proven to be wrong. In none of the cases where the EU has favoured 
positive measures (Eritrea, Chad, Rwanda, Ethiopia), has the democratisation record improved. On the 
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contrary, in countries like Eritrea, Ethiopia and Rwanda, an increased closure of political space has 
been noted (see Chapter 2). Even in Chad, where the implementation of the August 2007 political 
agreement is considered as finalised, the electoral crisis has not been resolved: the 2011 presidential 
elections were again boycotted by the opposition and the share of the ruling party has remained equal 
in the 2011 legislative elections. This is because the effectiveness of positive measures strongly 
depends on the political will of target countries to democratise. When this will is lacking, as it is the 
case in most non-democratic countries, political dialogue is limited to mere rhetoric, while capacity-
building will simply result in „cosmetic reforms‟, for example by supporting partisan „democratic 
institutions‟. This is the case in Ethiopia, where the EU finances the „Democratic Institutions 
Programme‟, which involves purely technical capacity-building for parliament, judiciary, ombudsman, 
human rights commission, etc. (Human Rights Watch 2010d: 33 and 70-71). Non-democratic 
governments are well aware of the potentially threatening aspect of some democracy promotion 
activities, including support for civil society, election observation or the independent media. For this 
reason, a growing „backlash‟ against democracy assistance has been observed in recent years, which 
has resulted in a reduced marge de manoeuvre for democracy assistance in sensitive areas (Carothers 
2010b). When it comes to political dialogue, member states‟ and EU officials interviewed for this 
dissertation have been generally sceptical of the potential impact of this dialogue. In the case of 
Ethiopia, political dialogue is limited to two meetings per year with the Prime Minister, where 
member states‟ representatives were found to sit as „chickens in a row‟, while Meles counters all the 
concerns that are raised (anonymous interview, January 2011). In other cases, such as Rwanda, 
interviewees suggested that dialogue was fruitful, but could only name commitments made, rather than 
concrete achievements (anonymous interviews, January 2012). Hence, rather than a strategy for 
change, political dialogue seems confined to a mere „Q &A‟ between the EU and partner countries.  
 
6.7. A look at the future  
I have indicated that the time period investigated in this dissertation entails some particularities. This 
raises the question whether my conclusions could remain valid in the future. Although it is impossible 
to predict the future, my research has indicated that norms, self-interest and considerations of 
effectiveness easily change over time. From this perspective, my educated guess is that the 
conclusions from this dissertation cannot simply be replicated in another timing and context. Indeed, 
there are already indications that times are changing. A potentially influential factor is the Arab 
revolutions, which inevitably have an impact on how democratisation processes are interpreted by the 
EU and on how support to authoritarian regimes is perceived in the public opinion. As noted in the 
first Chapter, this is already influencing the EU‟s position on political conditionality, as was recently 
shown in the new proposals on budget support. Apart from its effect on the position of the EU, the 
Arab revolutions may also be interpreted as a „fourth wave of democratisation‟, which inspires pro-
democratic forces in other countries. While the spill-overs of the Arab revolutions in sub-Saharan 
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Africa are – after all – limited, there have been protests against rising food and full prices in countries 
like Nigeria and Uganda. In this context it should also be added that African political integration is 
likely to continue. These conditions may thus create a context where EU negative measures could „tip 
the balance‟ towards democratisation and where pressure on the EU to respond to democratisation 
processes is mounting.  
 
Another aspect to take into account is the financial crisis that has swept across EU since 2008 and 
continues to lead to austerity measures, including in the development budget. This has made the EU 
focus more on the impact of aid and deliver accountability to the taxpayers, as can be seen in the 2011 
Agenda for Change (European Commission 2011g) and the rather weak position of the European 
Commission during the fourth OECD High level forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (New Europe 
2011, November). The reducing budget and related public scrutiny of development assistance is likely 
to lead to aid suspensions in non-democratic countries. In this context, the growing influence of the EP 
should be underlined. The EP is becoming increasingly active on human rights and democratisation in 
sub-Saharan Africa, although formally it does not yet have a say in the spending of the EDF. At the 
time of writing, the EP is demanding that EU aid for elections in the DRC is made conditional on 
democratic reform (De Morgen 2012, June). Moreover, the question of a possible „budgetisation‟ of 
the EDF, which would make the EDF subject to approval of the EP, has recently been put on the table 
by a number of member states (Maxwell and Herbert 2012).  
 
While these examples suggest that political conditionality may come „back in fashion‟, there are also 
indications that this will not be the case. The institutional context has drastically changed with the 
establishment of the EEAS and the new EU delegations in the field. There are already signs of 
contradictions between the EEAS, which directs the EU‟s foreign policy, and DG DEVCO, which is in 
charge of development objectives (Laporte 2012: 3). Moreover, the war on terror will have an 
increasing impact on the EU‟s Africa policies. Indeed, the interventions of Western actors to fight 
terrorism and to overcome state failure in Somalia have been counterproductive. A similar effect can 
be noted in the Sahel, where there has been an upsurge of terrorist activities by AQIM in the last three 
years, and in northern Nigeria, where Boko Haram has recently started activities. This is already 
leading to an approach that is more focused on „hard‟ security issues, similar to that of the US. In 
January 2012, Catherine Ashton offered counter-terrorism assistance in Nigeria (allAfrica 2012, 
January). The military coup in Mali in March 2012 has further accelerated this evolution, and EU 
military advisors have recently been sent to the north of Niger as part of the EU‟s plans to provide 
counter-terrorism training to Nigerien forces (Reuters 2012, June). Although the two recent strategies 
on security and development (European External Action Service 2011; Council of the EU 2011e) set 
forth the EU‟s specific „developmental‟ approach to the security-development nexus, they cannot 
conceal that terrorism has become a crucial issue for the EU in sub-Saharan Africa. Apart from the 
EU, the member states are also increasingly focusing on counter-terrorism in Africa, including France 
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in the Sahel. Taking these evolutions into account, security interests may become more important in 
defining the EU‟s position on political conditionality. Lastly, the influence of the BRICs in sub-
Saharan Africa is unlikely to diminish in the near future. In this context, political conditionality may 
be further downgraded, out of fear for losing ground to these new actors, and because the extent to 
which aid can provide leverage is in any case diminishing. 
 
While it is not entirely clear what the future will bring, the question of double standards is likely to 
remain important. The pressure of public opinion, domestic pro-democratic forces and international 
actors to „do something‟ is likely to remain, while self-interest will continue to hamper donors to give 
in to these pressures. As long as development cooperation is not completely usurped by foreign policy, 
developmental concerns and democracy promotion will continue to conflict. As Hayman observes in 
the context of the recent discussions on budget support and political conditionality: „Far from 
diminishing under the aid paradigm of the 2000s, aid conditionality [...] remains as strong as ever‟ 
(Hayman 2011a: 674). 
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8. Annexes 
 
1. Overview of elections and EU reaction   
Country Election type Year EU-EOM? Other observers Result EU reaction 
Ethiopia Parliamentary 2000 No 
US embassy: generally free 
and fair in most areas, 
irregularities in opposition 
strongholds 
518 of 547 votes for 
EPRDF and affiliated 
parties 
None 
Ethiopia Parliamentary 2005 
Campaigning relatively free, but 
opposition candidates and supporters 
suffered from intimidation, delay and 
lack of transparency in counting and 
publication of results, counting and 
closing process fell short in half of the 
polling bureaus. 
Carter Center: flawed 
counting process, 
postelection violence, delay 
in finalising election 
results, ineffective 
complaints review 
373 of 547 seats for 
EPRDF and affiliated 
Presidency declaration: „the 
EU would refer to the 
comments made by its 
mission […] concerning both 
positive aspects and reported 
irregularities‟ 
Ethiopia Parliamentary 2010 
Electoral board failed to prove 
independence, elections fell short of 
international commitments for 
elections, notably regarding 
transparency of the process and a lack 
of level playing field amongst 
candidates 
AU: elections reflected the 
will of the Ethiopian people 
545 of 547 seats for 
EPRDF and affiliated 
High Representative 
declaration: „important 
moment in the democratic 
process in the country‟ 
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Kenya Presidential  2002 
Example for other countries in the 
region 
Carter Center: example to 
the region and Africa as a 
whole 
62.2% for Kibaki, 
31.3% for Kenyatta 
None 
Kenya Parliamentary 2002 Same as presidential  Same as presidential 
125 of 210 for NARC, 
64 for KANU 
None 
Kenya Referendum 2005 Not observed Not observed 
41.88% 'Yes' votes, 
58.12% 'No' votes 
None 
Kenya Presidential  2007 
Election fell short of international and 
regional standards, notably regarding 
secrecy of vote, 
independence/neutrality of election 
administration, transparency and 
disposal of petitions 
Commonwealth: elections 
credible until polling day, 
but announcement of 
results raised suspicions, 
therefore not in line with 
international standards 
46.42% for Kibaki, 
44.07% for Odinga 
Presidency declaration: „The 
EU calls on Kenya‟s leaders 
to address the concerns about 
the integrity of the election 
process raised by EU 
observers‟ 
Kenya  Parliamentary  2007 Same as presidential Same as presidential 
102 for Orange 
Democratic 
Movement 
(opposition), 78 for 
ruling party coalition 
None 
Kenya Referendum 2010 No EU observer mission No international observers 
68.55% 'Yes' votes, 
31.45% 'No' votes 
High Representative 
declaration: „historic event 
for the country‟, „which 
demonstrates the 
commitment of the 
government to fundamental 
legal and political change‟ 
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Chad Presidential  2001 No EU observer mission 
OAU: voting went without 
major hitches and without 
intimidation 
63.17% for Déby, 
16.35% for Yorongar 
Presidency declaration: „EU 
regrets the many 
shortcomings‟, „is concerned 
about the restriction of 
liberties‟… 
Chad Parliamentary 2002 No EU observer mission No 
113 of 155 for ruling 
MPS 
None 
Chad Referendum 2005 No EU observer mission No 
65.75% 'Yes' votes, 
34.25% 'No' votes 
None 
Chad Presidential  2006 No EU observer mission 
AU and international 
NGOs: 'free and fair', 
despite minor 
organisational problems 
64.67% for Déby, 
15.13% for 
Coumakoye 
(boycotted by main 
opposition parties) 
Declaration Michel: „the 
Commission regrets the 
climate in which the election 
took place, the lack of open 
and peaceful dialogue and 
the opposition‟s call for a 
boycott of the polls‟ 
Chad Parliamentary 2011 
Free and open campaigning, but ruling 
party disposes of material benefits, 
electoral commission mostly 
independent, but lacks capacity 
 
125 of 188 for ruling 
party coalition 
Presidency declaration: 
„welcome the peaceful and 
serene electoral campaign‟, 
„commend the great sense of 
responsibility of the political 
parties‟ 
Chad Presidential  2011 No EU observer mission 
AU observers: elections 
conformed to international 
standards 
83.59% for Déby 
(opposition candidates 
withdrew) 
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Niger Presidential  2004 No EU observer mission 
OIF: participation rate 
raises doubts, incomplete 
distribution of voting cards, 
no massive fraud 
65.53% for Tandja, 
34/47% for Issouffou 
(second round) 
None 
Niger Parliamentary 2004 No EU observer mission OIF: same as presidential 
47 of 113 seats for 
ruling MNSD, 25 for 
PNDS-Taraya, 22 for 
CDS-Rahama 
None 
Niger Referendum 2009 No EU observer mission 
 
92.50% 'Yes' votes, 
7.50% 'No' votes 
Presidency declarations: 
„setback for democracy‟, 
„grave violations of core 
democratic values and the 
principles of the rule of law‟, 
suspension of budget support 
Niger Parliamentary 2009 No EU observer mission 
Observers refused to 
observe the poll 
76 of 113 seats for 
ruling MNSD, 25 
seats for parties allied 
with MNSD, 11 seats 
for independent 
candidates (opposition 
boycott) 
Article 96  
Niger Referendum 2010 No EU observer mission 
 
90.19% 'Yes' votes None 
Niger Presidential  2011 
Only minor irregularities which did 
not have an impact on the result 
AU: few hitches, but did 
not jeopardize vote 
58.04% for Issouffou, 
41.96% for Oumarou 
(second round) 
High Representative 
Declaration: „This election 
marks a milesone in the 
process of transition to 
democracy‟, Resumption of 
aid 
Niger Parliamentary 2011 Same as presidential Same as presidential 
34 of 113 seats for 
PNDS-Taraya, 25 for 
MSND-Nassara, 23 
for MODEN/FA  
Resumption of aid 
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Nigeria Parliamentary 2003 
Elections were not conducted in a 
transparent and credible manner 
NDI: irregularities, but 
impact difficult to assess; 
IRI: inadequate election 
administration, violence-
wracked campaign, 
numerous electoral fraud, 
which did not affect 
electoral outcomes; 
Commonwealth: major 
shortcomings in 
administration, serious 
fraud and intimidation in 
some states 
223 of 360 seats for 
PDP and 96 for ANPP 
in HoPR, 76 of 109 
for PDP and 27 for 
ANPP in Senate 
Presidency declaration: 
„welcomes the fact that the 
[…] elections were 
conducted peacefully‟, 
„acknowledges that President 
Obasanjo has been 
announced president-elect‟, 
„expresses concern about 
serious irregularities‟ 
Nigeria Presidential  2003 
Serious irregularities and fraud, 
international standards not met 
NDI: irregularities, but 
impact difficult to assess; 
IRI: inadequate election 
administration, violence-
wracked campaign, 
numerous electoral fraud, 
but these did not affect 
electoral outcomes; 
Commonwealth: serious 
fraud and intimidation in 
some states 
61.94% for Obasanjo 
(PDP), 32.19% for 
Buhari (ANPP) 
Presidency declaration (see 
above) 
Nigeria Presidential  2007 
Poor organisation, serious fraud and 
intimidation, not transparent, 
irregularities, lack of equal conditions 
for parties, violence, commission not 
independent, results affected.  
NDI: serious irregularities, 
fraud, intimidation; 
Commonwealth: lack of 
transparency, 
organisational deficiencies 
fueled suspicions of fraud; 
IRI: the elections were 
found to be well below 
international standards ; 
ECOWAS: shortcomings, 
logistical failures, 
irregularities 
69.60% for Yar'Adua 
(PDP), 18.66% for 
Buhari (ANPP) 
Presidency declaration : 
 „is disappointed that the 
elections […] did not 
represent a significant 
progress in relation to the 
2003 election‟, „deeply 
concerned that these 
elections were marred by 
irregularities‟ 
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Nigeria Parliamentary 2007 Same as presidential elections 
Same as presidential 
elections  
263 of 360 seats for 
PDP, 63 seats for 
ANPP (HoPR), 87 of 
109 seats for PDP, 14 
seats for ANPP 
(Senate) 
Presidency declaration (see 
above) 
Nigeria Presidential  2011 
Organisation, campaigning and pre-
election environment relatively free 
and fair 
Commonwealth: 
presidential elections were 
credible and creditable and 
reflected the will of the 
Nigerian people 
58.89% for Goodluck 
Jonathan (PDP), 
31.98% for Buhari 
(ANPP) 
High Representative 
Declaration:  
„successful elections‟, 
„significant improvement‟, 
„most credible elections‟, 
„commends the leadership of 
the INEC‟ 
Nigeria Parliamentary 2011 
Same as presidential elections, but 
party interference on election day 
Commonwealth:  elections 
were credible and 
creditable and reflected the 
will of the Nigerian people 
123 of 360 seats for 
PDP, 47 for Action 
Congress for Nigeria 
(ACN), 25 for ANPP, 
30 for Congress for 
Progressive Change 
(HoPR), 45 of 109 
seats for PDP, 13 for 
ACN, 7 for ANPP, 5 
for CPC 
Presidency declaration (see 
above) 
Rwanda Referendum 2003 
No fraud, intimidation, but lack of a 
real campaign, and main opposition 
party was disbanded  
 
93.42% 'Yes', 6.58% 
'No' vote 
None 
Rwanda Presidential  2003 
Uneven competition, not a real 
opposition, intimidation during 
campaigning, campaigns dominated 
by Kagame and ruling party 
NORDEM: voters were 
strongly influenced to vote 
for ruling party, legislation 
on campaigning to tight to 
allow free and open 
campaigning 
95.05% for Kagame 
Presidency declaration: 
„fundamental step in the 
country‟s national 
reconciliation process‟, 
„European Union is obliged 
to point out that the election 
observation mission [found] 
incidents, acts of harassment 
and intimidation, 
disappearances and arrests of 
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[the] opposition‟ 
Rwanda Parliamentary 2003 
Uneven competition, not a real 
opposition, intimidation during 
campaigning, campaigns dominated 
by Kagame and ruling party 
NORDEM: idem 
presidential elections 
40 of 53 seats for 
RPF, 7 for Social 
Democratic Party 
(PSD), 6 for Liberal 
Party (PL) 
Presidency declaration: „the 
European Union has noted 
the comments made by its 
election observer mission in 
its preliminary statement on 
3 October 2003 as regards 
the obstacles to opposition 
activities, the intimidation, 
the threats and the arrests that 
marked the election 
campaign‟  
Rwanda Parliamentary 2008 
No sealing of ballot boxes, omission 
to check voters‟ fingers to prevent 
multiple voting, non-rigorous 
verification of voters, consolidation 
process not transparent, intimidation 
of opposition, shortcomings in 
electoral legislation, etc. 
East African Community: 
free and fair 
42 of 53 seats for 
RPF, 7 for PSD and 4 
for PL  
None 
Rwanda Presidential  2010 No EU observer mission 
Commonwealth: some of 
the key benchmarks for 
democratic elections were 
met, others not; 
campaigning was free, but 
opposition was impeded 
from participating 
93.08% for Kagame 
Presidency declaration: 
„elections constitute a new 
stage in Rwanda‟s 
democratic process‟, „we 
note that some progress 
remains to be made in 
ensuring fundamental 
freedoms‟, „concerned about 
the serious incidents which 
marred the pre-electoral 
period‟ 
Guinea Referendum 2001 No EU observer mission 
 
98.36% 'Yes' vote, 
1,64% 'No' vote 
Presidency Declaration: 
„expresses its concern at the 
possible implications, for the 
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country‟s stability and 
democratic development, of 
the planned referendum in 
Guinea‟ 
Guinea Parliamentary 2002 No EU observer mission No 
85 of 114 seats for 
PUP, 20 seats for 
UPR (boycott main 
opposition party 
RPG) 
None 
Guinea Presidential  2003 No EU observer mission No 
95.25% for Conté 
(boycott main 
opposition parties) 
None 
Guinea Presidential  2010 
People could vote their president 
freely, in an environment marked by 
pluralism in the campaigning period, 
freedom of expression and movement 
of candidats 
Carter Center: conduct of 
elections was broadly 
consistent with country's 
international and regional 
obligations; OIF: despite 
organisational 
shortcomings, Guineans 
have been able to express 
themselves freely on a new 
president 
52.52% for Condé, 
47.48% for Diallo  
High Representative: „crucial 
step in sustaining the 
country‟s democratisation 
process‟, „of paramount 
importance that the 
Independent National 
Election Commission ensures 
transparency […] and 
publishes as soon as possible 
the detailed results‟  
Côte d'Ivoire Referendum 2000 No EU observer mission No 
86.53% 'Yes', 13.47% 
'No' vote  
Presidency declaration: 
„welcomes the fact that the 
citizens of Côte d‟Ivoire 
were able to express their 
views on the future 
Constitution‟ 
Côte d'Ivoire Presidential  2000 Report N/A
58
 OAU: (report N/A) 
59.36% for Gbagbo 
(FPI), 32.72% for 
Guei (RDR & PDCI-
RDA boycott) 
Presidency declaration: „The 
[EU] condemns such 
unacceptable methods‟, 
„deeply regrets the 
dissolution of the National 
Electoral Commission‟ 
                                                     
58
 Most election observers withdrew after the announcement by the Supreme Court that Ouattara was excluded. However, there were already some EU observers in the country at 
that time who were there to assess the security situation.  
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Côte d'Ivoire Parliamentary 2000 Report N/A 
International observers 
withdrawn  
96 of 225 seats for 
FPI, 94 for PDCI-
RDA (RDR boycott) 
Presidency declaration: „it 
[…] regrets the acts of 
violence‟, „considers the fact 
that a section of voters did 
not have the opportunity to 
voice its opinion to be 
detrimental for the return of 
democracy‟ 
Côte d'Ivoire Presidential  2010 
Shortcomings in publication of results, 
which damaged transparence, lack of 
press freedom, two polls were 
positively evaluated but President 
refused to accept his defeat 
Carter Centre: observers 
saw no evidence of 
systematic irregularities 
that would have a 
significant impact on the 
results; OIF: no significant 
irregularities, but 
shortcomings in 
announcement of results, 
security of voters not 
guaranteed 
First round: 38.3% for 
Gbagbo (FPI), 
32.08% for Ouattara 
(RDR) and 25.24% 
for Bédié 
(PDCI/RDA) 
Second round: 
45.90% for Gbagbo 
(FPI), 54.10% for 
Ouattara (RDR) 
Council Conclusions, 
adoption of targeted 
measures 
Côte d‟Ivoire Parliamentary  2011 No EU observer mission  
Carter Center: essential 
step in re-establishing 
constitutional order; OIF: 
low voter turnout, but 
peaceful, ECOWAS: some 
incidents, which do not put 
to doubt credibility, 
UEMOA: calm, discipline 
and order on election day; 
AU: no violence by 
security forces;   
Of 255 seats, 122 for 
RDR, 76 for PDCI-
RDA, 31 for 
independent 
candidates  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
None  
Zimbabwe Referendum 2000 No EU observer mission 
 
45.32% 'Yes' votes, 
54.68% 'No' votes 
Presidency declaration: „the 
referendum […] confirmed 
the commitment of the 
people of Zimbabwe to 
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participate in the political life 
of the country‟ 
Zimbabwe Parliamentary 2000 
ZANU-PF leaders failed to condemn 
pre-election violence, police unwilling 
to intervene in intimidation, counting 
procedures were followed in a proper 
manner 
Commonwealth: political 
violence, often instigated 
by ruling party, media 
coverage in favour of 
ruling party, polling and 
counting free and fair; 
OAU: scattered incidents 
of attempts to intimidate 
voters; NDI/IRI observers 
did not manage to received 
accreditation 
62 of 120 seats for 
ZANU-PF, 57 seats 
for MDC  
Presidency declaration: 
„welcomes the outcome‟, 
„voting was calm and well-
organised, inspite of the high 
levels of violence, 
intimidation and coercion 
that marred the election 
campaign‟ 
Zimbabwe Presidential  2002 No EU observer mission 
Commonwealth: while the 
actual polling and counting 
process was peaceful and 
secrecy of voting was 
assured, the election was 
marred by politically 
motivated violence and 
intimidation, which was not 
always halted by the 
security forces 
56.2% for Mugabe 
(ZANU-PF), 42.0% 
for Tsvangirai (MDC) 
Suspension of development 
aid under Article 96 of the 
Cotonou Agreement, targeted 
sanctions, weapons embargo 
Zimbabwe Parliamentary 2005 No EU observer mission 
SADC: poll was peaceful, 
transparent, credible and 
well managed 
78 of 120 seats for 
ZANU-PF, 41 seats 
for MDC (HoPR), 43 
of 50 seats for 
ZANU-PF, 7 for 
MDC (Senate) 
Presidency declaration: 
„concerned by a number of 
serious shortcomings found 
in the Zimbabwean electoral 
system‟, „reservations about 
the environment in which the 
voting took place‟ 
361 
 
Zimbabwe Presidential  2008 No EU observer mission 
SADC: period preceding 
run-off was marred by 
political violence, 
opposition campaigning 
was disrupted; Pan African 
Parliament: basic 
conditions of credible 
elections were reflected, 
but results were delayed 
47.87% for Mugabe 
(ZANU-PF) and 
43.24% for Tsvangirai 
in first round, 90.22% 
for Mugabe and 
9.78% in second 
round after MDC 
boycott 
Council conclusions: 
„strongly condemns the state-
sponsored campaign of 
violence and intimidation‟, 
„calls for an immediate end 
to the beatings, tortures, 
killings and other human 
rights abuses‟, Extension of 
sanctions 
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2. Overview of violations of civil-political rights   
Country Year What happened? EU reaction?  
Eritrea sep/01 
Imprisonment of eleven dissidents, closure of 
independent newspapers and arrest of ten 
journalists 
Démarche, 
declaration, 
postponing new 
CSP 
Eritrea nov/04 
Arrest and torture of thousands of people 
suspected of evading military service None 
Eritrea apr-may/05 Arrest three trade union leaders None 
Ethiopia apr/01 
Two students killed, thousands of students and 
more than hundred opposition members arrested 
in and after manifestations against academic 
freedom and police brutality None 
Ethiopia may/01 Arrest two leading human rights defenders None 
Ethiopia apr/02 
Students arrested and shot dead by security forces 
in antigovernment protests  None 
Ethiopia apr/02 
Arrest and sentencing of two journalists for 
writing articles criticising the government None 
Ethiopia may/02 
About 25 people killed after police opened fire at 
peaceful demonstration None 
Ethiopia jun/02 
Hundreds of school students arrested after 
peaceful demonstration None 
Ethiopia nov/03 
Ban on Ethiopian Free Press Journalists 
Association (EFJA) None 
Ethiopia jan-feb/04 
Dozens of students and teachers detained after 
peaceful demonstration  None 
Ethiopia jun/05 
Ban on public demonstrations, arrest of 
thousands of people after anti-government 
manifestation, leading to 36 deaths, arrest of 
human rights defenders  Mediation efforts 
Ethiopia sep/05 Arrest of hundreds of opposition party officials None 
Ethiopia nov-dec/05 
Arrests of 30,000 to 40,000 opposition 
supporters, at least 17 journalists, opposition 
activists, firing live ammunition on opposition 
demonstration leading to 193 deaths 
Suspension of 
budget support 
Ethiopia aug/06 
Detention of over 250 civilians in peaceful 
demonstration None 
Ethiopia sep/06 
Arrest of four members teacher's trade union 
(ETA) None 
Ethiopia 
dec/06-
Jan/07 
Detention of 60 officials or alleged supporters of 
opposition None 
Ethiopia jan/07 
Arrest and sentencing of three journalists on old 
charges None 
Ethiopia sep/07 
Arrest of eight human rights defenders, students, 
teachers, on suspicion of links with rebel group None 
Ethiopia jan/09 Adoption restrictive legislation on civil society Declaration  
Ethiopia aug/09 
Arrest two editors on the basis of obsolete press 
law, for articles critical of the government None 
Ethiopia dec/09 Closure of independent newspaper Declaration  
363 
 
Ethiopia jun/11 
Unlawful arrest two journalists and two 
opposition party members on the basis of anti-
terrorism legislation None 
Chad apr-jun/01  
Ban on public demonstrations, ban on 
programmes of political nature for non-state 
radio, violent dispersion of opposition 
demonstrations, arrests of 6 opposition members 
and 30 activists and trade unionists None 
Chad feb/02 
Suspension of radio station FM Liberté for 
broadcasting information likely to disrupt public 
order None 
Chad apr/02 
Ban on political programming in the context of 
2002 legislative elections None 
Chad feb/03 
Two reporters convicted for publishing article 
critical of President's mother-in-law, three month 
closure of leading independent newspaper  None 
Chad jun-aug/05 
Arrest four journalists of private newspaper after 
criticism about referendum None 
Chad sep-oct/05 Arrest three independent journalists  None 
Chad apr-may/06 
Arbitrary arrest thirteen high-ranking army 
officers after coup attempt, assault and attack on 
journalist, arrest of radio director None 
Chad nov/06 Censorship on private media for six months None 
Chad jan/07 Arbitrary arrest human rights defender None 
Chad nov/07 
Arbitrary arrest seven members of former armed 
opposition movement  None 
Chad  
dec/07-
mar/08 
Arrest of four opposition members, closure of 
radio station, arrest and intimidation of five 
journalists, increasing penalties for false news, 
defamation and insulting the president, killings of 
three people from the same ethnic group as the 
armed opposition None 
Kenya mar/00 
Arrest eleven human rights activists for 
performing theatre for school children None 
Kenya jun/00 
Two journalists arrested over coverage of police 
rape None 
Kenya aug/00 
Violent dispersion of pro-democracy rally, 
leaving one death and many others injured None 
Kenya sep/00 
Harassment human rights activists after helping 
to bring charges against Minister None 
Kenya feb/01 Arrest eleven human rights activists  None 
Kenya oct/01 Arrest 71 members of human rights groups None 
Kenya nov/05 
Allegedly politically movitated suspension of 
private radio station None 
Kenya feb/06 
Raid on two tabloids after article critical of 
president; detention of three journalists over 
article on president; raid on newspaper and 
television station None 
Kenya 
dec/07-
jan/08 
Dozens of people killed - many by police bullets 
- in protests against alleged fraud in elections 
Threat Article 96 
consultations and 
sanctions 
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Niger oct/00 
Arrest three journalists after publishing on border 
dispute None 
Niger may-jun/02 
Arrest of three journalists for criticising 
government, arrest human rights activist None 
Niger aug/02 
Presidential decree restricting the media, arrest of 
two journalists None 
Niger sep-nov/03 
Arrest of two journalists after article criticising 
government None 
Niger mar/05 
Arrest of five members of civil society 
organisations after widespread protests, raids on 
independent media, closure of independent radio 
station None 
Niger jul/06 
Ban on independent weekly after criticizing 
president None 
Niger sep/06 
Arrests of three journalists after criticizing 
government None 
Niger jul-oct/07 
Arbitrary arrest of dozens of civilians, suspension 
of newspaper Air Info, ban on live broadcasts on 
Touareg rebellion, arrest of journalists after 
publishing about rebellion None 
Niger dec/07 
Arrest of dozens of civilians as a represaille to 
attack Touareg rebels None 
Niger aug/08 
Suspension of private broadcaster which had 
given a lot of airtime to arrested Prime Minister None 
Niger aug-sep/09 
Ban on public demonstrations, arrests of 
opposition members (including main opposition 
leaders Issouffou and Amadou), human rights 
defenders and three journalists Article 96 
Nigeria apr/00 State crackdown on independent newspaper None 
Nigeria dec/02 Intimidation of two human rights activists None 
Nigeria jan/03 Arrest of leader civil society organisation None 
Nigeria jul/03 
Four people shot dead in clashes between 
security forces and civilians in peaceful 
demonstration None 
Nigeria apr/04 
Arrest opposition leader who planned anti-
government protests None 
Nigeria sep/04 
Arrest of three staff members and editor 
independent magazine as well as raid on its 
offices,  after publishing stories critical of the 
government None 
Nigeria aug/05 
Arrest of two human rights defenders in their 
campaign to bring Charles Taylor to justice  None 
Nigeria jun/06 
Arrest presenter television station and journalist 
after criticism about President none 
Nigeria jun/06 
Government dismisses head human rights 
commission None 
Nigeria aug/06 
Arrest two journalists after criticizing state 
governor None 
Nigeria sep/08 
Suspension of television station and arrest of staff 
members after false reporting about president None 
Nigeria oct/09 
Security forces use violence against 
demonstrators None 
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Nigeria apr/10 Police violence against human rights activists None 
Nigeria may/10 
Adoption prevention of terrorism law, 
incompatible with HR obligations None 
Nigeria 
aug/10 Human rights defender and father of human 
rights defender attacked by police None 
Rwanda may/01 
Ban on opposition party and arrest opposition 
leader Bizimungu None 
Rwanda jun/02 
Arrest 20 people allegedly linked to banned 
opposition party None 
Rwanda apr/03 
Largest opposition party MDR banned by 
parliament, disappearance three former military 
officers and prominent members of civil society None 
Rwanda may/03 
Arrest members non-violent political youth group 
Itara  None 
Rwanda sep/03 Arrest eight opposition supporters None 
Rwanda nov/03 Arrest six journalists independent newspaper None 
Rwanda jun/04 Sentencing Bizimungu and seven codefendants Declaration  
Rwanda jul/04 
Parliamentary report accuses independent media 
and civil society of divisionism Declaration  
Rwanda nov/04 Arrest two journalists independent newspapers  None 
Rwanda jan/05 Ban on leading human rights organisation None 
Rwanda feb/07 
Intimidation independent press, arrest professor 
on charges of divisionism None 
Rwanda jun/07 Ban on new independent weekly  None 
Rwanda sep/08 
Independent journalists threatened for criticizing 
the government None 
Rwanda feb-aug/10 
Arrests of opposition and suspension independent 
newspapers, murder of opposition politician and 
journalist during election campaign None 
Rwanda oct/10 Arrest two opposition leaders  Declaration 
Guinea sep/00 
Conviction opposition leader Condé and 47 other 
prisoners of conscience None 
Guinea oct-nov/01 
Arrest and beatings of demonstrators, arrest of 
opposition leaders in run-up to constitutional 
referendum None 
Guinea dec/01 
Security forces fire live ammunition on 
protesting students, three killed None 
Guinea jun/06 
Crackdown of security forces on public 
demonstration, killing over 13 protestors and 
injuring many more  Declaration 
Guinea jan/feb 2007 
Crackdown of security forces on public 
demonstrations, killing over 130 protestors, arrest 
two staff members of private radio station  Declaration  
Guinea sep-nov/08 
Frequent break-up of anti-government protests by 
security forces None 
Guinea jul/09 Twelve soldiers detained without charge None 
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Guinea sep/09 
Security forces opened fire on opposition 
manifestation, killing over 160 people  
Council 
Conclusions; CFSP 
sanctions 
Guinea oct/10 
Security forces use excessive violence in election 
protests, killing one person, leaving about 60 
injured and 100 detained None 
Côte 
d'Ivoire apr/00 
Kidnapping and torture of reporter private 
newspaper to reveal sources None 
Côte 
d'Ivoire sep/00 
Soldiers arrested and tortured after attack on 
private residence Robert Guei None 
Côte 
d'Ivoire oct/00 
Government responsible for political violence in 
elections Declaration  
Côte 
d'Ivoire feb/01 Intimidation of private newspaper None 
Côte 
d'Ivoire oct/03 RFI journalist shot dead by police Declaration 
Côte 
d'Ivoire mar/04 
Security forces open fire on opposition march, 
leading to death of 120 civilians 
Declaration, COM 
proposal for opening 
Article 96 
consultations but 
refused 
Côte 
d'Ivoire feb/07 
Four journalists charged for writing articles 
critical about Gbagbo None 
Côte 
d'Ivoire mar/09 
Journalist jailed for writing column critical of the 
government None 
Côte 
d'Ivoire jul/10 
Arrest three journalists who refused to reveal 
sources None 
Côte 
d'Ivoire 
dec10-
mar/11 
Post-election violence by security forces and 
militia loyal to president, leading to hundreds of 
deaths 
Declarations, CFSP 
sanctions 
Côte 
d‟Ivoire Jun/11 
Arrest dozens of Gbagbo supporters without 
charge None 
Zimbabwe apr/00 Violence against peaceful demonstrators None 
Zimbabwe jun-sep/00 
Intimidation opposition and journalists in the run-
up to elections, including abduction opposition 
supporter Declaration 
Zimbabwe jun/00 Three journalists fined for defamation None 
Zimbabwe jan/01 Bombing of independent newspaper Daily News Declaration 
Zimbabwe apr/01 Defamation charges against three journalists None 
Zimbabwe jul/01 
Attack against opposition supporters in the 
context of parliamentary by-elections None 
Zimbabwe aug/01 Arrest seven journalists independent newspaper None 
Zimbabwe jan/02 
Prosecution of two opposition members of 
parliament and their employees after unfair trial 
relating controversial case 
Council 
consultations Article 
96, CFSP sanctions 
Zimbabwe feb/02 
Arrest of three opposition members of parliament 
and 33 MDC supporters 
Council 
consultations Article 
96, CFSP sanctions 
Zimbabwe feb-mar/02 
Introduction of legislation restricting press 
freedom, freedom of opposition, freedom of 
association 
Council 
consultations Article 
96, CFSP sanctions 
Zimbabwe mar/02 Jailing journalists after criticising government None 
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Zimbabwe may/02 
Harassment and assault of oppositon supporters 
by members of ruling party and security forces; 
arrest four journalists on the basis on new media 
law None 
Zimbabwe jul-aug/02 
Arrest of opposition members and human rights 
activists in the context of september 2002 local 
elections None 
Zimbabwe nov/02 
Publication list of human rights organisations 
'threatening security' None 
Zimbabwe dec/02 Arrest 10 trade union leaders Declaration  
Zimbabwe feb/03 
Arrests of seven MDC MPs and several other 
MDC officials and supporters, torture of MDC 
MP, human rights lawyer and three members of 
civil human rights organisation Declaration 
Zimbabwe mar/03 
Arrests of approximately 400 opposition 
supporters after protest actions Declaration 
Zimbabwe jun/03 
Arrest of two independent journalists by ZANU-
PF supporters None 
Zimbabwe sep/03 Closure of independent newspaper Daily News 
Declaration, Council 
conclusions 
February 2004 
Zimbabwe oct-nov/03 
Arrest of protestors at two peaceful 
demonstrations  Declaration  
Zimbabwe jan/04 Arrest four journalists for defamation None 
Zimbabwe feb/04 Violent clampdown on peaceful demonstration Declaration  
Zimbabwe apr/04 
Breakup of demonstration civil society 
association, arrest youth activist None 
Zimbabwe apr/04 
Violence against opposition in the context of 
Zengheza by-elections Declaration  
Zimbabwe may/04 Arrest two journalists independent weekly None 
Zimbabwe jun/04 Closure of independent newspaper Tribune Declaration  
Zimbabwe dec/04 Anti-NGO bill Declaration 
Zimbabwe jan/05 Approval new repressive media law None 
Zimbabwe feb/05 Closure of new independent weekly None 
Zimbabwe mar/05 
Arrests and violence against opposition, 
journalists and human rights defenders in context 
of parliamentary elections Declaration  
Zimbabwe nov/05 
Murder of human rights activist by paramilitary 
group Declaration 
Zimbabwe dec/05 
Arrest three staff members independent news 
production company None 
Zimbabwe jan-feb/06 Arrest former journalists independent newspaper None 
Zimbabwe sep/06 
Arrest of two trade union leaders and people 
planning to participate in demonstration Declaration  
Zimbabwe mar/07 
Two journalists beaten and detained for 48h by 
police None 
Zimbabwe mar/07 
Arrest of 50 activists and MDC members at 
demonstration 
Visits to detainees in 
prison, Council 
conclusions, 
sanctions extended 
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Zimbabwe apr-may/07  
Several journalists jailed and beaten by police 
forces None 
Zimbabwe may/07 
Police violently stops demonstration by civil 
society organisation None 
Zimbabwe jan-jun/08 
State-sponsored violence against opposition 
supporters and candidates in context of elections, 
harassment local election observers, journalists, 
trade union leaders tortured, arrest human rights 
activists, over 300 people killed, 11,000 severely 
injured 
Council 
conclusions, 
declaration, 
sanctions extended 
Zimbabwe oct-dec/08 
Violence against opposition, arrest of at least 40 
women's rights activists, a human rights activist 
and trade union leaders 
Council 
conclusions, 
sanctions extended 
Zimbabwe feb/09 
Arrest and detention of MDC politician Roy 
Bennett None 
Zimbabwe apr/09 Arrest two MDC officials None 
Zimbabwe aug/09 Arrest and detention of four student leaders None 
Zimbabwe oct/09 Continued violence against the opposition Declaration 
Zimbabwe nov/09 Arrest of five trade union members Declaration 
Zimbabwe feb/10 Police raid on trade union leader None 
Zimbabwe apr/10 
Arrest four members of women's rights 
organisation None 
Zimbabwe jun/10 Arrest four human rights defenders None 
Zimbabwe feb/11 
Over 60 human rights activists arrested after 
attending lecture on Arab revolution None 
Zimbabwe apr/11 
Director human rights NGO convicted for 
leading illegal organisation None 
Source: Amnesty International, Committee to Protect Journalists, Official databases Council, Bulletin 
European Union, Answers to parliamentary questions 
 
 
